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READ AND DISTRIBUTE. 



REPORT 



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 



UPON THE 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 



ITS CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND, 



FROM JULY 26, 1861, TO NOVEMBER 7, 1862. 



Eeprhtted entiee from the Copt transmitted by the Secuetart of War to the House of 

Represkntatives. 



BOSTON: 

PUBLISHED AT THE OFFICE OF THE BOSTON COURIER. 

1864. 



^ ■']'{() 



7 



In the Senatk of the Uxited States, .7rt7nw7-?/ 20, 1SC4. 
Resolved, That five tliousanci copies of the Report of General George B. MeClelhin upon the operations of th. 
Army of the Potomac, recently communicated by the Secretary of War to the House of Representatives, be prints 
for the use of the Senate, without the accompanying documents and maps. 



Stereotyped and Printed by 

i. E. Fakwell and Compaht, 

87 Confess Street, Boston. 



LETTER 



THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 



TRANSMITTING THE KEPOET OF 



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN 

Upon the Organization of the Army of the Potomac, and its Campaigns in Virginia and 
Maryland, from July 26, 1861, to November 7, 1862. 



December 23, 1863. — Laid on the table and ordered to be printed. 



War Department, 1 

Washington City, D. C, December 22, 1863. j 

Sir: — 

In compliance with the resolution dated December 15, 1863, I have the 
honor to communicate herewith " the Report made by Major-General George 
B. McCIellan, concerning the organization and operations of the army of the 
Potomac, while under his command, and of all army operations while he was 
commander-in-chief. " 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

EDWIN M. STANTON, 

Secretary of War, 
Hon. Schuyler Colfax, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 



EEPORT. 



FIRST PERIOD 



niAPTER I. 

New York, August 4, 1863. 
Sir : I have the honor to submit herein the 
official report of the operations of the army of 
the Potomac wliilo under my charge. Accom- 
panying it are the reports of the corps, division, 
and subordinate commanders, pertaining to the 
various engagements, battles, and occurrences 
of the campaigns, and important documents 
connected willi its organization, sujjply, and 
movements. These, with lists of maps and 
memoranda siibmitted, will ])e found duly ap- 
pended, duly arranged, and marked for conven- 
iiiit reference. 

Charged, in the spring of ISOl, with the oper- 
ations in the Department of the Ohio, which 
included the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, 
and latterly Western Virginia, it had become 
my duty to counteract the hostile designs of the 
enemy in Western Virginia, which were imme- 
diately directed to the destruction of the Balti- 
more and Ohio railroad, and the possession of 
the Kanawha valley, with the ultimate object of 
gaining Wheeling and the control of the Ohio 
river. 

The successful affairs of Phillippi, Rich Moun- 
tain, Carrick's Ford, &c., had been fought, and 
I had acquired possession of all Western Vir- 
ginia north of the Kanawha valley, as well as 
of the lower portion of that valley. 

I had determined to proceed to the relief of 
the upper Kanawha valley, as soon as provision 
was made for the permanent defence of the 
mountain passes leading from the east into the 
region under control, when I received at Bever- 
ly, in Randolph county, on the 21st of July, 
1801, intelligence of the unfortunate result of 
the battle of Manassas, fought on that day. 

On the 22d I received an order by telegraph, 
directing me to turn over my command to Brig- 
adier General Rosecrans, and repair at once to 
Washington. 

I had already caused reconnoissances to be 
made for intrenchments at the Cheat Mountain 
pass : also on the Hunterville road, near Elk- 



water, and at Red House, near the main road 
from Romney to Graft(m. During the afternoon 
and night of the 22d I gave the final instructions 
for the construction of these works, turned over 
the command to Brigadier General Rosecrans, 
and started, on the morning of the 23d, for 
Washington, arriving there on the afternoon of 
the 2Gth. On the 27th I assumed command of 
the division of the Potomac, comprising the 
troops in and around Washington, on both banks 
of the river. 

With this brief statement of the events which 
immediately preceding my being called to the 
command of the troops at Washington, I pro- 
ceed to an account, from such authentic data as 
are at hand, of my military operations while 
commander of the army of the Potomac. 

The subjects to be considered naturally ar- 
range themsels-es as follows : — 

The organization of the army of the Potomac. 
The military events connected with the defences 
of Washington, from July, 1801, to March, 1802. 
I'he campaign on the Peninsula, and that in 
Maryland. 

The great resources and capacity for powerful 
resistance of the South at the breaking out of 
the Rebellion, and the full proportions of the 
great conflict about to take place, were sought 
to be carefully measured ; and I had also en- 
deavored, by every means in my power, to im- 
press upon the authorities the necessity for such 
immediate and full preparation as alone would 
enable the Government to prosecute the war on 
a scale commensurate with the resistance to be 
offered. 

On the fourth of August, 1801, I addressed to 
the President the following memorandum, pre- 
pared at his request. 

MEMORANDUM. 

The object of the present war differs from 
those in which nations are engaged, mainly in 
this : that the purj)ose of ordinary war is to con- 
quer a peace, and make a treaty on advantageous 
terms ; in this contest it has become necessary to 
crush a population suffiiicntly numerous, intel- 



ligent and warlike to constitute a nation. "We 
have not only to defeat their armed and organ- 
ized forces in the field, but to display such an 
overwhelming strength as will convince all our 
antagonists, especially those of the governing, 
aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of 
resistance. Our late reverses make this course 
imperative. Had we been successful in tiie re- 
cent battle (Manassas), it is possible that we 
might have been spared the labor and expenses 
of a great effort. 

Now we have no alternative. Their success 
will enable the political leaders of the Rebels to 
convince the mass of their people that we are 
inferior to them in force and courage, and to 
command all their resources. The contest began 
with a class, now it is with a people, — our mili- 
tary success can alone restore the former issue. 
I3y thoroughly defeating their armies, taking 
their strong places, and pursuing a rigidly pro- 
tective policy as to private property and un- 
armed persons, and alenient course as to private 
soldiers, we may well hope for a permanent res- 
toration of a peaceful Union. But in the first 
instance the authority of the Government nuist 
be supported by overwhelming physical force. 

Our foreign relations and financial credit also 
imperatively demand that the military action of 
the Government should be prompt and irresist- 
ible. 

The Rebels have chosen Virginia as their bat- 
tle-field, and it seems projier for us to make the 
first great struggle there. But while thus direct- 
ing our main etibrts, it is necessary to diminish 
the resistance there offered us, by movements 
on other jjoints both by land and water. 

Without entering at present into details, I 
would advise that a strong movement be made 
on the Mississippi, and that the Rebels be driven 
out of Missouri. 

As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that 
Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would 
advise a movement through that State into East- 
ern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the 
Union men of that region, and of seizing the 
railroads leading from Memphis to the east. 

The possession of those roads by us, in con- 
nection with the movement on the Mississippi, 
would go far towards determining tlie evacuation 
of Virginia by the Rebels. In the mean time all 
the passes into Western Virginia from the east 
should be securely guarded, but I would advise 
no movement from that quarter towards Rich- 
mond, unless the political condition of Kentucky 
renders it impossible or inexpedient for us to 
make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee 
through that State. Every effort should, how- 
ever, be made to organize, equip and arm as 
many troops as possible in Western Virginia, in 
order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments 
available for other operations. 

At as early a day as practicable, it would be 
well to protect and reopen the Baltimore and 
Ohio railroad. Baltimore and Fort Monroe 
should be occupied by garrisons sufficient to re- 
tain them in our possession. 

The importance of Harper's Ferry and the 
line of the Potomac in tlie direction of Lees- 
burg will be very materially diminished so soon 
as our force in this vicinity becomes organized, 
Btrong, and efficient, because no capable general 



will cross the river north of this city, when we 
have a strong army here ready to cut off his re- 
treat. 

To revert to the West. It is probable that no 
very large additions to the troops now in Mis- 
souri will be necessary to secure that State. 

I presume that the force required for the 
movement down the Mississippi will be deter- 
mined by its commander and the President. If 
Kentucky assumes the right position, not more 
than 20,000 will be needed, together with those 
that can be raised in that State and Eastern Ten- 
nessee, to secure the latter region and its rail- 
roads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville. 

The Western Virginia troops, with not UKire 
than five to ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana, 
siiould, under proper management, sufiice for its 
protection. 

When we have reorganized our main army 
here, 10.000 men ought to be enough to protect 
the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Pdto- 
mac, 5.000 will garrison Baltimore, ;l,000 Fort 
Monroe, and not more than 20.000 will be neces- 
sary at the utmost for the defence of Washing- 
ton. 

For the main army of operations I urge the 
following composition : — 

250 regiments of infantrj', say 22.'>,000 men. 

100 field buttcTios, 000 gnus l.'i.OOO '' 

28 regiments of cavalry 25,500 " 

5 regiments engineer troops 7,500 " 

Total 273,000 " 

The force must be supplied with the necessary 
engineer and pontoon trains, and with transpor- 
tation for everything save tents. Its general 
line of operations should be so directed that 
water transportation can be availed of from 
point to point, by means of the ocean and tli.' 
rivers emjjtying into it. An essential feature of 
the plan of operations will be the emi)Ioyment 
of a strong naval force to protect the movement 
of a lleet of transports intended to convey a 
considerable body of troops from point to point of 
the enemy's sea-coast, thus either creating diver- 
sions and rendering it necessary for them to detach 
largely from their main body in order to protect 
such of their cities as may be thrcati-ned, or else 
landing and forming estahlisliments on their 
coast at any favorable places that opportunity 
might offer. This naval force should also co- 
operate with the main army in its eftbrts to seize 
the imiiortant seaboard towns of the Rebels. 

It cannot be ignored that the construction of 
railroads has introduced a new and very impor- 
tant element into war, by the great facilities thusi 
given for concentrating at particular positions 
large masses of troops from remote sections, and 
by creating new strategic points and lines of 
operations. 

It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the 
partial operations suggested, and such others as 
the particular case may require. We must en- 
deavor to seize places on the railways in the rear 
of the enemy's points of concentration, and we 
must threaten their seaboard cities, in order that 
each State may be forced, by the necessity of its 
own defence, to diminish its contingent to the 
confederate army. 

The proposed movement down the Slississippi 
will produce important results in this connection. 



That advance and the progress of the main army 
at the east will materially assist each other by 
diminishing the resistance to be encountered by 
each. 

The tendency of the Mississippi movement 
upon all questions connected with cotton is too 
well understood by the President and cabinet to 
need any illustration from me. 

There is another independent movement that 
has often been suggested and which has always 
recommended itself to my judgment. I refer to 
a movement from Kansas and Nebraska through 
the Indian territory upon Red River and western 
Texas for the purpose of protecting and devel- 
oping the latent Union and free-State sentiment 
well known to predominate in western Texas, 
and which, like a similar sentiment in AVestern 
Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize 
that section into a free State. How far it will be 
possible to support this movement by an advance 
throtigh New Mexico from California, is a matter 
which I have not sufficiently examined to be able 
to express a decided opinion. If at all practic- 
able, it is eminently desirable, as bringing into 
play the resources and warlike qualities of the 
Pacific States, as well as identifying them with 
our cause and connecting tlie bond of Union 
between them and the General Government. 

If it is not departing too far from my pro- 
vince, I will venture to suggest the policy of an 
ultimate alliance and cordial understanding with 
Mexico ; their sympathies and interests are with 
us, — their antipathies exclusively against our 
enemies and their institutions. I think it would 
not be difficult to obtain from the Mexican gov- 
ernment the right to use it at least during the 
present contest, the road from Guaymas to New 
Mexico ; this concession would very materially 
reduce the obstacles of the column moving from 
the Pacific; a similar permission to use their 
territory for the passage of troops between the 
Panuco and tlie Rio Grande, would enable us to 
throw a column of troops by a good road from 
Tampico, or some of the small harbors north of 
it, upon and across the Rio Grande, without risk 
and scarcely firing a shot. 

To what extent, if any, it woidd be desirable 
to take into service and employ Mexican sol- 
diers, is a question entirely political, on which 
I do not venture to ofler an opinion. 

The force I have recommended is large ; the 
expense is great. It is possible that a smaller 
force might accomplish the object in view, but 
I understand it to be the purpose of tliis great 
nation to reestablish the power of its govern- 
ment and restore jteace to its citizens, in the 
shortest possible time. 

The question to be decided is simply this : 
shall we crush the Rebellion at one blow, termi- 
nate the war in one campaign, or shall we leave 
it as a legacy for our descendants ? 

When the extent of the possible line of oper- 
ations is considered, the force asked for for .tlie 
main army under my command cannot be re- 
garded as unduly large ; every mile we advance 
carries us further from our base of operations 
and renders detachments necessary to cover our 
communication, while the enemy will be con- 
stantly concentrating as he falls back. I propose, 
with the force which I have requested, not only 
to drive the enemy out of Virgina and occupy 



Richmond, hut to occupy Charleston, Savannati, 
Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile and New Or- 
leans ; in other words to move into the heart 
of the enemy's country, and crush the Rebellion 
in its very heart. 

By seizing and repairing the railroads as wo 
advance, the difficulties of transportation will 
be materially diminished. It is perhaps unneces- 
sary to state that, in addition to tlie forces named 
in this memorandum, strong reserves should be 
formed, ready to supply any losses that may 
occur. 

In conclusion, I would submit that the exi- 
gencies of the treasury may be lessened by 
making only partial payments to our troops, 
when in the enemy's country, and by giving the 
obligations of the United States for such 'sup- 
plies as may there be obtained. 

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

Major- General. 

I do not think the events of the war hare 
proved these views upon the method and plans 
of its conduct altogether incorrect. They cer- 
tainly have not proved my estimate of the num- 
ber of troops and scope of operations too large. 
It is probable that I did undcr-estimate the time 
necesary for the completion of arms and equip- 
ments. It was not strange, however, that by 
many civilians intrusted with authority there 
should have been an exactly opposite opinion 
held on both these particulars. 

The result of the first battle of Manassas had 
been almost to destroy the morale and organiza- 
tion of our army, and to alarm Government and 
people. Tlie national capital was in danger ; it 
was necessary, besides holding the enemy in 
check, to build works for its defence, strong and 
capable of being held by a small force. 

It was necessary also to create a new army for 
active operations and to expedite its organiza- 
tion, equipment, and the accumulation of the ma- 
terial of war, and to this not inconsiderable la- 
bor all my energies for the next three months 
were constantly devoted. 

Time is a necessary element in the creation of 
armies, and I do not, therefore, think it neces- 
sary to more than mention the impatience with 
which many regarded tlie delay in the arrival of 
new levies, though recruited and pressed forward 
with unexampled rapidity, the manufacture and 
sufjply of arms and cqui])ments, or the vehe- 
mence with which an immediate advance upon the 
enemy's wcjrks directly in our front was urged by 
a patriotic but sanguine people. 

The President, too, was anxious for the speedy 
employment of our army, and, although pos-, 
sessed of my plans through frequent conferences, 
de.-ired a paper from me upon the condition of 
the forces under my command, and the imme- 
diate measures to be taken to increase their 
efficiency. Accordingly, in the latter part of 
October, I addressed the following letter to the 
Secretary of War. 

SiK : In conformity with a personal under- 
standing with the President yesterday, I have the 
honor to submit the following statement of the 
condition of the army under my command, and 
the means required for the preservation of the 
Government and the suppresbion of the Rebellion. 



It will be remembered that, in a memorial I 
had the honor to address to the President soon 
after my arrival in Wasliington, and in my com- 
munication addressed to Licutenant-General 
Scott, under date of 8th of August, in my let- 
ter to the President, authorizing him, at liis re- 
quest, to withdraw tlie letter written by me to 
General Scott; and in my letter of the 8th of 
September, answering your note of inquiry of 
that date, my views on the same subject are frank- 
ly and fully expressed. 

In these several communications I have stated 
tlie force I regarded as necessary to enable this 
army to advance with a reasonable certainty of 
success, at the same time leaving tlie capital 
and the line of the Potomac sufficiently guarded, 
not only to secure the retreat of the main army, 
in tlie event of disaster, hut to render it out of 
the enemy's power to attempt a diversion in 
Maryland. 

So much time lias passed, and the winter is ap- 
proaching so rapidly, that but two courses are 
left to the Guvernment, viz: either to go into 
winter quarters, or to assume the offensive with 
forces greatly inferior in number to the army I 
regarded as desirable and necessary. If politi- 
cal considerations render the first course unad- 
visable, the second alone remains. Wliile I 
regret that it has not been deemed expedient, or 
perhaps possible, to concentrate tlie forces of 
the nation in tliis vicinity, (remaining on the de- 
fensive elsewhere,) keeping the attention and 
efforts of the Government fixed upon this as 
the vital point, where the issue of the great 
contest is to be decided, it may still he that, by 
introducing unity of action and design among 
the various armies of the land, by determining 
the courses to be pursued by the various com- 
manders under one general plan, transferring 
from the other armies the superfluous strength 
not required for the purpose in view, and thus 
reinforcing the main army, whose destiny it is 
to decide the controversy, we may yet be able 
to move with a reasonable prospect of success 
before the winter is fairly upon us. 

The nation feels, and I share tliat feeling, tliat 
the army of the Potomac holds the fate of the 
country in its hands. 

The stake is so vast, the issue so momentous, 
and the effect of the next battle will be so in)i)or- 
tant throughout the future, as well as the present, 
tliat I continue to urge, as I ever have done since 
I entered upon the command of this army, upon 
the Government to devote its energies and its 
available resources towards increasing the num- 
bers and efficiency of the army on which its sal- 
vation depends. 

A statement carefully prepared by the chiefs of 
engineers and artillery of this army, gives us the 
necessary garrison of this city and its fortifica- 
tions, 33,70.5 men,— say 35,000. 

The present garrison of Baltimore and its de- 
pendencies is about 10,000. I have sent the chief 
of my staff to make a careful examin ition into the 
condition of these troops, and to obtain the infor- 
mation requisite to enable me to decide whether 
this number can be diminished, or the reverse. 

At least 5,000 men will be required to watch 
the river hence to' Harper's Ferry and its vicin- 
ity; probably 8,000 to guard the lower Poto- 
mac. • 



As you arc aware, ,all the information we have 
from spies, prisoners, &c., agrees in showing tliat 
the enemy have a force on the Potomac not les:^ 
than 150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, 
ably commanded and strongly intrenched. It is 
plain, therefore, that to insure success, or to ren- 
der it reasonably certain, the active army should 
not number less than 150,000 efficient troops, with 
400 guns, unless some material change occurs in 
the force in front of us. 

The requisite force for an advance movement 
by the army of the Potomac may be thus esti- 
mated : — 

Column of active oper.ations 150,000 men, 400 guns. 

(iarrison of city of Washi,K,'ton.. .'JojOOO " 40 " 

To guard the rotoraac to Har- 

pi>r'ii.Forry 5,000 " 12 " 

To guard tlic lower Totoiuac fci,000 " ','4 " 

Garrison for Baltimore and An- 
napolis 10,000 " 12 " 

Total effective force required. . 205,000 men, 488 guns, 

or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 
210,000 men, should the losses by sickness, &e., 
not rise to a higher percentage than at ])resent. 

Having stated what I regard as the requisite 
force to enable this army to advance, I now pro- 
ceed to give the actual strength of tiic army of 
tlie Potomac. 

Tlic aggregate strength of the army of the Po- 
tomac, by the official report on the morning of 
the 27th instant, was 108,318 officers and men, 
of all grades and arms. This includes the troops 
at Baltimore and Annapolis, on the upper and 
lower Potomac, the sick, absent, &c. 

The force present for duty was 147,095. Of 
this numt)er, 4,208 cavalry were completely un- 
armed. 3,103 cavalry only partially armed, 5.1)79 
infantry unequipped, making 13,410 unlit for the 
field, (irrespective of those not yet sufficiently 
drilled.) and reducing the effective force to 134.- 
2S5, and the number disposable for an advance 
to 70,285. The infantry regiments are, to a con- 
siderable extent, armed with unscrviceal)le we;?p- 
ons. Quite a large number of good arms, which 
had been intended for tins army, were ordered 
elsewl\ere, leaving the army of the Potomac in- 
sufficiently, and. in some cases, badly armed. 

On the 30th of September there were with this 
army 228 field guns ready for the field ; so far as 
arms and equij)ments are concerned, some of the 
batteries are still quite raw, and unfit to go into 
action. I have intelligence that eight New York 
batteries are en route hither : two others are ri'udy 
for the field. 1 will still (if the New York bat- 
teries have six guns each) be 112 guns short of 
the number required for the active column, say- 
ing nothing, for the present, of those necessary 
for the garrisons and corps on the Potomac, 
which would make a total deficiency of 200 guns. 

I have thus briefly stated (mr present condi- 
tion and w^nt! ; it remains to suggest the means 
of supplying the deficiencies. 

First, that all the cavalry and infantry arms, 
as fast as procured, wlietlier mantifactured in 
this country or purchased abroa<l. be sent to thi.« 
army until it is fully prepared for the field. 

Second, that the two companies of the fourth 
artillery, now understood to be en route from 
Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, be"ordered to this 
army, to be mounted at once ; also, that the com- 
panies of the third artillery, en route from Call- 



fornia, be sent here. Had not the order for 
Smead's battery to come here from Harrisburg, 
to replace the battery I gave General Sherman, 
been so often countermanded, I would again ask 
for it. 

Third, that :i more effective regulation may be 
made authorizing the transfer of men from the 
volunteers to the regular batteries, infantry, and 
cavalrv ; that we may make the best possible use 
of the "invaluable regular -'skeletons." 

Fourili, I have no official information as to tlie 
United States forces elsewhere, but, from the 
best information I can obtain from the War De- 
])artinent and other sources, I am led to believe 
that the United States troops are : — 

III WeKtcrn Virginia, about 30,000 

In KentiiPky 40,000 

III Missouri 80,0li0 

lu Fortress Jlonroe 1 1 ,000 

Total 161,000 

Besides these, I am informed that more tlian 
100,000 are in progress of organization in other 
Nortlieru and Western States. 

1 would tlierefore recommend that, not inter- 
fering with Kentucky, there should be retained 
in Western Virginia and Missouri a sufficient 
force for defensive purposes, and that the sur- 
l)lus troops be sent to the army of the Potomac, 
to enable it to assume tlie offensive ; that the 
same course be pursued in respect to Fortress 
Monroe, and that no further outside expeditions 
be attempted until we have fought the great bat- 
tle in front tjf us. 

Fifth, that every nerve be strained to hasten 
the enrolment, organization, and armament of 
new batteries and regiments of infantry. 

Sixtii. that all the battalions now raised for new 
regiments of regular infantry be at once ordered 
to this army, and that the old infantry and cav- 
alry en route from California be ordered to this 
ai'iny imimdiately on their arrival in New York. 

I have thus iiiihcated. in a g 'iieral manner, the 
objects to be accompli, lied, and the means by 
which we may gain our ends. 

A vigorous employment, of these means will, 
in my opinion, enable the arm)' of the Potomac 
to assume successfully this season the offensive 
operations which, ever since entering upon the 
command, it has been my anxious desire and dili- 
gent effort to prepare for and prosecute. The 
advance should not be postponed beyond the2.jth 
of November, if [lossilile to avoid it. 

Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy 
in action are indispensable. The entire military 
field should be grasped as a whole, and not in 
detached parts. 

^ One plan sliould be agreed upon and pursued ; 
a single will should direct and carry out these 
])laus. 

The great object to be accomplished, the crush- 
ing defeat of the Rebel army (now) at Manassas, 
should never for one instant be lost sight of. liut 
all the intellect and means and men of the Gov- 
ernment poured upon that point. The loyal 
Stales possess ample force to effect all this and 
more. The Eebels have displayed energy, unan- 
imity, and wisdom worthy of the most desperate 
days of the French revolution. Should we do less ? 

The unity of this nation, the preservation of 
2 



our institutions, are so dear to me, that I have 
willingly sacrificed my private happiness with 
the single object of doing my duty to my coun- 
try. When the task is accomplished, I shall be 
glad to return to the obscurity from wMch events 
have drawn me. 

Whatever the determination of the Govern- 
ment may be, I will do the best I can with the 
army of the Potomac, and -will share its fate, 
whatever may be the task imposed upon me. 

Permit me to add that, on this occasion as 
heretofore, it has been my aim neither to exag- 
gerate nor underrate the power of the enemy, 
nor fail to express clearly the means by which, 
in my judgment, that power may be broken. 
Urging the energy of preparation and action, 
which has ever been my choice, but with the 
fixed purpose by no act of mine to expose the 
Government to hazard by premature movement, 
and requesting that this communication may be 
laid before the President, 

I have the honor to be. very respectfully, your 
obedient servant, G. B. McCLELLAN, 

Major- General. 

Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. 

When I assumed command in Washington, on 
the 27th of July, 18G1, the number of troops in 
and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, 
less than 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillery-men, 
with nine imperfect field batteries of thirty 
pieces. 

On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the 
brigade organization of General McDowell still 
existed, and the troops were stationed at and in 
rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Al- 
bany, at Fort Kunyan, Eoach's Mills. Cole's 
Mills, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, 
with a detachment at the Theological Seminary. 

There were no troops south of Hunting Creek, 
and many of the regiments were encamped on 
the low grounds bordering the Potomac, seldom 
in the best positicms for defence, and entirely in- 
adequate in numbers and conditicm to defend the 
long line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. 

On the Maryland side of the river, upon the 
heights overlooking the Chain bridge, two regi- 
ments were stationed, whose commanders were 
independent of each other. 

There were no troops on the important Tenal- 
lytown road, or on the roads entering the city 
from the south. 

The camps were located without regard to 
purposes of defence or instruction, the roads 
were not picketed, and there was no attempt at 
an organization into brigades. 

In no quarter were the dispositions for defence 
such as to offer a vigorous resistance to a re- 
spectable body of the enemy, either in the posi- 
tion and numbers of the troops, or the number 
and character of the defensive works. Earth- 
works, in the nature of tties de pont, looked 
upon the approaches to the Georgetown aque- 
duct and ferry, the Long bridge and Alexandria, 
by the Little iiiver turniiike, and some simple d<?- 
fensive arrangements were made at the Chain 
bridge. With the latter exception not a single 
defensive work had been commenced on the 
Maryland side. 

Tliere was notliing to prevent the enemy shell- 
ing the city from heights within easy range, 



10 



which could be occupied by a hostile cohimn al- 
most without resistance. Many soldiers had de- 
serted, and the streets of Washington were crowd- 
ed with straggling officers and men, absent from 
their stations without authority, Avhose behavior 
indicated the general want of discipline and or- 
ganization. 

I at once designated an efficient stafl", after- 
wards adding to it as opportunity was afforded 
and necessity required, who zealously cooperat- 
ed with me in the labor of bringing order out of 
confusion, reassigning troops and commands, 
projecting and throwing up defensive works, re- 
ceiving and organizing, equipping and providing 
for the new levies arriving in the city. 

The valuable services of these officers in their 
various departments, during this and throughout 
the subsequent periods of the history of the ar- 
my of the Potomac, can hardly be suflQciently 
appreciated. Their names and duties will be 
given in another part of this Report, and they 
are conmiended to the liivorable notice of the 
War Department. 

The restoration of order in the city of Wash- 
ington was cliected through the appointment of 
a provost marshal, whose authority was supported 
by the few regular troops within my command. 
These troops were thus in position to act as a 
reserve, to be sent to any point of attack where 
their services might be most wanted. The ener- 
gy and ability displayed by Colonel A. Porter, 
the provost marshal, and his assistants, and the 
strict discharge of their duly by the troops, 
produced the best results, and Washington 
soon became one of the most quiet cities in 
the Union. 

The new levies of infantry, upon arriving in 
Washington, Avere formed into provisional brig- 
ades, and placed in camp in the suburbs of the 
city for equipment, instruction, and discipline. 
As soon as regiments were in a fit condition for 
transfer to the forces across the Potomac, they 
were assigned to the brigades serving there. 
Brigadier-General F. J. Porter was at first as- 
signed to the charge of the provisional brigades. 
Brigadier-General A. E. Burnside was the next 
ofiicer assigned to this duty, from which, howev- 
er, he was soon relieved by Brigadier-General 
S. Casey, who continued in charge of the newly 
arriving regiments until the army of the Poto- 
mac departed for the Peninsula, in INIarch, 1802. 
The newly arriving artillery troops reported to 
Brigadier-General "William P. Barry, the chief 
of artillery, and the cavalry to Brigadier-Gen- 
eral George Stoneman, the chief of cavalry. 

By the 15th of October, the number of troops 
in and about Washington, inclusive of the garri- 
son of the city and Alexandria, the city guard 
and the forces'on the Maryland shore of the Po- 
tomac below Washington, and as far as Cumber- 
land above, the troops under the command of 
General Dix at Baltimore and its dependencies, 
were as follows : — 

Total present for duty 133,201 

" sick 9,290 

" in confinement 1,150 

Aggregate present 14^,647 

" absent f*,404 

Grand Aggregate 152,051 



The following table exhibits similar data for 
the period stated, including the troops in Mary- 
land and Delaware : — 



Date. 



Present 



For 
duty. 



Dec. 1, 1861.1 169,452 

Jan. 1, 1802. 191,480 

Feb. 1, 1S02.I 190,806 

Mar. 1, 18li2.| 193,142 ^ 1-3,107 




I Total 
Absent. P--"t 

! absent. 



11,470 I 198,213 

11,707 ' 219,707 'J 

14, no 1 222, 96 

13 5r0 I 221,9S7 



For convenience of reference the strength ol 
the army of the Potomac at subsequent periods 
is given. 





Grand aggregate 
present and absent. 


I^ CO p 

CO 00 o6 




a 

<u 


c T 

.= o 

it 


: g S 

; co" 




a 


11,0.37 
27,700 
34,638 




1 


"cl 

fclj 
< 


115,350 
117,220 
106,406 


5 

-3 


o a 

o ^ 

ta 

= s 

" 5 


Men. 

356 
320 
213 


a 
u 

e 
o 


■»» ^ o 


a c3 
2 u 
to tc 


.M 

S 


a 


5,385 
10,541 
15,959 


e 

o 


CO O 1^ 

CO C-. X 

C) ■*! ti 


c s 
• -1- 


3 


d 
c 


104,010 
101,160 
85,715 




^O 


1 

O 


4,725 
4,665 
3,834 






6 




April 30 
June 20 
July 10 





In organizing the army of the Potomac, and 
preparing it for the field, the first step taken was 
to organize the infantry into brigades of four reg- 
iments each ; retaining the newly arrived regi- 
ments on the Maryland side until their arma- 
ment and equipment were issued and they had 
obtained some little elementary instruction, be- 
fore assigning them permanently to brigades. 
When the organization of the brigades was well 
established, and the troops somewhat disciplined 
and instructed, divisions of three brigades each 



11 



yere gradually formed, as is elsewhere stated in 
his Report, although I was always in favor of the 
jrganization into army corps as an abstract prin- 
iple. I did not desire to form them until the 
irmy had been some little time in the field, in 
jrder to enable the general officers first to ac- 
quire the requisite experience as division com- 
nanders on active service, and that I might be 
ible to decide from actual trial who were best 
itted to exercise these important commands. 

For a similar reason I carefully abstained from 
oiaking any recommendations for the promotion 
rf officers to the grade of major-general. 

When new batteries of artillery arrived they 
ilso were retained in Washington until their 
irmament and equipment were completed, and 
heir instruction sufficiently advanced to justify 
:heir being assigned to divisions. The same 
ourse was pursued in regard to cavalry. I 
regret that circumstances have delayed the chief 
of cavalry, General George Stoneman, in fur- 
nishing Ids report upon the organization of that 
arm of the service. It will, however, be for- 
warded as soon as completed, and will, doubtless, 
how that the difficult and important duties in- 
trusted to him were efficiently performed. He 
encountered and overcame, as far as it was pos- 
sible, continual and vexatious obstacles arising 
from the great deficiency of cavalry arms and 
equipments, and the entire inefficiency of many 
of the regimental officers first apjiointed; tliis 
last difficuhy was, to a considerable extent, over- 
come in the cavalry, as well as in the infantry 
and artillery, by the continual and prompt action 
of courts-martial and boards of examination. 

As rapidly as circumstances permitted, every 
cavalry soldier was armed with a sabre and re- 
volver, and at least two squadrons in every regi- 
ment with carbines. 

It was intended to assign at least one regiment 
of cavalry to each division of the active army, 
l)esides forming a cavalry reserve of the regular 
regiments and some picked regiments of volun- 
teer cavalry. Circumstances beyond my con- 
trol rendered it impossible to carry out this in- 
tention fully, and the cavalry force serving with 
the army in the field was never as large as it 
ought to have been. 

It was determined to collect the regular infan- 
try to form the nucleus of a reserve. The ad- 
vantage of such a body of troops at a critical 
moment, especially in an army constituted mainly 
of new levies, imperfectly disciplined, has been 
frequentlj'^ illustrated in military history, and 
was brought to the attention of the country at 
the first battle of Manassas. I have not been 
disappointed in the estimate formed of the value 
of these troops. I have always found them to 
be relied on. Whenever they have been brought 
under tire they have sliown the utmost gallantry 
and tenacity. The regular infantry, which had 
been collected from distant posts, and which had 
been recruited as rapidly as the slow progress 
of recruiting for the regular service would allow, 
added to the small battalion with McDowell's 
army, which I found at Washington on my arri- 
val, amounted, on the 30th of August, to 1,040 
men ; on the 28th of February, 1862, to 2,682, 
and on the 80th of April, to 4,603. On the 17th 
of May, 18(i2, they were assigned to General 
Porter's corps for organization as a division, 



with the fifth regiment of New York volunteers, 
which joined May 4, and the tentii New York 
volunteers, which joined subsequently. They 
remained from the commencement under the 
command of Brigadier-General George Sykes, 
major third infantry United States army. 

ARTILLERY. 

The creation of an adequate artillery estab- 
lishment for an array of so large proportions was 
a formidable undertaking ; and had it not been 
that the country possessed in the regular service 
a body of accomplished and energetic artillery 
officers, the task would have been almost hope- 
less. 

The charge of organizing tliis most important 
arm was confided to Major (afterwards Brigadier- 
General) William F. Barry, chief of artillery, 
whose industry and zeal achieved the best re- 
sults. The report of General Barry is appended 
among the accompanying documents. By refer- 
ring to it, it will be observed that the following 
principles were adopted as the basis of organiza- 
tion : — 

" 1. That the proportion of artillery should 
be in the proportion of at least two and one half 
pieces to 1,000 men, to be expanded, if possi- 
ble, to three pieces to 1,000 men. 

" 2. That the proportion of rifled guns should 
be restricted to the system of the United States 
ordnance department; and if Parrott and the 
' smooth bores ' (with the cxcci^tion of a few 
homtzers for special service) to be exclusively 
the twelve-pounder gun, of the model of 1857, 
variously called the ' gun-howitzer, the ' light 
twelve-pounder,' or the ' Napoleon.' 

"3. That each field battery should, if practi- 
cable, be composed of six guns, and none to be 
less than four guns, and in all cases the guns of 
each battery should be of uniform calibre. 

" 4. That the field batteries were to be assign- 
ed to divisions and not to brigades, and in the 
proportion of four to each division, of which one 
was to be a battery of regulars, the remainder of 
volunteers, the captain of the regular battery to 
be the commandant of artillery of tlie division. 
In the event of several divisions constituting an 
army corps, at least one half of the divisional 
artillery was to constitute the reserve artillery 
of the corps. 

" 5. That the artillery reserve of the whole 
army shoidd consist of one hundred guns, and 
should comprise, besides a sufficient number of 
light ' mounted batteries,' all the guns of posi- 
tion, and, until the cavalry wei'e massed, all the 
horse artillery. 

"6. That the amount of amniunition to ac- 
company field batteries was not to be less than 
four hundred rounds per gim. 

" 7. A siege train of fifty pieces. This was 
subsequently expanded, for special service at the 
siege of Yorktown, to very nearly one hundred 
pieces, and comprised the unusual calibres and 
enormously heavy weight of metal of two 200- 
pounders, five 100-pounders, and ten 13-inch sea- 
coast mortars." 

As has been before stated, the chief of artil- 
lery reports the whole of the field artillery of the 
army of the Potomac, July 28, 1861, was com- 
prised of nine imperfectly equipped batteries, of 
thirty guns, 650 men, and 400 horses. la 



12 



March, 1862, when the whole army took the 
field, it consisted of ninety-two batteries, of 520 
guns, 12,500 men, and 11,000 horses, fully 
equipped and in readiness for active field service; 
of the whole force thirty batteries were regu- 
lars, and sixty-two batteries volunteers. During 
the short period of seven months, all of this 
immense amount of material was issued by the 
ordnance department and placed in the hands of 
the ai'tillery troops after tiieir arrival in Wash- 
ington. About one fourth of all the volunteer 
batteries broutiht with them from their respec- 
tive States a few guns and carriages, but they 
were nearly all of such peculiar calibre as to 
lack uniformity with tlie more modern and 
more serviceable ordnance with which the other 
batteries were armed, and they therefore had to 
be withdrawn and replaced by more suitable 
material. Wliile about one sixth came supplied 
with horses and harness, less than one tenth 
were apparently fully equipped for service 
when they reported ; and every one of these 
required the supply of many deficiencies of ma- 
terial, and very extensive instruction in the the- 
ory and practice of their s])ecial arm. 

The operations on tlie Peninsula by the army 
of the Potomac commenced with a full field a*"- 
tillery force of fifty-two batteries of two hundred 
and ninety-nine guns. To this must be added 
the field artillery of Franklin's division of Mc- 
Dowell's corps, whicli joined a few days before 
the capture of Yorktown, but was not disem- 
barked from its transports for service imtil after 
the battle of Williamsburg, and the field artillery 
of McCall's division of McDowell's corps, ( four 
batteries, twenty-two guns, ) which joined in 
June, a few days before the battle of Mechanics- 
ville, (June 26, 1862.) making a i?i-and total of 
field artillery, at any time with the army of the 
Peninsula, of sixty batteries of three hundred 
and forty-three guns. With tins large force, 
serving in six corps d'armee of eleven divisions, 
and the artillery reserve, the only general and 
field officers were one lirigadier-gencral, four 
colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, and three 
majors, a number obviously insufficient, and 
whichimpaired to a great degree, in consequence 
of the want of rank and official influence of the 
commanders of corps and division artillery, the 
efficiency of the arm. As this faulty organiza- 
tion can be suitably corrected only by legislative 
action, it is earnestly hoped that the attention of 
the proper autiiorities may be at an early day 
invited to it. 

When there were so many newly organized 
volunteer field batteries, many of whom received 
their first and only instruction in the intrenched 
camps covering Washington during the three 
or four inclement months of the winter of 1861- 
*62, there was. of course, much to be improved. 
Many of the volunteer batteries, however, evin- 
ced such zeal and intelligence, and availed them- 
eelves so industriously' of the instructions of the 
regular officers, their commanders, and the ex. 
ample of the regular batteries, their associates, 
that they made rapid progress, and attained a 
degree of proficiency highly creditable. 

The designations of the different batteries of 
artillery, both regular and volunteer, follow 
within a few pages. 

The following distribution of regiments and 



batteries was made, as a preliminary organiza- 
tion of the forces at hand, shortly after my arri- 
val in Washington. The infantry, artillery, and 
cavalry, as fast as collected and brought into 
primary organization, were assigned to brigades 
and divisions, as indicated in the subjoined state- 
ments. 

Organization of the Division of the Potomac, 
August 4, 1861. 

Brigadier- General nunter's Brigade. — 2;M, 
25th, 35th, and 37th regiments New York vol- 
unteers. 

Brigadier- General HeintzelmarCs Brigade. — 
5th regiment Maine volunteers, 16th, 26th. and 
27th regiments New York volunteers, and Tid- 
ball's battery, (A.) 2d United States artillery. 

Brigadier- General W. T. Sherman's Brig- 
ade. — 9th and 14th regiments Massachusetts vol- 
unteers, DeKalb regiment New York volunteers, 
4th regiment Michigan volunteers, Hamilton's 
battery, (E, ) 3d United States artillery, and 
company I, 2d United States cavalry. 

Brigadier- General Kearney's Brigade. — 1st, 
2d, and 3d regiments New Jersey volunteers, 
Green's battery, (G.) 2d United States artillery, 
and company G, 2d United States cavalry. 

Brigadi'r- General Ilool-er's Brigade. — 1st and 
11th regiments Massacliusetts volunteers, 2d 
regiment New Hampshire volunteers, and 26th 
regiment Pcnsvlvania volunteers. 

Colonel Key's's Brigade.— 2M, 24th. and 30tli 
regiments New York volunteers, and 14th regi- 
ment New York State militia. 

Brigadier- General Frankliti's Brigade. — lotii, 
18th, olst, and 32d regiments New York volun- 
teers. Piatt's battery, (M.) 2d United States ar- 
tillery, and company C, New York ( Lincoln ) 
cavalry. 

Colonel BlenJcer's Brigade. — 8th and 27tli regi- 
ments New York volunteers, 27th regiment 
Pennsylvania volunteers, and Garibaldi Guard, 
New York volunteers. 

Colonel Richardson's Brigade. — 12th regiment 
New York volunteers, and 2d and 3d regiments 
Michigan volunteers. 

Brigadier-General Stone's Brigade. — 34th and 
Tannany regiments New York volunteers, 1st 
regiment Minnesota volunteers, and 2d regiment 
New York State militia. 

Colonel William F. Smith's Brigade- — 2d and 
3d regiments Vermont volunteers, 6th regiment 
Maine volunteers, 33d regiment New York vol- 
unteers. Company H, 2d United States cavalry, 
and Captain Mott's New York battery. 

Colonel Couch's Brigade. — 2d regiment Rhode 
Island volunteers, 7th and 10th regiments Mas- 
sachusetts volunteers, and 36th regiment New 
York volunteers. 

The 2d regiment Maine, the 2d regiment Wis- 
consin, and the 13th regiment New York volun- 
teers, stationed at Fort Corcoran. 

The 21st regiment New York volunteers, sta- 
tioned at Fort Runyon. 

The 1 7th regiment New York volunteers, sta- 
tioned at Fort Ellsworth. 

By October the new levies had arrived in 
sufficient numbers, and the process of organiza- 
tion so far carried on, that the construction of 
divisions had been effected. 



I 



13 



The following statement exhibits the compo- 
ition of the army, October 15, 1861. 

Organization of the Army of the Potomac, 
Odoher 15, 1861. 

1. Brigadier- General George Stoneman's 
avalry command. — 5th United States cavalry, 
th Pennsylvania cavalry, Oneida cavalry, (one 
onipany,) 11th Pennsylvania cavalry, (Har- 
an's,) and Barker's Illinois cavalry, (one com- 
)any.) 

2. Colonel H. J. Hunfs artillery reserve. — 
Batteries L, A, and B, 2d United States artil- 
ery, batteries K and F, 3d United States artil- 
ery, battery K, 4th United States artillery, bat- 
ery H, 1st United States artillery, and battery 
i, 5th United States artillery. 

CITY GUARD, BKIGADIEK-GENEEAL ANDREW 
PORTER. 

Cavalry. — Companies A and E, 4th United 
states cavalry. 

Artillery. — Battery K, 5th United States artil- 
ery. 

Infantry. — 2d and 3d battalions United States 
nfantry, 8th and 1st companies United States 
nfantry, and Sturgis's rifles, ( Illinois volun- 
;eers.) 

4. BANKS'S DIVISION. 

Cavalry. — Four companies 3a regiment New 
STork cavalry, (Van Allen's.) 

Artillery. — Best's battery E, 4th United States 
irtillery, detachment 9th New York artillery, 
Matthcws's battery E, 1st Pennsylvania artillery. 
Tompkins's battery A, 1st Rhode Island artillery. 

Infantry. — Abercrombie's brigade : 12th Mas- 
sachusetts, 12th and 16th Indiana, and 30th 
Pennsylvania volunteers. Stiles's brigade : 3d 
^Visconsin, 29th Pennsylvania, and 13th Massa- 
:;husetts volunteers, and 9th New York State 
militia. Gordon's brigade : 2d Massachusetts, 
28th and 19th New York. 5th Connecticut, 46th 
and 28th Pennsylvania, and 1st Maryland volun- 
teers. 

m'dowell's division. 

Cavalry. — 2d New York cavalry, (Harris's 
Light,) Colonel Davis. 

Artillery. — Battery M, 2d, and battery G, 1st 
United States artillery. 

Infantry. — Keys's brigade : 14th New York 
State militia, and 22d, 24th, and 30th New York 
volunteers. Wadsworth's brigade : 12th, 21st, 
23d, and 35th New York volunteers. King's 
brigade : 2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th 
Indiana volunteers. 

heintzelman's division. 

Cavalry. — 1st New Jersey cavalry. Colonel 
Halsted. 

Artillery. — Thompson's battery, C, United 
jStates artillery. 

Infantry. — Richardson's brigade : 2d, 3d, and 
5th Michigan, and 37th New York volunteers. 
Sedgwick's brigade : 3d and 4th Maine, and 38th 
and 40th New York volunteers. Jameson's brig- 
ade : 32d, 63d, 61st, and 45th Pennsylvania vol- 
unteers, and Wild Cat reserves, (Pennsylvania 
volunteers.) 

F. J. porter's division. 
Cavalry. — 3d Pennsylvania cavalry, Colonel 



Avei-ill, and 8th Pennsylvania cavalry. Colonel 
Gregg. 

Artillery.— Baxter J E, 2d, and battery *E, 3d 
United States artillery. 

Infantry.— MovaWs brigade: 33d Pennsyl- 
vania, 4th Michigan, 9th Massachusetts, and 4th 
New York volunteers. Martindale's brigade : 
13th New York, 2d Maine, and 18th Massachu- 
setts volunteers, and DeKalb regiment New 
York volunteers. Butterfield's brigade: 50th 
New York, 83d Pennsylvania, (Colonel McLean,) 
17th and 25tli New York volunteers, and Stock- 
ton's independent Michigan regiment. 

FRANItLIN's DIVISION. 

Cavalry.— 1%% New York cavalry. Colonel 
McReyiiolds. 

^Ir^i7/e/-i/.— Batteries D and G, 2d United 
States artillery, and Hexamer's battery, (New 
Jersey volunteers.) 

Infantry.— Keixxwefs brigade: 1st, 2d, 3d, 
and 4th New Jersey volunteers. Slocum's bri- 
gade : 16th, 26th, and 27th New York, and 6th 
Maine volunteers. Newton's brigade : 15th, 
18th, 31st, and 32d New York volunteers. 

stone's division. 

Cavalry. — Six companies 3d New York (Van 
Allen) cavalry. 

Artillery.— Exrhy's battery I, 1st United States 
Vaughn's battery B, 1st Rhode Island artillery 
and Bunting's 6th New York independent 
battery. 

Infantry. — Gorman's brigjde : 2d New York 
State militia, 1st Minnesota, 15th Massachusetts, 
and 34th New York volunteers, and Tammany 
regiment, (New York volunteers.) Lander's 
brigade : 19th and 20th Massachusetts, and 7th 
Michigan volunteers, and a company of Massa- 
chusetts sharpshooters. Baker's brigade : Penn- 
sylvania volunteers, (1st, 2d, and 3d^ California. 

buell's division. 

Ai-tillery. — Batteries D and H, 1st Pennsyl- 
vania artillery. 

Infantry. — Couch's brigade : 2a Rhode Island, 
7th and 10th Massnchusetts, and 3()th New York 
volunteers. Graham's brigade : 23d and 31st 
Pennsylvania, and 67th (1st Long Island) and 
65th (1st United States chasseurs) New York 
volunteers. Peck's brigade : 13th and 21st Penn- 
sylvania, and 62d (Anderson Zouaves) and 55th 
New York volunteers. 

m'call's DrVISION. 
Cavalry. — 1st Pennsylvania reserve cavalry. 
Colonel Bayard. 

Artillery. — Easton's battery A, Cooper's bat- 
tery B, and Kein's battery G, 1st Pennsylvania 
artillery. 

Infantry. — Meade's brigade : 1st rifles Penn- 
sylvania reserves, 4th, 3d, 7th, 11th, and 2d 

Pennsylvania reserve infantry. brigade : 

5th, 1st, and 8th Pennsylvania reserve infantry. 
brigade : lOth. 6th, 9th, and 12th Penn- 
sylvania reserve infantry. 

hooker's division. 
Cavalry. — Eight companies 3d Indiana cav- 
alry, Lieutenant-Colonel-Carter. 

* This battery was transferred to Sherman's expedi" 
lion. 



14 



Artillery. — Elder's battery E, 1st United States 
artillery. 

Infantry. brigade : 1st and 11th Massa- 
chusetts, 2d Xew Hampshire, 2Gth Pennsylvania, 
and 1st Miciiigau volunteers. Sickles's brigade : 
1st, 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th regiments Excelsior 
brigade, New York volunteers. 

BLENKEr's BRIGADE. 

Cavalry. — -tth New York cavalry, (mounted 
rifles,) Colonel Dickel. 

Artillery. — One l)attery. 

Infantry.— S\\\ and 29th New York, 27th and 
35th Pennsylvania volunteers, Garibaldi guard 
and Cameron rifles, (New York volunteers.) 

smith's division. 

Cavalry. — 5th Pennsylvania cavalry, (Came- 
ron dragoons,) Colonel Friedman. 

Artillery. — Ayres's battery F, 5th United 
States artillery, Mott's 2d New York independent 
battery, and Barr's battery E, 1st Pennsylvania 
artillery. 

Infantry. brigade : 2d, 3d, 4th, and 

5th Vermont volunteers. Stevens's brigade : 
35th and 4'Jth New York, and Oth Maine volun- 
teers, and *71)th New York State militia. Han- 
cock's brigade : *-t7tli and 49th Pennsylvania, 
43d New York, and 5th Wisconsin volunteers. 
Companies B and E, Berden's sharpshooters. 

Casey's provisional brigades. — 5th, Gth, and 
Tth New Jersey volunteers, *llound-lIead regi- 
ment, (Pennsylvania volunteers.) battalion Dis- 
trict of Columbia volunteers, 40th Pennsylvania. 
8th New Jersey, and 4th New Hampshire volun- 
teers. 

5. Garrison of Alexandria. — Brigadier Gen- 
eral Montgomery, military governor. Cameron 
guard, (Pennsylvania volunteers.) 

Garrison of Fort Albany. — 14th Massachu- 
setts volunteers. 

Garrison of Fort Richardson. — 4th Connecti- 
cut volunteers. 

Garrison of Fort Washington. — Company D, 
1st United States artillery; companies H and I, 
87th New York volunteers, and United States 
recitiits unassigned. 

6. DIX'S division, BALTIMORE. 

Cavalry. — Company of Pennsylvania cavalry. 

Artillery. — Battery I, 2d United States artil- 
lery, 2d Massachusetts light battery, and a bat- 
tery of New York artillery. 

Infantry.— od, 4th, and 5th New York, 17th 
and "25th Massachusetts. 21st Indiana, fith Mich- 
igan, 4th Wisconsin, 7th Maine, 2d Maryland 
battalion, and Beading City Guard, volunteers. 

On the 8th of March, 1862, the President di- 
rected, by the following order, the organization 
of the active portion of the army of the Potomac 
into four army corps, and the formation of a fifth 
corps from the division of Banks and Shields. 

The foUo^ving is the text of the President's 
order : — 

* The 79th New York State militia, the 47th Pennsyl- 
vania volunteers, and the Kound-Hcad rc;4imeut, were 
transferred to General Sherman's expedition. 



" [President's General War Order No. 2.] 
" Executive Mansion, 

" Washington, March 8, 1862. 

" Ordered, 1st. That the major-general com- 
manding the army of the Potomac proceed forth- 
with to organize that part of the said army des- 
tined to enter upon active operations, (including 
the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left 
in the fortifications about Washington,) into four 
army corps, to be commanded according to se- 
niority of rank, as follows : — 

" First corps to consist of four divisions, and 
to be commanded by Major-General I. jNIeDowell. 
Second corps to consist of three divisions, and 
to be commanded by Brigadier-General E. V. 
Sumner. Third corps to consist of tin-ee divi- 
sions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-Gen- 
eral S. P. Heintzelman. Fourth corps to con- 
sist of three divisions, and to be commanded by\ 
Brigadier-General E. D. Keyes. 

" 2. That the divisions now commanded hy\ 
the officers above assigned to the commands of 
army corps shall be embraced in and form part 
of their respective corps. 

" 3. The forces left for the defence of Wash- 
ington will be placed in command of Brigadier- 
General James Wadsworth, who shall, also, be 
military governor of tlie District of Columbia. 

"4. That this order be executed with such 
promptness and despatch as not to delay the 
commencement of the operations already di- 
rected to be undertaken by the army of the 
Potomac. 

" 5. A fiftli army corps, to be commanded by)' 
Major-General N. P. Banks, will be formed! 
from Ids own and General Shields's (late Gen- 
eral Lander's) division. 

"ABEAHAM LINCOLN." 

The following order, which was made as soon 
as circumstances permitted, exhibits the steps 
taken to carry out the requirements of the Pres- 
ident's war order No. 2. 

"AEMY CORPS. 
" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Fairfax Court-house, Virginia, 
" March 13, 18G2. 

General Orders No. 151. 

" In compliance with the President's war or- 
der No. 2, of March 8, 18C2, the active portion 
of the army of the Potomac is formed into army 
corps, as follows : — 

" First corps, Major-General Ir^vin McDoAvell, 
to consist for the present of the divisions of Frank- 
lin, McCall, and King. Second corps, Brigadier- 
General E. V. Sumner; divisions, Kichardson, 
Blenker, and Sedgwick. Third corps, Brigadier- 
General S. P. Heintzelman ; divisions, F. J. 
Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton. Fourth corps, 
Brigadier-General E. D. Keyes ; divisions, 
Couch, Smith, and Casey. Fifth corps, Ma- 
jor-General N. P. Banks ; divisions, Williams 
and Shields. 

" The cavalry regiments attached to di-vdsions 
will, for the present, remain so. Subsequent 
orders will provide for these regiments, as well 
as for the reserve artillery. Regular infantry 
and regular cavalry arrangements will be made 



15 



to unite the divisions of each army corps as 
promptly as possible. 

" The commanders of divisions •will at once 
report in person, or, where that is impossible, by 
letter, to the commander of their army corps. 
" By command of Major-General McCleUan. 
"A. V. COLBURN, 
" Assistant Adjutant- General." 

I add a statement of the organization and 
composition of the troops on April 1, commenc- 
ing with the portion of the army of the Potomac 
which went to the Peninsula, giving afterwards 
the regiments and batteries left on the Potomac 
and in Maryland and Virginia after April 1, 
18G2. 

Troops of the Army of the Potomac sent to the 
Peninsula in March and early in April, 1862. 

1st. Cavalry reserve, Brigadier-General P. 
St. G. Cooke ; Emery's brigade, 5th United 
States cavalry, 6th United States cavalry, 6th 
Pennsylvania cavalry; Blake's brigade, 1st Uni- 
ted States cavalry. 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, 
Barker's squadron Illinois cavalry. 

2d. Artillery reserve, Colonel Henry J. Hunt; 
Graham's battery K and G, 1st United States, 
6 Napoleon guns; liandall's battery E, 1st 
United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Carlisle's bat- 
tery E, 2d United States, 6 20-pounder Parrott 
guns ; Robertson's battery, 2d United States, 6 
3-inch ordnance guns ; Benson's battery M, 2d 
United States, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Tid- 
ball's battery A, 2d United States, 6 3-inch ord- 
nance guns ; Edwards's battery L and M, 3d 
United States, 6 lO-pounder Parrott guns ; Gib- 
son's battery C and G, 3d United States, 6 3-inch 
ordnance guns ; Livingston's battery F and K, 
3d United States, 4 10-pounder Parrott guns ; 
Howe's battery G, 4th United States, G Napo- 
leon guns ; De Russy's battery K, 4th United 
States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Weed's battery I, 5th 
United States, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Smead's 
battery K, 5th United States, 4 Napoleon guns ; 
Ames's battery A, 5th United States, G — 4 10- 
pounder Parrott and 2 Napoleon guns ; Died- 
rich's battery A, New York artillery and bat- 
talion, 6 20-pounder Parrott guns ; Vogelie's 
battery B, New York artillery and battalion, 4 
20-pounder Parrott guns ; Knierim's battery C, 
New York artillery and battalion, 4 20-pounder 
Parrott guns; Grimm's battery D, New York 
artillery and battalion, 6 32-pounder howitzer 
guns. Total, 100 guns. 

3d. Volunteer engineer troops, Gen. Wood- 
bury; 15th New York volunteers, 50th New 
York volunteers. 

Regular engineer troops. Captain Duane : 
Companies A, B, and C, Uuited States Engi- 
neers. 

Artillery troops, with siege trains ; 1st Con- 
necticut heavy artillery. Colonel Tyler. 

4th. Infivntry reserve, (regular brigade,) Gen- 
eral Sj'kes ; 9 companies 2d United States Infan- 
try, 7 companies 3d United States Infantry, 10 
companies 4th United States infantry, 10 com- 
panies Gth United States infantry, 8 companies lOtli 
and 17tli United States infantry, 6 companies 
11th United States infintry, 8 companies 12th 
United States infantry, 9 companies 14th United 



States infantry, and 5th New York volunteers, 
Colonel Warren. 

SECOND CORPS, GENERAL SUMNER. 

Cavalry.— d,i\\ Illinois cavalry, Colonel Farns- 
worth, and one squadron Gth New York cavalry. 

Richardson's division. 

Artillery.— Q\n.r^'s battery A and G, 4th United 
States, G Napoleon guns ; Frank's battery G, 1st 
New York, G 10-pounder Parrott guns ; Pettit's 
battery B, 1st New York, G 10-pounder Parrott 
guns ; Hogan's battery A, 2d New York, G 10- 
pounder Parrott guns. 

Infantry. — Howard's brigade, 5th New Hamp- 
shire, 81st Pennsylvania, and Gist and Glth New 
York volunteers; Meagher's brigade, G9th,63d, 
and 88th New York volunteers ; Frencli's brig- 
ade, 62d, 57th, and GGth New York, and 63d, 
Pennsylvania volunteers. 

Sedgwick's division. 

Artillery. —Kivhy's battery 1, 1st United States, 
6 Napoleon guns; Tompkins's battery A, 1st Rhode 
Island, 6—4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 12-pounder 
howitzer guns; Bartlett's battery B, 1st Rhode 
Island, 6 — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 12-pounder 
howitzer guns; Owen's battery G, G 3-inch ord- 
nance guns. 

Infantry.— Gorman's brigade, 2d New York 
State militia, and 15th Massacliusetts, 34th New 
York, and 1st Maine volunteers ; Burns's brigade ; 
G9th, 71st, 72d, and lOGtli Pennsylvania volun- 
teers ; Dana's brigade, 19th and 20th Massachu- 
setts, 7th Michigan, 42d New York volunteers. 

NoTK. — Blenker's division detached and as- 
signed to the mountain department. 

THIRD CORPS, GENERAL HEINTZEL- 

MAN. 

Cavalry. — 3d Pennsylvania cavalry. Colonel 
Avei'ill. 

porter's division. 

Artillery. — Griffin's battery K, 5th United 
States, G 10-pounder Parrott guns ; Weeden's 
battery C, Rhode Island; Martin's battery C, 
Massachusetts, 6 Napoleon guns; Allen's bat- 
tery E, Massachusetts, 6 3-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Martindalc's brigade, 2d Maine, 
18th and 22d Massachusetts, and 25th and loth 
New York volunteers; Morell's brigade, 14th 
New York, 4th Michigan, 9th Massachusetts, 
and 62d Pennsylvania volunteers ; Butterfield's 
brigade, 17th, 44th, and 12th New York, 83d 
Pennsylvania and Stockton's Michigan volun- 
teers. 

First Berdan sharpshooters. 

hooker's division. 

Artillery.— Yin\\'» battery II, 1st United States, 
6 — 4 10-poundcr Parrott and 2 12-pounder how- 
itzer guns; Smith's batterjs 4th New York, 6 
10-pounder Parrott guns ; Bramliall's battery, 
Gth, New York, G 3-incii ordnance guns; Os- 
born's battery D, 1st New York artillery, 4 3- 
inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Siekles's brigade, 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 
and 5th Excelsior, New York; Naglee's brigade, 
1st and 11th Massachusetts, 2Gtli Pennsylvania, 
and 2d New Hampshire volunteers ; Colonel 



16 



Starr's brigade, 5th, 0th, 7th, and 8th New Jersey 
volunteers. 

Hamilton's division. 

Artillery. — Thompson's battery G, 2d United 
States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Beam's battery B, 
New Jersey, (J — 4 10-pounder Tarrott and 2 Na- 
poleon guns ; Randolph's battery E, Rhode Is- 
land, 6 — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 Napoleon 
guns. 

Infantry. — Jameson's brigade, lOath, 63d, 
and 57th Pennsylvania, and 87th New York vol- 
unteers ; Birney's brigade, 38th and 40th New 

York, and 3d and 4th Maine volunteers ; 

brigade, 2d, 3d, and 5th Michigan, and 37th 
New York volunteers. 

FOURTH CORPS, GENERAL KEYES. 
couch's division. 

Artillery. — McCarthy's battery C, 1st Pennsyl- 
vania, 4 10-pounder Parrott guns ; Flood's bat- 
tery 1), 1st Pennsylvania. 4 lO-jJOunder Parrott 
guns; Miller's battery E, 1st Pennsylvania, 4 
Napoleon guns ; Brady's battery F, 1st Pennsyl- 
vania, 4 10-pounder Parrott guns. 

Infantry. — Graham's brigade, 07th (1st Long 
Island) and 05th (1st United States chasseurs) 
New York, 23d, 31st, and Olst Pennsylvania vol- 
unteers; Peck's brigade. '.)8tli, 102d, and y3d 
Pennsylvania, and G2d and 55th New York vol- 
unteers ; brigade, 2d Rliode Island, 7th 

and 10th Massachusetts, and 30lh New 'i'ork 
volunteers. 

smith's division. 

Artillery. — Ayre's battery F, 5th United States. 
6 — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 Napoleon guns ; 
Mott's battery, 3d New York, G — 4 10-pounder 
Parrott and 2 Napoleon guns; Wheeler's bat- 
tery E, 1st NcAv York, 4 3-inch ordnance guns ; 
Kennedy's battery, 1st New York, 6 3-inch ord- 
nance guns. 

Infantry. — Hancock's brigade, 4th Wisconsin, 
49th Pennsylvania, 43d New York, and 0th 
Maine volunteers ; Brooks's brigade, 2d, 3d, 
4th, 5th, and 0th Vermont volunteers ; David- 
son's brigade, 33d, 77th, and 49th New York, 
and 7th Maine volunteers. 

Casey's division. 

Artillery. — Regan's battery, 7th New York. 6 
3-inch ordnance guns ; Fitch's 8th New York, 
C 3-inch ordnance guns ; Bates's battery A, 1st 
New York, 6 Napoleon guns ; Spratt's battery 
H, 1st New York, 4 3-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Keim's brigade, 85th, 101st, and 
103d Pennsylvania, and 90th New York volun- 
teers; Palmer's brigade ; 85th, 98th, 92d, 81st, 

and 93d New York volunteers ; brigade, 

104th and 52d Pennsylvania, 5Gth and 100th New 
York, and 11th Maine volunteers. 

5th. Provost guard : 2d United States cavalry ; 
battalions 8th and 17th United States infantry. 

At general headquarters ; 2 companies 4th 
United States cavalry, 1 company Oneida cav- 
alry, (New York volunteers,) and 1 company 
Stui'ges's i-ifles, (Illinois volunteers.) 

The following troops of the army of the Poto- 
mac were left behind, or detached on and in 
front of the Potomac for the defence of that line, 



April 1, 1862. Franklin's and IMcCall's divi- 
sions, at subsequent and different dates, joined 
the active portion of the army on the Peninsula. 
Two brigades of Shields's division joined at 
Harrison's Landing. 

FIRST CORPS, GEXKHAL McDOWELL. 

Cavalry. — 1st, 2d, and 4th New York, and 1st 
Pennsylvania. 

Sharpshooters. — 2d regiment Berdan's siiarp- 
shooters. 

franivlin's division. 

.4 /T!i7?«-i/.— Piatt's battery, D, 2d United 
Stales, 6 Napoleon guns; Porter's battery, A, 
Massachusetts, — 4 lO-pounder Parrott and 2 
12-pounder howitzer guns; Ilexanier's battery, 
A, New Jersey, (> — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 
12-pounder howitzer guns ; Wilson's battery, 
F, 1st New York Artillery, 4 3-inch ordnance 
guns. 

Infantry. — Kearney's brigade. 1st. 2d, 3d, 
and 4th New Jersey volunte«.rs ; Sloeum's brig- 
ade, 10th and 27th New York, 5th Maine, and 
90th Pennsylvania volunteers; Newton's brig- 
ade, 18th, 31st, and 32d New York, and 95th 
Pennsylvania volunteers. 

m'call's division. 

Artillery. — Seymour's battery, C, 5th United 
States, 6 Najjoleon guns; Easton's battery. A, 
1st Pennsylvania, 4 Napoleon guns; Cooper's 
battery, IJ, 1st Pennsylvania, lO-jxiunder Par- 
rott guns; Kein's battery, C, 1st Pennsylvania, 
6 — 2 10-pounder, and 4 12-pounder Parrott 
guns. 

Infantry. — Reynolds's brigade, 1st, 2d, 5th, 
and 8th Pennsylvania reserve regiments; 
Meade's brigade, 3d, 4th, 7th, and 11th Penn- 
sylvania reserve regiments ; Ord's brigade, Otii, 
9th, 10th, and 12th Pennsylvania reserve reg- 
iments. 

1st Pennsylvania reserve rifles. 

king's division. 

Artillery. — Gibbon's battery, B, 4th United 
States, 6 Napoleon guns; Monroe's battery, D, 
1st Rhode Island. 6 10-pounder Parrott guns; 
Gerrish's battery. A, Mew Hampshire, Js'apo- 
leon guns; Durrell's battery, Pennsylvania, 6 
10-pounder Parrott guns. 

Infantry. — brigade, 2d, 6lh, and 

7th Wisconsin, and 19th Indiana volunteers; 
Patrick's brigade, 20th, 21st, 23d, and 25th 
New York State Militia; Augur's brigade, 14th 
New York State Militia, and 22d, 24th, and 30ih 
New York volunteers. 

FIFTH COUPS, GEXKRAL BANKS. 

Cavalry. — 1st Maine, 1st Vermimt, 1st Michi- 
gan, 1st Rliode Island. 5th and 8th New York, 
Keyes's battalion of Pennsylvania, 18 companies 
of Maryland, 1 squadron of Virginia. 

Unattached. — 28th Pennsylvania volunteers, 
and 4th regiment Potomac home brigade, (Mary- 
land volunteers.) 

"Williams's division. 
Artillery. — Best's battery, F, 4th United 
States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Hampton's battery, 
Maryland, 4 10-pounder Parrott guns; Thomp- 
son's battery, Maryland, 4 10-poiuider Parrott 



17 



guns ; Matliews's battery, P, Pennsylvania. G 

3-inch ordnance guns; battery, M, 

1st New Yorli, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns ; 
Knapp's battery. Pennsylvania, 6 lO-puunder 
Parrott guns; McMahon's battery, New York, 
6 3-inc'b ordnance guns. 

Infanfrij. — Abercrombie's brigade, 12tli and 

. 2d Massachusetts, and ICth Indiana, 1st Poto- 
niac home brigade, (Maryland.) 1 company 

I Zouaves D'Afrique, (Pennsylvania,) volunteers. 
brigade ; Otli New York State militia, 

1 and 20th Pennsylvania, 29th Indiana and 3d 

Wisconsin volunteers. brigade; 28tli 

New York, 5th Connecticut, 46th Pennsylvania, 
1st Maryland, 12th Indiana, and 13th Massachu- 
setts volunteers. 

SHIELDS'S DIVISION. 

AHillery. — Clark's battery, E, 4th United 
States, 6 lO-pounder Parrott guns ; Jenks's bat- 
tery, A, li-t V^irginia. 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 
6-pounderguns ; Davy's battery, B. 1st Virginia, 
2 10-poundcr Parrott guns ; Huntington's bat- 
tery, A, 1st Ohio, fi 13-pounder James's guns; 
! Robinson's battery, L, 1st Ohio, 2 12-pounder 

howitzers and 4 G-pounder guns ; and 

battery, 4tli Ohio artillery. 

InfantvLj. — brigade, 14th Indiana, 

4th, 8th, and (;7th Ohio, 7th Virginia, and 84th 

Pennsylvania volunteers ; brigade, 

5tli, 62d, and Glith Ohio, 13th Indiana, and 

30ih Illinois volunteers; brigade, 7th 

and 20th Ohio, 7th Indiana, 1st Virginia, and 
lull Pennsylvania volunteers. Andrew sharp- 
shooters. 

GENERAL WADSWORTH's COMMAND. 

Cavalry. — 1st New Jersey cavalry, at Alex- 
andria, and 4th Pennsylvania cavalry, east of 
the Capitol. 

Artillery and Infnniry. — 10th New Jersey 
volunteers. Bladcnsburg road ; 104tli New York 
volunteers, Kalorania Heights; 1st Wisconsin 
heavy aitillcry. Fort Cass Virginia; 3 batteries 
of New York artillery, Ft)rt9 Ethan Allen and 
Marcy ; depot of New York light artillery, 
Camp Barry; 2d District of Columbia volun- 
teers, Washington City; 2Gth Pennsylvania vol- 
unteers, G Street wharf; 2(jth New York vol- 
unteers. Fort Lyon ; 95th New York volun- 
teers Camp Thomas ; 04th New York, and 
detachment of 88th Pennsylvania volunteers, 
Alexandria; 91st Pennsylvania volunteers, 
Franklin Square barracks ; 4th New York artil- 
lery. Forts Carroll and Greble; 112th Pennsyl- 
vania volunteers. Fort Saratoga; 7()th New 
York volunteers. Fort Massachusetts ; 59th 
New York volunteers. Fort Pennsylvania ; de- 
tachment of 88th Pennsylvania volunteers. Fort 
Good Hope; 99th Pennsylvania volunteers, 
F.>rt Mahon ; 2d New York light artillery, Forts 
Ward, Worth, and Blenker; 107th and 54th 
Pennsylvania volunteers, Kendall Green ; Dick- 
erson's light artillery, 8(>th New York, and 
detachment of 88th Pennsylvania volunteers, 
east of the Capitol; 14tli Massachusetts (volun- 
teers) heavy artillery, and 56th Pennsylvania 
volunteers. Forts Albany, Tillinghast, Richard- 
son, Runyon, Jackson, Barnard, Craig, and 
Scott ; detachments of 4th United States .artil- 
lery and 37th New York volunteers, Fort Wash- 

3 



ington ; 97th, 101st, and 91st New York, anj 
12th Virginia volunteers. Fort Corcoran. 

In Camp near Washington. — 6th and lOtli 
New York, Swain's New York, and ild Pennsyl- 
vania cavalry, all dismounted. 

These troops (3,359 men) were ordered to 
report to Colonel Miles, commanding railroad 
guard, to relieve 3,306 older troops ordered to 
be sent to Manassas to report to General Aber- 
crombie. 

GENERAL Dlx's DEPARTMENT, BALTIMORE. 

Cavalry. — 1st Maryland cavalry and detach- 
ment of Purnell Legion cavalry. 

Artillery. — Battery I, 2d United States ; bat- 
tery — , Maryland; battery L, 1st New York, 
and two independent batteries of Pennsylvania 
artillery. 

Infantry. — 3d and 4th New York, 11th, 87th, 
and 111th Pennsylvania, detachment 21st Mas- 
sacliusetts, 2d Delaware, 2d Maryland, 1st and 
2d Eastern Shore (INIaryland) home guards, and 
Purnell Legion (two battalions) Maryland vol- 
unteers. 

lu a staff charged with labors so various and 
important as that of the army of the Potomac, a 
chief was indispensable to supervise the various 
departments and to relieve the commanding gen- 
eral of details. The officer of chief of staff, well 
known in European armies, had not been con- 
sidered necessary in our small peace establish- 
ment. The functions of the office were not 
defined, and, so far as exercised, had been in- 
cluded in the Adjutant-General's dejiartment. 
The small number of officers in this department, 
and the necessity for their employment in other 
duties, have obliged commanding generals dur- 
ing this war, to resort to other branches of the 
service to furnish suitable chiefs of staff. 

On the 4th of September, 1861, I appointed 
Colonel R. B. Marcy, of the inspector general's 
department, chief of staff, and he entered upon 
service immediately, discharging the various and 
important duties with great fidelity, industry, 
and ability, from this period until I was removed 
from command at Rectortown. Many improve- 
ments have been made during the war in our 
system of staff administration, but much re- 
mains to be done. 

Our own exxierience, and that of other armies, 
agree in determining the necessity for an effi- 
cient and able staff. To obtain this our staff 
establishment should be based on correct princi- 
ples, and extended to be adequate to the necessi- 
ties of the service, and should include a system 
of staff and line education. 

The affairs of the Adjutant-General's depart- 
ment, while I commanded the army of the Poto- 
mac, were conducted by Brigadier-General S. 
Williams, assisted by liieutenant Colonel James 
A. Ilardie, aide-de-camp. Their management 
of the department during the organization of the 
army in the fall and winter of 1861, and during 
its subsequent operations in the field, was excel- 
lent. 

They were, during the entire period, assisted 
by Captain Richard B. Irwin, aide-de-camp, and 
during the organization of the army by the fol- 
lowing-named officers : Captains Joseph Kirk- 
land, Arthur McClellan, M. T. McMahon, Wil- 



18 



Ham P. Mason, and William F. Biddle, aidcs-de 
camp. 

My personal staff, when we embarked for the 
Peninsula, consisted of Colonel Thomas M. Key, 
additional aide-de-camp; Colonel E. H. Wright, 
additional aide-de-camp and major, Gth United 
States cavalry; Colonel T. T. Gantt, additional 
aide-de-camp ; Colonel J. J. Astor, Jr., volunteer 
aide-de-camp; Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Col- 
burn, additional aide-de-camp and captain, Ad- 
jutant-General's department; Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel X. B. Sweitzer, addhional aide-de-camp and 
captain, Ist United States cavalry; Lieutenant- 
Colonel Edward McK. Hudson, additional aide- 
de-camp and captain, 14th United States infan- 
try; Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Von Radowitz, 
additional aide-de-camp; Major PL "Von Ham- 
merstein, additional aide-de-camp; Major W. 
W. Russell, United States marine corps ; Major 
F. LeCompte, of the Swiss army, volunteer 
aide-de-camp; Captains Joseph Kirkland, Ar- 
thur McClellan, L. P. D'Orleans, R. D'Orleans, 
M. T. McMahon, William P. Mason, Jr., Wil- 
liam F. Biddle, and E. A. Raymond, additional 
aides-de-camp. 

To this number I am tempted to add the 
Prince dc Joinville, who constantly accompanied 
me through the trying campaign of the Penin- 
sula, and frequently rendered important services. 
Of these officers Captain McMahon was assigned 
to the personal staff of Brigadier-General Frank- 
lin, and Capt-ains Kirkland and Mason to that of 
Brigadier-General F. J. Porter during the siege 
of Yorktown. They remained subsequently with 
those general officers. Major Le Compt left the 
army during the siege of Yorktown; Colonels 
Gantt and Astor, Major Russell, Captains, L. P. 
D'Orleans, R. D'Orleans, and Raymond at the 
close of the Peninsula campaign. Before its 
termination Captains W. S. Abert and Charles 
R. Lowell, of the 6th United States cavalry, 
joined my staff" as aides-de-camp, and remained 
with me until I was relieved from the command 
of the army of the Potomac. All of these officers 
served me with great gallantry and devotion ; 
they were ever ready to execute any service, no 
matter how dangerous, difficult, or fatiguing. 

ENGINEERS. 

Wlien I assumed the command of the army of 
the Potomac I found Major J. G. Barnard, 
United States engineers, subsequently brigadier- 
general of volunteers., occupying the position of 
chief engineer of that army. I continued him 
in the same office, and at once gave the neces- 
sary instructions for the completion of the de- 
fences of the capital, and for the entire reorgani- 
zation of the department. 

Under liis direction the entire system of de- 
fences was carried into execution. This was 
completed before the army departed for Fort 
Monroe, and is a sufficient evidence of the skill 
of the engineers and the diligent labor of the 
troops. 

For some months after the organization of the 
army of the Potomac was connncnced there 
were no engineer troops with it. At length, 
however, three companies were assigned. Under 
the skilful management of Captain J. C. Duane, 
United States Engineers, these new companies 
rapidly became efficient, and, as will be seen, 



rendered most valuable service during the ensu' 
ing campaigns. 

The number of engineer troops being entirely 
inadequate to the necessities of the army, an ef- 
fort was made to jiartially remedy this defect by 
detailing the 15th and 50th New York volunteers, 
which contained many sailors and mechanics, as 
engineer troops. They were first placed under 
the immediate superintendence of Lieutenant- 
Colonel B. S. Alexander, United States Engin- 
eers, by whom they were instructed in the duties 
of pontoniers, and became somewhat familiar 
with tliose of sappjrs and miners. Previous to 
the movement of the army for the Peninsula 
this brigade was placed und-jr the connnand of 
Brigadier-General D. P. Woodbury, major Unit- 
ed States Engineers. 

The labor of preparing the eni^ineer and bridge 
trains devolved chiefly upon Captain Duane, 
who was instructed to procure the new model 
French bridge train, as I was satisfied that the 
India-rubber pontoon was entirely useless for 
the general purposes of a campaign. 

The engineer department presented the fol- 
lowing complete organization when the army 
moved for the Peninsula : — 

Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard, chief engin- 
eer; First Lieutenant H. C. Altbott, topographi- 
cal engineers, aide-de-camp. Brigade volun- 
teer engineers, Brigadier-(4eneral Woodbury 
commanding : 15th New York volunteers. Colo- 
nel McLeod Murphy; 50th New York volun- 
teers, Colonel C. B. Stewart. Battalion, three 
companies United States Engineers, Captain J. 
C. Duane commanding ; companies respectively* 
commanded by First Lieutenants C. B. Reese, 
C. E. Cross, and O. E. Babcock, United States 
Engineers. The chief engineer was ably assist- 
ed in his duties by Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Al- 
exander, and First Lieutenants C. R. Comstock, 
M. D. McAlester, and Merrill. United States 
Engineers. Captain C. S. Stuart and Second 
Lieutenant F. U. Farquhar, United States Engin- 
eers, joined after the army arrived at Fort Mon- 
roe. 

The necessary bridge equipage for the opera- 
tions of a large army had been collected, con- 
sisting of batteaux with the anchors and flooring 
material, (French model,) trestles, and engin- 
eers' tools, with the necessary wagons for their 
transportation. 

The small number of officers of this corps 
available rendered it impracticable to detail 
engineers permanently at the hcad([uarters of 
corps and divisions. The companies of regular 
engineers never had their jjroper number of offi- 
cers, and it was necessary, as a rule, to follow 
the principle of detailing engineer officers tem- 
porarily whenever their services were required. 

TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS. 

To the corps of topographical engineers was 
intrusted the collection of topographical informa- 
tion and the preparation of campaign maps. 
Until a short time previous to the departure of 
the army for Fort Monroe, Lieutenant-Colonel 
John W. Macomb was in charge of this depart- 
ment, and prepared a large amount of valuable 
material. He was succeeded by Brigadier-Gen- 
eral A. A. Humphreys, who retained the position 
throughout the Peninsula campaign. These 



« 



19 



oflBcers were assisted by Lieutenants H. L. 
Abbott, O. G. Wagner, N. Bowon, John M. 
Wilson, and James H. Wilson, topographical 
engineers. This number, being the greatest 
avaihible, was so small that much of the duty of 
the department devolved upon parties furnished 
by Professor Bache, Superintendent of the Coast 
Survejs and other gentlemen from civil life. 

Owing to the entire absence of reliable topo- 
graphical maps, the labors of this corps were 
difficult and arduous in the extreme. Notwith- 
standing the energy and ability displayed by 
General Humphreys, Lieutenant-Colonel Ma- 
comb, and their subordinates, who frequently 
obtained the necessary information under fire, 
the movements of the army were sometimes 
unavoidably delayed by the difllculty of obtain- 
ing knowledge of the country in advance. The 
result of their labors has been the preparation of 
an excellent series of maps, which will be inval- 
uable to any array traversing the same ground. 

During the campaign it was impossible to draw 
a distinct line of demarkation between the duties 
of the two corps of engineers, so that the labors 
of reconnoissances of roads, of lines of iutrench- 
ments, of fields for battle, and of the position of 
the enemy, as well as the construction of siege 
and defensive works, were habitually performed 
by details from either corps, as the convenience 
of the service demanded. 

I desire to express my high appreciation of the 
skill, gallantry, and devotion displayed by the 
officers of both corps of engineers, under the 
most trying circumstances. 

During the Maryland campaign I imited the 
two corps imder Captain J. C. Duane, United 
States Engineers, and found great advantages 
from the arrangement. 

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 

For the operations of the medical department 
I i-efer to the reports, transmitted herewith, of 
Surgeon Charles S. Tripler and Surgeon Jona- 
than Letter man, who, in turn, performed the 
duties of medical director of the army of the 
Potomac, the former from August 12, 1861, until 
July 1, 1862, and the latter after that date. The 
difficulties to be overcome in organizing and 
making effective the medical department were 
very great, arising principally from the inexperi- 
ence of the regimental medical officers, many of 
whom were physicians taken suddenly from civil 
life, who, according to Surgeon Tripler, " had to 
be instructed in their duties from the very alpha- 
bet," and from the ignorance of the line officers 
as to their relations with the medical officers, 
wliich gave rise to confusion and confiict of 
authority. Boards of examination were insti- 
tuted, by which many ignorant officers were 
removed; and by the successive exertions of 
Surgeons Ti'ipler and Letterman, the medical 
corps was brought to a very high degree of effi- 
ciency. With regard to the sanitary condition 
of the army while on the Potomac, Dr. Tripler 
says that the records show a constantly increas- 
ing immunity from disease. " In October and 
November, 1861, with an army averaging 130,000 
men, we had 7,932 cases of fever of all sorts ; 
of these, about 1,000 were reported as cases of, 
typhoid fever. I know that errors of diagnosis 
were frequently committed, and therefore tliia 



must be considered as the limit of typhoid cases. 
If any army in the world can show such a record 
as this, I do not know when or where it was 
assembled." From September, ISOl, to Feb- 
ruary, 1862, while the army was increasing, the 
number of sick decreased from 7 per cent, to 
6.18 per cent. Of those, the men sick in the 
regimental and general hospitals were less than 
one half; the remainder were slight cases, under 
treatment in quarters. " During this time, so 
far as rumor was concerned, the army was being 
decimated by disease every month." Of the 
8<initary condition of the army during the Penin- 
sula campaign, up to its arrival at Harrison's 
Landing, Dr. Tripler says : " During this cam- 
paign the army was favored witli cxcL'llent health. 
No epidemic disease appeared. Those scourges 
of modern armies — dysentery, tupus, cholera — 
were almost unknown. We had some typhoid 
fever and more malarial fevers, but even these 
never prevailed to such an extent as to create 
any alarm. The sick reports were sometimes 
larger than we cared to have them ; but the great 
majority of the cases reported were such as did 
not threaten life or permanent disability. I 
regret that I have not before me the retained 
copies of the monthly reports, so that I might 
give accurate statistics. I have endeavored to 
i-ecover them, but have been unsuccessful. My 
recollection is, that the whole sick report never 
exceeded 8 per cent, of the force, and this includ- 
ing all sorts of cases, the tiivial as well as the 
severe. The army of the Potomac must be con- 
ceded to have been the most healthy army in the 
service of the United States." 

His remarks at the conclusion of his report 
upon our system of medical administration, and 
his suggestions for its impi-ovement, are especi- 
ally worthy of attention. 

The service, labors, and privations of the 
troops during the seven days' battles had, of 
course, a great effect on the health of the army, 
after it reached Harrison's Landing, increasing 
the number of sick to about 20 per cent, of the 
whole force. 

The nature of the military operations had also 
unavoidably placed the medical department in a 
very unsatisfactory condition. Supplies Ivad 
been almost entirely exhausted or necessarily 
abandoned; hospital tents abandoned or de- 
stroyed, and the medical officers deficient in 
numbers and broken down by fatigue. 

All the remarkable energy and ability of Sur- 
geon Letterman were required to restore the 
efficiency of his department; but before we left 
Harrison's Landing he had succeeded in fitting 
it out thoroughly with the supplies it required, 
and the health of the army was vastly improved 
by the sanitary measures which were enforced 
at his suggestion. 

The great haste with which the army was 
removed from the Peninsula made it necessary 
to leave at Fort Monroe, to be forwarded after- 
wards, nearly all the baggage and transportation, 
including medical stores and ambulances, all the 
vessels being required to transport the troops 
themselves and their ammunition ; and when the 
army of the Potomac returned to Washington 
after General Pope's campaign, and the medical 
department came once more under Surgeon 
Letterman's control, he found it in a deplorable 



20 



condition. The officers were worn out by the 
labors they had performed, and the few supplies 
that had been brought from the Pcnin^;uhv had 
been exhaustetl or abandoned, so that the work 
of reorgani/ation and resupplying had to be 
again perfornu'd, and tliis while the army was 
moving rapidly, and almost in the face of the 
enemy. Tliat" it was successfully accoinplished 
is shown by the care and attention which the 
wounded reci'ived after the battles of South 
Mountain and AiUk'tam. 

Among the improvements introduced into his 
department by Surgeon Letterman, the principal 
are the organization of an auil)idance corps, the 
system of licdd hospitals, ami the method of sup- 
plying by lirigades, all of which were instituted 
during tlie Maryland campaign, and have since 
proved very efficient. 

QTTAUTERM aster's DErARTMENT. 

On assuming command of the troops in and 
around Wasliington, I api)ointcd Captain S. Van 
Vliet, assistant quartermaster, (afterwards brig- 
adier-general,) chief quartermaster to my com- 
mand, and gave him the necessary instructions 
for organizing his department, and collecting the 
supplies requisite for the large army then called 
for. 

The disaster at Manassas had but recently oc- 
curred, and the army was quite destitute of quar- 
termaster's stores. General Van Vliet, with 
great energy and zeal, set iiimself about the task 
of furnishing the supplies innncdiately necessary, 
and preparing to obtain tlie still larger amounts 
which would be required by the new troops, 
which were moving in large numbers towards 
the capital. The principal depot for supplies in 
the city of Washington was under charge of Col- 
onel D. H. Rucker, assistant quartermaster, wlio 
ably performed his duties. l.ieutenant-Colonel 
R. Ingalls, assistant quartermaster, was placed 
in charge of the department on the south side of 
the Potomac. I directed a large depot for trans- 
portation to be estal)lislied at rerryvilk-, on the 
left bank of the Susquehanna, a point equally 
accessible by rail and water. Captain C. G. 
Sawtelle, assistant quartermaster, was detailed 
to organize the cam}), and performed his duties 
to my entire satisfaction. Captain J. J. Dana, 
assistant quartermaster, had immediate charge 
of the transportation in and about Washington, 
as well as the large number of horses purchased 
for the use of the artillery and cavalry. The 
principal difficulties whicli tieneral Van Vliet 
had to encounter arose from the inexperience of 
the majority of the officers of his department in 
the new regiments and brigades. 

The necessity of attending personally to minor 
details rendered his duties ardiu)us and harass- 
ing in the extreme. All obstacles, however, 
were surmounted by the untiring industry of the 
chief quartermaster and his immediate subordi- 
nates, and wlien the army was prepared to move 
the organization of the department was found to 
be admiraljle. 

When it was d(>termined to move the army to 
the Peninsula, the duties of providing water 
transportatiiin were devolved by the Secretary 
of War upon his assistant, the lion. John Tuc- 
ker. The vessels were ordered to Alexandria, 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls was placed in 



immediate charge of the embarkation of troops, 
transportation, and material of every descrip- 
tion. Operations of this nature, on so extensive 
a scale, had no parallel in the history of our 
country. 

The arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ingalls were perfected with remarkable skill and 
energy, and the army and its material were era- 
barked and transported to Fortress Monroe in a 
very short space of time, and entirely without 
loss. 

During the operations on the Peninsula, until 
the arrival of troops at Harrison's Landing, Gen- 
eral Van Vliet retained the position of chief 
quartermaster, and maintained the thorough or- 
ganization and efficiency of his department. The 
principal depots of supplies were under the im- 
mediate charge of Lieutenant Colonels Ingalls 
and Sawtelle. 

On the 10th of July, 1862, General Van Vliet 
having requested to be relieved from duty with 
the army of the Potomac, I appointed Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Ingalls chief quartermaster, and he 
continued to discharge the duties of that office 
during the remainder of the Peninsula and Mary- 
land campaigns, in a manner which fully stis- 
tained the high reputatio^n he had previously 
acquired. 

The immediate amount of labor accomplished, 
often under the most difficult circumstances, the 
admirable system under which the duties of the 
department were performed, and the entire suc- 
cess which attended the etiorts to supply so largHj 
an army, reflect the highest credit upon the offi- 
cers upon whom these onerous duties devolved. 
The reports of General Van Vliet and Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Ingalls, with the accompanying doc- 
uments, give in detail the history of the depart- 
ment from its organization imtil I was relieved 
from the command of the army of the Potomac. 

SUBSISTENCE DJ'.PARTMENT. 

On the 1st of August, 1861, Colonel H. F. 
Clark, eomnusary of subsistence, joined my staff", 
and at once entered ujion his duties as chief com- 
missary of the army of the Potomac. In order 
to realize the resijonsibilities pertaining to this 
office, as well as to form a proper estimate of the 
vast amount of labor M'hich must necessarily de- 
volve upon its occupant, it is only necessary to 
consider the unprepared state of the country to 
engage in a war of such magnitude as the pres- 
ent, and the lack of practical knowledge, on 
the part of the officers, with reference to supply- 
ing and subsisting a large and at that time unor- 
ganized army. Yet, notwithstanding the exist- 
ence of these great obstacles, the manner in which 
the duties of the commissary department were 
discharged was such as to merit and call forth 
the connnendation of the entire army. 

During the stay of the army of the Potomac in 
the vicinity of Washington, prior to the Penin- 
sula campaign, its subsistence was drawn chiefly 
from the depots which had been established by 
the commissary department at Washington, Al- 
exandria, Forts Corcoran and Runj'on. In the 
imi)ortant task of designating and establishing 
dei)ots of supplies. Colonel Clark was ably sec- 
onded by his assistants. Colonel Amos Beck- 
with, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A. ; 
Lieutenant-Colonel George Bell, commissary of 



21 



subsistence, U. S. A. ; Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. 
Porter, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A. : 
Captain Thomas Wilson, commissary of subsist- 
ence, U. S. A.; Captain BrownwcU Granger, 
commissary of subsistence, U. S. volunteers ; 
Cajitain W. H. Bell, commissary of subsistence, 
U. S. A ; Captain J. H. Woodward, commissary 
of subsistence, U. S. volunteers ; and Captain 
W. R. Murphy, commissary of subsistence, U. S. 
volunteers. 

For a full knowledge of the highly creditable 
manner in which each and all of the above-men- 
tioned officers discharged their duties, I invite 
attention to the detailed report of Colonel Clarke. 
The remarks and suggestions contained in his 
report are worthy of attention, as affording 
valuable rules for the future guidance of the 
subsistence department in supphdng armies in 
the field. The success of the subsistence depart- 
ment of the army of the Potomac was in a great 
measure attributable to the fact that the sub- 
sistence department at Washington made ample 
provision for sending supirfies to the Peninsula, 
and that it always exercised the most intelligent 
foresight. It moreover gave its advice and 
countenance to the officers charged with its 
duties and reputation in the field, and those 
officers, I am happy to say, worked with it, and 
together, in perfect harmony for the public good. 
During the entire period that I was in command 
of the a,rmy of the Potomac, there was no 
instance within my knowledge where the troops 
were without their rations from any fault of the 
officers of this department. 

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 

This very important branch of the service 
was placed under the charge of Captain C. P. 
Kingsbury, ordnance coi'jis, colonel and aide-de- 
camp. Great difficulty existed in the proper 
organization of the department for the want of 
a sufficient number of suitable officers to perform 
the duties at the various headquarters and depots 
of supply. But far greater obstacles had to be 
surmounted, from the fact that the supply of 
small arras was totally inadequate to the demands 
of a large army, and a vast proportion of those 
furnished were of such inferior quality as to be 
unsatisfactory to the troops, and condemned by 
their officers. The supply of artillery was more 
abundant, but of great variety. Rifled ordnance 
was just coming into use, for the first time in 
this country, and the description of gun and kind 
of projectile which would prove most effective, 
and should, therefore, be adopted, was a mere 
matter of tlieory. To obviate these difficulties, 
large quantities of small arms of foreign manu- 
facture were contracted for; private enteii^rise 
in the construction of arms and ammunition was 
encouraged; and by the time the army was 
ordered to move to the Peninsula the amount of 
ordnance and ordnance stores was ample. Much 
also had been done to bring the quality, both of 
arms and ammunition, up to the proper standard. 
Boards of officers were in session continually 
during the autumn and winter of 18G1, to test 
the relative merits of new arms and projectiles. 

The reports of these boards, confirmed by^ 
subsequent experience in the field, have done 
much to establish the respective claims of diflTer- 
ent inventors and manufacturers. During the 



campaigns of the Peninsula and IMaryland, the 
officers connected with the department were 
zealous and energetic, and kept tlie troops well 
supplied, notwithstanding the perplexing and 
arduous nature of their duties. One great 
source of perplexity was the fact that it had 
been necessary to issue arms of all varieties and 
calibres, giving an equal diversity in the kinds 
of ammunition required. Untiring watchfulness 
was, therefore, incumbent upon the officers in 
charge, to prevent confusion and improper dis- 
tri])ution of cartridges. Colonel Kingsbury dis- 
charged the duties of his office with great effi- 
ciency until the day of July, 1SG2, when 

his health required that he should be relieved. 
First Lieutenant Thomas G. Baylor, ordnance 
corps, succeeded him, and performed his duty 
during the rcmaintler of the Peninsula and 
Maryland campaigns with marked ability and 
success. 

The want of i-eports from Colonel Ivingsbury 
and Lieutenant Baylor renders it impossible for 
me to enter at all into the details of the organi- 
zation of the department. 

PROVOST marshal's department. 

Immediately after I was placed in command 
of the " Division of the Potomac," I appointed 
Colonel Andrew Porter, IGth regiment infantry, 
provost marshal of Washington. All the avail- 
able regular infantry, a battery and a squadron 
of cavalry were placed under his command, and 
by his energetic action he soon corrected the 
serious evils wliich existed, and restored order 
in the city. 

When the army was about to take the field, 
General Porter was appointed Provost Marshal 
General of the army of the Potomac, and held 
that most important position imtil the end of the 
Peninsula campaign, when sickness, contracted 
in the untiring discharge of his duties, com- 
pelled him to ask to be relieved from the posi- 
tion he had so ably and energetically filled. 

The Provost Marshal General's dej)artment 
had the charge of a class of duties which had not 
before, in our service, been defined and grouped 
under the management of a special department. 
The following subjects indicate the sphere of 
tliis department : ^.uppression of marauding and 
depredations, and of all brawls and disturb- 
ances, preservation of good order, and suppres- 
sion of disturbances beyond tlie limits of the 
camps. 

Prevention of straggling on the march. 

Suppression of gambling houses, drinking 
houses, or bar-rooms, and brothels. 

Regulation of hotels, taverns, markets, and 
places of public amusement. 

Searches, seizures, and arrests. Execution of 
sentences of general courts-martial, involving 
imprisonment or capital punishment. Enforce- 
ment of orders proliibiting the sale of intoxicat- 
ing liquors, whether by tradesmen or suttlers, 
and of orders respecting passes. 

Desei-ters from the enemy. 

Prisoners of war taken from the enemy. 

Countersigning safeguards. 

Passes to citizens within the lines, and for 
purposes of trade. 

Complaints of citizens as to the conduct of 
the soldiers. 



22 



General Porter was assisted by the following- 
named officers : — 

Major W. H. Wood, 17th United States in- 
fantry; Captain James McMillom, acting assist- 
ant adjutant-general, 17th United States infantry; 
Captain W. 'T. Gentry, 17th United States in- 
fantry; Captain J. W. Forsurth, 18th United 
States infantry; Lieutenant J. W. Jones, 12th 
United Statesinfantry ; Lieutenant C. F. Trow- 
bridge, IGth United Statesinfantry; and Lieu- 
tenant C. D. Mehafl'ey, 1st United States in- 
fantry. 

The provost guard was composed of the 2d 
Uniied States cavalry. Major Pleasanton, and a 
battalion of the 8th and 17th United States in- 
fantry. Major Willard. After General Porter 
was relieved. Major Wood was in charge of this 
department until after the battle of Antietam, 
when Brigadier-General Patrick was appointed 
Provost Marshal General. 

COMMANDANT OF GENERAL HEACQUARTEES. 

When the army took the field, for the purpose 
of securing order and regularity in the camp of 
headquarters, and facilitating its movements, the 
office of conmiandant of general headquarters 
was created, and assigned to Major G. O. Haller, 
7th LTnited States inf'antrJ^ Six companies of 
infantry were placed under his orders for guard 
and police duty. Among the orders appended 
to this report is the one defining his duties, 
which were always satisfactorily performed. 

JUDGE ADVOCATE. 

From August, 18G1, the position of judge 
advocate was held by Colonel Thomas T. Gantt, 
aide-de-camp, until compelled by ill health to 
retire, at Harrison's Landing, in August, 18G2. 
His reviews of the decisions of courts-martial 
during this period were of great utility in cor- 
recting the practice in military courts, diflusing 
true notions of disci])Hne and subordination, and 
setting before tlie army a higli standard of soldi- 
erly honor. Upon the retirement of Colonel 
Gantt the duties of judge advocate were ably 
performed by Colonel Thomas M. Key, aide-de- 
camp. 

SIGNAL CORPS. 

The method of conveying intelligence and 
orders, invented and introduced into the service 
by Major Albert J. Myer, signal officer United 
States army, was first jn-actically tested in large 
operations during the organization of the army 
of the Potomac. 

Under the direction of Major Myer a signal 
corps was formed by detailing officers and men 
from the different regiments of volunteers and 
instructing them in the use of the flags by day 
and torciies by night. 

Tlie chief signal officer was indefatigable in 
his exertions to render his corps effective, and 
it soon became available for service in every 
division of the army. In addition to the flags 
and torches. Major Myer introduced a portable 
insulated telegraph wire, which could be readily 
laid from point to point, and which could be 
used under the same genera! system. In front 
of Washington, and on the Lower Potomac, at 
any point within our lines not reached by the 
rrulitary telegraph, the great usefulness of this 



system of signals was made manifest. But ;* 
was not until after the arrival of the army upo 
the Peninsula, and during the siege and battU^i ji 
of that and the Maryland campaigns, that i\-* '; 
great benefits to be derived from it on the fie:d 
and under fire were fully appreciated. 

There was scarcely any action or skirmish in 
whicli the signal corps did not render important 
services. Often under heavy fire of artillery, 
and not unfrequently while exposed to musketry, 
the officers and men of this corps gave infor- 
mation of tlie movements of the enemy, and 
transmitted directions for the evolutions of our 
own troops. 

The rei)ort of the chief signal officer, with ac- 
companying documents, will give the details of 
the services of this corps, and call attention to 
those members of it who were part'icnlarly 
distinguished. 

TELEGRAPHIC. 

The telegraphic operations of the army (»* the 
Potomac were superintended by Major Thomas 
J. Eckert, and under tlie immediate direction of 

Mr. Caldwell, who was, with a corps of 

operators, attached to my headquarters during 
the entire campaigns upon the Peninsula and in 
Maryland. 

Tlie services of this corps were arduous and 
efficient. Under the admirable arrangements of 
Major Eckert they were constantly provided 
with all the material for constructing new lines, 
•which were rapidly established whenever the 
army changed position ; and it was not unfre- 
quently the case that the operatives worked un- 
der fire from the enemy's guns ; yet they invari- 
ably performed all the duties required of them 
with great alacrity and cheerfulness, and it was 
seldom that I was without the means of direct 
telegraphic communication with the War De- 
partment and with the corps commanders. 

From the organization of the army of the Po- 
tomac up to November 1. 1862, including the 
PeninjJiila and Maryland campaigns, upwards of 
twelve hundred (1,200) miles of military tele- 
graph line had been constructed in connection 
with the operations of the army, and the number 
of operatives and builders employed was about 
two hundred, (200.) 

To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and enter- 
prising aeronaut, who had the management of 
the balloons, I was greatly indebted for tlie valu- 
able information obtained during his ascensions. 

I have more than once taken occasion to re- 
commend the members of my staff, botii general 
and personal, for promotion and reward. I beg 
leave to repeat these recommendations, and to 
record tluir names in the history of the army of 
the Potomac, as gallant soldiers, to whom their 
country owes a debt of gratitude still unpaid, for 
the courage, ability, and untiring zeal they dis- 
played during the eventful campaigns in which 
they bore so prominent a part. 



CHAPTER II. 

On the 15th of October the main body of the 
army of the Potomac was in the immediate 
vicinity of Washington, with detachments on 



23 



the left bank of the Potomac as fnr down as 
Liverpool point, and as far up as Williamsport 
and its vicinity. The different divisions wore 
posted as follows : Hooker at Budd's ferry, 
Lower Potomac ; Heintzelman at Fort Lyon and 
vicinity ; Franklin near the theological semi- 
nary; Blcnker near Hunter's chapel; McDowell 
at Upton's hill and Arlington; F. J. Porter at 
Hall's and Miner's hills ; Smith at Mackall's 
hill;McCall atLangley; Buellat Tenallytown, 
Meridian hill, Emow's chapel, &c., on the left 
bank of the river; Casey at Washington; Stone- 
man's cavalry at Washington; Hunt's artillery 
at Wasliington; Banks at Darnestown, with de- 
tachments at Point of Rocks, Sandy Hook, Wil- 
liamsport, &o. ; Stone at Poolesville ; and Dix 
at Baltimore, with detachments on the Eastern 
Shore. 

On the 10th of October, 18GI. General McCall 
marched to Drainsville with his division, in order 
to cover reconnoissances to be made in all direc- 
tions the next day, for the purpose of learning 
the position of the enemy, and of covering the 
operations of the topographical engineers in 
making maps of tlv.it region. 

On the 2'Jth, acting in concert with General 
McCall, General S'mith jiushed strcmg parties to 
Freedom hill, Vienna, Flint hill. Peacock hill, 
&c., to accomplish the same ])urpose in that part 
of the front. These reconnoissances were suc- 
cessful. 

On the morning of the 20th I received the 
following telegram from General Banks's head- 
quarters : — 

" Darnestown, October 20, 1861. 
" Sir : The signal station at Sugar Loaf tele- 
graphs that the enemy have moved away from 
Leesburg. All quiet here. 

"R. M. COPELAND, 
" Assistant Adj utant- General. 
"General Mabcy." 

Wliereupon I sent to General Stone, at Pooles- 
ville, the following telegram : — 

"Camp Griffin, October 20, 1861. 
" General McClcllan desires me to inform you 
that General McCall occupied Drainsville yes- 
terday, and is still there. Will send out heavy 
reconnoissances to-day in all directions from 
that point. The general desires that you will 
keep a good look-out iijoon Leesburg, to see if 
this movement has the effect to drive them away. 
Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part 
would have the effect to move them. 

"A. y. COLBURN, 
" Assista7it Adjutant- General. 
" Brigadier-General C. P. Stone, Poolesville." 

Deeming it possible that General McCall's 
movement to Drainsville, together with the 
subsequent reconoissances, might have the effect 
of inducing the enemy to abandon Leesburg, 
and tiie despatch from Sugar Loaf appearing to 
confirm this view, I wish General Stone, who 
had onlj' a line of pickets on the river, the mass 
of his troops being out of sight of, and beyond 
range from, the Virginia bank, to make some 
display of an intention to cross, and also to 
watcn the enemy more closely than usual. I 
did not direct him to cross, nor did I intend that 



he should cross the river in force, for the pur- 
pose of fighting. 

The above despatch was sent on the 20th, and 
reached General Stone as early as 11 a. m. of 
that day. I expected him to accomplish all that 
was intended on the same day; and this he did, 
as will be seen from the folhnving despatch, re- 
ceived at my headquarters in Washington from 
Poolesville on the evening of October 20 : — 

" Made a feint of crossing at this place this af- 
ternoon, and at the same time started a recon- 
noitring party towards Leesburg from Harrison's 
Island. The enemy's pickets retired to in- 
trencliments. Report of reconnoitring party not 
yet received. I have means of crossing one 
hundred and twenty- five men once in ten min- 
utes at each of two points. River falling slowly, 
"C. P. STONE. 

" B rigadier- General. 

" Major-General McClellan." 

As it was not foreseen or expected that Gen- 
eral McCall would be needed to co-operate with 
Gener.il Stone in any attack, he was directed to 
fall back from Drainsville to his original camp, 
near Prospect hill, as soon as the required re- 
connoissances were completed. 

Accordingly he left Drainsville, on his return, 
at about 8^ a. m. of the 21st, reachmg his old 
camp at about 1 a. m. 

In the mean time I was surprised to hear from 
General Stone tJiata portion of his troops were 
engaged on the Virginia side of the river, and at 
once sent instructions to General McCall to re- 
main at l)rains\ille, if he had not left before the 
order reached him. 

The order did not reach him until his return 
to his camp at Langley. He was then ordered 
to rest his men, and hold his division in read- 
iness to return to Drainsville at a moment's no- 
tice, should it become necessary. Similar instruc- 
tions were given to other divisions during the af- 
ternoon. 

The first intimation I received from General 
Stone of the real nature of his movements was iu 
a telegram, as follows : — 

" Edwards's Ferry, October 21 — 11.10 a. m. 
" The enemy have been engaged opposite Har- 
rison's island ; our men are bchavin<jc admirably. 
" C. P. STONE, 

Brigadier- General, 
"Major-General McClellan." 

At 2 p. M. General Banks's adj utant- general 
sent the following : — 

" Darnestown, October 21, 1801 — 2 p. m. 

"General Stone safely crossed the river this 

morning. Some engagements have taken place 

on the other side of the river, — how important is 

not known. 

"R. M. COPELAND, 
^^ Acting Assistant Adjutant- General. 
" General R. B. Maucy." 

General Stone sent the following despatches on 
the same day at the hours indicated : — 

" Edward's Fekuy, October 21, 18G1 — 2 p. m. 

" There has been sharp firing on the right of 

our line, and our troops appear to be advancing 



24 



there under Eakor. Tlie loft, under Gorman, 
has advanced its skirmishers nearly one mile, 
and, if the movement continues successful, will 
turn the enemy's right. 

"C. P. STONE, 
" Brigadier- General, 
" Major-General McClellan." 

" Edward's Ferry, October 21, 18G1 — 4 p. m. 
" Nearly all my force is across the river. Ba- 
ker on the right; Gorman on the left. Right, 
sharply engaged. 

" C. P. STONE, 
" Brigadier-General. 
" General McClellax." 

" Edward's Ferry, October 21, 1861 — y.80 p. m. 

" I am occupied in preventing further disaster, 
and try to get into a position to redeem. Wq 
have lost some of our best commanders, — Baker 
dead, Cogswell a prisoner or secreted. '1 he 
wounded are being carefully and rapidly re- 
moved; and Gorman's wing is being cautit)usly 
withdrawn. Any advance from Drainsville must 
be made cautiously. 

" All was reported going well up to Baker's 
death, but, in the confusion following that, the 
right wing was outflanked. In a few hours I 
shall, unless an niglit attack is made, be in the 
same position as last night, save the loss of many 
good men. 

'• C. P. STONE. 
" Brigadier- General. 

" Major-General McClellan." 

Althougli no more fully informed of the state 
of affiiirs, I had, during the afternoon, as a pre- 
cautionary measure, ordered General Banks to 
send one brigade to the support of the troops at 
Harrison's island, and to move with the other 
two to Senecca mills, ready to support General 
Stone if necessary. The 9.30 p. m. despatch of 
General Stone did not give me an entire under- 
standing of the state of the case. 

Aware of the difficulties and perhaps fatal con- 
sequences of recrossing such a river as the Poto- 
mac after a repulse, and from these telegrams 
eupposing his whole force to be on the Virginiu 
side, I directed General Stone to intrench him- 
self, and hold the Virginia sides at all hazards 
until reinforcements could arrive, when he 
could safely witlidraw to the Maryland side, or 
hold his position on the Virginia side, should 
that prove advisable. 

General Banks was instructed to move the 
rest of his division to Edwards's ferry, and to 
send over as many men as possilile before day- 
light to reinforce Stone. He did not arrive in 
time to effect this, and was instructed to collect 
all the canal-boats he could find, and use them 
for crossing at Edward's ferry in sufficient force 
to enable the troops already there to hold the op- 
posite side. 

On the 22d I went to the ground in person, 
and reaching Poolesville, learned for the first time 
the full details of the affair. 

The following extract from the evidence of 
General Stone before the " Conmiittce on the 
Conduct of the War "on the 5th of January, 
18(J2, will throw further light on the occurrence. 

General Stone says he received the order 



from my headquarters to make a slight demon- 
stration at about 11 o'clock a. ji. <m the 20tli, 
and that, in obedience to that order, he made the 
demonstration on the evening of the same day. 

In regard to the reconnoissance on the 21st, 
which resulted in the battle of Ball's BluflT, he 
was a-«ked the following questions : — 

Question. "Did this reconnoissance origi- 
nate with yourself, or had you orders from the 
general-in-chief to make it?" 

To which he replied, " It origimited with my- 
self, — the reconnoissance." 

Question. " The order did not proceed from 
General McCleUanV " 

Answer. " I was chrected the day before to 
make a demonstration; that demonstration was 
made the day previous." 

Question. " Did you receive an order from the 
general-in-chicf to make tlie reconnoissance V "' 

Answer. " No, sir." 

Making a pereonal examination on the 23d. I 
foirnd th;it the position on tlie Virginia side at 
Edward's Ferry was not a tenalde one, but did 
not think it wise to wkhdraw the troops by day- 
light. I therefore caused more artillery to be 
placed in position, on t!ie ^laryland side to cover 
the approaches to the ground held by us, and 
crossed t!ie few additional tro'ps that tlie liigii 
wind permitted us to get over, so as to !)e as se- 
cure as possible against any attack during the 
day. Before nightfall all the precautions were 
taken to secure an orderly and quiet passage of 
the troops and guns. 

The movement was commenced soon after 
dark, under the personal supervisiim of General 
Stone, who received the order for the withdrawal 
at 7.1.5 p. M. 

By 4 a. m. of the 24th everything had reached 
the Maryland shore in safety. 

A few days afterwards I received information 
which seemed to be authentic to the eltect tiiat 
large bodies of the enemy had been ordered f.-om 
Manassas to Lcesburg, to cut off our troops on 
the Virginia side. Their timely withdrawal had 
probably prcvcntt d a still more serious disaster. 

I refer to General Stone',': report of this battle, 
furnished the War Department, and his pub- 
lished testimony liefore the "Committee on the 
Conduct of the War" for further details. 

The records of the War Department show my 
anxiety and efl^orts to assume active offensive 
operations in the fall and early winter. It is 
only just to say, however, that the unprecedented 
condition of the roads and Virginia soil M-otild 
have delayed an advance till February, had the 
discipline, organization, and equipment of the 
army been a^ complete at the close cf the fall as 
Avas necessary, and as I desired and labored 
against every impediment to make them. 

AV^hile still in command only of the army of 
the Potomac, namely, in early September, I pro- 
posed the formation of a corps of New ICngland- 
ers for coast service in the bays and inlets of the 
Chesapeake and Potomac, to co-operate Avith my 
own command, from which most of its material 
was drawn. 

On the first of November, however, I was 
called to relieve Lieutenant-Gencral Scott in the 
cliief and general command of the armies of tiie 
Union. TJie direction and nature of this coast 
expedition therefore, were somewhat changed, 



I 



25 



as will soon appear in the original plan submitted 
to the Secretary of War, and the letter of in- 
structions later issued to General Burnside, its 
commander. The whole country mdeed had 
now become the theatre of military operations 
from the Potomac to beyond the Mississippi; 
and to assist the navy in perfecting and sustain- 
ing the blockade, it became necessary to extend 
these operations to points on the sea-coast, 
Roanoke Island, Savannah, and New Orleans. 
It remained also to equip and organize the armies 
of the West, whose condition was little better 
tlian that of the army of the Potomac had been. 
The direction of the campaigns in the West, 
and of the operations upon the seaboard, 
enabled me to enter upon larger combinations 
and to accomplish results, the necessity and 
advantage of which had not been unforeseen, 
but wliich had been beyond the ability of the 
single army formerly under my command to 
effect. 

The following letters, and a subsequent paper 
addressed to the Secretary of AVar, sufficiently 
indicate the nature of those combinations to 
minds accustomed to reason upon military opera- 
tions : — 

*' Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Washington, Septeuiher 6, 18G1. 

" Sir : I have the honor to suggest the follow- 
ing proposition, with the request that the neces- 
saiy authority be at once given me to carry it 
out : to organize a force of two brigades of live 
regiments each, of New England men, for the 
general service, but particularly adapted to coast 
service, — the officers and men to be sufficiently 
conversant with boat service to manage steamers, 
sailing vessels, launches, barges, surf-boats, 
floating batteries, &c. To charter or buy for the 
command a sufficient number of propellers, or 
tug-boats, for transportation of men and supplies, 
the machinery of wliich should be amply pro- 
tected by timl)or ; the vessels to have permanent 
experienced officers from the merchant service, 
but to be manned by details from the command. 
A naval officer to be attached to the staff of 
the commanding officer. The flank companies 
of each regiment to be armed with Dahlgren 
boat guns, and carbines with Avater-^jroof car- 
tridges ; the other companies to have sucli arms 
as I may hereafter designate ; to be uniformed 
and equipped as the Rhode Island regiments are. 
Launches and floating batteries with timber para- 
pets of sufficient capacity to land or bring into 
action the entire force. 

" The entire management and organization of 
the force to be under my control, and to form an 
integral part of the army of the Potomac. 

" The immediate object of this force is for 
operations in the inlets of Chesapeake Bay and 
the Potomac ; by enaljling me thus to land troops 
at points where tlicy are needed, this force can 
also be used in conjunction with a naval force 
operating against points on the sea-coast. This 
coast division to be commanded by a general 
officer of my selection ; the regiments to be 
organized as other land forces ; the disburse- 
ments for vessels, &c., to be made by the proper 
department of the army upon the requisitions of 
the general commanding the division, with my 
approval. 



"I think the entire force can be organized in 
thirty days, and by no means the least of the 
advantages of this proposition is the fact that it 
will call into the service a class of men who 
would not otherwise enter the army. 

" You will immediately perceive that the olyect 
of this force is to follow along the coast, and up 
the inlets and rivers, the movements of the main 
army when it advances. 

"I am, very respectfullv. your otjedient ser- 
vant, G. B. iVIcCLELLAN, 

" Major- General Commanding. 

" Hon. Simon Cameron, 

" Secretary of War." 

Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procuring the 
requisite vessels, and adapting them to the special 
purposes contemplated, this expedition was not 
ready for service until January, 18(32. Then in 
the chief command, I deemed it best to send it 
to North Carolina, Avith the design indicated 
in the following letter : — 

" Headquarters of the Army, 
" Washington, January 7, 1862. 

"General: In accordance with verbal in- 
structions heretofore given you, you will, after 
uniting with Flag-officer Goldsborough at Fort 
Monroe, proceed under his convoy to Hattcras 
Inlet, where you will in connection with him 
take the most prompt measures for crossing the 
fleet over the Bulkhead into the waters of the 
sound. Under the accompanying general order 
constituting the department of North Carolina, 
you will assume command of the garrison at 
Hatteras Inlet, and make such dispositions in 
regard to that place as your ulterior operations 
may render necessary, always being careful to 
provide for the safety of that very important 
station in any contingency. 

" Your first point of attack Avill be Roanoke 
Island and its dependencies. It is presumed 
that the navy can reduce the batteries on the 
marshes, and cover the lanchng of your troops 
on the main island, by which, in connection with 
a rapid movement of the gunboats to the northern 
extremity, as soon as the marsh battery is re- 
duced, it may be hoped to capture the entire 
garrison of the place. Having occupied the 
island and its dependencies, you will at once pro- 
ceed to the erection of the batteries and defences 
necessary to hold it with a small force. Should 
the flag-officer require any assistance in seizing 
or holding the debouches of tlie canal from Nor- 
folk, youVill please afford it to him. 

" The commodore and yourself having com- 
pleted your arrangements in regard to Roanoke 
Island, and the Avaters north of it. you will please 
at once make a descent on Newliern, having 
gained possession of Avhich, and the railroad 
passing through it, you will at once throw a 
sufficient force upon Beaufort, and take the steps 
necessary to reduce Fort Macon and open that 
port. When you seize Newborn, you Avill en- 
deavor to seize the railroad as far Avest as Golds- 
borough, should circumstances favor such a 
movement. The temper of the people, the Rebel 
force at hand, &c., Avill go far towards determin- 
ing the question as to how far Avest the railroad 
can be safely occupied and held. Should cir- 
cumstances render it advisable to seize and hold 
lialeigh, the main north and south line of rail- 



26 



road passing through Goldsborough should be so 
effectually destroyed for considerable distances 
north and south of that point, as to render it 
impossible for the Rebels to use it to your disad- 
vantage. A great point would be gained, in any 
evenr, l)y the etiectual destruction of the Wil- 
mington and Weldon Railroad. 

"I would advise great caution in moving so 
far into the interior as upon Raleigh. Having 
accomplished the objects mentioned, the next 
I)oint of interest would probably be Wilmington, 
the reduction of which may require that addi- 
tional means shall be afforded you. I would 
urge great caution in regard to proclamations. 
In no case wouhl I go beyond a moderate joint 
proclamation with the naval commander, which 
should say as little as possible about politics or 
the negro ; merely state that the true issue for 
which we ;ire fighting is the preservation of the 
Union, and upholding the laws of the General 
Government, and stating that all who conduct 
themselves proi>erly will, as far as possible, be 
protected in their persons and property. 

" You will please report your operati-'i.- "J 
otYen as an o])portunity offers itself. 

" With my best wishes for vour success, I am. 
&c., &c. GEO. B. MtCLELLAN, 

" Major- General Commanding in Chief. 

"Brigadier-General A. E. Buexside, 
" Commanding Expedition." 

The following letters of instruction were sent 
to Generals Halleck, Buell, Sherman, and 
Butler; and I also communicated verbally to 
these officers my views in full regarding the held 
of operations assigned to each, and gave them 
their instructions as much in detail as was neces- 
sary at that time : — ^ 

" Headquarters of the Army, 
" Washington, D. C, Noremher 11, 18(J1. 

" General : In assigning you to the command 
of the department of Missouri, it is probably 
unnecessary for me to state that I have intrusted 
to you a duty which requires the utmost tact and 
decision. 

" You have not merely the ordinary duties of 
a military commander to perform; but the far 
more difficult task of reducing chaos to order, of 
changing probably the majority of the personnel 
of the staff of the department, and of reducing 
to a point of econom}', consistent with the inter- 
ests and necessities of the State, a system of 
reckless expenditure and fraud, perhaps unheard 
of before in tlie hi-;tory of the world. 

" You will find in your department many gen- 
eral and staff' officers holding illegal commissions 
and appointments, not recognized or approved 
by the President or Secretary of War. You will 
please at once inform these gentlemen of the 
nullity of their appointment, and see that no pay 
or allowances are issued to them until such time 
as commissions may be authorized by the Presi- 
dent i)V Secretary of War. 

" If any of them give the slightest trouble, 
you will at once arrest them and send them, 
under gtiard, out of the limits of your depart- 
ment, informing them that if they return, they 
will be placed in close confinement. You will 
please examine into the legality of the organiza- 
tion of the troops serving in the department. 



When you find any illegal, unusual, or impropei 
organizations, you will give to tb.e officers and 
men an opportunity to enter the legal military 
establishment under general laws and orders from 
the War Department ; rex)orling in full to these 
headquarters any officer or organization that may 
decline. 

" You will please cause competent and reliable 
staff officers to examine all existing contracts 
immediately, and suspend all payments upon 
them unt 1 you receive the report in each case. 
Where there is the slightest doubt as to the pro- 
priety of the contract, you will be good enough 
to refer the matter, with full explanation, to these 
headquarters, stating in each case what would be 
a fair compensation for the services, or materials 
rendered under the contract. Discontinue at 
once the reception of material or services under 
any doubtful contract. Arrest and bring to 
prompt trial all officers who have in any way 
violated their duty to the Government. In 
regard to the political conduct of affairs, you 
will please labor to impress upon the inhabitants 
of Missouri and the adjacent Stntcs that we are 
fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to 
■apl'old the power of our National Government, 
and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace 
and good order. 

"With respect to military operations it is 
probable, from the best inforniation in my pos- 
session, that the interest of the Government will 
be best served by fortifying and holding in con- 
siderable strength Rolla, Sedalia, and other 
interior points, keeping strong patrols constantly 
moving from the terminal stations, and concen- 
trating the mass of the troops on or near the 
Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations 
as the public interests may demand. 

" I would be glad to have you make as soon af? 
possible a personal inspection of all the important 
points in your department, and report the result 
to me. I cannot too strongly impress upon you 
the absolute necessity of keeping me constantly 
advised of the strength, condition, and location 
of your troops, together with all facts that will 
enable me to maintain that general direction of 
the armies of the United States which it is my 
purpose to exercise. I trust to you to maintain 
thorough organization, discipline, and economy 
throughout your department. Please inform me 
as soon as possible of everything relating to the 
gunboats now in process of construction, as well 
as those completed. 

" The militia force authorized to be raised by 
the State of Missouri for its defence will be 
under your orders. 

"I am. General, iSbc, &c. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
^'- Major- General Commanding U. S. A. 

" Maior-General H. W. Hallecic, U. S. A. 

" Commanding Department of Missouri." 

Headquarters of the Army, 

Washington, November 7, 1862. 
"General: In p-' ing you instructions for 
your guidance in command of the Department 
of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter you. I 
merely wish to express plainly the general ideas 
which occur to me in relation to the conduct of 
operations there. That portion of Kentucky 
west of the Cumberland River is by its position 



27 



80 closely related to the States of Illinois and 
Missouri, that it has seemed best to attach it to 
the Department of Missouri. Yoiir operations 
there, in Kentucky, will be confined to that por- 
tion of the State east of the Cumberland liiver. 
I trust I need not repeat to you that I regard 
the importance of the territory committed to 
your care as second only to that occupied by the 
army under my immediate command. It is ab- 
solutely necessary that we shall hold all the 
State of Kentucky ; not only that, but that the 
majority of its inhabitants should be warmly in 
favor of our cause, it being that which best sub- 
serves their interests. It is possible that the 
conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is 
more important than that of our military opera- 
tions. I certainly cannot overestimate the im- 
portance of the former. You will please con- 
stantly to bear in mind the precise issue for 
which we are fighting ; that issue is the preser- 
vation of the Union, and the restoration of the 
full authoritj-^ of the General Government over 
all portions of our territory. We shall most 
readily suppress this Rebellion, and restore the 
authority of the Government, by religiously re- 
specting the constitutional rigiits of all. I know 
that I express the feelings and opinion of the 
President, when I say that we are fighting only 
to preserve the integrity of the Union and the 
constitutional authority of the General Govern- 
ment. 

"Tlie inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon 
it that their domestic institutions will in no man- 
ner be interfered with, and that they will receive 
at our hands every constitutional protection. 
I have only to repeat that you will in all re- 
spects carefully regard the local institutions of 
the region in which you command, allowing 
nothing but the dictates of military necessity to 
cause you to depart from the spirit of these in- 
structions. 

" So nmch in regard to political considera- 
tions. Tlie military problem would be a simple 
one could it be entirely separated from political 
influences ; such is not the case. Were the 
population among which you are to operate 
wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that 
Nashville sliould be your first and principal ob- 
jective point. It so happens that a large major- 
ity of the inhabitants of eastern Tennessee are 
in favor of the Union; it therefore seeins proper 
that you should remain on the defensive on the 
line from Louisville to Nashville, while you 
tlirow the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, 
by Cumberland Gap or Walker's Gap, on Knox- 
ville, in order to occupy the railroad at that 
point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of east- 
ern Tennessee to rise, while you at the same 
time cut off the railwa ' connimnication between 
eastern Virginia and the Mississippi. It will 
be prudent to fortify the pass before leaving it 
in your rear. 

" Brigadier-General D. C. Bcell." 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, November 12, 1862. 

" Geiteral: Upon assuming command of the 
department, I will be glad to have you make, 
as soon as possible, a careful report of the con- 
dition and situation of your troops, and of the 



military and political condition of your com- 
mand. The main point to which I desire to call 
your attention is the necessity of entering east- 
ern Tennessee as soon as it can be done with 
reasonable chances of success, and 1 hope that 
you will, with the least possible delay, organize 
a column for that purpose, sufficiently guarding 
at the same time the main avenues by which the 
Rebels may invade Kentucky. Our conversa- 
tions on the subject of military operations have 
been so full, and my confidence in your judg- 
ment is so great, that I will not dwell furlhur 
upon the subject, except to urge upon you the 
necessity of keeping me fully inf)riaed as to the 
state of affairs, both military and political, and 
your movements. In regard to political mat- 
ters, bear in mind that we are fighting only to 
preserve the integrity of the Union and to up- 
hold the power of the General Government; 
as far as military necessity will admit, religious- 
ly respect the constitutional rights of all. Pre- 
serve the strictest discipline among the troops, 
and while employing the utmost energy in mili- 
tary movements, be careful so to treat the un- 
armed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the 
breach existing between us and the Rebels. 

" I mean by this that it is tije desire of the 
Government to avoid unnecessary irritation by 
causeless arrests and persecution of individuals. 
Where there is good reason to believe that per- 
sons are actually giving aid, comfort or infor- 
mation to the enemy, it is of course necessary 
to arrest them ; but I have always found that it 
is the tendency of subordinates to make vexa- 
tious arrests on mere suspicion. You will find 
it well to direct that no arrest shall be made ex- 
cept by your order or that of your generals, 
unless in extraordinary cases, always holding 
the party making the arrest responsible for the 
propriety of his course. It should be our con- 
stant aim to make it apparent to all that their 
property, their comfort, and their personal safety 
will be best preserved by adhering to the causo 
of the Union. 

" If the military suggestions I have made in 
this letter prove to have been founded on erro- 
ne(jus data, you are of course perfectly free to 
change the plan of operations. 

" Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, 

Commanding Department of the Ohio." 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Wusliiiigtou, February 14, 18G2. 

" General : Your despatches in regard to the 
occupation of Dafuskie island, &c., were re- 
ceived to-day. I s.aw also to-day, for the first 
time, your requisition for a siege train for Sa- 
vannah. 

" After giving the subject ail the consideration 
in my power, I am forced to the conclusion that, 
under present circumstances, the siege and cap- 
ture of Savannah do not promise results com- 
mensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When 
I learned that it was possible for the gunboats to 
reach the Savannah River, above Fort Pulaski, 
two operations suggested themselves to my mind, 
as its immediate results. 

" First. The capture of Savannah by a '■coup 
de main,' — the result of an instantaneous ad- 
vance and attack by the army aud navy. 



28 



"The time fortius has passed, and your letter 
indicates tliat you are not accountable for the 
failure to jcizu the propitious moment, but that, 
on the ci^ntrary, you perceived its advantages. 

" Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut otf its 
supplies, and at least facilitate its reduction by 
a bombardment. 

"Although we have a long delay to deplore, 
the second course still remains open to us ; and 
I strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski, 
and its bombardment as soon as the 13-inch 
mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am con- 
fident you can thus reduce it. "With Pulaski, 
you gain all that is really essential ; you obtain 
comi)lete control of the harbor; you relieve 
the blockading lleet, and render the main body 
of your force disposable for other operations. 

"I do not consider the possession of S:tvan- 
nah worth a siege after Pulaski is in our liMndo. 
But the possession of Pulaski is of the first im- 
portance. The expedition to Fernandina is well, 
and 1 shall be glad to learn that it is ours. 

" But, after all, the greatest moral effect would 
be produced by the reduction of Charleston and 
its defences. There the Rebellion had its birth ; 
there the unnatural hatred of our Government is 
most intense ; there is the centre of the boasted 
power and courage of the Rebels. 

" To gain Fort Sumter and held Charleston, 
is a task well worthy of our greatest efforts, and 
considerable sacrifices. That is the problem I 
would be glad to have you study. Some time 
must elapse before we can be in all respects 
ready to accomplish that purpose. Fleets are 
en route and armies are in motion wliich have 
certain preliminar}'^ objects to accomplish, before 
we are ready to take Charleston in hand. But 
the time will before long arrive when I shall be 
prepared to make that movement. In the mean 
time it is my advice and wish that no attempt be 
made upon Savannah, unless it can be carried 
witli certainty by a ' coup de main." 

" Please concentrate your attention and forces 
upon Puiaski and Fernandina. St. Augustine 
might as well be taken by way of an interlude, 
while awaiting the preparations for Charleston. 
Success attends us evurywhere at present. 
Very truly yours, 
"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
*^ Major- Genei-al Commaiuling United States 

Army. 
" Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman, 

" Commanding at Port Royal, <5'c." 

" Headquauters of the Akmt, 

" Washington, February 23, 18G2. 

" General : You are assigned to the command 
of the land forces destined to co-operate with the 
navy in the attacks upon New Orleans. You 
will use every means to keep your destination a 
profound secret, even from your staff officers, 
with the exception of your chief of staff, and 
Lieutenant VVeitzell, of the engineers The 
force at your disposal wdl consist of the first 
thirteen regiments named in your memorandum 
handed to me in jjcrson, tiie 21st Indiana, 4th 
Wisconsin, and Gtli Michigan, (old and good 
regiments from Baltimore.) 

"The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and Gth 



Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Mon- 
roe. 

"Two companies of the 21st Indiana are well 
drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force 
already en route for Ship Island will be suffi- 
cient for your purposes. 

"After full consultation with officers well ac- 
quainted with the country in which it is proposed 
to operate, I have arrived to the conclusion that 
two (2) light batteries fully equipped, and one 
(1) without horses, will be all that are neces- 
sary. 

" This will make your force about 14,400 in- 
fantry, 275 cavalry, 580 artillery; total 15,255 
men. The commanding general of tlie depart- 
ment of Key West is authorized to loan you, 
temporarily, two regiments; Fort Pickens can, 
probai)ly, give you another, which will bring your 
force to nearly 18,000. 

" The object of your expedition is one of vital 
importance — the capture of New Orleans. The 
route selected is up the Mississippi River, and 
the first obstacle to be encountered (perluips the 
only one) is in the resistance oQ'ered by i'orts 
St.Pliilip and Jackson. It is expected that the 
navy can reduce these works; in that case you 
will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garri- 
son in them to render them perfectly secure ; and 
it is recommended that, on the upward passage, 
a few heavy guns and some troops be left at the 
pilot station (at the forks of the river) to cover 
a retreat in the event of a disaster. These 
troops and guns will, of course, be removed as 
soon as the forts are captured. 

" Should the navy fliil to reduce the works, 
you will land your forces and siege train, and 
endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, 
and carry them by assault. 

" The next resistance will be near the English 
Bend, where there are some eartlien batteries. 
Here it may be necessary for you to land your 
troops and cooperate with the naval attack, al- 
though it is more than probable that the Navy, 
unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these 
works arc taken, the city of New Orleans neces- 
sarily falls. In that event, it will probably be 
best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your 
troops, also the eastern bank of the river above 
the city. It may be necessary to place some 
troops in the city to preserve order ; but if there 
appears to be sufficient Union sentiment to con- 
trol the city, it may be best for purpc^ses of dis- 
cipline to keep your men out of the city. 

" After obtaining possession of New Orleans, 
it will be necessary to reduce all the works 
guarding its approaches from the east, and par- 
ticularly to gain the Manchac pass. 

"Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Liv- 
ingston, will next claim your attention. 

" A feint on Galveston may facilitate the ob- 
jects we have in view. I need not call your at- 
tention to the necessity of gaining possession ot 
all the rolling stock you can on the different rail- 
ways, and of obtaining control of the roads them- 
selves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a 
combined naval and land force should be accom- 
plished as soon as possible after you have gained 
New Orleans. Then endeavor to oj)en your com- 
munication with the northern column by the 
Jlississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity 
of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as 



29 



you can safely dc so, either after or before you 
have effected the junction. Allow nothing to 
divert you from obtaining full possession of all 
the approaches to New Orleans. When that 
object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it 
will be necessary to make a combined attack on 
Mobile, in order to gain possession of the har- 
bor and works, as well as to control the railway 
terminus at the city. In regard to this, I will 
send more detailed instructions as the operations 
of the northern column develop themselves. 

'• I may briefly state that the general objects 
of the expedition arc, Jirsf, the reduction of 
New Orleans and all its approaches ; then Mo- 
bile and its defenses ; then Pensacola, Galves- 
ton. &c. It is probable that by the time New 
Orleans is reduced, it will be in the power of the 
Government to reinforce the land forces suffi- 
ciently to accomplish all these olijects. In the 
mean time you will please give all the assistance 
in your power to the army and navy commanders 
in your vicinity, never losing sight of the fact 
tliat the great object to be achieved is the cap- 
ture and firm retention of New Orleans. 
I am, &.C. 

GEO B McCLELLAN, 
Major- General Commanding United States 

Army. 
" Major-General B. E. Butler, 

United States Volunteers. 

The plan indicated in the above letters com- 
prehended in its scope the operations of all the 
armies of the Union, the army of the Potomac 
as well. It was my intention, for reasons easy 
to be seen, that its various parts should be car- 
ried out simultaneously, or nearly so, aud in 
cooperation along the whole line. If this plan 
was wise, and events have failed to prove that 
it was not, then it is unnecessary to defend any 
delay which would have enabled the army of tlie 
Potomac to perform its sliare in the execution 
of the wliole work. 

But about the middle of January, 1862, upon 
recovering fi-om a severe illness, I found that 
excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of 
the army of the Potomac had taken possession 
of the minds of the administration. 

A change had just been made in the War De- 
partment, and I was soon urged by the new Sec- 
retary Mr. Stanton, to take innuediate stej^s to 
secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio 
railroad, and to free the banks of the lower 
Potomac from the Rebel batteries which annoyed 
passing vessels. 

Very soon after his entrance upon office I 
laid before him verbally my design as to the part 
of the plan of the campaign to be executed by 
the army of the Potomac, Avhich was to attack 
Richmond by the lower Chesapeake. He in- 
structed me to develop it to the President, which 
I did. The result was that the President dis- 
approved of it, and by an order of January 31, 
I8ti2, substituted one of his own. On the 27th 
of January, 1862, the following order was issued 
without consultation with me : — 

" [President's General War Order No. 1.] 

" ExF.cuTivE Mansion, 
" Washington, January 27, 1862. 
** Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 



1862, be the day for a general movement of the 
land and naval forces of tlu' United States against 
the insurgcut forces. Tliat esi)ccially tlie army 
at and about Fortress Monroe, the army of the 
Potomac, the army of Western Virgiuia, the 
army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army 
and fl(jtilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the 
Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day. 

" That all other forces, botli land and naval, 
with their respective conunanders, obey existing 
orders for the time, and be ready to obey addi- 
tional orders when duly given. 

" That the heads of departments and especially 
the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all 
their subordinates, and the general-iu-eliief, with 
all other commanders and sultordinates of land 
and naval forces, will severally be held to their 
strict and full responsibihties for prompt execu- 
tion of this order. 

" ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

The order of January 31, 1862, was as fol- 
lows : — 

fPresidcnt's Special War Order No. 1.] 

" ExiiccTivE Mansion, 
"Washington, January 31, 1862. 

" Ordered, That all the disposable force of the 
army of the Potomac, after providing safely for 
the defence of Washington, be formed into an 
expedition for the immediate object of seizing 
and occupying a point upon the railroad south- 
westward of what is known as Manassas Junc- 
tion, all details to be in the discretion of tiie 
commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move 
on or before the 22d day of February next. 

" ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

I asked his excellency whether this order was 
to be regarded as final, or whether I could be 
permitted to submit in writing my objections to 
his plan, and my reasons fu* preferring my own. 
Permission was accorded, and I therefore pre- 
pared the letter to the Secretary of War, which 
is given below. 

Before this had been submitted to the Presi- 
dent, he addressed me the following note : — 

" Executive Mansion, 
" Washington, February 3, 1862, 

" My dear Sir : You and I have distinct and 
different plans for a movement of the army of 
the Potomac : yours to be done by the Chesa- 
peake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and 
across land to the terminus of the railroad on 
the York River; mine to move directly to a point 
on tiie railroad southwest of Manassas. 

"If you will give satisfactory answers to the 
following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan 
to yours : — 

" 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly 
larger expenditure of time and money than 
mine ? 

"2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by 
your plan than mine ? 

" 3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by 
your plan than mine ? 

" 4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable in 
this : that it would break no great line of the 
enemy's communications, while mine would? 



30 



i 



" 5th. Tn case of disaster, would not a retreat 
be more difficult by your plan than mine? 
" Yours, truly, 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

These questions were substantially answered 
by tlie following letter of the same date to the 
Secretary of War : — 

" Headquarters of the Army, 

"Washintjton, February 3, 1862. 

" Sir : I ask your indulgence for the follow- 
ing papers, rendered necessary by circum- 
stances. 

" I assumed command of the troops in the 
vicinity of Washington on Saturday, July 27, 
18G4, six days after the battle of Bull Run. 

"I found no army to command; a mere col- 
lection of regiments cov^^ering on the banks of 
the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispir- 
ited by the recent defeat. 

"Notliing of any consequence had been done 
to secure the southern approaches to the capital 
by means of defensive works ; nothing wliatever 
had been undertaken to defend the avenues to 
the city on the northern side of the I'otomac. 

"The troops were not only undisciplined, un- 
drilled, and dispirited ; they were not even 
placed iu military positions. The city was 
almost in a condition to have been taken by a 
dash of a regiment of cavalry. 

" Without one day's delay I undertook the 
difficult task assigned to me ; that task the hon- 
orable Secretary knows was given to me without 
solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have 
accomplislied it will best be shown by the past 
and the present. 

" The capital is secure against attack, the ex- 
tensive forlilications erected by the labor of our 
troops enable a small garrison to hold it against 
a numerous arni}^ the enemy have been held in 
check, the State of Maryland is securely in our 
possession, the detached counties of Virginia are 
again within the pale of our laws, and all appre- 
hension of (rouble in Delaware is at an end; the 
enemy are confined to the positions they occu- 
pied before the disaster of tiie 21st July. More 
than all tliis, I have now under my command a 
well-drilled and reliable army, to which the des- 
tinies of the country may be confidently com- 
mitted. This army is young and untried in bat- 
tle ; but it is animated liy the highest spirit, and 
is capalile of great deeds. 

"That so much has been accomplished, and 
euch an army created in so short a time, from 
nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the 
liighcst glories of the administration and the na- 
tion. 

" Many weeks, I may say many months ago, 
this army of the Potomac was fully in condition 
to repel any attack ; but there is a vast differ- 
ence Ixitween tiiat and the efficiency required to 
enable troops to attack successfully an army 
elated by victory, and intrenched in a position 
long Kinoe selected, studied, and fortified. 

" In the earliest papers I submitted to the 
President, I asked for an effective and movalile 
force far exceeding the aggregate now on the 
banks of tlie Potomac. I have not the force I 
asked for. 



" Even when in a subordinate position, I al- 
ways looked beyond the operations of tlie army 
of the Potomac; I was never satisfied in my own 
mind with a barren victory, but looked to com- 
bined and decisive operations. 

" When I was placed in command of the ar- 
mies of the United States, I immediately turned 
my attention to the whole field of operations, re- 
garding the army of the Potomac as only one, 
while the most important, of the masses under my 
command. 

"I confess that I did not then appreciate the 
total absence of a general plan which iiad before 
existed, nor did I know that utter disorganiza- 
tion and want of preparation pervaded the west- 
ern armies. 

" I took it for granted that they were nearly, 
if not quite, in condition to move towards the 
fulfilment of my plans. I acknowledge that I 
made a great mistake. 

" I sent at once — with the approval of the Ex- 
ecutive — officers I considered competent to com- 
mand in Kentucky and Missouri. Their instruc- 
tions looked to prompt movements. I soon 
found that the labor of creation and organization 
had to be performed there ; transportation — arms 
— clothing— artillery — discipline, all were want- 
ing. These things required time to procure 
them. 

" The generals in command have done their 
work most creditably, but we are still delayed. 
I had hoped tliat a general advance could be 
made during tlie good weather of December; I 
was mistaken. 

" My wish was to gain possession of the east- 
ern Tennessee railroad, as a preliminary move- 
ment; then to follow it up immediately by an 
attack on Nashville and Richmond, as nearly at 
the same time as possible. 

"I have ever regarded our true policy as 
being that of fully preparing ourselves, and then 
seeking for the most decisive results. I do not 
wish to waste life in useless battles, but prefer 
to strike at the heart. 

"Two bases of operations seem to present 
themselves for the advance of the army of the 
Potomac. 

"1st. That of Washington — its present posi- 
tion — involving a direct attack upon the in- 
trenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, 
Manassas, &c., or else a movement to turn one 
or both flanks of those positions, or a combina- 
tion of the two plans. 

"The relative force of the two armies will not 
justify an attack on both flanks : an attack on 
his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon 
communication, and cannot prevent him from 
collecting for the decisive battle all the detach- 
ments now on his extreme right and left. 

" Should we attack his riglit flank by the line 
of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac 
below that river, and near his batteries, we 
could perhaps prevent the junction of the en- 
emy's right with his centre, ( we might destroy 
the former;) we would remove tlie obstructions 
to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the 
length of wagon transportation by establishing 
new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, 
and strike more directly his main railway com- 
munication. 

" The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth 



31 



of the Bull Run are watched by the Rebels ; bat- 
teries are said lo be placed on the heights in the 
rear, (concealed by the woods,) and the arrange- 
ment of his troops is such that he can oppose 
some considerable resistance to a passage of that 
stream. Information has just been received, to 
the effect that tlie enemy are intrenching a line 
of heights extcrrding from the vicinity of Sangs- 
ter's ( Union mills ) towards Evansport. Early 
in January, Spriggs's ford was occupied by 
General Rhodes, with 3,600 men and eight (8) 
guns ; there are strong reasons for believing 
that Davis's ford is occupied. These circum- 
stances indicate or prove that the enemy antici- 
pates the movement in cpiestion, and is prepared 
to resist it. Assuming for the present that this 
operation is determined upon, it may be well to 
examine briefly its probable progress. In the 
present state of affairs, our column ( for the 
movement of so large a force must be made in 
several columns, at least five or six) can reach 
the Accatinck without danger; during the march 
thence to the Occoquan, our riglit flank becomes 
exposed to an attack from Fairfax station, 
Sangster's, and Union mills. This danger must 
be met by occupying in some force either the 
two first-named places, or better, the point of 
junction of the roads leading thence to the vil- 
lage of Occoquan ; this occupation must be con- 
tinued so long as we continue to draw supplies 
by the roads from this city, or until a battle is 
won. 

" The crossing of the Occoquan should be 
made at all the fords from Wolf's run to the 
mouth ; the points of crossing not being neces- 
«arly confined to the fords themselves. Should 
the enemy occupy this line in force, we must, 
with what assistance the flotilla can afford, en- 
deavor to force the passage near the mouth, 
thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole 
line, or be taken in flank himself. 

" Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it 
would be necessary to throw a column by tlie 
shortest route to Dumfries ; partly to force the 
enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac ; 
partly to cover our left flank against an attack 
from the direction of Aquia ; and lastly, to estab- 
lish our communications with the river by the 
best roads, and thus give us new depots. The 
enemy would by tliis time have occupied the line 
of the Occoquan above Bull Run, holding Brents- 
ville in force, and perhaps extending his lines 
somewhat further to the southwest. 

" Our next step would then be to prevent the 
enemy from crossing the Occoquan between 
Bull Run and Broad Run, to fall upon our right 
flank while moving on Brentsville. This might 
be effected by occupying Bacon Race church and 
the crossroads near the mouth of Bull Run, or 
still more effectually by moving to the fords 
themselves, and preventing him from debouch- 
ing on our side. 

" These operations would possibly be resisted, 
and it would require some time to effect them, 
as, nearly at the same time as possible, we 
should gain the fords necessary to our purposes 
above Broad Run. Having secured our right 
flank, it would become necessary to carry Brents- 
ville at any cost, for we could not leave it be- 
tween the right flank and the main body. The 



firial movement on the railroad must be deter- 
mined by circumstances existing at the time. 

"This brief sketch brings out in bold relief 
the great advantage possessed by the enemy in 
the strong central position he occupies, with 
roads diverging in every direction, and a strong 
line of defence enabling Jiiin to remain on the 
defensive, witli a small force on one flank, while 
he concentrates everything on the other for a de- 
cisive action. 

"Should WG place a portion of our force in 
front of Centrcvillc, while the rest crosses the 
Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing our 
army by a very difficult obstacle, and by a dis- 
tance too great to enabk' the two parts to sup- 
port each other, should either be attacked by 
the masses of the enemy, while the other is 
held in check. 

" I should perhaps have dwelt more decidedly 
on the fact that the force left near Sangster's 
nmst be allowed to remain somewhere on that 
side of the Occoquan until the decisive battle is 
over, so as to cover our retreat in the event of 
disaster, unless it should be decided to select 
and intrench a new base somewliere near Dum- 
fries, a proceeding involving nmch time. 

" After the passage of the Occoquan by the 
main army, tliis covering force could be drawn 
into a more central and less exposed position, — 
say Brimstone hill or nearer the Occoquan. In 
this latitude the weather will for a considerable 
period be very uncertain, and a movement com- 
menced in force on roads in tolerably firm con- 
dition will be liable, almost certain, to be much 
delayed by rains and snow. It will, therefore, 
be next to impossible to surprise the enemy, or 
take him at a disadvantage by rapid mana-uvres. 
Our slow progress will enable him to divine our 
purposes, and take his measures accordingly. 
The probability is, from the best information we 
possess, that the enemy has improved the roads 
leading to his lines of defence, while we have to 
work as we advance. 

" Bearing in mind what has been said, and the 
present unprecedented and impassable condition 
of the roads, it will be evident that no precise 
period can be fixed upon for the movement on 
this line. Nor can its duration be closely calcu- 
lated ; it seems certain that many weeks may 
elapse before it is possible to commence the 
march. Assuming tlie success of this operation, 
and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the ques- 
tion at once arises as to the importance of the 
results gained. I think these results would be 
confined to the possession of the field of battle, 
the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac 
by the enemy, and the moral efl'ect of the vic- 
tory ; important results, it is true, but not de- 
cisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of 
the enemy's main army, for lie could fall back 
upon other positions, and fight us again and 
again, should the condition of the troops permit. 
If he is in no condition to figlU us again out of 
the range of the intrenchments at Richmond, we 
would find it a very diSicult and tedious matter to 
follow him up there, for he would destroy his 
railroad bridges and otherwise impede our pro- 
gress through a region where the roads are as 
bad as they well can be. and we would probably 
find ourselves forced at last to change the whole 
theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route to 



32 






Richmond, with a sniiillor availahle force, and 
at an expenditure of much more time, than were 
we to adopt the short line at once. We would 
also have forced the enemy t'l concentrate his 
forces and perfect his defensive m.>asures at the 
very points wliere it is desirable to strike him 
when least prepared. 

" II. The second base of operations available 
for the army of the Potomac is that oftlie Lower 
Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest pos- 
sible land i-oute to Richmond, and strikes direct- 
ly at tlie he;irt of the enemy's power in the east. 

" The roads in that region are passable at all 
periods of the j'ear. 

•'The country now alluded to is much more 
fovorable for otfensivc operations than that in 
front of Washington (which is very unfavor- 
able), mueli more level, more cleared land, the 
woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the 
spring some two or three weeks earlier. A 
movement in force on that line obliges the ene- 
my to abandon his intrenched position at Manas- 
sas, in order to liasten to cover Richmond and 
Norfolk. He must do this ; for should he per- 
mit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction 
can be averted only by entirely defeating us 
in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. 
This movement, if successful, gives us the cap- 
ital, the cainmunications, the supplies of the 
Rebels ; Norfolk would fall ; all the waters of 
the Chesapeake would be ours ; all Virginia 
would be in our power, and the enemy forced to 
abandon Tenner ee and North Carolina. The 
alternative presented to the enemy would be, to 
beat us in a position selected by ourselves, dis- 
perse, or pass beneath the Caudine forks. 

" Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a 
perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon 
Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered 
by the fleet. 

•' During the whole movement our left flank is 
covered by the water. Our right is secure, for 
the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach 
us in time ; he can only oppose us in front ; we 
bring our fleet into full play. 

"After a successful battle our position would 
be, — Burnside forming our left, — Norfolk held 
securely, — our centre connecting Burnside with 
Buell. both by Raleigh and Lynchburg, — Buell 
in eastern Tennessee and Nortli Alabama, — Hal- 
leck at Nashville and Memphis. 

"The next movement would be to connect 
with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wilming- 
ton and Charleston; to advance our centre into 
South Carolina and Georgia; to push Buell 
either towards Montgomery, or to unite with the 
main army in Georgia ; to throw Halleck south- 
ward to meet the naval expedition from New Or- 
leans. 

" We should then be in a condition to reduce 
at our leisure all the southern seaports ; to oc- 
cupy all the avenues of communication; to use 
the great outlet of the Mississippi ; to re-estab- 
lish our Government and arms in Arkansas, 
Louisiana and Texas; to force the slaves to 
labor for our subsistence, instead of that of the 
Rebels ; to bid defiance to all foreign interfer- 
ence. Such is the object I have ever had in 
view, — this is the general plan which I hope to 
accomplish. 

" For many long months I have labored to pre- 



pare the army of the Potomac to play its part in the 
programme ; from the day when I vvaS placed in 
command of all our armies, I have exerted my- 
self to place all the other armies in such a con- 
dition that they, too, could perform their allotted 
duties. 

" Should it be determined to operate from the 
lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which 
promises the most brilliant result is Urbana, on 
the lower Rappahannock. This point is easily 
reached by vessels of heavy draught ; it is nei- 
ther occupied n.>r observed by the enemy, — it is 
but one mai'ch from West Point, the key of that 
region, and thence but two mirches to Rich- 
mond. A ra5)id movement from Urbana would 
probably cut off" Magruder in t'ic Peninsula, and 
enable us to occupy Richmond, before it could 
be strongly reinforced. Shouhl we fail in that, 
we could, with the co-operation of the navy, 
cross the James, and throw ourselves in the rear 
of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come 
out and attack us, for his position would be un- 
tenable, with us on the southern bank of the 
river. 

" Should circumstances render it not advisa- 
ble to land at Urbana, we can use Mobjack bay; 
or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take 
Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with com- 
plete security, although with less celerity and 
brilliancy of results, — up the Peninsula. 

" To reach whatever point may be selected .as 
a base, a large amount of cheap water transpor- 
tation must be collected, consisting mainly of 
canal boats, barges, wood-boats, schooners, &c., 
towed by small steamers, all of a very different 
character from those required for all previous 
e.xpeditions. This can certainly be accom- 
plished within thirty days from the time the order 
is given. I propose, as the best possible plan 
that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to select 
Urbana as a landing-place for the first detach- 
ments ; to transport by water four divisions of 
infantry with their batteries, the regular infen- 
try, a few wagons, one bridge train, and a few 
squadrons of cavalry, making the vicinity of 
Hooker's position the place of embarkation for 
as many as possible ; to move the regular caval- 
ry and reserve artillery, the remaining bridge 
trains and wagons, to a point somewhere near 
Cape Lookout, then ferry them over the river by 
means of North River ferry-boats, march them 
over to the Rappahannock, (covering the move- 
ment by an infantry force near Heathsville,) 
and to cross the Rappahannock in a similar way. 
The expense and difficulty of the movement will 
then be very much diminished, (a saving of 
transportation of about 10,000 horses.) and the 
result none the less certain. 

"The concentration of the cavalry, &c., on the 
lower counties of Maryland can be effected 
without exciting suspicion, and the movement 
made without delay from that cause. 

"This movement, if adopted, will not at all 
expose the city of Washington to danger. 

" The total force to be thrown upon the new 
line would be, according to circumstances, from 
110,000 to 140.000. I hope to use the latter 
number by bringing fresh troops into Washing- 
ton, and still leaving it quite safe. I fully real- 
ize that in all projects offered, time will probably 
be the most valuable consideration. It is my 



33 



decided opinion that, in that point of view, t1ie 
second phxn should be adopted. It is possible, 
na}', liig'lily probable, that the weather and state 
of the roads may be such as to delay the direct 
movement from Wa^hinjjton, with its unsatisfac- 
tory results and great risks, far beyond the time 
required to complete the second plan. In the 
first case we can fix no definite time for an 
advance. The roads have gone from bad to 
worse. Nothing like their present condition was 
ever known here before; they are impassable 
at present. We are entirely at the mercy of the 
weather. It is by no means certain that we can 
beat tiiem at Manassas. On the other line I re- 
gard success as certain by all the chances of 
Avar. We demoralize the enemy by forcing liiiu 
to abandon his prepared position for one which 
we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, and 
wlierc success must produce immense results. 

" My judgment, a.s a General, is clearly in fa- 
vor of this i)roject. Nothing is certain in war, 
but all the chances are in favor of this move- 
ment. So much am I in favor of the southern 
line of operations, that I would prefer the move 
from Fortress Monroe as a base, — as a certain 
though less brilliant movement than that from 
Urb:ina, to an attack upon Manassas. 

" I know that His Excellency the President, 
you, and I. all agree in our wishes ; and that 
these wishes are, to bring this war to a cluse as 
promptly as the means in our possession will 
permit. I believe that the mass of the people 
have entire confidence in us, — I am sure of it. 
Let us, then, look only to the great result to be 
accomplished, and disregard eveiything else. 

" I am, very respectfully, your obedient ser- 
vant, 

"GEO. B McCLELLAN, 

• ' Ma jo r- General, Commanding. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

'■' Secretary of IFrrr." 

This 1' tter rau«t have produced some efl'ect upon 
the mind of the I're.-ident, since the execution of 
his ord(.'r was not requi ■cd, although it was not 
revoked as formally as it had been issued. Many 
verlial conferences ensued, in which, among 
other things, it was determined to collect as 
many canal-boats as possilile, with a view to 
employ them largely in the transportation of the 
army to the lower Chesajieake. The idea was 
at one time entertained by the President to use 
them in forming a bridge across the Potomac 
near Liverpool Point, in order to throw the army 
over that point; but tliis was subsequently aban- 
doned. It was also found by experience that it 
wftuld require much time to prepare the canal- 
boats for use in transportation, to the extent that 
hal been anticipated. 

Einally, on the 27th of February. 1862. the 
Secretary of War, by the authority of the Presi- 
dent, instructed Mr. John Tucker, Assistant 
Secretary of War, to procure at once the neces- 
sary steamers and sailing craft to transport the 
army of the Potomac to its new field of opera- 
tions. 

The following extract from the report of Mr. 
Tucker, dated April ,5, will show the nature and 
progress of this well-executed service. 

****** 

" I was called to Washington by telegraph, on 



17th January last, by Assistant Secretary of War 
Tliomas A. Scott. I was informed that Hujor- 
General McClcllan wished to see nic. From 
him I learned that he desired to know if trans- 
portation on smooth water could be obtained to 
move at one time, for a .short distancK', ai)out 
50,000 troops, 10,000 horses, 1,000 wagons, 13 
batteries, and the usual equipment of such' an 
army. He frankly stated to me that he had 
always supposed such a movemeiU entirely feasi- 
ble, until two experienced quartermasters had 
recently reported it impracticable, in their judg- 
ment. A few days afterwards, I reported toGeii. 
McClellan tliat 1 was entirely confident the trans- 
ports could be commanded, and stated the mode 
by which his object could be accomplished. A 
Aveek or two afterwards I had tlie iionor of an 
interview with the President and General Mc- 
Clellan, when the subject was further discussed, 
and especially as to the time required. 

"I expressed the opinion that, as the move- 
ment of the horses and wagons would have to be 
made chiefiy by schooners and barges, that as 
each i^chooner would require to be properly fitted 
for the protection of the horses, and furnished 
with a supply of water and forage, and each 
transport for the troops provided wUh water, I 
did not deem it prudent to assume that such an 
expedition could start within thirty days from 
the time the order was given. 

"The President and General McClellan both 
urgently stated the vast importance of an earlier 
movement. I replied that if favorable winds 
prevailed, and there was great despatch in load- 
ing, the time might be materially diminished. 

" On the Uth February you (Secretary of 
War) advertised for transports of various descrip- 
tions, inviting bids on the 27th February. I was 
informed that the proposed movement by water 
was decided upon. That evening the Quarter- 
master-General was informed of the decision. 
Directions were given to secure the transporta- 
tion, — any assistance was tendered. He prompt- 
ly detailed to this duty two most efficient assist- 
ants in his department. Colonel Rufus Ingalls 
was stationed at Annapolis, where it was then 
proposed to embark the troops, and Captain 
Henry C. Hodges was directed to meet me in 
Philadelphia, to attend to chartering the vessels. 
With these arrangements I left Washington on 
the 28th February. 

***** Hi 

" I beg to hand hercAvith a statement, prepared 
by Captain Hodges, of the vessels chartered, 
which exhibits the prices paid, and parties from 
Avhom they Avere taken : — 

113 steamers, at an average price per flay, $215 10 

188 schooners, " " " " ' 24 45 

88 barges, •' " " " 14 27 

" In thirty-seven days from the time I received 
the order in Washington, (and most of it was 
accomplished in thirty days.) these vessels trans- 
ported from Perryviile, Alexandria, and Wash- 
ton, to Fort Monroe, (the place of departure 
having been changed, which caused de^ay,) 
121,500 men, 14.502 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 
batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon bridges, 
telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity 
of equipage, &c., i-equired for an army of such 
magnitude. The only loss of which I have 



34 



heard is eight mules and nine barges, which latter 
went ashore in a gale within a few miles of Fort 
Monroe, — llie cargoes being saved. With this 
trifling exception, not the slightest accident has 
occurred, to my knowledge. 

"I respectfully, but confidently, submit that, 
ifor economy and celerity of movement, this 
'expedition is without a parallel on record. 
****** 
"JOHN TUCKER, 
" Assistant Secretary of War." 

In the moan time the destruction of the bat- 
teries on tlie lower Potomac, by crossing our 
troops opposite them, was considered, and prep- 
arations were even made for throwing Hooker's 
Division across the river, to carry them by 
assault. Finally, however, after an adverse 
report from Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard, 
Ciiief Engineer, given below, who made a recon- 
noissance of the positions, and in view of the 
fact that it was still out of the power of the Navy 
Department to furnish suitable vessels to co-op- 
erate with land troops, this plan was abandoned 
as impracticable. A close examination of the 
enemy's works and their approaches, made after 
they were evacuated, showed that the decision 
was a wise one. The only means, therefore, of 
accomplishing the capture of these works, so 
much desired by the President, was by a move- 
ment by land, from the left of our lines, on tlie 
right bank of the Potomac, — a movement obvi- 
ously unwise. 

The attention of the Navy Department, as 
early as August 12, 18G1, had been called to the 
necessity of maintaining a strong force of efn- 
cient war vessels on the Potomac : — 

" Headquarters Division of the Potomac, 

" Washington, August 12, 18G1. 

"Sir: I liavo to-day received additional in- 
formation which convinces me that it is more 
than probable that the enemy will, within a very 
short time, attempt to throw a respectable force 
from the moutli of Aquia Creek into Maryland. 
This attempt will probal)ly be preceded by the 
erection of batteries at Matthias and White- 
House Points. Such a movement on the part of 
the enemy, in connection with others probaljly 
designed, would place Washington in great 
jeopardy. I most earnestly urge that the strong- 
est possible naval force be at once concentrated 
near the mouth of Aquia Creek, and that the 
most vigilant watch be maintained day and night, 
bo as to render such passage of the river abso- 
lutely impossible. 

" I recommend that the Minnesota and any 
other vessels available from Hampton Roads be 
at once ordered up there, and that a great quan- 
tity of coal be sent to that vicinity, sufficient for 
eeveral weeks' supply. At least one strong war 
vessel should be kept at Alexandria, and I again 
urge the concentration of a strong naval force 
on the Potomac without delay. 

" If the Naval Department will render it abso- 
lutely impossible for the enemy to cross the river 
below Washington, the security of the capital 
will be greatly increased. 

" I cannot too earnestly urge an immediate 
compliance with these requests. 



" T am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient 
servant, GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" MaJ3r-G:aeral Comhianding. 
" Hon. GiDEOX Welles, 

" Secretartj of the United States Navy. 

It was on tlic 27tli of September, 18G1, that 
General Barnanl, Chief Engineer, in company 
with C;i;)tain Wynian of the Potomac llotilla, 
had been instructed to make a reconnoissance of 
the enemy's batteries as fir as Matthias Point 
In his report of his observations he says : — 

'• Batteries at High Point and Cockpit Point, 
and thence down 1o Chopawampsic, cannot be 
prevented. Wo may, indeed, prevent tlieir con- 
struction on certain points, but along here some- 
where the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as 
many batteries as he chooses. What is the rem- 
edy? Favorable circumstii.nces, not to be antici- 
pated nor made the basis of any caiculations, might 
justify and render successful the altsck of a partic- 
ular battery. To suppose that we can capture cdl, 
and by mere attacks of this kind prevent the 
n:ivigation being molested, is very much the 
same as to suppose tiiat the hostile army in our 
own front can prevent us building and main- 
taining field-works to protect Arlington and Al- 
exandria by capturing them, one and all, as fast 
as they are built." 

In another communication upon the subject of 
crossing troops for the purpose of destroying the 
batteries on the Virginia side of the Potomac, 
General Barney says : — 

" The operation involves the forcing of a very 
strong line of defence of the enemy, and all that 
we would have to do if we were really opening a 
campaign against them there. 

" It is true we hope to force this line hy turn- 
ing it. by landing on Freestone Point. With 
reason to believe that this may be successful, it 
cannot be denied that it involves a risk (-f failure. 
Should we, then, considering all the consequences 
which may be involved, enter into the operation, 
merely to capture the Potomac batteries? I 
think not. Will not the Ericsson, assisted by 
one other gunboat capable of keeping alongside 
tliesc batteries, so fir control tlieir fire as to 
keep the navigation sufficientl}' free as long as 
we require it? Captain Wyinan says yes." 

It was the ojiinion of competent naval officers, 
and I concur with them, that had an adequate 
force of strong and well armed-armed vessels 
been acting on the Potomac from the beginning 
of August, it would have been next to in>possible 
for tile Ilel)els to have constructed or maintained 
batteries upon the banks of tlie river. The 
enemy never occupied Matthias Point, nor any 
other point on the river, which was out of sup- 
porting distance from the main army. 

Wiien the enemy commenced the construction 
of these batteries, the army of the Potomac was 
not in a condition to pre\ent it. Their destruction 
by our army would have afl'orded Imt a tem- 
porory relief unless we had been strong enough 
to hold the entire line of the Potomac. This 
could be done either by driving the enemy from 
Manassas and Aquia Creek, by main force, or 
by manoeuvering to compel tiiem to vacate their 
position. The latter course was finally pursued, 
and with success. 

About the 20th of February, 1SG2, additional 



35 



measarcs wore talr.en to secure the roopcninEr of 
the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. The prelim- 
inary operations of General Lauder for this ob- 
ject are el.scwiiere described. 

I had often observed to the President and to 
members of the cabinet tliat the reconstrnetion 
of this railway could not be undertaken until wo 
were in a condition to fight a battle to secure it. 
I regarded the possession of Winchester and 
Strasburg as necessary to cover the railway in 
the rear, .ind it wa« not till the month of Feb- 
ruary that f felt prepared to accomplish this very 
desirable but not vital purpose. 

The whole of Banks's division and two brig- 
ades of yedgwiek's division were thrown across 
the river at Harper's Ferry, leaving one brigade 
of Sedgwick's division to observe and guard the 
Potomac from Great Falls to the moutii of the 
Monocaey. A sutficient number of troops of all 
arms were held in readiness in the vicinity of 
Washington, cither to march via Leesburg or to 
move by rail to Harper's Ferry, should this be- 
come necessary in carrying out the objects in 
view. 

The subjoined notes from a communication 
subsequently addressed to the War Department 
will siifBcicutly explain the conduct of these op- 
erations. 



♦' Wlien I started for Harper's Ferry, I plainly 
stated to the President and Secretary of War 
that the chief object of the operation would be to 
open tiie Baltimore and Oiiio railroad by cross- 
ing the river in force at Harper's Ferry; that I 
had collected the material for making a perma- 
nent bridge by means of canal-boats; that from 
the nature of the river, it was doubtful whether 
such a bridge could be constructed; that if it 
could not, I would at least occupy the ground in 
front of Harper's Ferry, in order to cover the re- 
building of the railroad bridge ; and finally, when 
the communications were perfectly secure move 
on Winchester. 

" When I arrived at the place I found the bat- 
teaii bridge nearly completed; the holding- 
ground proved better than had been anticipated; 
the weatiicr was favorable there being no wind. 
I at once crossed over the two brigades which 
bad arrived, and took steps to hurry up the 
other two. belonging respectively to Banks's and 
Sedgwick's divisions. The difficulty of crossing 
snp[)lies had not then become apparent. Tliat 
night I telegraphed for a regiment of regular 
cavalry and four batteries of heavy artillery to 
come np tlie next day (Thursday)besides directing 
Kevc>'s division of infantry to be moved up on 
Friday. 

" Me\'t morning the attempt was made to pass 
the canal-boats through the lift-lock, in order to 
conmience at once the construction of a perina- 
nent bridge. It was then found for the first time 
that the lock was too sniall to permit the passage 
of the boats, it having been built for a class of 
boats running on the Shenandoah canal, and too 
narrow by some four or six inc'ies for the canal- 
boats. The lift-locks, above and below, are all 
large enough for the ordinary boats. I had seen 
them at Edwards's Ferry thus used. It had al- 
ways been represented to the engineers by the 
military railroad employes, and others, that the 



lock was large enongh. and, the difTerence bein? 
too small to be detecteil by the eye. no one had 
thought of measuring it, or suspecting any diffi- 
culty. I thus suddenly found myself unable to 
build the i)erinuient bridge. A violent gale had 
arisen, whieli tluvatened the safety of our only 
means of communication ; the narrow approach 
to the bridge was so crowded and clogged with 
wagons that it was very clear that, under exist- 
ing circumstances, notiiing more could be done 
than to cross over the b;)ggage and supplies of 
the two brigades. Of the others, instead of 
being able to cross both during the morning, the 
last arrived only in time to go over just Ijefore 
dirk. It was evident that the troops under or- 
ders would only be in the way, should they ar- 
rive, and tliat it would not be possible to subsist 
them for a rapid march on Winchester. It was 
therefore deemed necessary to countermand the 
order, content ourselves with covering the re- 
opening of the railroad for the present, and in 
the mean time tise every exertion to establish, 
as promptly as possii)le, dejjots of forage and 
subsistence on the Virginia side, to supply the 
troops, and enable them to move on Winchester 
independently of the bridge. Tlie next day 
(Friday) I sent a strong reconnoissance to 
Charlestown, and imder its protection, went 
there myself. I then determined to hold that 
place and to move the troops composing Lander's 
and Williams's commands at once on M.irtinsburg 
and Bunker Hill, thus effectually covering tJio 
reconstruction of the railroad. 

" Having done this, and taken all the steps in 
my ])ower to insure the rapid transmission of 
supplies over the river, I reiurned to tliis city, 
well satisfied with what had been accomplished. 
While up the river I learned that the President 
was dissatisfied with the state of aifairs; but, on 
my return here, understood from the Secretary 
of War that upon learning the whole state of the 
case the President was fully satisfied. I eon- 
tented myself, therefore, with giving to the Sec- 
etary a brief statement, as I have written here." 

Tlie design aimed at was entirely compassed, 
and before the first of Ajiril, the date of my de- 
parture for the Peninsula, the railroad was in 
running order. As a demonstration upon the 
left fiank of the enemy, this movement no doubt 
assisted in deterniining the evacuation of his 
lines on the 8th and 'Jth of March. 

On my return from Harper's Ferry, on the 
28th of February, the preparations neee'-sary to 
carry out the wishes of the President and Secre- 
tary of W^ar in regard to destroying the i)atter- 
ies on the lower Potomac were at once under- 
taken. Mature retlection convinced me that this 
operation would require the movement of the 
entire army, for I frit sure that the enemy would 
resist it with his whole strength. I undertook 
it with great reluctance, both on account of the 
extremely unfavoraiile condition of the roads 
and my firm conviction that the proposed move- 
ment to the lower Chesapeake would necessarily, 
as it subsequently did, force the enemy to aban- 
don all his positions in front of Washington. 
Besides, it did not forward my plan of campaign 
to precipitate tiiis evaeuati(m by any direct at- 
tack, nor to subject the armv to any needless 
loss of life and material by a battle near Wash- 
ington, which could produce no c^ecisive results. 



36 



The preparations for a movement towards the 
Occoquan, to carry the batteries, were, however, 
advanced as rapidly as the season permitted, 
and I had invited the commanders of divisions 
to meet at lieadquarters on the 8th of March, 
for the purpose of giving thera their instructions, 
and receiving their advice and opinion in regard to 
tlieir commands, when an interview with tlie 
President indicated to me the possibility of a 
change in my orders. 

His Excellency sent for me at a very early 
hour on the morning of the 8th, and renewed 
his expressions of dissatisfaction with the atfair 
of Harper's Ferry, and with my plans for the 
new movement down the Chesapeake. Another 
recital of the same facts which had before given 
satisfaction to His Excellency again produced, as 
I supposed, the same result. 

The views which I expressed to the President 
■were reinforced by the result of a meeting of 
my general officers at headquarters. At that 
meeting my plans were laid before the division 
commanders, and were approved by a majority 
of those present. Nevertheless, on the same 
day two important orders were issued by the 
President, without consultation with me. The 
first of these was the general war order No. 2, 
directing the formation of army corps, and as- 
signing their commanders. 

I had alwnys lieen in favor of the principle 
of an organization into army corps, but preferrecl 
deferring its practical execution until some lit- 
tle experience in campaign and on the field of 
battle shoidd show what general officers were 
most competent to exercise these high commands, 
for it must be remembered that we tlien had no 
officers whose experience in war on a large scale 
WAS sufficient to prove that they possessed tlie 
necessary qualifications. An incompetent com- 
mander of an army corps might cause irrepar- 
able damage, while is is not probable tliat an 
incompetent division commander could cause 
any very seriims mischief. These views had 
frequently been cxpresseil by me to the Pres- 
ident and members of the cabinet; it was there- 
fore with as much regret as surprise that I 
learned the existence of this order. 

The first order has been given above ; the 
second order was as follows : — 

[ Preside ut's General W.ar Order No. 2. ] 
"ExECDTivE Mansion, 
" Washinrjton, March 8, 18G2. 

^^ Ordered, That no change of the base of 
operations of the army of the Potomac shall be 
made without leaving in and about Washington 
such a force as, in the opinion of the general-in- 
chief and tlie commanders of army corps, shall 
leave said city entirely secure. 

"That no more than two army corps (about 
fifty thousand troops ) of said army of the Po- 
tomac shall be moved en route for a new base of 
operations until the navigation of tlie Potomac, 
from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, sliall 
be freed from enemy's batteries, and otiicr ob- 
structions, or until the President shall hereafter 
give express i)ermission. 

That any movement as afores.aid, en route for 
a new base of operations, which may be ordered 
by the general-in-chief, and which may be in- 



tended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall 
begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th 
March instant, and the general-in-chief shall be 
responsible that it moves as early as that day. 

" Ordered, That the army and navy co-oper- 
ate in an immediate eflTort to capture the enemy's 
batteries upon the Potomac between Wasbiog- 
ton and the Chesapeake Bay. 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

"L. Thomas, Adjutant- General" 

After what has been said already in regard to 
the eflTect of a movement to the lower Chesa- 
peake, it is unnecessary for me to comment upon 
this document, further than to say that the time 
of beginning the movement depended upon the 
state of readiness of the transports, the entire 
control of which had been placed by the Secre- 
tary of War in the hands of one of the Assistant 
Secretaries, and not under the Quartermaster 
General ; so that even if the movement were 
not impeded by the condition imposed, in re- 
gard to the batteries on the Potomac, it could 
not have been in my power to begin it before 
the 18th of March, unless the Assistant Secre- 
tary of War had completed his arrangements by 
that time. 

Meanwhile important events were occurring 
which materially modified the designs for the sub- 
sequent campaign. The appearance of the Mer- 
rimack off Old Point Comti)rt, and the encounter 
with tlie United States squadron on the 8th of 
March, threatened serious derangement of the 
plan for the Peninsula movement. But tiie en- 
gagement between the Monitor and Merrimack 
on the 9th of March, demonstrated so satisfac- 
torily the power of the former, and the other na- 
val preparations were so extensive and formid- 
able, tliat the security of Fort Monroe, as a base 
of operations, was placed beyond a doubt ; and 
althougli the James Kiver was closed to us, the 
York Hiver, with its tributaries, was still open 
as a line of water communication with the for- 
tress. The general plan, therefore, remained 
undisturbed, although loss promising in its de- 
tiiis than when the James Kiver was in our con- 
trol. 

On Sunday, the 9tli of March, information 
from various sources made it apparent that the 
enemy was evacuating his positions at Centre- 
ville and Manassas as well as on the upper and 
lower Potomac. The President and Secretary 
of War were present when the most positive in- 
formation reached me, and I expressed to them 
my intention to cross the river immediately, and 
there gain the most authentic information, prior 
to determining what course to pursue. 

The retirement of the enemy towards Rich- 
mond had been expected as the natural conse- 
quence of the movement to thePeninsula, but the 
adoption of this course immediately on ascer- 
taining that such a movement was intended, 
wliile it relieved me from the results of the 
undue anxiety of my superiors, and attested the 
character of the design, was unfortunate in that 
the then almost impassable roads between our 
position and theirs deprived us of the opportu- 
nity for inflicting damage usually afforded by the 
withdrawal of a large army in the face of a pow ■ 
erful adversary. 



37 



The retirement of the enemy and the occupa- 
tion of the abandoned positions whieli necessarily 
followed presented an opportunity for the troops 
to gain some experience on tlie marcli and biv- 
ouac preparatory to the campaign, and to get rid 
of the siipcrtluous baggage and other " impedi- 
ments " which accumulate so easily around an 
army encamped for a long time in one locality. 

A march to Manassas and back would produce 
no delay in embarking for the lower Chesa- 
peake, as the transports could not be ready for 
some time, and it afforded a good intermediate 
step between the quiet and comparative comfort 
of the camps around Washington, and the rigors 
of active operations, besides accomplishing the 
important object of determining the positions 
and perhaps the future designs of the enemy, 
with the possibility of being able to harass their 
rear. 

I therefore issued orders during the night of 
the 9th of March for a general movement of the 
army the next morning towards Centreville and 
Manassas, sending in advance two regiments of 
cavalry under Colonel Averill, with orders to 
reach Manassas, if possible, ascertain tlie exact 
condition of affairs, and do wliatever he could to 
retard and annoy the enemy if really in retreat; 
at the same time I telegraphed to the Secretary 
of War that it would be necessary to defer the 
organization of the army corps until the comple- 
tion of the projected advance upon Manassas, as 
the divisions could not be brouglit together in 
time. The Secretary replied, requiring imme- 
diate compliance with the President's order, but 
on my again representing that this would com- 
pel the abandonment or postponement of tlie 
movement to Manassas, he finally consented to 
its postponement. 

At noon on the 10th of March the cavalry ad- 
vance reached tlie enemy's lines at Centreville, 
passing througli his recently occupied camps 
and works, and finding still burning heaps of 
military stores and much valuable property. 

Immediately after being assigned to the com- 
mand of the troops around Washington, I organ- 
ized a secret service force, under Mr. E.J. Allen, 
a verj' experienced and efficient person. This 
force, up to the time I was relieved from com- 
mand, was continually occupied in procuring 
from all possible sources, information regarding 
the strength, positions, and movements of the 
eneni}'. 

All spies, "contrabands," deserters, refugees, 
and many prisoners of war, coming into our 
lines from the front, were carefully examined, 
first by the outpost and division commanders, 
and then l>y my Chief of Staff and the Provost 
Marshal General. Their statements, taken in 
writing, and in many cases under oath, from day 
to day, for a long period previous to the evacua- 
tion of Manassas, comprised a mass of evidence 
which, by careful digests and collations, enabled 
me to estimate with considerable accuracy the 
strength of the enemy before us. Summai-ies 
showing the character and results of the labors 
of the secret service force accompany this re- 
port, and I refer to them for the facts they con- 
tain, and as a measure of the ignorance which 
led some journals at that time, and persons in 
high office, unwittingly to trifle with the reputa- 
tion of an army, and to delude the country with 



quaker gun stories of the defences, and gross iin- 
der statements of the numbers of the enemy. 

The ft)llowing orders were issued for the ex- 
amination of persons coming from the direction 
of the enemy. 

[" Ch'ciilar.] 

"Headquarters Army op the Potomac 
"Washinfjion, December Ifi, 18G1. 

" The Major-General commanding directs that 
hereafter all deserters, prisoners, spies, ' contra- 
bands,' and all other persons whatever coming 
or brought within our lines from Virginia, shall 
be taken immediately to the quarters of the 
commander of the division within whose lines 
they may come or be brought, without previous 
examination by any one, except so far as may 
be necessary for the officer commanding the ad- 
vance guard to elicit information regarding his 
particular post; that the division commander 
examine all such persons himself, or delegate 
such duty to a proper officer of his staff, and 
allow no other persons to hold any communica- 
tion with them ; that he then immediately send 
them, with a sufficient guard, to tlie provost-mar- 
shal in this city forfurther examination and safe- 
keeping, and that stringent orders be given to 
all guards having such persons in charge not to 
hold any communication with tlieiu wliatever; 
and further, that the information elicited from 
such persons shall be immediately couimunicated 
to the major-general commanding, or to the 
chief of staff, and to no other person whatever. 

" The Major-General commanding further 
directs that a sufficient guard be placed around 
every telegraph station pertaining to this army, 
and that such guards be instructed not to allow 
any person, except the regular telegraph corps, 
general officers, and such staff officers as may 
be authorized by their chief, to enter or loiter 
around said stations within hearing of the sound 
of the telegraph instruments. 

" By command of Major-General McClel- 

LAN. 

"S. WILLIAMS, 
" Assistant Adjutant- General." 

" Headquartfjis Army of the Potomac, 

" Washington, February 26, 1862. 
" General Order 

No. 27. 
* * * 

"All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and 
other persons coming within our lines, will be 
taken at once to the provost marshal of tlie near- 
est division, who will examine them in presence 
of the division commnnder, or an officer of his 
staff designated for the purpose. This exami- 
nation will only refer to such information as may 
affect the division and tiiose near it, especially 
those remote from general headquarters. 

'• As soon as this examination is completed, — 
and it must be made as rapidly as possible, — the 
person will be sent, under proper guard, to the 
Provost Marshal General, with a statement of 
his replies to the questions asked. Upon re- 
ceiving him, the Provost Marshal General will 
at once send him. with his statement, to tlie chief 
of staff of the army of the Potomac, who will 
cau«e the necessary examination to be made. 
The Provost Marshal General will have the cus- 



lody of all such persons. Division commanders 
will ill once conimunlcate to otlier division com- 
manders all information tims obtained which 
affects them. 

***** * * 

" By command of Major-General McClel- 

LAN. 

"S. WILLIAMS, 
" Assistant Adjutant- General." 

In addition to the foregoing orders, the divi- 
sion commanders were instructed, whenever tiiey 
desired to send out scouts towards the enemy, to 
make known tlie object at headquarters, in order 
that I might determine whether we had the in- 
formation it was proposed to obtain, and that I 
might give the necessary orders to other com- 
manders, so that tlie scouts should not be mo- 
lested by the guards. 

It will be seen from the report of the chief of 
the secret service corps, dated Marcii 8, that the 
forces of the Rebel army of the Potomac, at that 
date, were as follows : — 

At Manassas, Ccntrt-'villc, Bull Run, Upper 

Occoquan, an'l vicinity 80,000 men. 

At Brooks's Station, Dumfries, Lower Oj- 

coquan, and vici .lity 18,000 men. 

At Leesljurg- and vi.anity 4.5!io men. 

In the Shenandoah Valley 13 000 men. 

115.000 meu. 

Ahout three hundred field guns and from 
twenty-six to thirty siege guns were with the 
Ilehel army in front of Washington. The report 
made on the 17th of Marcli, after the evacuation 
of Manassas and Centreville, corroborates the 
statements contained in the report of the 8th, 
and is fortified by the affidavits of several rail- 
road engineers, constructors, baggage-masters, 
&c., whose opportunities for forming correct esti- 
mates Avere unusually good. These afiidavits 
will be found in the accompanying reports of the 
chief of the secret service corps. 

A reconnoissance of tlie works at Centreville 
made by Lieutenant McAlcster, United States 
Engineers, on March 14, 1SG2, and a survey of 
those at Manassas, made by a party of the United 
States Coast Survey, in April, 1SC2, confirmed 
also my conclusions as to the strength of the 
enemy's defences. Those at Centreville con- 
sisted of two lines, one facing cast and the other 
north. The former consisted of seven works, 
viz : one bastion fort, two redoubts, two lunettes, 
and two batteries ; all containing embrasures for 
forty guns, and connected by infantry parapets 
and double caponieres. It extended along the 
crest of the ridge a mile and three quarters from 
its junction with the northern front to ground 
thickly wooded and impassable to an attacking 
column. 

The northern front extended about one and 
one fourth mile to Great Rocky Run, and thence 
three fourths of a mile further to thickly wooded, 
impassable ground in the valley of Cub Run. 
It consisted of six lunettes and batteries with 
embrasures for thirty-one guns, connected by an 
infantry parapet in the form of a cremaillerc line 
with redans. At the town of Centreville, on a 
high hill commanding the rear of all the works 
witliin r.ango, was a large hexagonal redoubt 
with ten embrasures. 

Manassas Station was defended in all directions 



by a system of detached works, with platforms 
for heavy guns arranged for marine carriages, 
and often connected by infiintry parapets. ThLs 
system was rendered complete by a very large 
woz'k, with sixteen embrasures, whicii command- 
ed the highest of the other works by about fifty 
feet. 

Sketches of the reconnoissances above referred 
to will be found among the maj^s ax:)i)ended to this 
Kcport. 

From this it will be seen that the positions 
selected by the enemy at Centreville and Manas- 
sas were naturally very strong, witli imjiassable 
streams and broken ground, afibrding ample pro- 
tection for their fianks, and tliat strong lines of 
intrenchments swejJt all the available approaches. 

Although the history of every former war has 
conclusively shown the great advantages which 
are possessed by an army acting on the defensive 
and occupying strong jjosilions, defended by 
heavy earthworks ; yet, at the commencement of 
this war, but few civilians in our country, and, 
indeed, not all military men of rank, had a just 
appreciation of the fact. 

New levies that have never been in battle can 
not be expected to advance Avithout cover under 
the murderous fire from sucli defences, and carry 
them by assault. This is work in wliich veteran 
troops frequently fiilter and are repulsed with 
loss. That an assault of the eneiny's positions 
in front of Washington, with the new troops 
composing the army of the Potomac, during the 
winter of lSGl-"(32, wt>uld have resulted in defeat 
and demoralization, was too probable. 

The same army, though inured to war in many 
battles, hard fought and bravely won, has twice, 
under other generals, sufi'ered such disasters as 
it was no excess of prudence tiien to avoid. 
My letter to the Secretary of War, dated Feb- 
ruary 3, 18G2, and given above, expressed the 
opinion that the movement to the Peninsula 
would compel the enemy to retire from his posi- 
tion at jManassas and free Washington from 
danger. When the enemy first learned of that 
plan, they did thus evacuate Manassas. During 
the Peninstila campaign, as at no former period, 
northern Virginia was completely in our posses- 
sion, and the vicinity of Washington free from 
the presence of the enemy. The ground so 
gained was not lost, nor Washington again put 
in danger, until the enemy learned of the orders 
for the evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to me 
at Harrison's Bar, and were again left free to 
advance northward and menace the national 
capital. Perhaps no one now doubts that the 
best defence of Washington is a Peninsula attack 
on Richmond. 

My order for the organization of the army 
corps was issued on the 13th of March ; it has 
been given above. 

While at Fairfax Court-House, on March 12, 
I was informed through the telegraph, by a mem- 
ber of my staff, that the following document had 
appeared in the National Intelligencer of that 
morning : — 

[President's War Order, No. 3.] 

"Executive Mansion, 
" Washington, March 11, 1862. 
" Major-Gcneral McClellan having personally 
taken the field at the head of the army of the 



39 



Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved 
from the command of the otlier military depart- 
ments, he retaining command of the department 
of the rotomac. 

'^ Ordered further, That the departments now 
under the respective commands of Generals lial- 
leck and Hunter, together with so much of that 
under General Buell as lies west of a north and 
south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, 
Tennessee, he consolidated and designated the 
Department of the Mississipi)i ; and that, imtil 
otherwise ordered, ]\Iajor-Gcneral Halleck have 
command of said department. 

" Ordered, also. That the country west of the 
Department of the Potomac and east of the De- 
partment of the Mississippi he a military depart- 
ment, to he called the Mountain Department, and 
that tlic same be commanded by Major-Geaeral 
Fremont. 

"That all the commanders of departments, 
after the receipt of this order by them, respec- 
tively report severally and directly to the Secre- 
tary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent 
reports will be expected of all and each of them. 
"ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

Though unaware of the President's intention 
to remove me from the position of General-in- 
chief, I clieerfiilly acceded to tlie disposition he 
saw fit to make oi my services, and so informed 
him in a note on the 12th of March, in which 
occur these words : — 

"I believe I said to you some weeks since, in 
connection with some western matters, th.at no 
feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever 
prevent me from devoting myself to the service. 
I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it, 
and you will find that, under present circum- 
stances, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, 
and that no consideration of self will in any 
manner interfere with the dischai'ge of mj' public 
duties. Again thanking you for tlie official and 
personal kindness you have so often evinced 
towards me, I am," &c., &c. 

On the 14th of March a reconnoissance of a 
large body of cavalry with some infautrj-, under 
command of General Stoneman, was sent along 
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to determine 
the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force 
his rear across the Rappahannock, but the roads 
were in such condition that, finding it impossible 
to subsist his men, General Stoneman was forced 
to return after reaching Cedar Run. 

The following despatch from him recites the 
result of this expedition : — 

" Headquarters, Union Mills, 

" March IG, 18G2. 

" We arrived here last evening about dark. 
We got corn for horses ; no f "ovisions for men. 
Bull Run too high to cross. Had we stayed an 
hour longer we should not have got here to-day, 
owing to tlie high water in the streams. Felt 
the enemy cautiously, and found him in force at 
Warrentun Junction. Saw two regiments of 
cavalry and tliree bodies of infantry on the otlier 
side of Cedar Run. Had we crossed, should 
not have been able to get back for high water. 
Had three men of 5th cavalry hit in driving in 
enemy's pickets ; one slightly wounded in thq 
head. Enemy acted confidently, and followed 



us some way hack on the road, but did not mo- 
lest us in any way. Enemy's force con^i^ted of 
Stuart's and I'^well's cavalry, a battery of artiil- 
lery, and some infantry. Railroiul bridges all 
burned down up to Warrenton Juncliun ; still 
entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn at a 
moment's warning, iiaving dry wood piled upoa 
tlieni. Heard cars running during nigiit before 
last; probably bringing up troops from i;;ippa- 
hannock. Heard of two regiments of infantry 
at Warrenton engaged in inijiressing ilio militia 
and securing forage. Heard of a large forces 
of infantry tins side of Rappahannock River, 
having come up to Warrenton Junction from 
Aquia Creek diiy before yesterday. Bridges all 
destroyed this side of Broad Run. The aides 
who take this will give you further particulars. 

"Very respectfully, &c. 

"GEORGE SrONEMAN, 

" Brigadier- General CoKiraanding. 

" COL. COLBUKN." 

The main body of the army was, on tlie 15th 
of Mareli, moved back to the vicinity of Alexan- 
dria to be embarked, leaving a jjart of General 
Suinnur's corps at Manassas until other troops 
could be sent to relieve it. Before it was with- 
drawn a strong reconnoissance, under General 
Howard, was sent towards the R!i[)i),ihannock, 
the result of wliich appears in the following de- 
spatch : — 

" Warrenton Junction, 

''March 29, 1862. 
" Express just received from General How- 
ard. He drove the enemy across the Rappa- 
hannock bridge, and is now in camp on this bank 
of and near the Rappahannock River. 

" The enemy blew up the bridge in Iiis retreat. 
There was skirmishing during the march, and a 
few shots exchanged by the artillery, without 
any loss on our part. Their loss, if any, is not 
known. General Howard will return to thia 
cami) to-raorrow morning. 

"E. V. SUMNER, 
" Brigadier- General. 
" General S. Williajis." 

The line of the Rappahannock and the Man- 
asses Gap railroad was thus left reasonably se- 
cure from menace by any considerable body of 
the enemy. 

On the 13th of March a council of war was 
assembled at Fairfax Court-house, to discuss 
the militarj- status. The President's order No. 
3, of March Sth, was considered. The follow- 
ing is a memorandum of the proceedings of the 
council : — 

" Headquarters Arjit of the Potomac, 

Fairfax Court-house, March I'd, 1862. 

" A council of the generals comiiLinding army 
corps, at the headquarters of the army of the 
Potomac, were of tlie opinion — 

"I. That the enemy having retreated from 
Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappa- 
hannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the 
generals commanding army corps that the oper- 
ations to be carried on will be best undertaken 
from Old Point Comfort, between the York and 
James rivers : Provided, 



40 



" 1st. Tliat tlie eneiuj^'s vessel, Merriraack, can 
be neutralized. 

" 2d. That the means of transportation, sufH- 
cient for an immediate transfer of the force to 
its new base, can be ready at Washington and 
Alexandria to move down the Potomac ; and, 

" 3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had 
to silence, or aid in silcncmg, the enemy's bat- 
teries on tlie York River. 

" 4th, that tiie force to be left to cover Wash- 
ington shall be such as to give an entire feeling 
of security for its safety from menace. (Unani- 
mous.) 

"II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army 
should then be moved against the enenu', behind 
the llappahannock, at the earliest i)os,sible mo- 
ment, and the means for reconstructing Ijridges, 
repairing railroads, and stocking them with ma- 
terials sufficient for supplying the army, should 
at once be collected, for both the Orange and 
Alexandria, and Aquia and Richmond railroads, 
(Unanimous.) 

"N. B. — That with the forts on the right bank 
( f the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on 
the left bank occupied, a covering force in front 
of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. 
(Keyes, Heintzelman, and McDowell.) A total 
of 40,000 men for the defence of the city would 
suffice. (Sumner.") 

This was assented to by myself, and immedi- 
ately communicated to the War Department. 
The following reply was received the same 
day:— 

War Departjient, 3Iarch 13, 18C2. 

''The President having considered the plan 
of operations agreed upon by yourself and the 
commanders of army corps, makes no olijec- 
tion to the -same, but gives the following direc- 
tions as to its execution : — 

"1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction 
as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy 
shall not repossess himself of that position and 
line of communication. 

" 2. Leave Washington entirely secure. 

" 3. Move the remainder of the force down 
the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress 
Monroe, or anywhere between here and tliere, 
or, at all events, move such remainder of the 
army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some 
route. 

" EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Sccreiary of Wcu\ 
" Major-Gcneral George B. McClellan." 

My preparations were at once begun in ac- 
cordance with these directions, and on the Kith 
of March the following instructions were sent 
to Generals Banks and Wadsworth : — 

''Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" March IG, 1802. 

" Sir : You will pf)st your command in the 
vicinity of Manassas, intrench yourself strongly, 
and throw cavalry yjickcts well out to the front. 

"Your first care will Ijc the rebuilding of the 
railway from Washington to Manassas, and to 
Strasl)urg, in order to open your conmiunica- 
tions with the valley of the Shenandoah. As 
soon as the Manassas Gap railway is in running 
order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four 



regiments, with two batteries, at or near the 
point where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. 
Something like two regiments of cavalry should 
be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester, 
and thoroughly scour the country south of the 
railway and up the Shenandoah valley, as well 
as through Chester Gap, which might perhaps 
be advantageously occupied by a detachment of 
infantry, well intrencheil. Block-houses siiould 
be built at all the railway bridges. Occupy by 
grand guards Warrenton Junction and Warren- 
ton itself, and also some little more advanced 
point on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, as 
soon as the railway bridge is repaired. 

" Great activity should be observed by the cav- 
alry. Besides the two regiments at Manassas, 
another regiment of cavalry will be at your dis- 
posal, to scout towards the Occoquau, and prob- 
ably a fourth towards Leesburg. 

"To recapitulate, the most important points 
wMch should engage your attention are as fol- 
lows : — 

"1. A strong force, Avell intrenched, in the 
vicinity of JManassas, perhaps even Centrcville, 
and another force, (a brigade.) also well in- 
trenched, near Strasburg. 

" 2. Block-houses at the railway bridges. 

'• 3. Constant emjjloyment of the cavalry ■well 
to the front. 

"4. Grand guards at Warrenton Junction and 
in advance, as far as the Rappahannock, if jjos- 
sible. 

"5. Great care to be exercised to obtain full 
and early information as to the enemy. 

"6. The general object is to cover the line of 
the Potomac and Washington. "The above is 
conununicated by command of Major-General 
McClelhin. 

"S. WILLIAMS, 
" Assistant A/^jutant- General. 

" Major-Gtneral N. P. Banks's, 

" Commanding FifiJt Corjjs, Army of the 
Potomac." 

" Headquaeters xVrmy of the Potomac, 

" March IG, 1802. 

" Sir : The command :o which you have been 
assigned, by instructions of the President, as 
military governor of the District of Columbia, 
embraces the geographical limits of the District, 
and Avill also include the city of Alexandria, the 
defensive works south of the Potomac, from the 
Oecoquan to Difficult Creek, and the post of 
Port Washington. 

" I enclose a list of the troops and of the de- 
fences embraced in these limits. 

" General Banks will command at Manassas 
Junction, with the divisions of Williams ai^.d 
Shields, composing the fifth corps, but you 
should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance in yoiu- 
front, carefully guard the approaches in that 
quarter, and maintain the duties of advanced 
guards. You will use the same precautions on 
either flank. 

"All troops not actually needed for the police 
of Washington and Georgetown, for the garri- 
sons north of the Potomac, and for other indi- 
cated special duties, should be moved to the 
south side of the river. 

" In the centre of your front you should post 
the main body of your troops, and proper pro- 



41 



portions at sriiitable distances towards your right 
and left flanks. Careful patrols will be made, la 
order thoroughly to scour the country in front, 
from right to icft. 

'• It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain 
the forts and their armaments in the best possi- 
ble order, to look carefully to the instruction and 
discipline of their garrisons, as well as all otlier 
troops iinder your command, and, by frequent 
and rigid inspections, to insure the attainment 
of these ends. 

" The care of the railways, canals, depots, 
bridges, and ferries, within the above-named lim- 
its, will devolve upon you, and you are to insure 
their security and provide for thcu" protection by 
every means in your power. You will also pro- 
tect the depots of the public stores and the 
transit of stores to troops in active service. 

'' By means of pati'ols you will thoroughly 
scour the neigiiboring country, south of the East- 
ern Branch, and also on your right, and you will 
use every possible precaution to intei'cept mails, 
goods, and persons passing unauthorized to the 
enemy's lines. 

"The necessity of maintaining good order 
within your limits, and especially in the capital 
of the nation, cannot be too strongly enforced. 

"You will forward and facilitate the move- 
ment of all troops destined for the active part of 
the army of the Potomac, and especially the 
transit of detachments to their proper regiments 
and corps. 

" The charge of the new troops arriving in 
"Washington, and of all troops temporai'ily there, 
will devolve upon you. You will form them into 
provisional brigades, promote their instruction 
and discipline, and facilitate their equipment. 
Report all arrivals of troops, their strength, 
composition, and equipment, by every opportu- 
nity. 

"Besides the regular reports and returns, 
whiph you will be required to render to the Adju- 
tant-General of the army, you will make to these 
headquarters a consolidated report of your com- 
mand, every Sunday morning, and monthly re- 
turns on the first day of each month. 

" The foregoing instructions are communi- 
cated by command of Major-General McClellan. 
S. WILLIAMS, 

Assistant Adjutant- General. 

"Brigadier-General J. S. Wadswokth, 
" Military GoTcmor of the District of Co- 
lumbia." 

The Secretary of War had exi^ressed a desire 
that I should communicate to the War Depart- 
ment my designs with regard to the emplojmient 
of the army of the Potoniiic in an official foi'm. 
I submitted, on the 19th of March, the follow- 
ing: — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Theological Seminary, Va., March 19, 18G2. 

" Sir : I have the honor to submit the follow- 
ing notes ^n the proposed operations of the 
active portion of the army of the Potomac. 

" The proposed plan of campaign is to assume 
Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, 
taking the line of Yorktown and West Point 
upon Riclmiond as the line of operations, Eich- 
mond being the objective point. It is assumed 
C 



that the fall of Richmond involves that of Nor- 
folk and the whole of Virginia; also, tluit we 
shall figlit a decisive battle between West Pomt 
and Riclnnond, to give wliich battle the llubels 
will concL'ulraU^ all their availalile forces, under- 
stancUng, as tluy will, that it involves the tate of 
tlieir cause. It therefore follows, — 

" 1st. That we sliould collect all our available 
forces and operate upon adjacent lines, maintain- 
ing perfect communication between our colunms. 

"2d. That no time should be lost in reaching 
the field of battle. 

"The advantages of the peninsula between 
York and James rivers are too obvious to need 
explanation; it is also clear that West Point 
should as soon as possible be reached, and used 
as our main depot, that we may have the shortest 
lino of land transportation for our supplies, and 
the use of the York River. 

"There are two methods of reaching this 
point, — 

" 1st. By moving directly from Fort Monroe 
as a base, and trusting to the ro;ids for our sup- 
plies, at the same time landing a strong corps 
as near Yorktown as possible, in order to tui'a 
the Rebel lines of defence south of Yorktown ; 
then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a 
siege, in all probability involving a delay of 
weeks, perhaps. 

" 2d. To make a combined naval and land at- 
tack upon Yorktown, the first object of the cam- 
paign. This leads to the most rapid and deci- 
sive results. To accomplish tins, the navy 
should at once concentrate upon the York River 
all their available and most powerful batteries ; 
its reduction shotild not in that case require 
many hours. A strong corps would be pushed 
up the York, under cover of the navy, directly 
upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of 
Yorkto\vn, and we could at once establish our 
new base of operations at a distance of some 
twenty-five miles from Riclmiond, with every 
facility for developing and bringing into play 
the whole of our available force on either or 
both banks of the James. 

" It is impossible to urge too strongly the ab- 
solute necessity of the full co-operation of the 
navy as a part of this programme. Without it 
the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, 
and we may be forced to (larry in front several 
strong positions which by their aid could be 
turned without serious loss of either time or 
men. 

" It is also of first importance to bear Ln mind 
the fact already alluded to, that the captureof 
Richmond necessarily involves the prompt fall 
of Norfolk, while an operation agixinst Norfolk, 
if successful, as the beginning of the campaign, 
facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by 
the demoralization of the Rebel troops involved, 
and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be 
obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond 
by the same means which would have accom- 
plished it in the bcgimiing, having meanwhile 
afforded the Rebels ample time to perfect their 
defensive arrangements, for they would well 
know, from the moment the army of the Poto- 
mac changed its base to Fort I\Ionroe, that Rich- 
mond must be its ultimate object. 

••It may be summed up in a few words, that, 
for the prompt success of this campaign, it ia 



42 



absolutely necessarj'- that the navy should at 
once throw its whole available force, its most 
powerful vessels, against Yorkt.own. There is 
the most important point, — there the knot to be 
cut. An immediate decision upon the subject- 
matter of tills communication is highly desirable, 
and seems called for by the exigencies of the oc- 
casion. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient 
servant, 

" GEOEGE B. McCLELLAN, 

Major- General. 
*' Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War" 

In the mean time the troops destined to form 
the active army were collected in camps conven- 
ient to the points of embarkition, and every 
preparation mtide to embark them as rapidly as 
possible when the transports were ready. 

A few days before sailing for Fort Monroe, 
while still encamped near Alesindria. I met the 
President, by appointment, on a steamer. He 
there infonned me that he had bien strongly 
pressed to take General Blonker's division from 
my command and give it to General Fremont. 

His Excellency was good enough to suggest 
several reasons for not taking Blenker's division 
from me. I assented to the force of his sugges- 
tions, and was extremely gratified by liis decis- 
ion to allow the division to remain with the 
army of the Potomac. It was therefore with 
surprise that I received, on the 31st, the follow- 
ing note : — 

" Executive Mjjnsiox, 
Washington, March 31, 1SG2. 

" My dear Sir : This morning I felt con- 
strained to order Blenker's divi-^ion to Fremont, 
and I write this to assure you that I did so with 
great pain, uiidcrstsmding that you would wish 
it otherwise. If you could know the full pres- 
sure of tlie case, I am coufideot that you would 
justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment 
that the coimuauder-in-chief may order what he 
pleases. 

" Yours, very truly, 

" A. LmCOElT. 

" Major-General McClellan." 

To this I replied, in stibstance, that I regretted 
the order, and could ill afford to lose ten thou- 
sand troops which had been coiinted upon in 
forming my plan of campaign, but as there was 
no remedy, I would yield, and do the best I 
could without them. In a conversation with the 
President a few hours afterwards I repeated ver- 
bally the same thing, and expressed my regret 
that Blenker's division had been given to Gen- 
eral Fremont from any pressure other than the 
requirements of the national exigency. I was 
partially relieved, however, by the President's 
positive and emphatic assurance that I might be 
confident that no more troops beyond these ten 
thousand should in any event be tiken from me, 
or in any way detached from my command. 

At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by 
the enemy, Jackson was at Winchester, our 
forces occupying Charlestown, and Shields's 
reaching Buaker Hill on the 11th. On the 
morning of tlie 12th, a brigade of General 
Banks's troops, under General Hamilton, entered 



Winchester, the enemy having left at 5 o'clock t 
the evening before, his rear guard of cavalry - 
leaving an hour before our advance entered the • 
place. The enemy having made his preparations i 
for evacuation some days beforc, it was not pos- 
sible to intercept his retreat. On the 13th the 
mass of Banks's corps was concentrated in the 
immediate vicinity of Winchester, the enemy 
being in the rear of Strasburg. 

On the 19th (leneral Shields occupied Stras- 
burg, driving the enemy tAventy miles south to 
Monnt Jackson. 

On the 20th the first division of Banks's corps 
commenced its movement towards IMunassas, in 
compliance with my letter of instructions of 
the IGth. 

Jackson probably received information of this 
movement, and siiirposcd that no force of any 
consequence was left in the vicinity of Win- 
chester, and ujjon the falling back of Shields to 
that place, for the purpose ofeniicing Jackson in 
pursuit, the latter promptly followed, whereupon 
ensued a skirmish on the 22d, in wliicli (ieneral 
Shields was wounded, and an atiair at Winches- 
ter on the 23d, resulting in the tlefcat of Jackson, 
who was pursued as rapidly as the l'xilau^tion of 
our troops and the ditlicully ol obtaining supi)lie3 
permitted. It is presumed that the full reports 
of the battle of Winchester were forwarded 
direct to the War Department by General 
Banks. 

It being now clear that the enemy had no in- 
tention of returning b}' the Manas^as route, the 
following letter of April 1, was written to Gen- 
eral BaJiks : — 

"Headqcartt.rs Akmt of the Potomac, 

*' On board the Commodore, April 1, 1862. 

"General: The change in affairs in the val- 
ley of the Shenandoah has rendered necessary a 
corresponding departure, temporarily at least, 
from the jihin we some days since agreed upon. 

" In my arrangenn-nts 1 assume that you have 
with you a force amply sufficient to diivc Jack- 
son before you, provided he is not reinforced 
largely. I also assume that yuw nniy find it im- 
possible to detach anytliing towards JManassas 
for some days, probably not until the operations 
of the main army have drawn all the Kebel force 
towards Richmond. 

" You are aware that General Sumner has for 
some days been at IManassas Junction with two 
divisions of Infantry, six batteries, and two regi- 
ments of cavalry, and that a reconnoissance to the 
liappahamiock forced the enemy to destroy the 
railway bridge at Kappahannock Station, on the 
Orange and Alexandria Piiilroad. Since that 
time our cavalry have found notliingon this side 
the Rappahamiock in that direction, and it seems 
clear that we have no reason to fear any return 
of the Rebels in that quarter. Their movements 
near Fredericksburg also indicate a final aban- 
donment of that neighborhood. I doubt whether 
Johnson will now reinforce Jackson with a view 
of offensive operations. The time is probably 
passed when he could have gained anything by 
doing so. I have ordered in one of Sumner's 
divisions (that of Richardson's, late Sumner's) 
to Alexandria for embarkation. Blenker's has 
been detached from the army of the Potomac and 
ordered to report to General Fremont. 



43 



" Abcrcrombie is probably at "Warrcnton Junc- 
tion to-day. Geary is at White Plains. 

"Two regiments of eavalry have been ordered 
out, and are now on the way to relieve the two 
regiments of Sumner. 

" Four thousand infantry and one battery leave 
Washington at once for IManassas. Some three 
thousand more will move in one or two days., 
and soon after some three thousand additional. 

" I will order Blcnker to march on Strasburg 
and to report to you for temporary duty, so that 
should you find a, large force in your front you 
can avail j^ourscif of his aid as soon as possible. 
Please direct him to Winchester, thence to report 
to the Adjutant-General of tiie army for orders : 
but keep liim until you are sure what you have 
in front. 

" In regard to your own movements, the most 
important thing at present is to throw Jackson 
■well back, and then to assume such a position as 
to enabk' j'ou to prevent his return. As soon as 
the railway communiciitions are re-established 
it Avill be jjrobably important and advisable to 
move on Staunton, but this would require secure 
communications, and a force of from twenty-five 
thousand to thirty thousand for active operations. 
It should also be nearly coincident with my own 
move on Richmond, at all events not so long 
before it as to enable the Rebels to concentrate 
on you, and then return on mo. I fear that you 
cannot be ready in time, although it may come 
in very well with a force less than that I have 
mentioned, after the main battle near Richmond. 
When General Tiumner leaves Warrenton Junc- 
tion, General Abercrombie will be placed in im- 
mediate command of Manassas and Warrcnton 
Junction, under your general orders. Please 
inform me frequently by telegraph and otherwise 
as to the state of things in yorn- front. 
" I am very truly yours, 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- Goieral Commanding. 

" Major-General N. P. Banks, 

" Commanding Fifth Corps. 

"■ P. S. — From what I have just learned, it 
■would seem that the regiments of cavalry in- 
tended for Warrenton Junction have gone to 
Harper's Ferry. Of the four additional regi- 
ments placed under your orders, two should as 
promptly as possibly move by the shortest route 
on Warrcnton Junction. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, ■your obedient 
servant, GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General Commanding." 

This letter needs no further explanation than 
to say that it was my intention, had the operations 
in that quarter remained under my charge, 
either to have resumed the defensive position 
marked out in the letter of Mnrch IG, or to have 
advanced General Banks upon Staunton as 
might in the progress of events seem advisable. 

It is to be remembered that Avhcn I -wrote the 
preceding and following letters of April 1, I had 
no expectation of being relieved from the charge 
of the operations in the Shenandoah Valley, the 
Prefident's War Order No. 3 giving no intimation 
of such an intention, and that so far as reference 
■was made to final operations after driving Jackson 
back and taking such a position as to prevent 



his return, no positive orders were given in the 
letter, the matter being left for future consid- 
eration, when the proper time arrived for a 
decision. 

From the following letter to tlie Adjutant- 
General, dated April 1, 1SG2, it will be s en that 
I left for the dctenee of the national capital and 
its approaches, when I sailed for the Peninsula, 
73,45(j men, witli 109 pieces of liglit artillery, 
including the 32 pieces in Washington alluded 
to, but not enumerated in my Ictterlu the Adju- 
tant-General. It will also be seen that I recom- 
mended other available troops in Isew York 
(more than 4,000) to be at once ordered for- 
■ward to reinforce them. 

"HEADQUAnTEUs Army OF the Potomac, 
" Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1SG2. 

" Gexerae : I have to request that yoii -vrill 
lay the following communication before the Hon. 
Secretary of War. 

" The approximate numbers and positions of 
the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac 
are as follows : — 

"General Dix has, after guarding the railroads 
under his charge, sufficient'to give him 5,000 for 
the defence of Baltimore, and 1.988 available 
for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort 
Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 
men. 

" The garrisons of the forts around Washing- 
ton amount to 10,G00 men; other disposable 
troops now with General Wadsworth about 
11,400 men. 

"The troops employed in guarding the various 
railways in ]\Iaryland amount to some 3,359 
men. These it is designed to relieve, being old 
regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send 
forv/ard to JIanassas. 

"General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton 
with a force, which, including Colonel Geary, at 
White Plains, and the cavalry to be at his dis- 
posal, will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 
pieces of artillery. 

" I have the honor to request that all the 
troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and 
New York, and in any of the Eastern States, 
may be ordered to Washington. I learn from 
Governor Curtin that there arc some 3,500 men 
now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should 
be glad to have sent to Manassas. Four thousand 
men from General Wadsworth I desire to be 
ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the 
railroad guards above alluded to, will make up a 
force under the conmiand of General Abercrom- 
bie of something like 18,G39 men. 

" It is my design to push General Blenker's 
division from Warrcnton upon Strasburg. He 
should remain at Straslnirg long enough to allow 
matters to assume a definite form in that region 
before proceeding to his ultimate destination. 

" The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah 
will thus, — including Blenker's division, 10,028 
strong, with 24 pieces of artillery ; Banks's 5th 
corps which embraces the command of General 
Shields, 19, GST strong, with 41 guns, some 3,G52 
disposable cavalry, and the railroad guards, 
about 2,100 men, — amount to about 35,4G7 men. 

" It is designed to relieve General Hooker by 



44 



one regiment, say S50 men, being, with some 
600 cavalry, 1,350 men on the lower Potomac. 

To recapitulate : — 

*' At. Warrcnton there is to he 7,7^^0 men 

" At jnuiiissas, say lO.So'J " 

"In the valU'y of'thc Sheuaudoah 35,4i>7 " 

" On the lower rotoaiac 1,3)0 " 

"luall 55,4.55 " 

" Tliere would thus bo left for the garrisons 
and the front of Washington, imder General 
Wadsworth, some 18.000, inclusive of the bat- 
teries under instruction. The troops organizing 
or ready for service in New York, I learn, will 
probably number more than four thousand. 
These should be assembled at AVashington, sub- 
ject to dis])osition where their services may be 
most required. 

" I am, very respectfully, your obedient ser- 
vant, 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General Commanding. 
" Brig. Gen. L. Thomas, 

" Adjutant- General U. S. Army." 

The following letter from General Barry shows 
that thirty-two (02) field guns, Avith men, horses, 
and equipments, were also left in Washington 
city when the army sailed. These were the bat- 
teries under instruction referred to above : — 

" Headquarters Ixspector of Artillery, 
" Washington, December 16, 1862. 

" General : It having been stated in various 
public prints, and in a speech of Senator Chan- 
dler, of Michigan, in his place in the United 
States Senate, quoting what he stated to be a 
portion of the testimony of Brigadier-General 
Wadsworth, MiUtary Governor of Washington, 
before the joint Senate and House Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, that Major-Gcneral 
McClellan had left an inefficient force for the 
defence of Washington, and not a gun on 
wheels, — 

" I have to contra,dict this charge as follows : — 

" From ofHcial reports made at the time to me, 
(the Chief of Artillery of the army of the Poto- 
mac,) and now in my possession, by the com- 
manding officer of the light artillery troops left 
in camp in the city of 'Washington by your 
orders, it appears that the following-named field 
batteries were left : — 

" Battery C, 1st New York artillery. Captain 
Barnes, 2 guns; battery K, 1st New York artil- 
lery. Captain Crounse, 6 guns; battery L, 2d 
New York artillery, Cnptain Iloliinson, 6 gims ; 
9th New York independent battery, Captain Mon- 
zordi, 6 guns ; 16th New York independent bat- 
tery, Captain Locke; battery A, 2d battalion 
New York artillery, Captain Hogan, G guns; 
battery B, 2d battalion New York artillery. Cap- 
tain McMahon, 6 guns ; total of batteries, 32 
guns. 

" With the exception of a few horses which 
could have been procured from the quarter- 
master's department in a few hours, the batteries 
•were all fit for immediate service, excepting the 
16th New York battery, which having been pre- 
viously ordered, on General Wadsworth's appli- 
cation, to report to him for special service, was 
unequipped with either guns or horses. 



" I am. General, very respectfully, your obe- 
dient servant, W. F. BARRY, 

" Brig.-Gen., Inspector of Artillery, 

" United States Army. 
"Maj.-Gen. McClellan, 
" United States Army." 

It is true that Blenker's division, which is in- 
cluded in the force enumerated by me, was under 
orders to reintbrce General Fremont, but the fol- 
lowing despatch from the Secretary of War, 
dated March 31, 1862, will show that I was 
authorized to detain him at Strasburg until mat- 
ters assumed a definite form in that region, be- 
fore proceeding to his ultimate destination; in 
other words, until Jackson was disposed of. 
And had he been detained there, instead of mov- 
ing on to IIarper"s Ferry and Fi-anklin, under 
other orders, it is probable that General Banks 
would have defeated Jackson, instead of being 
himself obliged subsequently to retreat to Wil- 
liamsport. 

" War Department. 
" Washington, D. 0., March 31, 1862. 
" The order in respect to Blenker is not de- 
signed to hinder or delay the movement of Rich- 
ardson, or any other force. He can remain 
wherever you desire him as long as required for 
your movements, and in any position you desire. 
The order is simply to place him in position for 
reinforcing Fremont, as soon as your dispositions 
will permit, and he may go to Harper's Ferry 1/y 
such route and at such time as you shall direct. 
State your own wishes as to the movement, when 
and how it shall be made. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 
"Maj.-Gen. McClellan." 

Without including General Blenker's division, 
there were left 67,428 men and 85 pieces of light 
artillery, which, under existing circumstances, I 
deemed more than adequate to insure the perfect 
security of Washington against any force the 
enemy could bring against it, for the following 
reasons : — 

Tlie light troops I had thrown forward under 
General Stoneman in ptirsuit of the Rebel army, 
after the evacuation of Manassas and Ccntreville, 
had driven their rear guard across Cedar Run, 
and subsequent expeditions from Sumner's coii.a 
liad forced them beyond the Rappahannock. 
They had destroyed all the railroad bridges l;e- 
hind them, thereby indicating that they did not 
intend to return over that route. Indeed, if they 
had attempted such a movement, their j-.rogress 
must have been slow and difficidt, as it would 
have involved the reconstruction of the bridges; 
and if my orders for keeping numerous cavalry 
patrols well out to the front, to give timely no- 
tice of any approacli of the enemy, had been 
strictly enforced, (and I left seven regiments of 
cavalry for this express purpose,) they could not 
by any possibility have reached AVasJiington be- 
fore tliere would have been ample time to con- 
centrate the entire forces left for its defence, as 
well as those at Baltimore, at any necessary 
point. 

It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to 
the authorities, that the movement of the army 



45 



of the Potomac would have the effect to draw- 
off the hostile army from Mannssas to the de- 
fence of their capital, and thus free Washington 
from menace. Tliis opinion was confirmed the 
moment the movement coniuienccd, or rather as 
soon as the enemy became aware of our inten- 
tions ; for witli the exception of Jackson's force 
of some •15.000, which his instructions show to 
have been intended to operate in such a way as 
to prevent McDowell's corps from being sent to 
reinforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude 
made its appearance in front of Washington 
during the progress of our operations on the 
Peninsula; nor until the order was given for my 
return from Harrison's Landing was Washington 
again threatened. 

Surrounded, as Washington was, with numer- 
ous and strong fortifications, well garrisoned, it 
was manifest that the enemy could not afford 
to detach from his main army a force sufficient 
to assail them. 

It is proper to remark, that just previous to 
my tle{)arture for Fort Monroe, I sent my chief 
of str.ti" to General Hitchcock, who at that time 
held staff relations witli His Excellency the Pres- 
ident and the Secretary of War, to submit to him 
a list of the troops I proposed to leave for the 
defence of Washington, and the positions in 
which I designed posting them. General Hitch- 
cock, after glancing his eye over tlie list, ob- 
served that lie was not the judge of what was 
)-e(|uircd for defending tlie capital ; that General 
^IcC'lellan's position was such as to enable him 
to understand the subject much better than he 
did, and he presumed tiiatif the force designated 
was, in his judgment, sufficient, nothing more 
jwould be required. He was then told by the 
Ichief of staff that I would be glad to have his 
opinion, as an old and experienced officer ; to 
this he replied, that as I had had the entu-e con- 
trol of the defences for a long time, 1 was the 
best judge of what was needed, and he declined 
to give any other expression of opinion at that 
time. 

On the 2d of April, the day following my de- 
parture for Fort Monroe. Generals Hitchcock 
and Thomas were directed by the Secretary of 
War to examine and report whether the Presi- 
dent's instructions to me, of March 8 and 13 had 
been complied with ; on the same day their re- 
port was submitted, and their decision was — 

'That the requirement of the President, that 
this city (Washington) shall be left entirely se- 
cure, has not been fully complied with." 

The President, in his letter to me on the 9th 
of April, says : " And now allow me to ask, do 
you really think I should permit the line from 
Eichmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, 
to be entirely open, except wliat resistance 
could be presented by less than twenty thousand 
unorganized troops." 

In the report of Generals Hitchcock and 
Thomas, alluded to, it is acknowledged that 
there was no danger of an attack from the direc- 
tion of Manassas, in these words : ''In regard to 
occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy 
have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may 
be fair to assume thaji^hey have no intention of 
returning for the reoccupation of their late 
position, and therefore no large force would be 
necessary to hold that position." 



That, as remarked before, was precisely the 
view I took of it, and tliis was enforced by the 
subsequent movements of the enemy. 

In another paragraph of the report it is stated 
that fifty-five thousand men was the number 
considered adequate for tiie defence of the 
capital. That General McClellan, in his enu- 
meration of the forces left, had included lianks's 
army corps, operating in the Shenandoah Valley, 
but whether this corps should be regarded as 
available for the protection of Washington, they 
decline to express an opinion. 

At the time this report was made, the only 
enemy on any approach to Washington was 
Jackson's force, in front of Banks iu the Shen- 
audoah Valley, with the Manassas tJaj) Railroad 
leading from this valley to Washington ; and it 
will be admitted, I presume, iliat liiuks, occu- 
pying the Shenandoali Valley, was in the best 
])osition to defend not only that approach to 
Washington, but the roads to Harper's Ferry 
and above. 

The number of troops left by me for the de- 
fence of Washington, as given iu my letter to the 
Adjutant-General, were taken from the latest 
official returns of that date, and these, of course, 
constituted the most trustwortiiy and authentic 
source from which such information could be 
obtained. 

Another statement made by General Hitch- 
cock before the " Committee on the Conduct of 
the War," in reference totiiissame order, should 
be noticed. He was asked the following ques- 
tion ; "Do you understand now that the move- 
ment made by General McClellan to Fort Mon- 
roe, and up the York Iviver, was in compliance 
with the recommendation of the council of gen- 
erals commanding corps, and held at Fairfa.x 
Court-house on the 13th of March last, or in 
violation of it? 

To which he replied as follows : " I have con- 
sidered, and do now consider, that it was in vio- 
lation of the recommendation of that council in 
two important particulars ; one particular being 
that portion of this report whieli represents the 
council as agreeing to the expedition by way of 
the Peninsula, provided the Rebel steamer Mer- 
rimack could first be neutralized. Tiiat impor- 
tant provision General McClellan disregarded. 

If * :ti :|t 4t 4< 

The second particular alluded to by General 
Hitchcock was in reference to the troops left for 
the defence of Washington, Avhich had been dis- 
posed of above. 

In regard to the steamer Merrimack, I have 
also stated that, so far as our operations on 
York River were concerned, the power of this 
vessel was neutralized. I now proceed to give 
some of the evidence which influenced me in 
coming to that ccnclusion. 

Previous to our departure for the Peninsula, 
Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, was 
sent by the President to Fort Monroe to consult 
with Flag-officer Goldsborough upon this subject. 
The result of that consultation is contained in 
the following extract from tiie evidence of Ad- 
miral Goldsborougli before the '• Committee on 
the Conduct of the War," viz : •' I told Mr. Wat- 
son, Assistant Secretary' of War, that the Presi- 
dent might make his mind perfectly easy about 
the Merrimack going up York liiver ; that she 



46 



could never get there, for I had ample means to 

prevent tlmt." 

Captain G-. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, testifies before the commiUee as fol- 
lows : — 

"General McClcllan expected the navy to 
neutralize tlie Merrimack, and I promised that 
it sliould be done." 

General Keyes, commanding 4th army corps, 
testifies as follows bcibre the committee : — 

" During the time that tlie subject of the change 
of base was discussed, I had refused to con-^ent 
to the Peninsula line of operations until 1 had 
sent word to the Navy Department and asked 
two questions : First, whether the Merrimack 
was certainly neutralized, or not? Second wheth- 
er the n;ivy was in condition to co-operate effi- 
ciently with the army to break through between 
Yorktown and Gloucester Point? To both of 
these, answers were returned in the affirmative; 
that is, the Merrimack was neutralized, and the 
navy was in a condition to co-operate efficiently 
to break through between Yorktown and Glou- 
cester Point." 

Before starting for the Peninsula, I instructed 
Lieutcnnnt-Coloncl 13. S. Alexander, of the 
United States corps of Engineers, to visit Ma- 
ll issas Junction and its vicinity for the purpose of 
determining upon the defensive works necessary 
to enable us to hold that place with a small force. 
The accompanying letters from Colonel Alex- 
ander will show what steps were taken by him to 
carry into cll'cct this important order. 

I regret t.) say that those who succeeded me 
in command of the region in front of Wasiiing- 
ton, whatever were the fears for its safety, did 
not deem it necessary to carry out my plans and 
instructions to them. Had Manassas been 
placed in condition for a strong defence, and its 
communications secured as recommended by 
Colonel Alexander, the result of General Pope's 
campaign would probably have been ditierent. 

"Washington, D. C, April 2, 18G2. 

" Sir : You will proceed to Manassas at as 
early a moment as practicable and mark on the 
ground the works i'or the defence of that place, 
on the ))ositii)ns whicii I indicated to you yester- 
day. You will find two carpenters, experienced 
in tliis kind of work, ready to accompany you, 
by calling on Mr. Dougherty, the master carpen- 
ter of the Treasury extension. 

"The general idea of the defence of this po- 
sition is, to occupy the fringe of elevation which 
lies al)out halfway between Manassas depot and 
the junction of the railroad, with a series of 
works open to the rear, so that they may be 
commanded by the work hereafter to be de- 
scribed. 

" There will be at least four of these works, 
three of them being on the left of the railroad 
leading from Alexandria, at the positions occu- 
pied by the enemy's works. The other on the 
right of this road, on the position we examined 
yesterday. The works of the enemy to the ncjrth 
of this latter position, numbered 1 and 2 on Lieu- 
tenant Comstock's sketch, may also form a part 
of the front line of our defence; but tlie sides of 
these works looking towards Manassas station 
should be levelled, so that the interior of the 
works may be seen from the latter position. 



"Embrasures should be arranged in all these 
works iov field artillery. The approaches should 
be such that a battery can drive into the 
works. The number of embrasures in each bat- 
tery will depend upon its size and the ground to 
be commanded. It is supposed there will be 
from four to eight embrasures in each battery. 

"The other works of the enemy lool^ing to- ' 
wards the cast and south may be strengthened so 
as to afford sufficient defence in these directions. 
The work No. '6 in Lieutenant Conistock's sketch 
may be also strengthened and arranged for field ' 
artillery, when time will permit. Tliis work is 
in a good position to cover a retreat, whicii 
would be made down the valley in which tiie 
railroad runs towards Bull Kun. 

" At Manassas station there should be a fort 
constructed. The railroad will pass through this 
fort, and the depot, if tliere should be one built, 
should be placed in its rear. This latter work 
should be regarded as the key to the position. 
It should be as large as the nature of the ground 
will permit. 

" liy going down tlie slopes, which are not 
steep, it may be made large enough to accommo- 
date 2,000 or 3,000 men. The top of the posi- 
tion need not be cut away ; it will be better to 
throw up tlie earth into a large traverse, which 
may also be a bomb-proof. Its profile should be 
strong, and its ditches shoidd be flanked. It 
should receive a heavy armament of 24- or ?>2- 
pounders, with some rifled (Parrott) 20 or oO- 
pounders. Its guns should command all the 
exterior works, so that these works could be of 
no use to the enemy, should he take them. In 
accommodating the fort to the ground this con- 
sideration should not be lost sight of. 

"After tracing these works on the ground, 
you will make a sketch embracing the whole of 
them, showing their relative positions and size. 
This sketcli should embrace tlie junction of the 
railroads, and the ground for some distance 
around the main work. It need not be made 
with extreme accuracy. The distances may be 
paced, or measured, with a tape line. The bear- 
ings may be taken by compass. 

" Having located the works and prepared your 
sketch, you will report to Captain Frederick E. 
Prime, of the corps of engineers, who will fur- 
nish yon the means of construction. 

" It is important that these works should be 
built with tlve least possible delay. You will, 
therefore, expedite matters as fast as possible. 
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
"B. S. ALEXANDLR, 
" Licificnani-CoJoncJ, Aids-dc-Camp. 
" Captain Fueu. 11. Muntueu, Present." 

" Washington, April 0, 1SC2. 

" SrR : I enclose you hcrewitii a co])y of the 
instructions which I gave to (Captain Munthcr, 
in reference to the defences of Manassas. 

" As there has been a new department created, 
(that of the IJaiipahani.ock.) it is possible that 
you and I, as well as General McClellan, are re- 
lieved from the further consideration of this 
subject at the present time. 

" I will, however, state for your information, 
should the subject ever come before you again, 
that in my opinion the comnuinication with 
Manassas by land should be secured. 



47 



" To effbct this in the best manner, so far as 
my observations extended, I think tlic bridge 
over Bull lliin, near Union Mills, and just above 
the railroad bridge, siiouid be rebuilt or thor- 
oughly repaired, and that a small work, or two 
or three open batteries, should be erected on the 
adjacent beiglits to protect it as well as the rail- 
road bridge. 

" Tlie communication by land would then be 
through or near Centreville, over the road used 
by the enemy. 

"I write this for fear something shotild detain 
me here; but I hope to leave here to join you 
to-morrow. My health is much improved. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
"B. S. ALEXANDER, 
" Lieutenant- Colonel, Aide- de- Camp. 
" Brigadier-General J. G. Barnard, 

•' Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac." 

I may be permitted also to mention that the 
plans (also unexecuted by my successor^ indi- 
cated in my letter of instructions to f eneral 
Banks, dn,ted March IG, 18G2, for intrencliing 
Chester Gap and the point where the Manassas 
Railroad crosses the Shenandoah, were for the 
purpose of preventmg even the attempt of such 
a raid as that of Jackson in the month of May 
following. 

M'L'TARY INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST PERIOD. 

X fore taking up the liistoi'y of the embarka- 



tion and Peninsula campaign, I should remark 
tliat during the fdl and winter of 1SG1-'(J2, 
while tlie army of the I'otomac was in position 
in front of VVashinglon, reeoimoissances wero 
made from time to time, and skirniishes fre- 
quently ocx'urred, whieli were of great impor- 
tance in the education of the tioops, accustt)ming 
them to the presence of the enemy, and giving 
them confidence under fire. Tliere were niany 
instances of individual gallantry displayed in 
these affairs ; the reports of ihem will be found 
among the documents which accompany this 
report. 

One of the most brilliant of these affairs was 
that whicli took i)laco at Drainsville on Dceem- 
cer 20, ISGl, when tiie 3d biigade of McCall's 
division, under Brigadier-General E. 0. C. Ord, 
with Easton's battery, routed and pursued four 
regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a bat- 
tery of six pieces. 

The operations of Brigadier-General F. W, 
Lander on the upper Potomac, during the 
months of January and February, 18G2, frus- 
trated the attempts of General Jackson against 
the Baltimore and O.iio liairoad, Cumberland, 
&c., and obliged him to fill back to Winchester. 
His constitution was impaired by liie hard.siiips 
he had experienced, and on tlie 2d March the 
fearless General Lander expired, a victim to the 
excessive fatigue of the campaign. 



SECOND PERIOD. 



CHAPTER I. 

The council composed of the four corps comman- 
ders, organized by tiie President of the United 
States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, 
adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations 
for the movement of the army of the Potomac 
upon Ilieiunond. For the prompt and successful 
execution of tiie projected operation, it was re- 
garded by all as necessary tiiat the whole of tiie 
four CO ps should be employed, with at least the 
addition of ten thousand men drawn from the 
forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, that 
position and its dej)endencies being regarded as 
amj)ly jjrotected by the naval force in its neigh- 
borhood, and tlie ativance of the main army up 
the Peninsula, so that it could be safely left with 
a small garrison. 

In addition to the land forces the co-operation 
of the navy was desired in the projected attack 
upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, 
as well as in controlling the York and James 
rivers for tlie protection of our flanks, and the 
use of the transports in bringing supplies to the 
army. With these expectations, and for reasons 
stated elsewliere in this re])ort, my original plan 
of moving by Urbuna and West Point was aban- 
doned, and the line with Fort Monroe as a base 
adopted. In the arrangements for the transpor- 
tation of the army to the Peninsula Ijy water, the 
vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous" 
mainly at Anna|,olis; but upon the evacuation 
of Manassas and the Ixatteries of the lower Poto- 
mac by the enemy, it became more convenient to 
embark the troops and materials at Alexandria, 
and orders to that efl'ect were at once given. 

In making the prelimniary aiTangements for 
the movement it was determined that the first 
corps. General McDowell's should move as a 
unit first, and efi'eet a landing eitlier at the Sand- 
box, some four miles south of Yorktown, in or- 
der to turn all the enemy's defences at Ship 
Point, Howard's Bridge, Big Bethel, &c., or else, 
shi.uld existing circumstances render it prefera- 
ble, land on tiie Gloucester side of York River 
and move on V\ est Point. 

Tiie transports, however, arrived slowly and 
few at a time. In order, therefore, to exjiedite 
matters, I dec ded to embark the army by divis- 
ions, as transports arrived, keejiing army corps 
togeliier as mucli as possible, and to collect the 
troops at Fort Monroe. In determining the order 
of embarkation, convenience and ex])edition were 
especially consulted, except that the lirst corps 
was to be embarked last, as I intended to move 
it in mass to its point of disembarkation, and to 
land it on either bank of the York, as might then 
be determined. 

On the 17th of March Hamilton's division, of 



the 3d corps, embarked at Alexandria and pro- 
ceeded to Fort Monroe witn the following or- 
ders : — 

Washington, D. C, March 17, 1862. 
" You Avill, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, 
report to General Wool and request liim t > as- 
sign )0U jiround for encamping your division. 
You will remain at F rt Monroe until further 
orders from General McClcUm. Should Gen- 
eral Woul require the services of your division in 
repelling an attack, you will obey his orders and 
use every effort to carry out his views. 

" li. B. MARCY, 

" Chief of Staff. 
" General C. S. Hamilton, 

" Cummundinc) Uicision." 

On the 22d of March, as soon as transporta- 
tion was ready, General Fitz John Porer's 
division of the same cor|)s, embarked. General 
Ileintzelman was ordered to accompauy it, mider 
the following instructions : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Seminary, March 22, 1862. 

" General : Upon tlie disembarkation of Por- 
ter's division at Fori Monroe, I have to request 
tiiat you will move your two divisions, Poner's 
and Hamilton's, some three or four miles out 
from the fort to tind good camping places, 
where wood and water can be readily obtained, 
and where your positions will be good in a de- 
fensive point of view. You may find it advisa- 
Ijle to place one division on or near the r.iad le id- 
ing to Yorktown from Newport News, — the other 
upon that leading t > Yorktown direct from F..rt 
Mouro.'. It you tind that the nature of the coun- 
try will permit easy communication and mutual 
support between the two divisions, it will lie best 
to place one on each road. It will be best to 
remain pretty near the fort for the present, in 
order to give the impression that our object is to 
attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You will 
do well, however, to push strong reconn()i>sanoes 
well to the front to ascertain the position of the 
enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possi- 
ble, reinforce you by the third division of } our 
corps, and it is probable that a part or the wiiole 
of the 4th corps will also move from Fort Mon- 
roe. This will probably be determined betiire 
your disembarkation is completed, and you will 
be informed accordingly. 

'• My desire would be to make no important 
move in advance until we are fully prepiu-ed to 
follow it up and give the enemy no time to 
recover. 

"Ihe quartermaster of your corps will receive 
detailed instructions in regard to land transporU- 
tion from General Van Viiet. 



49 



" It will be advisable to mobilize your corps 
with the least possible delay, and have it pre- 
pared for an advance. I have directed extra 
clothing, ammunition, &c., to be sent to Fort 
Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be supplied 
without dii^ay. 

" Please report to rae frequently and fully the 
condition of things on the new field of operations, 
and wliatever intelligence you gain as to the 
enemy. 

" Engage guides in sufficient numbers at onc«, 
andenleavor to send out spies. 
" I am very truly yours, 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-Oencral, Co nima riding. 
" Brigadier-General S. P. Heixtze^man, 
" Commanding Zd Corps." 

The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly 
as transports could be supplied. 

On the 1st of April 1 embarked with the head- 
quarters on the steamer Commodore, and reach- 
ed Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d. 

In consequence of the delay in the arrival of 
the horse transports at Alexandria, but a small 
portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the 
artillery reserve had not yet completed its disem- 
barkation. 

I found there the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry and 
the 5th regular cavalry; the 2d regular cavalry 
and a portion of the 1st had arrived, but not 
disembarked. So few wagons had arrived that 
it was not possible to move Casey's division at 
all for several days, while the other divisions 
were obliged to move with scant supplies. 

As to the force and position of the enemy the 
information then in our possession was vague 
and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained 
from the staff officers of General Wool, and was 
simply to the effect that Yorktown was sur- 
rounded by a continuous line of earthworks, 
with sti-on-j water batteries on the York Kiver, 
and ga-risoned by not less than 15,000 troops, 
under command of General J. B. Magruder. 
Maps, which had been prepared by the topo- 
graphic.il engineers under General Wool's com- 
mand, were furnished me, in which the War- 
wick River was represented as flowing parallel to, 
but not crossing, the road from Newport News to 
Williamsburg, making the so-called Mulberry 
Island a real island ; and we had no information 
as to the true course of the Warwick across the 
Peninsula, nor of the formidable line of works 
which it covered. 

Information which I had collected during the 
winter placed General Magruder's command at 
from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of 
General Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at 
about 15.000. 

It was also known that there were strong de- 
fensive works at or near Williamsburg. 

Knowing that General Huger could easily 
spare some troops to reinforce Yorktown, that he 
had indeed done so, and that Johnston's army of 
Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James 
and York rivers to the same point, I proposed to 
invest that town without delay. 

The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, U. 
S. Topographical Engineers, attached to General 
Wool's staff, given to me as the result of several 
montiis' labor indicated the feasibility of the 



design. It was also an object of prunary im- 
portance to reach the vicinity of Vorktown be- 
fore the enemy was reinforced sulficieiuly to 
enable liim to hold in force his works at Big 
Bfthel, ILnvard's Biid^v, Ship Point, &(:., oa 
the direct road to Yorktown and Young's Mills, 
on the road from Newport News. This was the 
more urgent, as it was now evident that some 
days must elapse before the first corps could 
arrive. 

Everything possible was done to hasten the 
disembaikatiou of the cavalry, artillery, and 
wagons in the harbor; and on the 3d the orders 
of march were given for the following day. 

There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity 
on the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the 
3d corps, two divisions of the 4th corps, and one 
division of the 2d corps, and Sykes's brigade of 
regular infantry, together with Hunt's artillery 
reserve and the regiments of cavalry before 
named, in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns, 
besides the division of artillery. 

Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of the 2d 
and 3d corps had not arrived, and Casey's division 
of the -Ith corps was unable to move for want of 
wagons. 

Before I lefl Washington an order had been 
issued by the War Department placing Fort 
Monroe and itjs dependencies under my control, 
and authorizing me to draw from the troops 
under General Wool a division of about 10,0(JO 
men, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps. 

During the night of the 3d I received a tele- 
gram from the Adjutant-General of the army, 
stating that, ])y the President's order, I was de- 
prived of all control over General Wool and the 
troops under his command, and forbidden to 
detach any of his troops without his sanction. 

This order left me without any base of opera- 
tions under my own control, and to this day I 
am ignorant of the c luses which led to it. 

On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James 
River was declared by the naval authorities 
closed to the operations of their vessels by the 
combined influence of the enemy's batteries on 
its banks and the Confederate steamers Merri- 
mack, Yorktown, Jamestown, and Teazer. Flag- 
Officer Goldsborough, then in command of the 
United States squadron in Hampton Roads, re- 
garded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest 
and most imperative duty to watch and neutral- 
ize the Merruaack ; and as he designed using his 
m jst powerful vessels in a contest with her, he 
did not feel able to detach to the assistance of 
the army a suitable force to attack the water 
batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this 
was contrary to what had been previously stated 
to rae, and materially affected my plans. 

At no time during the operations against 
Yorktown was the navy prepared to lend us any 
material assistance in its reduction until after 
our land batteries had partially silenced the 
works. 

I had hoped, let me say, by rapid moveraenis, 
to drive before me or capture the enemy on tha 
Peninsula, open the James River, and press on to 
Richmond before he should be materially re- 
inforced from other portions of the territory. 
As the narrative proceeds the causes will be de- 
veloped which frustrated these apparently well- 
grounded expectations. 



50 



I determined then to move the two divisions 
of tlie 4th corps by the Newport News and Wil- 
lianishiirg road, to take up a position between 
Yorktown and Williamsburs^, while the two di- 
visions of the 3d corps moved direct from Fort 
Monroe upon Yorktown; the reserves moving 
so as to support either corps as might prove 
necessary. I designed, should the works at 
Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious re- 
sistance, to land the 1st corps, reinforced if 
necessary on the left bank of the York or on tlie 
Severn, to move on Gloucester and West Point, 
in order to take in reverse whatever force the 
eneuiy might have on the Peninsula, and com- 
pel him to abandon his positions. 

In the commencement of the movement from 
Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were encoun- 
tered from the want of precise topographical in- 
formation as to the country in advance. Correct 
local maps were not to be found, and the coun- 
try, though known in its general feature, we 
found to be inaccurately described in essen- 
tial particulars in the only maps and geograph- 
ical memoirs or papers to which access could be 
had. Erroneous courses to streams and roads 
■were frequently given, and no dependence could 
be placed on the information thus derived. This 
difficulty has been found to exist with respect to 
most portions of tlie State of Virginia, through 
■which my military operations have extended. 
Keconnoissances, frequently under fire, proved 
the only trustworthy sources of information. 
Negroes, however truthful their reports, pos- 
sessed or were able to communicate very little 
accurate and no comprehensive topographical 
information. 

On the 3d the following orders ■were given 
for the movement of the 4th : — 

" Porter's and Hamilton's divisions and Aver- 
ill's cavalry of the 3d corps, and Sedgwick's di- 
vision of the 2d corps, under Brigadier-General 
Heintzelman, commanding 3d corps, will move 
to-morrow in the following order: Porter's 
division with Averill's cavalry at 6 a. m. over 
the Newmarket and New bridges to Big Bethel 
and Howard's Bridge. This division will send 
forward to tlie batteries where the Ship Point 
road intersects tiie main Yorktown road a suffi- 
cient force to hold tiiat ])oint, and cut off the 
garrison of the Ship Point batteries. The 
■whole division may be used for tliis purpose if 
necessary, and if possible the batteries should 
he occupied by our troops to-morrow. Tiie 
portion of the division not necessary for this 
purpose will encamp at Howard's Bridge. 

'• Hamilton's division will march at 7 a. m. 
by the New Bridge road to Big Bethel, and will 
encamp on Howard's Creek. 

" Sedgwick's division will march at 8 a. m. 
by the Newmarket Bridge, taking the direct road 
to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard's 
Bridge. 

" Brigadier-General Keyes, commanding 4th 
corps, will move with Smith's and Couch's di- 
visions at 6 A. M. (Smith's division in advance), 
by the .lames River road. The 5th regular cav- 
alry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will 
move with Smith's division, which will encamp 
at Young's Mills, throwing forward at least one 
brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick. 
Couch's divisiou will encamp at Fisher's Creek. 



"The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry 
will move at 8.30 a. m. by the Newmarket 
bridge, to Big Bethel, where it will encamp. On 
the march it will keep in rear of Sedgwick's 
division." 

The following is an extract from the order 
issued on the 4th for the march of the 5th : — 

" The following movements of the army will 
be carried out to-morrow (oth). 

" General Keyes will move forward Smith's 
division at G a. m. via Warwick Court House 
and the road leading near the old shipyard, to 
the ' Half-way House ' on the Yorktown and 
Williamsburg road. 

'• General Couch's division will march at 6 
a. m. to close up on General Smith's division at 
the ' Half-way House.' 

" General Koyes's command will occupy and 
hold the narrow dividing ridge near the ' Half- 
way H(nise,' so as to prevent the escape of the 
garrison at Yorktown by land, and prevent 
reinforcements being thrown in. 

" General Heintzelman will move forward 
General Porter's two rear brigades at 6 a. m. 
upon the advanced guard, when the entire di- 
vision will advance to a point about two and 
three quarters miles from Yorktown, where the 
road turns abruptly to tiie north, and wiiere a 
road comes in from Warwick Court House. 

" General Hamilton's division will move at 6 
A. M. and follow General Porter's division, 
camping as near it as possible. 

"General Sedgwick's division will march at 
5 A. M. as far as the Warwick road, which en- 
ters the main Yorktown road near Doctor Pow- 
ers's house, and will await furtlier orders. 

"The reserve will march at ti a. m. upon the 
main Yorktown road, halting for further orders 
at Doctor Powers's House ; the infantry leading, 
the artillery following next, and the cavalry in 
rear. 

" General Sedgwick's division will, for the 
present, act with the reserve, and he will receive 
orders from headquarters." 

In giving these orders of march for the 4th 
and 5th, it was expected that there would be no 
serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the 
advance of the 3d corps beyond that point would 
force the enemy to evacuate the works at Young's 
Mills, while our possession of the latter would 
make it necessary for him to abandon those at 
Howard's Bridge, and the advance thence on 
Yorktown wotild place Ship Point in our posses- 
sion, together vith its garrison, unless they 
abandoned it piomptly. The result answered 
the expectation. 

During the afternoon of the 4th, General 
Keyes obtained information wf the presence of 
some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy in a strong 
position at Lee's Mills. The nature of that posi- 
tion, in relation to the Warwick not being at 
that time understood, I instructed General Keyes 
to attack and carry this position upon coming in 
front of it. 

Early in the afternoon of the 5th the advance 
of each column was brought to a halt, that of 
Heintzelman (Porter's division) in front of York- 
town, after overcoming some resistance at Big 
Bethel and Howard's Bridge ; that of Keyea 
(Smith's division) unexpectedly before the ene 
my's works at Lee's Mill, where the rgad from 



51 



Newport News to Williamsburg crosses Warwick 
Kiver. 

The progress of each column had been re- 
tarded by heai-y rains on that day, which had 
made the roads almost impassable to the infantry 
of Keyes's column, and impassable to all but a 
small portion of the artillery, while the ammu- 
nition, provisions, and forage could not be brought 
up at all. 

When General Keys approached Lee's Mills 
his left flank was exposed to a sharp artillery 
fire from the further bank of the Warwick, and 
upon reaching the vicinity of the mill he found 
it altogether stronger than was expected, unap- 
proachable by reason of the Warwick River, and 
incapable of being carried by assault. 

The troops composing the advance of each col- 
umn were, during the afternoon, under a warm 
artillery fire, the sharpshooters even of the right 
cohimn being engaged when covering reconnois- 
sances. 

It was at this stage and moment of the cam- 
paign that the following telegram was seat to 
me : — 

" Adjotant-General's Office, 

April 4, 18C2. 

" By direction of the President, General Mc- 
Dowell's army corps has been detached from 
the force under your immediate command, and 
the general is ordered to report to the Secretary 
of War. Letter by mail. 

"L. THOMAS, 
" Adjutant- General. 

" General McClellan." 

The President having promised, in an inter- 
view foUoAving his order of March 31, withdraw- 
ing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my 
command, that nothing of the sort should be 
repeated, — that I might rest assured that the 
campaign should proceed, with no furtlier de- 
ductions from the force upon which its opera- 
tions had been planned, — I may confess to hav- 
ing been shocked at this order, which, with that 
of the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, removed 
nearly 00,000 men from my command, and re- 
duced my force by more than one third, after 
its task had been assigned ; its operations plan- 
ned; its fighting begun. To me the blow was 
most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans 
for impending operations. It fell when I was 
too deeply comitutted to withdraw. It left me 
incapable of continuing operations which had 
been begun. It compelled the adoption of an- 
other, a different and a less effective plan of 
campaign. It made rapid and brilliant opera- 
tions impossible. It was a fatal error. 

It was now, of course, out of my power to 
turn Yorktown by West Point. I had, there- 
fore, no choice left but to attack it directly in 
front, as I best could with the force at my com- 
mand. 

Reconnoissances made under fire on that and 
the following (day determined that the sources of 
the Warwick River were near Yorktown, com- 
manded by its guns, while that stream, for some 
distance from its mouth on the James River, was 
controlled by the Confederate gunboats ; that 
the fords had been destroyed by dams, the 
approaches to which were generally through 
dense forests and deep swamps, and defended by 



extensive and formidable works; that timber 
telled for defensive purpust-s and tlio (luoding 
of the roads, caused by tliu daias, had made these 
works ai)parently iruiccessihle and iiupos.siiile to 
turn; that Yorktown was strongly forlilied. armed, 
and garrisoned, and connected with tiie defences 
of the Warwick by forts and intrenchmeuis, the 
ground in front of which was swejit by tlic guns 
of Yorktown. It was also ascertained tliat the 
garrisons had been, and were daily being re- 
inforced by troops from Norfolk and tlie army 
under General J. E. Johnston. Heavy rains 
made the roads to Fort Monroe impassable, and 
delayed the arrival of troops, annnunition, and 
supplies, while storms prevented for several days 
the sailing of transports from Hampton Roads, 
and the establishment of depots on the creeks of 
York River, near the army. 

The ground bordering the Warwick River is 
covered by very dense and extensive forests, the 
clearings being small and few. This, with the 
comparative flatness of the country, and tlie alert- 
ness of the enemy, everywhere in force, ren- 
dered thorougli reconnoissances slow, dangerous, 
and difficult, yet it was impossible otherwise to 
determine whether an assault was anywhere 
practicable, or whether the more tedious l)Ut sure 
operations of a siege must be resorted to. 

I made, on the 6th and 7tli, close personal re- 
connoissances of the right and left of the ene- 
my's positions, which, with information acquired 
already, convinced me tliat it was best to pre- 
pare for an assault by the preliminary employ- 
ment of heavy guns, and some siege operations. 
Instant assault would liave been simple foUv. On 
the 7th I telegraphed to the President as fol- 
lows : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

''April!, 18G2. 

"Your telegram of yesterday is received. In 
repl}', I have the honor to state, that my entire 
force for duty amounts to only about (85.000) 
eighty-five thousand men. General Wool's com- 
mand, as you will observe from the accompany- 
ing order, has been taken out of my control, al- 
though he has most cheerfully co-operated with 
me. The only use that can be made of his com- 
mand is to protect my communications in rear 
of this point. At this time only fifty-three thou- 
sand men have joined me, but they are coming 
up as rapidly as my means of transportation will 
permit. 

" Please refer to my despatch to the Secretary 
of War to-night, for the details of our present 
situation. 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 

" To the President, Washington, D. C." 

On the same day I sent the followmg : — 

"Headquarters Armt of the Potomac, 
" In front of Yorktown, 

" April 1, 18G2, — 7 p. m. 

" Your telegram of yesterday arrived here 
while I was absent, examining the enemy's right, 
which I did pretty closely. 

" The whole line of the Warwick, which really 
heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly de- 
fended by detached redoubts and other fortifica- 
tions, armed with heavy and light guns. The 



52 



approaches, except at Torktown, are covered by 
the Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at 
most, two passages, both of which are covered 
by strong batteries. It will be necessary to re- 
sort to the use of heavy guns, and some siege 
operations, before we assault. All the prisoners 
state that G^n. J. E. Johnston arrived at York- 
town ycsterdiiy witli heavy reinforcements. It 
seems clear tliat I shall have the whole force of 
the enemy on my hands, — probably not less than 
(100,000) one hundred thousand men, and prob- 
ably more. In consequence of the loss of Blen- 
ker's division and the 1st corps, my force is pos- 
sibly less than tliat of the enemy, wliile they 
have all the advantage of position. 

" I am under great obligations to you for the 
offer that the whole force and material of the 
Government will be as fully and as speedily un- 
der my command as heretofore, or as if the new 
departments had not been created. 

" Since my arrangements were made for this 
campaign, at least (50,000) fifty thousand men 
have been taken from my command. Since my 
despatch of theotli inst., five divisions have been 
in close observation of tlie enemy, and frequently 
exchanging shots. When my present command 
all joins, I shall have about (85,000) eighty-five 
thousand men for duty, from which a large 
force must be taken for guards, scouts, &c. With 
tliis army I could assault the enemy's works, 
and perhaps carry them ; but were I in posses- 
sion of their intrenchments, and assailed by 
double my numbers, I should have no fears as 
to the result. 

" Under the circumstances that have been de- 
veloped since we arrived here, I feel fully im- 
pressed with the conviction that here is to be 
fought the great battle that is to decide the exist- 
ing contest. I shall, of course, commence the 
attack as soon as I can get up my siege train, and 
shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's 
•works, but to do this with a reasonable degree of 
certainty requires, in my judgment, that I should 
if possible, have at least the whole of the 1st 
corps to land upon the Severn River and attack 
Gloucester in the rear. 

" My present strength will not admit of a de- 
tachment sufiieient for this purpose, without ma- 
terially impairing tlie efl[iciency of this column. 
Flag-Officer Goldsborough thinks the works too 
strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn 
Gloucester. I send, by mail, copies of his letter 
and one of the commander of the gunboats here. 
"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

^'■. Major- Geyieral. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

*' Hecretarij of War." 

I had provided a small siege train and moder- 
ate supples of intrenching tools for such a con- 
tingency as the present. Immediate steps were 
taken to secure the necessary additions. While 
the engineer officers were engaged in ascertain- 
ing the character and stix-ngth of all the defences, 
and the configuration of the ground in front of 
Yorktown, in order to determine the point of 
attack and to develop the approaches, the troops 
were occujiied in opt'ning roads to the depots 
established at the nearest available points, on 
branches of York River. Troops were brought 



to the front as rapidly as possible, and on the 
10th of April the array was posted as follows : — 

Heintzelman's corps, composed of Porter's, 
Hooker's, and Hamilton's divisions, in front of 
Y'orktown, extending in tlie order named, from 
the mouth of Wormley's Creek to the Warwick 
road, opposite Winn's Mills. Sumner's corps — 
Sedgwick's division only having arrived — on the 
left of Hamilton, extending down to Warwick 
and opposite to Winn's Mills works. Reyes's 
corps, (Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions,) 
on the left of Sedgwick, lacing the works at the 
one-gun battery, Lee's Mills, &c., on the west 
bank of the Warwick. Sunmer, after the 6th of 
April, commanded the left wing, composed of 
his own and Reyes's corps. 

Throughout the preparations for, and during 
the siege of Yorktown, I kept the corps under 
General Reyes, and afterwards the left wing, 
under General Sumner, engaged in ascertaining 
the character of the obstacles presented by the 
Warwick, and the enemy intrenched upon the 
right bank, with the intention, if possible, of 
overcoming them and breaking that line of de- 
fence, so as to gain possession of the road to 
Williamsburg, and cut oft' Yorktown from its 
supports and supplies. The forces under Gen- 
eral Heintzelman were engaged in similar efibrts 
upon the works betwaen Winn's INIills and York- 
town. General Reyes's report of the IGih of 
April, enclosing reports of brigade commanders 
engaged in reconnoissances up to that day, said, 
" that no part of his (the enemy's line opposite 
his own) line, so far as discovered, can be taken 
by assault, without an enormous waste of life." 
Reconnoissances on the right flank demonstrated 
the fact that the Warwick was not passable in 
that direction, except over a narrow dam, the 
approaches to which were swept by several bat- 
teries, and intrenchments which could be filled 
quickly with supports sheltered by the timber 
immediately in rear. 

General Barnard, chief engineer of the army 
of the Potomac, whose position entitled his opin- 
ions to the highest consideration, expressed the 
judgment that those formidable works could not, 
with any reasonable degree of certainty, be car- 
ried by assault. General Reyes, commanding 
4th army corps, after the examination of the 
enemy's defences on the left, before alluded to, 
addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ira 
Harris, United States Senate, and gave me a 
copy. Although not strictly ofiicial, it describes 
the situation at that time in some respects so well, 
that I have taken the liberty of introducing it 
here : — 

" Headquarters 4th Corps, 
" Warwick Corni, House, Va., April 7, 1862. 

"My dear Senator: The plan of campaign 
on this line was made with the distinct imder- 
standing that four army corps should be employ- 
ed, and that the navy should co-operate in the 
taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood 
it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up 
James River. 

"To-day I have learned that the 1st corps, 
which by the President's order was to embrace 
four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of 
tlie 2d corps, have been withdrawn altogether 



53 



from this line of operations, and from the army 
of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am in- 
formed, the navy has not the means to attack 
Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunl)oats up 
James River, for fear of the Merrimack. 

" The above plan of campaign was adopted 
unanimously by Major-General McDowell and 
Brigadier-Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and 
Kc3'cs, and was concurred in by Major-General 
McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our 
base. 

" This army being reduced by forty-five thou- 
sand troops, some of them among the best in the 
service, ami without the support of the navj', the 
plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any 
resemblance to the one I voted for. 

" I command the James River column, and I 
left my camp near Nevqiort News the morning 
of the 4th instant. I only succeeded in getting 
my artillery ashore the afternoon of the day 
before, and one of my divisions had not all ar- 
rived in camp the day I left, and for the want of 
transportation has not yet joined me. So you 
will observe that not a day was lost in the ad- 
vance, and in fact we marched so quickly, and so 
rapidly, that many of our animals were twenty- 
four and forty-eight hours without a ration of 
forage. But notwithstanding the rapidity of our 
advance, wc were stopped by a line of defence 
nine or ten miles long, strongly fortified by 
breastworks, erected nearly the whole distance 
behind a stream, or succession of ponds, nowhere 
fordable, one terminus being Yorktown, and the 
other ending in the James River, which is com- 
manded by the enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is 
fortified all around with bastioned works, and on 
the water side it and Gloucester are so strong 
that the navy are afraid to attack either. 

" The approaches on one side are generally 
inrough low, swampy, or thickly wooded ground, 
over roads which wc are obliged to repair or to 
make before we can get forward our carriages. 
The enemy is in great force, and is constantly 
receiving reinfoi'cements from the two rivers. 
The line in front of us is therefore one of the 
strongest ever opposed to an invading force in 
>iny country. 

" You will, then, ask why I advocated such a 
line for our operations ? My reasons are few, 
but I think good. 

" With proper assistance from the navy we 
could take Yorktown, and then with gunboats on 
both rivers we could beat any force opposed to 
us on Wai'wick River, because the shot and shell 
from the gunboats would nearly overlap across 
the Peninsula; so that if the enemy should re- 
treat — and retreat he must — he would have a 
long way to go without rail or steam transporta- 
tion, and every soul of his army must fall into 
our hands or be destroyed. 

" Another reason for my supporting the new 
base and plan was, that this line, it was expected, 
would furnish water transportation nearly to 
Richmond. 

" Now, supposing we succeed in breaking 
through the line in front of us, what can we do 
next ? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy 
retains command of James River, and we do not 
first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible for 
us to subsist this army three marches beyond 
where it is now. As the roads are at present, it 



is with the utmost difficidty that we can subsist 
it in the position it now occupies. 

" You will see, therefore, by what I liave said, 
that the force originally intended for the capture 
of Richmond should l)e all sent forward. If I 
thought the four army corps necessary when I 
supposed the navy would co-operate, and when 
I judged of the ol)stacles to be encountered by 
what I learned from maps and the opinions of 
officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and from 
all other sources, how nnich more should 1 think 
the full complement of troops requisite nowtliat 
the na\'y cannot co-operate, and now that the 
strength of the enemy's lines and the number of 
his guns and men prove to be almost immeas- 
urably greater than I had been led to expect. 
The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the 
military men here, who are at all competent to 
judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and 
the force of the enemy capable of l)cing increas- 
ed beyond the numbers we now have to oppose to 
him. Independently of the strenccth of the lines 
in front of us, and of the force of t!ie enemy be- 
hind them, we cannot advance until we get com- 
mand of either York River or .James River. The 
efficient co-operation of the navy is, therefore, 
absolutely essential, and so I considered it when 
I voted to change our base from the Potomac to 
Fort Monroe. 

"An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown; 
and if several strong gunboats could be sent up 
James River also, our success will bt certain and 
complete, and the Rebellion will soon be put 
down. 

" On the other hand we must butt against the 
enemy's works with heavy artillery, and a great 
waste of time, life, and material. 

" If we break through and advance, both our 
flanks will be assailed from two great water- 
courses in the hands of the enemy ; our supplies 
would give out, and the enemy, equal if not su- 
perior in numbers, would, with the other advan- 
tages, beat and destroy this arm}'. 

" The greatest master of the art of war has 
said, ' that if you would invade a country suc- 
cessfully you must have one line of operations, 
and one army, under one general.' But what is 
our condition ? The State of Virginia is made 
to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of 
some six generals, viz : Freniont. Banks, Mc- 
Dowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, besides 
the scrap over the Chesapeake, in the care of 
Dix. 

" The great battle of the war is to come off 
here. If we win it, the Rebellion will be crushed, 
— if we lose it, the consequences will be more 
horrible than I care to tell. The plan of cam- 
paign I voted for, if carried out with the means 
proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of 
the means proposed are withheld or diverted, I 
deem it due to myself to say that our success will 
be uncertain. 

" It is no cioabt agreeable to the commander of 
the 1st corps to have a separate department, and 
as this letter advoca.?s liis return to General 
McClellan's command, it .s proper to state that I 
am not at all influenced bv .personal regard or 
dislike to any of my seniors in rank. If I were 
to credit all the opinions which have been poured 
into my ears, I must believe that in regard to my 
present fine command. I owe much to General 



54 



McDowell and nothing to General McClellan. 
But I have disregardeil all such officiousncss, 
and I have from last July to the j)rescnt day sup- 
ported General McClelJan, and obeyed all Ids or- 
ders with as hearty a good-will a.s though he had 
been my brother or the frieud to whom I owed 
most. I shall continue to do so to the last, and 
so long as he is my couunander. And I am not 
desirous to displace him, and would not if I 
could. He left Washington with the understand- 
ing that he was to execute a definite plan of cam- 
paign with certain prescribed means. The plan 
■was good and the means sufficient, and without 
modification the enterprise was certain of suc- 
cess. But with the reduction of force and means, 
the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad 
plan, with means insufficient for certain success. 

" Do not look upon this communication as the 
offspring of despondency. I never despond; 
and when you see me working the hardest, you 
may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. 
I am working now to my utmost. 

" Please show this letter to the President, and 
I should like also that Mr. Stanton should know 
its contents. Do me the honor to write to me 
as soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect 
respect, 

"Your most obedient servant, 

E. D. KEYES, 

Brigadier- General ^ Commanding ith Army 
Corps. 

" Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate. 

On the 7th of April, and before the arrival of 
the divisions of Generals Hooker, Eichardson, 
and Casey, I received the following despatches 
from the President and Secretary of War : — 

Washington, April 6, 1862 — 8 p. m. 

"Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. Secre- 
tary of War informs me that the forwarding of 
transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's 
brigade, under your orders, is not, and will not 
be, interfered with. You now have over one 
hundred thousand troops with you, independent 
of General Wool's command. I think you better 
break the enemy's line from Yorktown to War- 
wick River at once. This will probably use 
time as advantageously as you can. 

"A. LINCOLN, President. 

" General G. B. McClellan." 

" Washington, April 6, 1862—2 p. m. 
" The President directs me to say that your 
despatch to him has been received. General 
Sumner's corps is on the road to join you, and 
will go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's 
divisicm is now on the advance towards Manas- 
sas. There is no moans of transportation here 
to send it forward in time to be of service in your 
present operations. Telegraph frequcntlj% and 
all in the power of the Government shall be done 
to sustain you as occasion may require. 

" E. M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 
" General G. B. McClellan." 

By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty 
good knowledge of the position and strength of 
the enemy's works, and the ol)stacles to l)e over- 
come. On that day I received the following let- 
ter from the President : — 



" Washington, April 9, 1862. 

"My dear Sir: Your despatches complain- 
ing that you are not properly sustained, while 
they do not oti'end me, do pain me very much. 

" Blenker's division was withdrawn from you 
before you left here, and you know the pressure 
under which I did it, and, as I thought, acqui- 
esced in it, — certainly not without reluctance. 

" After you left I ascertained that less than 
20,000 unorganized men, without a single field 
battery, were all you designed to be left for the 
defence of Washington and Manassas Junction, 
and part of this even was to go to General 
Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, 
once designed for Manassas Junction, was di- 
verted and tied up on the line of Winchester 
and Strasburg, and could not leave it without 
again exijosing the upper Potomac and the Bal- 
timore and Ohio Eailroad. This presented, or 
would present, when IMcDowell and Sumner 
should 1)6 gone, a great temptation to the enemy 
to turn back from the Eappahannock and sack 
Washington. My implicit order that Washing- 
ton should, by the judgment of all the command- 
ers of army corps, be left entirely secure, had 
been neglected. It was precisely this that drove 
me to detain McDowell. 

" I do not forget that I was satisfied with your 
arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junc- 
tion ; but when that arrangement was broken ui>, 
and nothing was substituted for it, of course I 
was constrained to sulistitute something for it 
myself. And allow me to ask, do you really 
think I should permit the line from Kichmond, 
via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entire- 
ly open, except what resistance could be present- 
ed by less than 20,000 unorganized troops ? This 
is a question wliich the country will not allow me 
to evade. 

There is a curious mystery abotit the number 
of troops now with you. When I telegrai^hed 
you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred 
thousand with you, I had just obtained from the 
Secretary of War a statement taken, as he said, 
from your own returns, making 108,000 then 
with you and en route to you. You now say you 
will have but 85,000 when all en route to you 
shall have reached you. How can the discrep- 
ancy of 23,000 be accounted for? 

"As to General Wool's command, I under- 
stand it is doing for you precisely what a like 
number of your own would have to do if that 
command was away. 

"I suppose the whole force which has gone 
forward for you is with you by this time. And 
if so, I '■liink t is the precise time for you to 
strike a blow. 3y delay tise enemy will rela- 
tively gain upon ycu, — that is, he will gain faster 
by fortifications aiid reinforcements than you 
can by reinforcements alone. And once more 
let me tell you, it is indi-^pensable to you that 
you strike a blow. I am powerless to help tlds. 
You will do me the justice to remember I always 
insisted that going down the bay in search of a 
field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, 
was only shifting, and not surmounting, a diffi- 
culty ; that we would find the same enemy, and the 
same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The 
country will not fail to note, is now noting, that 
the i)resent hesitation to move upon an intrenched 
enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. 



55 



" I beg to assure you that I have never writ- 
ten you or spoken to you in {greater kindness of 
feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to 
sustain you, so far as, in my most anxious judg- 
ment, I consistently can. But you must act. 
" Yours, very truly, 

"A. LINCOLN. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

With great deference to the opinions and 
wishes of His Excellency the President, I most 
respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which 
I have presented and those contained in the ac- 
companying letter of General Keyes, with the 
reports of General Barnard and other officers, 
as furnishing a reply to the above letter. His 
Excellency could not judge of the formidable 
character of the works before us as well as if he 
had been on the ground; and whatever miglit 
have been his desire for prompt action, (certain- 
ly no greater than mine,) I feel confident if he 
could liave made a personal inspection of the en- 
emy's defences, he would have forbidden me 
risking the safety of the army and the possible 
successes of the cmipaign on a sanguinary as- 
sault of an advantageous and formidable posi- 
tion, wJiich, even if successful, could not have 
been followed up to any other or better result 
than would have been reached by the regular op- 
erations of a siege. Still less could I forego tlie 
conclusions of my most instructed judgment for 
the mere sake of avoiding the personal conse- 
quences intimated in the President's despatch. 

The following extracts from the report of tlie 
chief engineer (Brigadier-General J.G. Barnard) 
embody the result of our reconnoissances, and 
give, with some degree of detail, the character 
and strength of the defences of Yorktown and 
the Warwick, and some of the obstacles which 
the army contended against and overcame. 

Extracts from General Barnard's Report. 

" The accompanying drawing (map No. 2) 
gives with accuracy the outline and armament 
of the fortifications of Yorktown proper, with 
the detached works immediately connected with it. 

'• The three bastioncd fronts, looking towards 
our approaches, appear to have been eai'liest 
built, and have about fifteen feet thickness of 
parapet and eight to ten feet depth of ditch, the 
width vai-ying much, but never being less at top 
of scarp than fifteen feet, — I think generally 
much more. 

•' The works extending around the town, from 
the western salient of i'ronts just mentioned, ap- 
pear to have been finished during the past win- 
ter and spring. They have formidable profiles, 
eighteen feet thickness of parapet, and generally 
ten feet depth of ditch. 

" The water batteries had generally eighteen 
feet parapet, the guns in barbette. 

" They were (as well as all the works men- 
tioned) carefully constructed with well-made sod 
revetments. 

'•There were numerous traverses between the 
guns, and ample magazines; how sufficient in 
bomh-pruof qualities I am unable to say. 

"The first two guns of the work on the heights 
bear upon the water as well as the land, and 
were of heavy calilire. 

" The list herewith gives all the guns in posi- 



tion, or for which tliere were emplacements. 
The vacant emplacements were all occupied be- 
fore the evacuation by siege guns, ritled 4.i-inch 
24:-pounders, and 18-pounders. 

" In Fort Magruder (ihe first exterior work) 
there were found one 8-inch columbiad, one 42- 
pounder, and one 8-inch siege howit'/er; the 
two former in barbette. The sketch will show 
the emplacements for guns on iiLld and siege 
carriages; making, I tliink, witli the foregoing, 
twenty-tAvo. Two of these were placed behind 
traverses, with embrasures covered by blind- 
ages. 

" The two external redoubts, with the connect- 
ing parapets, formed a re-entrant with tlu; fronts 
of attack, and all the guns bore on our ap- 
proaches. 

" It will be seen, therefore, that our ap- 
proaches were swept by tlie fire of at least forty- 
nine guns, nearly all of which were heavy, and 
many of them the most formidable guns known. 
Besides that, two thirds of the guns of the water 
batteries and all the guns of Gloucester bore on 
our right batteries, thougli under disadvanta- 
geous circumstances. 

"The ravine behind which the left of the 
Yorktown fronts of attack was placed was not 
very difficult, as the heads formed depressions 
in front of their left, imperfectly seen by their 
fire, and from wliicli access could be had to the 
ditches ; but we could not be stire of the fact be- 
fore the evacuation. The enemy held, liy means 
of a slight breastwork and rifle trenches, a jiosi- 
tion in advance of the heads of these ravines as 
far forward as the burnt house. 

" The ravines which head between the York- 
town fortifications and the exterior works are 
deep and intricate. Tiiey were tolerably well 
seen, however, by the works which run west- 
wardly from the Yorktown works, and wliicli 
were too numerous and complicated to be traced 
on paper. 

" Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, 
appears to have been built at an early period. 

'•The external connection between this work 
was first a rifle trench, probably afterwards en- 
larged into a parapet, with external ditch and an 
emplacement for four guns in or near the small 
redan in the centre. 

" Behind this they had constructed numerous 
epaulments, with connecting boyaus not fully 
arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended 
probal-ly to protect their camps and reserves 
against the destructive effects of our artillery. 

"From the ' red redoubt ' these trenches and 
epaulments ran to the woods and rivulet which 
forms one head of the Warwick, and continue 
almost without break to connect with the works 
at Wynn's Mill. This stream, just mentioned, 
whatever be its name, (the term • Warwick,' ac- 
cording to some, applying only to the tidal chan- 
nel from the James Kiver up as high as Lee's 
Mill,) was inundated by a number of dams from 
near where its head is crossed by the epaulments 
mentioned down to Lee's Mill. 

'• Below Lee's Mill the Warwick follows a tor- 
tuous course thr(nigh salt marshes of two hun- 
dred or three hundred yards in width, from 
which the land rises up boldly to a height of 
thirty or forty feet. 

" The first group of works is at Wynn's Mill, 



56 



where there is a dam and bridge. The next is 
to guard another dam between Wynn's and 
Lee's mills ; (this is the point attaelied by Gen- 
eral Smith on the liJth ultimo, and where Lieu- 
tenant JSIerrill was wounded ; the objeet of the 
attaek was merely to prevent the further eon- 
struetion of works and feel the strength of the 
position.) A work, of what strength is not 
known, was at the sharp angle of the stream just 
atiove Lee's Mill, and a formidable group of 
works at Lee's Mill, where there was also a dam 
and bridge. 

" From Lee's Mill a line of works extends 

across Mulberry Island, or is supposed to do so. 

" At Southal's Landing is another formidable 

group of works, and from here, too, they extend 

apparently across to the James River. 

"These groups of field-works were connected 
by rifle-trenches or parapets for nearly the whole 
distance. 

" They are for more extensive than may be 
supposed from tlie mention of tliem I make, and 
every kind of obstruction which the country af- 
fords, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, &c., 
was skilfully used. The line is certainly one of 
the most extensive known to modern times. 

" The country on both sides of the Warwick, 
from near Yorktown down, is a dense forest with 
few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads 
impassable during the heavy rains we have con- 
stantly had, except where our own labors had 
corduroyed them. 

" If we could have broken the enemy's line 
across the Isthmus, we could have invested York- 
town, and it must, witli its garrison, have soon 
fallen into our liands. It was not deemed prac- 
ticable, considering the strength of that line and 
the difficulty of iiandling our forces, (owing to 
the impracticable character of the country,) to 
do so. 

" If we could take Yorktown, or drive the en- 
emy out of that place, the enemy's line was no 
longer tenable. This we could do by siege 
operations. It was deemed too hazardous to 
attexnpt the reduction of the place by assault." 

The plan of the approaclies and their defences, 
as determined upon and finally executed, is ex- 
hibited on the accompanying map, (No. — .) It 
was, in words, to open the first parallel as nc-ar 
as possible to the works of the enemy, and under 
its protection to establish almost simultaneously 
batteries along the whole front, extending from 
York River on the riglit, to the Warwick on the 
left, a cord of about one mile in length. The 
principal approaches were directed against the 
east end of the main work, wJucli was most 
heavily armed, and bore both on the water and 
land, and lay between Wormley's Creek and 
York River. There also were placed the most 
of the batteries designed to act against the land 
front to enfilade the water batteries, and to act 
upon Gloucester. 

I designed at the earliest moment to open si- 
multaneously with several batteries, and as soon 
as the enemy's guns, which swept the neck of 
land between Wormley's Creek and the War- 
wick, were crippU-d and their fire kept down, to 
push the trenches as far forward as necessary, 
and to assault Yorktown and the adjacent 
works. 

I'lie approaches to the batteries, the necessary 



bridges, and the roads to the depots, had been 
vigorously pusJied to completion by the troo is 
under Generals Heintzelman and Sumner, and 
were available for infantry, and in some in- 
stances for artillery, on the 17th of April, when 
the batteries and their connections were com- 
menced, and labor upon them kept up night and 
day until finished. Some or the batteries on 
easy ground and concealed from the view of the 
enemy, were early completed and armed, and 
held ready for any emergency, Init not permitted 
to open, as the return tire of the enemy would 
interfere too much with the labor on other and 
more important works. The completion of the 
more exposed and heaviest batteries was delayed 
by storms, preventing the landing of guns and 
ammunition. 

It having been discovered that the enemy were 
receiving artillery stores at the wharf in York- 
town, on May 1st battery No. 1 was opened with 
eflect upon the wharf and town. 

_ On the 22d of April General Franklin, with 
his division from General McDowell's corps, had 
arrived and reported to me. Tlie garrison of 
Gloucester Point had been reinforced and the 
works strengthened; but as this division was too 
small to detach to the Severn, and no more 
troops could be spared, I determined to act on 
Gloucester by disembarking it on the north bank 
of the York River, under the protection of the 
gunboats. The troops were mainly kept on 
board ship while the necessary preparations 
were made for landing them, and supporting 
them in case of necessity. For a full account 
of this labor I refer to the report of Lieutenant- 
Colonel B. S. Alexander, of the engineer corps, 
detailed for this expedition. 

While the siege works wei-e being rapidlv 
completed, the roads on the leic wing necessary 
for communication and advance were opened 
and corduroyed over the marshes, batteries were 
erected to silence the enemy's guns, and drive 
him from his works at Wynn's and Lee's mills, 
preparatory to the general attack. Active recon- 
noissanees were continually going on, and at- 
tempts in force made to drive the enemy from 
the banks. 

The result of various reconnoissances made 
under the immediate direction of General W. F. 
Smith, commanding second division fourtli 
corps, led to the belief that the weakest point of 
the enemy's lines was opposite a field where it 
was ascertained that there was a dam covered by 
i battery known to contain at least one gun. 

It was determined to puoli a strong reeonnois- 
sance on this point to silence the enemy's fire, 
and ascertain the actual strength of the position. 
Being prepared to sustain the reconnoitering 
party by a real attack, if found expedient. Gen- 
eral W. F. Smith -was directed to undertake the 
operation on the KJth of April. He silenced the 
fire of the enemy's guns, discovered the ex- 
istence of other works previously concealed and 
unknown, and sent a strong party across the 
stream, which was finally forced to retire with 
some loss. Smith intrenciied himself in a posi- 
tion immediately overlooking the dam and the 
enemy's works, so as to keep them under con- 
trol, and prevent tlie enemy from using the dam 
as a means of crossing the Warwick to annoy us. 
Many tunes toward the end of the montli ti?.e 



57 



enemy attempted to drive in our pickets, and 
take GUI' i-itle-pits near Yorktown, but always 
without success. 

As the siege progressed, it was with great diffi- 
culty that tlie ritie-pits on the right could be ex- 
cavated and held, so little covering could be 
made against the hot fire of tlie enemy's artillery 
and infantry. Their guns conthmi'tl liriiig up to 
a late hour of the night of the od of ]May. 

Our batteries would have lieen ready to open 
on the morning of the Gth May at latest ; but on 
the morning of the 4th it was discovered that 
the enemy had already been compelled to evac- 
uate his position during the night, leaving behind 
him all Ids heavy guns, uninjured, and a large 
amount of ammunition and supplies. For the 
details of the la!)or of the siege I refer to the 
ficcompanying reports and journals of Brigadier- 
General J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, charged 
with the selections, laying out, and completion 
of the approaches and batteries ; of Brigadier- 
General Willi;im F. Barry, chief of artillery, 
charged with arming and supplying with auuim- 
nition all the siege and field batteries ; and of 
Brigadier-General Fitz-John Porter, director of 
the siege, to whom were assigned the guarding 
of the trenches, the assembling and distribution 
of the working parties, &c., &c. 

Early in the morning of the 4th, on the ene- 
my's abandoning his lines at Yorktown, I ordered 
all the availalile cavalry force, with four batteries 
of horse artillery, under Brigadier-General 
Stoneman, chief of cavalry, in immediate pursuit 
by the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, with 
orders to harass the enemy's rear, and try to cut 
off such of his forces as had taken the Lee's 
Mill and Williamsburg road. 

General Heintzelman was directed to send 
Hooker's division forward on the Yorktown and 
Williamsburg road to support General Stone- 
man; and Smith was ordered to proceed with his 
division upon the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg 
road for the same purpose. Afterwards, the di- 
visions of Generals Kearney, Couch, and Casey, 
were put en route, — the fb\st on the Yorktown 
road, and the others on the Lee's Mill road. 
These roads unite about a quarter of a mile 
south of Fort Magruder, and are connected by 
cross-roads at sevei'al points between Yorktown 
and Williamsburg. After these directions had 
been given. General Sumner (the officer second 
in rank in the army of the Potomac) was ordered 
to proceed to the front and take immediate 
charge of operations until my arrival. 

General Stoneman moved forward promptly 
with his command, consisting of four batteries of 
horse artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, 
the 1st and 6th United States cavalry, the 3d 
Pennsylvania and 8th Illinois, and Barker's 
squadron, meeting ^vith but little opposition until 
he arrived in front of the enemy's works about 
two miles east of Williamsburg. 

At a point about eight miles from Yorktown, 
in accordance with my instructions, he detached 
General Emory with Benson's battery, the 3d 
Pennsylvania cavalry, (Colonel Avcrill,) and 
Barker's squadron, to gain the Lee's Mill road, 
and endeavor, with the assistance of General 
Smith, to cut off the portion of the enemy's rear 
guard which had taken that route. General 
Emory had some sharp skirmishes with a regi- 



ment of cavalry and a battery under General 
Stuart, and drove them in the direction of Lee's 
Mill. 

General Smith having met with olistructions 
in his front, had transferred his coluiim, by a 
cross-road, to the Yorktown and Williamsljurg 
road, so that General Emory, finding no force 
to *j6perate with him, was unable to cut off the 
rear guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a 
circuitous route along the bank of tne James 
liiver. 

The position in which General Stoneman en- 
countered the enemy is about four miles in 
extent, the right resting on College Creek, and 
the left on Queen's Creek ; nearly three fourths 
of its front being covered by tributaries of these 
two creeks, upon which there are ponds. 

The ground between the heads of the boundary 
streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line 
of detached works had been constructed, con- 
sisting of Fort Magruder, a large work in the 
centre with a bastion front, and twelve other 
redoubts and epaulments for field guns. 

The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six 
feet high and nine feet thick; the ditch nine feet 
wide and nine feet deep, lilkd with water. The 
length of the interior crest is about GuO yards. 
The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of 
small dimensions, having tiices of aliout forty 
yards. The woods in front of the position were 
felled, and the oi)en ground in front of the works 
was dotted with numerous riile-pits. 

The roads leading from tiie lower part of the 
Peninsula to Williamsburg, one along the York 
River, (the Yovktownroad,) and the other along 
the James, (the Lee's Mill road,) unite between 
the heads of the tributary streams a short distance 
in front of Fort Magruder, by wliich they are 
commanded, and debouch from the woods just 
before uniting. A branch from the James Iliver 
road leaves it about one and three fourths of a 
mile below Fort Magruder and unites with the 
road from Allen's Landing to Williamsburg, 
which crosses the tributary of College Creek 
over a dam at the outlet of the pond, and passes 
just in rear of the line of works, being com- 
manded by the three redoubts on the right of the 
line, at about the same distance from Fort Ma- 
gruder. A branch leaves the York River road 
and crosses the tributary of Queen's Creek on a 
dam, and passing over the position-.and through 
the works in its rear, finally enters Williams- 
burg; this road is commanded by redoubts on 
the left of the line of the works. 

General Stoneman debouclied from the woods 
with his advance guard, (consisting of a part of 
the 1st United Slates cavalry, and one section of 
Gibson's battery, under the cnniinand of General 
Cooke,) and the enemy immediately opened on 
him witli several field-pieces from Fort Magru- 
der, having the correct range and doing some 
execution. Gil)son's battery was brought into 
position as rapidly as the deep mud would per- 
mit, and returned the fire ; while the t>th United 
States cavalry was sent to feel the enemy's left. 
This regiment passed one redoubt, which it 
found unoccupied, and appeared in the rear of 
a second, when a strong cavalry force, with in- 
fantry and artillery, came down upon it, where- 
upon the regiment was withdrawn. The rear 
squadron, under command of Captain Saun- 



58 



dcrs, repelled a charge of the enemy's cavalry 
in the most galhvnt manner. In the mean time 
the enemy was being reinforced by infantry, and 
the artillery fire becoming very hot. General 
Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, 
ordered tiie withdrawal of the battery. Tliis 
was accomplished, with the exception of one 
piece, which could not be extricated from the 
mud. Tlie enemy attempted to prevent the 
.TPovement, hut their ciiarges were met by the 
1st United States cavalry, under command of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, and they were driven 
back, losing several olficers and one stand of 
colors. General Stoneman then took a defen- 
sive position a short distance in the rear of the 
first, to await the arrival of the infantry. 

The advance of General Smith's column 
reached Skiff's Creek about llf^ o'clock, and 
foun<l the bridge over that stream in flames, and 
tlie road impassable. A practical)le route to the 
Yorktowu road iiavingbeen discovered, tiie divi- 
sion, by order of General Sumner, moved on 
by that road, and reached General Stoneman's 
position about 5i o'clock. General Sumner, ar- 
riving with it, a-^sumed comimnd. 

General ileinrzehnan and Kuyes also arrived. 
During the afternoon of the 4th, near the Half- 
way House, the head of General Hooker's col- 
umn encountered Smith's division filing into the 
road, and was obligud to halt between three and 
four hours until it had passed. General HocTker 
then followed on, and at Cheesecake Church 
turned off, by General Heintzclman's direction, 
taking a cross road, and moved out on the Lee's 
Mill road, thus changing places with General 
Smith. Marching part of the night, he came in 
sight of Fort Magruder early in the morning of 
the 5th. 

General Smith's division having been deployed 
General Sumner ordered an attack on the works 
in his front; but the lines having been thrown 
into confusion while moving through the dense 
forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt for 
that night was abandoned. The troops biv- 
ouacked in the woods, and a heavy rain began, 
which continued until the morning of the 6th, 
making the roads, already in very bad condition, 
almost imjiassable. 

During the morning of the 5th, General Sum- 
ner reconnoitred the position in his front, and at 
11 o'clock ordered Hancock's brigade, of Smith's 
divisi(m, to take possession of a work on the 
enemy's left, which had been found to be unoc- 
cupied. The remainder of Smith's division oc- 
cu[)ied the woods in front without being actually 
engaged. 

The divisions of Couch and Casey had re- 
ceived orders during the niglit to march at d'ly- 
liglit ; but on account of the terrible condition 
of the roads, and other impediments, were not 
able to reach the fluid until after 1 o'clock, p. m., 
at which time the first brigade of Couch's divi- 
sion arrived, and was posted in the centre, on 
Hooker's right. The other two brigades came 
up during the afternoon, followed by Casey's 
division. 

in the mean time General Hooker, having re- 
connoitred the enemy's position, began the at- 
tack at 7h A. M., and for a while silenced the 
guns of Fort Magruder, and cleared the ground 
in his front • but the enemy being continually 



reinforced, until their strength greatly exceeded 
his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to 
turn his left. 

For several hours his division struggled gal- 
lantly against the superior numbers of the ene- 
my. Five guns of Webber's battery were lost, 
and between three and four o'clock his ammuni- 
tion began to give out. The loss had been 
heavy, and the exhaustion of the troops was very 
great. At this time the division of General 
Kearney came up, who at 9 a. m. had received 
orders to reinf irce Hooker, and who had succeed- 
ed, by the greatest exertions, in passing Casey's 
troops, and pushing on to the front through the 
deep mud. General Kearney at once gallantly 
attacked, and thereby prevented the loss of an- 
other battery, and drove the enemy back at 
every point, enabling General Hooker to extri- 
cate himself from his position, and withdraw his 
wearied troops. Peck's brigade, of Couch's di- 
vision, as has been mentioned before, was im- 
mediately on its arrival, ordered by General 
Sumner to deploy on Hooker's right. This was 
promptly done, and the attacks of the enemy at 
that point were repulsed. General Peck held 
his position until late in the afternoon, when he 
was relieved by the other two brigades of 
Couch's division, and they were in quiet posses- 
sion of the ground when night closed the con- 
test. The vigorous action of these troops I'e- 
lieved General Hooker considerably. General 
Emory had been left with his command, on the 
night of the 4th, to guard the branch of the 
Lee's Mill road, which leads to Allen's Farm ; 
and on the morning of the otli it was ascertained 
that by this route tiie enemy's right could be 
turned. A request for infantry for this purpose 
was made to General Heintzeluian, who, late in 
the afternoon, sent four regiments and two bat- 
teries of Kearney's division, the first disposable 
troops he had, — and dirt cted General Emory to 
make the attack. With these reinforcements his 
force amounted to about 3,000 men and three 
batteries. General Emory, on account of want 
of knowledge of the ground, nd the lateness 
of the hour, did not succeed in this movement. 
It involved some risks, but, if successful, might 
have produced important results. 

At II A. M., as before mentioned. General 
Smith received orders from General Sumner to 
send one brigade across a dam on (mr right, to 
occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemy's line. 
Hancock's brigade was selected for this purpose. 
He crossed the dam, took possessiim of the first 
redoubt, and afterwards, findhig the second one 
vacated, he occupied that also, and sent for re- 
inforcements to enable him to advance further 
and take the next redoubt, which commanded 
the plain between his position and Fort Magru- 
der, and would have enal)led him to take in re- 
verse and cut tlie comnuinication of the troops 
engaged with Generals Hooker and Kearney. 

The enemy soon began to show himself in 
strength before him, and as his rear and right 
flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his 
request for reinforcements. General Smith was 
twice ordered to join him with the rest of his 
division, but each time the order was counter- 
manded at the moment of execution. General 
Sumner not being willing to weaken the centre. 
At length, in reply to General Hancock's re- 



59 



pcated messages for more troops, General Sum- 
ner sent him an order to fall back to his first 
position, the execution of which General Han- 
cock deferred as long as possible, being unwill- 
ing to give up the advantage already gained, 
and fearing to expose his command by such a 
movement. 

During the progress of these events I had re- 
mained at Yorktown to complete the prepara- 
tions for the departure of General Fi-anklin's 
and other troops to West Point by water, and to 
make the necessary arrangements with the naval 
commander for his cooperation. 

By i)ushing General Franklin, well supported 
by water, to the right bank of tlie ramunkey, 
opposite West Point, it was hoped to force the 
enemy to abandon whatever works he might 
have on the Peninsula below that point, or be 
cut otf. It was of paramount importance that 
the arrangements to this end should be promptly 
made at an early hour of the morning. I had 
sent two of my aids (Lieutenant-Colonel Sweit- 
zer and Major Hammerstein) to observe the 
operations in front, with instructions to report 
to me everything of importance that might occur. 
1 received no information from Aem leading 
me to suppose that there was anything occurring 
of more importance than a simple aifair of a 
rear-guard, until about one o'clock, p. m. when 
a despatch arrived from one of them that every- 
thing was not progressing favorably. This was 
confirmed a few minutes later by the reports of 
Governor Sprague and Major Hammerstein, 
who came directly from the scene of action. 

Completing the necessary arrangements, I 
returned to my camp without delay, rode rapidly 
to the front, a distance of some fourteen miles 
tiirough roads much obstructed by troops and 
wagons, and reached the field between four and 
five p. M., in time to take a rapid survey of the 
ground. I soon learned that there was no direct 
conununication between our centre and the left 
under General Heintzelman ; the centre was 
chiefiy in the nearer edge of the woods, situated 
between us and the enemy. As heavy firing 
was heard in the direction of General Hancock's 
command, I immediately ordered General Smith 
to proceed with his two remaining brigades to 
support that part of the line. General Naglee, 
with his brigade, received similar orders. I 
then directed our centre to advance to the fur- 
ther edge of the woods mentioned above, which 
was done, and I attempted to open direct com- 
munication with General Heintzelman, but was 
prevented by the marshy state of the ground in 
the direction in which the attempt was made. 

Before Generals Smith and Naglee could 
reach tlie field of General Hancock's operations, 
although they moved with great rapidity, he had 
been confronted by a superior force. Feigning 
to retreat slowl^'. he awaited their onset, and 
then turned upon them, and after some terrific 
volleys of musketry, he charged them with the 
bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole 
force, killing, wounding, and capturing from 
500 to GOO men, he himself losing only 31 men. 

This was one of the most brilliant engage- 
ments of the war, and General Hancock merits 
the highest praise for the soldierly qualities dis- 
played, and his perfect appreciation of the vital 
importance of his position. 



Night put an end to the operations here, and 
all the troops who had been engaged in this con- 
test slept on the muddy field, without shelter, 
and many without food. 

Kotwitlistanding tlie report I received from 
General Heintzelman, during the night, that 
General Hooker's division had sullored so much 
that it could not be relied on next day, and that 
Kearney's could not do uiore than liold its own 
without reinforcements, — being satisfied that the 
result of Hancock's engagement was to give U3 
possession of the decisive point of tlie battle-field 
during the night, 1 countermanded the order for 
the advance of tlie divisions of Sedgwick and 
Eichardson, and directed them to return to York- 
town, to proceed to West Point by water. 

Our loss during the day, the greater part of 
which was sustained by Hooker.s division, was 
as follows : — 

Killed, 45G; wounded, 1,400: missing, 372; 
total, 2,228. 

On the next morning we found the enemy's 
position abandoned, and occupied Fort Magruder 
and the town of VVilliiuusburg, which was filled 
witii the enemy's wounded, to whose assistance 
eighteen of their surgeons wure sent by General 
J. E. Johnston, the otticer in command. Several 
guns and caissons, which the enemy could not 
carry oti' on account of tlie mud, vvt-re secured. 
Colonel Averill was sent forward at once witli a 
strong cavalry force to endeavor to overtake 
the enemy's rear-guard. He found several guns 
abandoned, and picked up a large number of 
stragglers, but the condition of the roads and 
the state of the supplies forced liim to return, 
after advancing a few miles. 

It is my opinion tliat the enemy opposed us 
here with only a portion of his army. When 
our cavalry first appeared there was nothing but 
the enemy's rear-guard in Williamsburg. Other 
troops were brought back during the night and 
the next day to hold the works as long as possi- 
ble, in order to gain time for the trains, &c. 
already well on the way to Kichmond, to make 
their escape. Our trt)ops were greatly exhausted 
by the laborious marcii througli tlie mud from 
their positions in front of Yorktown, and by the 
protracted battle through wiiich they had just 
passed. Many of them were out of ratitms and 
ammunition, and one division, in its anxiety to 
make a prompt movement, had aiarched with 
empty haversacks. The supply trains liad been 
forced out of thi roads on the fourth and fifth to 
allow the troops and artillery to pass to the front, 
and the roads were now in such a state, after 
thirty-six hours' continuous rain, that it was 
almost impossible to pass even empty wagons 
over them. General Hooker's division had 
sufiered so severely that it was in no condition 
to follow the enemy, even if the roads had been 
good. Under these circumstances, an immedi- 
ate pursuit was impossible. 

Steps were at once taken to care for and re- 
move the wounded, and to bring up provisions, 
ammunition, and forage. 

The condition of the roads, as has been said, 
rendered it next to impossible to accomplish this 
by land from Yorktown. A temporary depot 
was therefore promptly established on Queen's 
Creek, and supplies drawn, and the wounded 
shipped, from that place. 



60 



The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, 
and Richtrdson were sent from Yorktown by 
water to the right bank of the Panninkey, in the 
vicinity of West Point. The remaining divi- 
sions, tiie trains, and the reserve artillery moved 
subsequently by land. 

Early oti the morning of the 7th General 
Franklin had comiileted the disembarkation of 
his division, and had placed it in a good position 
to cover the landing-place, both his flanks and a 
large portion of his front being protected Ijy 
water. 

Dana's brigade of Sedgwick's division arrived 
during the morning. 

At about 9 a.m. a large force of the enemy 
appeared, consisting of Whiting's division and 
other troops, andljctween 10 and 11 they attack- 
ed the part of the line held by Newton's brigade. 
The action continued until 3 p. m. when the 
enemy retired, all his attacks having been re- 
pulsed. This affair, the most important in 
wliich the division had yet been engaged, was 
highly creditable to General Franklin and his 
command. For the details I refer to his report, 
wliich is herewith submitted. Our loss was 49 
killed, 104 wounded, and 41 missing. Total, 
194, which includes a large proportion of officers. 
Cavalry reconnoissances were sent out from 
Williamsburg on the 6th and 7th, and on the 8th 
General Stoneman moved with an advance guard 
of cavalry, artillery, and infantry to open com- 
munication with General Franklin. 

As soon as our supplies had been received 
and the condition of the roads had become a 
little better, though still very bad, the advance 
of the remaining troops was IJegun. Smitli's divi- 
sion moving on the 8th. On the 10th headquar- 
ters were at Roper's Church, 19 miles from 
Williamsburg, all the divisions which had moved 
by land, except Hooker's, being in tlie vicinity of 
that place. 

We were now in direct communicaiujn with 
the portion of tlie army wliich had gone by 
water, and we began to draw supplies from 
them. 

On account of the small number and narrow- 
ness of the roads in this neighborhood, move- 
ments were difficult and slow. 

On the 15th, headquarters and the divisions of 
Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith reached 
Cuml)erland, which was made a temporary depot. 
Couch and Casey were then near New Kent 
Court House, Hooker and Kearney near Roper's 
Church, and Richardson and Sedgwick near 
Eltham. 

On the 14th and 15th much rain fell. 
On the 15th and IGth the divisions of Franklin, 
Smith, and Porter were with great difficulty 
moved to Wliite House, five miles in advance. 
So bad was the road tliat the train of one of 
tliese divisions required thirty-six hours to pass 
over tills short distance. General Stoneman 
had occupied this place some days before, after 
several successful skirmislies, in which our cav- 
alry proved superior to that of the enemy. The 
reports of these affairs are appended. 

About tliis time, with the consent of the Pres- 
ident, two additional corps were organized, viz : 
the 5th provisional corps, consisting of the divi- 
sions of Porter and Sykes, and the reserve artil- 
lery, under the command of General F. J. Porter, 



and the Gth provisional corps, consisting of the 
divisions of Franklin and Smith, under tlie com- 
mand of General W. B. Franklin. 

Headquarters readied White House on the 
IGth, and a permanent depot was at once 
organized there. 

On the 19th, headquarters and the corps of 
Porter and Franklin moved to Tunstall's Sta- 
tion, five miles from White House. 

On the liOth more rain fell. 

On the 21st the position of the troops was as 
follows : Stoneman's advance guard, one mile 
fiTjui New Eridj^e; Franklin's corps, three miles 
from New Bridge witli Porter's corps at sup- 
porting distance in its rear; Sumner's corjis, on 
the railroad about three miles from the Chicka- 
liominy, connecting the right with the left; 
Keyes's corps, on New Kent road near Bottoms 
Bridge, with Heintzelman's corps at supporting 
distance in the rear. 

Tlie ford at Bottom's Bridge was in our pos- 
session, and the rebuilding of the bridge, wliicli 
had been destroj'ed by the enemy, was com- 
menced. 

On the 22d, headquarters moved to Coal 
Harbor. 

On the 2Gth, the railroad was in operation as 
far as the Cliickahominy, and the railroad bridge 
across that stream nearly completed. 



CHAPTER II. 

When, on the 20th of May, our advanced light 
troops reached the banks of the Chickaliominy 
River, at Bottom's Bridge, tliey found that this 
as well as the railroad bridge, about a mile 
above, had been destroyed by the enemy. 

The Chickaliominy in this vicinity is about 
forty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of 
heavy forest trees, and bordered by low ni'irshy 
bottom lands, varying from half a mile to a mile 
in width. 

Our operations embraced that part of the river 
between Bottom's and Meadow bridges, which 
covered the principal approaclies to Riclimond 
from the enst. 

Within these limits the firm ground lying 
above high-water mark seldom approaches near 
the river on eitlier bank, and no locality wns 
found within this section where tlie high ground 
canie near the stream on both sides. It was 
subject to frequent, sudden, and great varintions 
in the volume of water, and a rise of a few feet 
overflowed the bottom lands on both sides. 

At low water it could be forded at almost any 
point ; but during high water it was above a 
fording stage, and could tlien be crossed only at 
the few points where bridges had been con- 
structed. These bridges had all been destroyed 
by the enemy on our approaeli, and it was nec- 
essary not only to reconstruct these, but to 
build several others. 

The west bank of the river opposite the New 
and Mechanicsville bridges was bordered by 
elevated bluffs, which afforded fhe enemy com- 
manding positions to fortify, establish his bat- 
teries, enfilading the approaches upon the two 
principal roads to Richmond on our right, and 



61 



resi«t the reconstruction of the important bridges. 
This obliged us to select other less exposed 
points for our crossings. 

As the enemy was not in great force opposite 
Bottom's Bridge on the arrival of our left at that 
point, and as it was important to secure a lodg- 
ment upon the right bank before he should 
have time to conceptrate his forces and contest 
the passage, I forthwith ordered Casey's division 
to ford the river and occupy the opposite heights. 
This was promptly done on the 20th, and recon- 
noissances were at once pushed out in advance. 

These troops were directed to throw up de- 
fences in an advantageous position to secure our 
left flank. General Heintzelman's corps was 
thrown forward in support, and Bottom's Bridge 
immediately rebuilt. 

In the mean time our centre and right were 
advanced to tlie river above, and on the 24:th we 
carried the village of Mechanicsville, driving the 
enemy out with our artillery, and forcing them 
across the bridge, which they destroyed. General 
Naglee on the same day dislodged a force of the 
enemy from the vicinity of the " Seven Pines," 
on the Bottom's Bridge road, and our advance 
on the left secured a strong position near that 
place. 

"^All the information obtained from deserters, 
negroes, and spies, indicated that the enemy oc- 
cupied in force all the approaches to Richmond 
from the east, and that he intended to dispute 
every step of our advance beyond the Chicka- 
hominy, and the passage of tlie stream opposite 
our right. Tliat their army was superior to 
ours in numbers, did not admit of a doubt. 
Strong defences had been constructed around 
Richmond. 

Impressed by these facts with the necessity of 
strengthening the army for the struggle, I did 
not fail to urge repeatedly upon my superiors 
the importance of reinforcing the army of the 
Potomac with every disposable man, in order to 
insure the success of our attack upon the Rebel 
capital. 

On the 10th of May I telegraphed as fol- 
lows : — 

" Camp at Eweix's Farm, three miles be- 
yond Williamsburg, 

" May 10, 1862—5 a. m. 

" From the information reaching me from 
every source, I regard it as certain that the 
enemy will meet us with all his force on or 
near the Chickahominy. They can concentrate 
many more men than I have, and are collecting 
troops from all quarters, especially well disci- 
plined troops from the South. Casualties, sick- 
ness, garrisons, and guards have much reduced 
our numbers, and will continue to do so. I 
shall fight the Rebel army with wiiatever force 
I may have, but duty requires me to urge that 
every effort be made to reinforce me without 
delay with all the disposable, troops in Eastern 
Virginia, and that we concentrate all our forces, 
as far as possible, to figlit the great battle now 
impending, and to make it decisive. 

" It is possible that the enemy may abandon 
Richmond without a serious struggle ; but I do 
not believe he will, and it would be unwise to 
count upon anything but a stubborn and desper- 
ate defence, — a life and death contest. I see no 



other hope for him than to figlit this battle, and 
we must win it. I sliall fight them whatever 
their force may bo, but I ask for every man tiiat 
the department can send me. No troops should 
now be left unemployed. Those who entertain 
the opinion tliat tlie Rebels will abandon Rich- 
mond without a struggle, are in my judgment 
badly advised, and do not comprehend their sit- 
uation, wliich is one requiring desperate meas- 
ures. 

"I beg that the President and Secretary will 
maturely weigh what I say, and leave nothing 
undone to comply with my request. If I am 
not reinforced, it is probable that I will bo 
obliged to fight nearly double my numbers 
strongly intrenched. I do not think it will be at 
all possible forme to bring more tiian (70,000) 
seventy thousand men upon tlie field of battle. 
"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. 

" Major- General Commanding. 
"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

On the 14th of May I sent the following tele- 
gram to the President : — 

" Cajip at Cumberland, 
May 14, 18C2. 

" I have more than twice telegraphed to the 
Secretary of War, stating that, in my opinion, 
the enemy were concentrating all their available 
force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and 
that such ought to be their policy. I have received 
no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs.^ 
I beg leave to repeat their substance to your 
Excellency, and to ask that kind consideration 
which you have ever accorded to my representa- 
tions and views. All my information from every 
source accessible to me establishes the fixed pur- 
pose of the Rebels to defend Richmond against 
this army by offering us battle with all the troops 
they can collect from east, west, and south, and 
my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my 
commanders whom I have been able to consult. 

" Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards 
have much weakened my force, and will continuo 
to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against 
the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the 
utmost, and with them I must attack in position, 
probably intrenched, a much larger force, perhaps 
double my numbers. It is possible that Rich- 
mond may be abandoned without a serious 
struggle; but the enemy are actually in great 
strength between here and there, and it would be 
unwise, and even insane, for me to calculate 
upon anytliing but a stubborn and desperate 
resistance. If they should abandon Richmond, 
it may well be that it is done with the purpose of 
making the stand at some place in Virginia south 
or west of there, and we should be in condition 
to press them without delay. The Confederate 
leaders must employ their utmost efforts against 
this army in Virginia, and they will be supported 
by the whole body of their military officers, 
among whom there may be said to be no Union 
feeling, as there is also very little among the 
higher class of citizens in the seceding States. 

" I have found no fighting men left in this 
Peninsula. All are in the ranks of the opposing 
foe." 

" Even if more troops than I now have should 
prove imnecessary for purposes of military occu- 



62 



pation, our greatest display of imposing force in 
the capital uf the Kebel Government will have 
the best moral eliect. I most respectfully and 
earnestly urge upon Your Excellency that the 
opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at 
the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg tliat 
you will cause tliis army to be reiiitorced without 
delay by all the disposable troops of tlie Govern- 
ment. I ask for every man that the War De- 
partment can send me. Any commander of the 
reinforcements whom your Excellency may 
designate will be acceptable to me, whatever 
expression I may have heretofore addressed to 
you on tiiat subject. 

" I will fight the enemy whatever their force 
may be, witli wliatever force I may have ; and I 
firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our 
triumph should be made decisive and complete. 
The soldiers of this army love their Government, 
and will fight well in its support. You may rely 
upon tliem. They have confidence in me as their 
general, and in you as their President. Strong 
reinforcements will at least save the lives of 
many of them. The greater our force tlie more 
perfect will be our combinations, and the less 
our loss. 

"For obvious reasons I beg you to give imme- 
diate consideration to this communication, and 
to inform me fully at the earliest moment of your 
final determination. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 

"His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

^^President af the United States." 

To which, on the 18th of May, I received this 
reply :— 

" "Washington, May 18 — 2 p. m. 

" General : Your despaiuli to the President, 
asking reinforcements, has been received and 
carefully considered. 

" The President is not willing to uncover the 
capital entirely ; and it is believed that even if 
this were prudent, it would require more time to 
eflTect a junction between 5'our army and that of 
the Rappahannock, by the vray of the Potomac 
and York River, than by a land march. In 
order, therefore, to increase the strength of the 
attack upon Riclunond at the earliest moment, 
General McDowell has been ordered to march 
upon that city by the shortest route. He is 
ordered, keeping himself always in position to 
save the capiUil from all possible attack, so lo 
operate as to put his left wing in communication 
with your right wing, and you are instructed to 
co-operate so as to establish the communication 
as soon as possible by extending your right wing 
to the north of Richmond. 

" It is believed that this communication can 
be safely established either north or south of the 
Pamunkey River. 

" In any event, you will be able to prevent 
the main l)od}-of the enemy's forces from leaving 
Richmond, and falling in overwhelming force 
upon General McDowell. He will move with 
between thirty-five (35) and forty tliousand 
(40,000) men. 

" A copy of the instructions to General 
McDowell are with tliis. The specific task 



assigned to his command has been to providia 
against any danger to the capital of the nation. 

" At your earnest call for reinforcements, he 
is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of 
Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not 
to uncover the city of Washington, and you will 
give no order, either before or after your junc- 
tion, which can put him out of position to cover 
this city. You and he will communicate with 
each other by telegraph or otherwise, as fre- 
quently as may be necessary for sufficient co- 
operation. When General McDowell is in posi- 
tion on your right, his supplies must be drawn 
from West Point, and you will instruct your staff 
officers to be prepared to supi>ly liim by that 
route. 

" The President desires that General McDowell 
retain the command of the Department of the 
Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he 
moves forward. 

"By order of the President. 

"EDWIN M. 'STANTON, 

"Secretary of War. 

"Major-General George B. McClellan, 

" Commanding Army of the Potomac, 
before Richmond." 

It will be observed that this order rendered it 
impossible for me to use the James River as a 
line of operations, and forced me to establish our 
depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Rich- 
mond from the north. 

I had advised, and preferred, that reinforce- 
ments should be sent l)y water, for the reasons 
that their arrival would be more safe and certain, 
and that I would l)e left free to rest the army on 
the James River whenever the navigation of that 
stream should be opened. 

The land movement obliged me to expose my 
right in order to secure the junction; and as the 
order for General McDowell's march was soon 
countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which 
the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated 
the plan of campaign. Had General McDowell 
joined me by watei', I could have approached 
Riclunond by the James, and tlms avoided the 
delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chicka- 
hominy, and would have had the army massed 
in one body instead of being necessarily divided 
by that stream. 

The following is a copy of the instructions to 
General McDowell : — 

" War Department, 

" Washington, May 17, 1862. 

" General : Upon being joined by General 
Shiidds's division, you will move upon Richmond 
by the general route of the Richmond and Fred- 
ericksburg railroad, cooperating with tlie forces 
under General McClellan, now threatening Rich- 
mond from the line of the Pamunkey and York 
rivers. 

" While seeking to establish as soon as possi- 
ble a communication between your left wing and 
the right wing of General McClellan, you will 
hold yourself always in such position as to cover 
the capital of the nation against a sudden dash 
of any large body of the Rebel forces. 

" General McClellan will be furnished with a 
copy of these instructions, and will be directed 



63 



to hold himself in readiness to establish com- 
munication with your left wing, and to prevent 
the main body of the enemy's army from leaving 
Richmond, and throwing itself upon your col- 
umn, before a junction of the two armies is 
effected. 

"A copy of his instructions in regard to the 
employment of j'our force is annexed. 
"By order of the President. 

" EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War, 
"General McDowell, 

" Comrii'g Dcp't of Rappahannocli" 

Having some doubts, from the wording of the 
foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authority 
over the troops of General McDowell, and as to 
the time when I might anticipate his arrival, on 
the 21st of May I sent tliis dispatch : — 

" Headqdartkks Armt of the Potomac, 
" Camp near TunstalVs Station, Virginia, 
May 21, 18G2— 11 p. m. 

"Your despatch of yesterday, respecting our 
situation and the batteries of Fort Darling, was 
received wliile I was absent with the advance, 
where I have been all this day. I have com- 
municated personally with Captain Goldsborough 
and by letter with Captain Smith. The vessels 
can do nothing without co-operation on land, 
which I will not be in condition to afford for sev- 
eral days. Circumstances must determine the 
propriety of a land attack. 

"It rained again last night, and rain on this 
soil soon makes the roads incredibly bad for 
army transportation. I personally crossed the 
Chickahorainy to-day at Bottom's Bridge ford, 
and went a mile bej'ond, the enemy being about 
half a mile in front. I have three regiments on 
the other bank guarding the rebuilding of the 
bridge. Kcj-es's corps is on the New Kent road, 
near Bottom's Bridge. Heintzelman is on the 
same road, within supporting distance. Sumner 
is on the railroad, connecting right with left. 
Stoneman, with advanced guard, is within one 
mile of New Bridge. Franklin, with two divi- 
sions, is aljout two miles this side of Stoneman. 
Porter's division, with the reserves of infantry 
and artillery, is within supporting distance. 
Headquarters will probably be at Coal Harbor 
to-morrow, one mile this side of Franklin. All 
the bridges over the Chickahominy are de- 
stroj^ed. The enemy are in force on every road 
leading to Eichmond, within a mile or two west 
of the stream. Their main body is on the road 
from New Bridge, encamped along it for four or 
five miles, spreading over the open ground on 
both sides. Johnston's headquarters are about 
tAvo miles beyond the bridge. 

"All accounts report their numbers as greatly 
exceeding our own. The position of the Rebel 
tt,rcbs, the declaration of the confederate authori- 
ties, the resolutions of the Virginia legislature, 
tht action of the city government, the conduct of 
the citi5b-?ns, and all other sources of information 
accessible vo me give positive assurance that our 
approach to Richmond involves a desperate bat- 
tle between the opposing armies. 

"All our divisions are moving towards the 
foe. I shall advance steadily and carefully, and 
attack them according to my best judgment, and 



in such manner as to employ my greatest 
force. 

" I regret the state of things as to General 
McDowell's connnand. We must l)eat the 
enemy in front of Richmond. One division 
added to this army for that effort would do more 
to protect Washington than his whole force can 
possibly do anywhere else in the fiuld. The 
Rebels are concentrating from all points for the 
two battles at Richmond and Corinth. I would 
still, most respectfully, suggest the policy of our 
concentrating here by movements on water. I 
have heard nothing as to the probabilities of the 
contemplated junction of McDowell's force with 
mine. I have no idea when he can start, wliat are 
his means of transjjortation, or when he may l)e 
expected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is 
little hope that he can join me over land in time 
for the coming battle. Delays on my part will 
be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoraliza- 
tion. This region is unhealthy for northern 
men, and unless kept moving, I fear that our 
soldiers may become chscouraged. At present 
our numbers are weakening from disease, but 
our men remain in good heart. 

" I regret also the configuration of the depart- 
ment of the Rappahannock. It includes a por- 
tion even of the city of Richmond. I think that 
my own department should embrace the entire 
field of military operations designed tor the cap- 
ture and occupation of that city. 

"Again, I agree Avith your Excellency that 
one bad general is better than two good ones. 

" I am not sure that I fidly comprehend your 
orders of the 17th instant addressed to myself 
and General McDowell. If a junction is effected 
before we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily 
be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg and 
within my department. This fact, my superior 
rank, aad the express language of the t)2d article 
of war, will place his command imder my orders, 
unless it is otherwise specially directed by your 
Excellency ; and I consider that he will be under 
my command, except that I am not to detach any 
portion of his forces, or give any orders wliich 
can put him out of position to cover Washington. 
If I err in my construction, I desire to be at once 
set right. Frankness compels me to say, anxi- 
ous as I am for an increase of force, that the 
march of McDowell's column upon Richmond by 
the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover 
Washington, as to any interposition by it, as 
completely as its movement by water. The 
enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on 
Washington. 

" Should they attempt a movement, which to 
me seems utterly improbable, their route would 
be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I desire that 
the extent of my authority over McDowell may 
be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and 
conflicting views may produce some of those 
injurious results which a divided command has 
so often caused. I would respectfully suggest 
that this danger can only be surely guarded 
against by ex-plicitly placing General McDowell 
under my orders in the ordinary way, and hold- 
ing me strictly responsible for the closest obser- 
vance of your instructions. I hope, Mr. Presi- 
dent, that it is not necessary for me to assure you 
that your instrTictlons would be observed in the 
utmost good faith, and that I have no personal 



64 



feelings which could influence me to disregard 
them in any particular. 

" I believe that tliere is a great struggle before 
this army, but I am neither di-:miiyed nor dis- 
couraged. I wish to strengthen its force as 
much as I can, but in any event I shall figlit it 
with all the skill, caution, and determination 
tiiat I possess, and I trust that the result may 
either olitain for me the permanent confidence 
of mv Government, or that it may close my 
career. 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General Commanding. 

" His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

^'■President of the United States." 

On the 24th I received the following reply : — 
"May 24, 1862? 
" From Washington, 2ith. 

" I left General McDowell's camp at dark last 
evening. Shields's command is there, but it is 
80 worn that he cannot move before Monday 
morning, the twenty-sixth. (2oth.) We liave so 
thinned o-ur line to get troops for other places 
that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, 
with a probable loss to us of one (IJ regiment 
infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting 
General Banks in some peril. 

" The enemy's forces, under General Ander- 
son, now opposing General McDowell's advance, 
have, as their line of supply and retreat, the 
road to Richmond. 

" If, in conjunction with McDowell's move- 
ment against Anderson, you could send a force 
from your right to cut oif the enemy's supplies 
from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges 
across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey, and 
intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent 
tlie army now opposed to you from receiving an 
accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand 
(15,000) men; and if you succeed in saving the 
bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for 
supplies in addition to the one you now have. 
Can you not do this almost as well as not, wiiile 
you are building the Chicahominy bridges? 
McDowell and Shields both say they can, and 
positively will move Monday morning. / ivish 
you to move cautiously and safely. 

" You will have command of McDowell, after 
he joins you, precisely as you indicated in your 
long despatch to us of the twenty-first, (21st.) 
" A. LINCOLN, President. 

" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

This information that McDowell's corps would 
march for Fredericksburg on the following Mon- 
day, (the 2(;th,) and that he would be under my 
command, as indicated in my telegram of the 
21st, was cheering news, and I now felt confi- 
dent that we would on his arrival be sufficiently 
strong to overpower the large army confronting 
us. 

At a later hour on the same day I received the 
following : — 

" Mat 24, 18(12. 
" From Washington, 4 p. m. 

" In consequence of General Banks's critical 
position, I have been compelled to suspend Gen- 
eral M( Dowcll's movements to join you. The 
enemy are makmg a desperate push upon Har- 



per's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General 
Fremont's force, and part of General McDow- 
ell's, in their rear. 

" A. LINCOLN, President. 
" Major-General Geo. B. McClellan." 

From which it will be seen that I could not 
expect General McDowell to join me in time to 
participate in immediate operations in front of 
Richmond, and on the same evening 1 replied to 
the President that I would make my calculatioHS 
accordingly. 

It then only remained for me to make the best 
use of the forces at my disposal, and to avail 
myself of all artificial auxiliaries to compensate 
as much as possible for tlie inadequacy of men. 
I concurred fully witli the Pie>ident in the in- 
junction contained in his telegram of the 24Lh, 
that it was necessary with my limited force to 
move " cautiously and safely." In view of the 
peculiar cliaracter of t!ie Cliicahominy, and the 
liability of its bottom land to sudden inundation, 
it became necessary to construct between Bot- 
tom's Bridge and Meclianicsville eleven (11) 
new i)ridges, all long and difficult, with exten- 
sive log-way approaclies. 

The entire army could probably have been 
thrown across the Chicaliominy immediately 
after our arrival, l>ut this would have left no 
force on the left bank to guard our communica- 
tions, or to protect our riglit and rear. If the 
communication with our supply depot had been 
cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated 
upon the right bank of tlie Chicahominy, and tlie 
stage of water as it was for many days after our 
arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means 
of transportation not furnishing a single day's 
supply in advance, the troops nmst have gone 
without rations, and the animals without forage, 
and the army would liave been paralyzed. 

It is true I miglit have al)andoned my commu- 
nications, and pushed forward towards Rich- 
mond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the ene- 
my and the consequent fall of the city for a 
renewal of supplies ; but the approaches were 
fortified, and the town itself was surrounded 
with a strong line of intrenchments, requiring a 
greater length of time to reduce than our troops 
could have dispensed with rations. 

Under these circumstances, I decided to retain 
a portion of the army on tlie left I)ank of tlie 
river until our bridges were completed. 

It will be remembered that the order for the 
cooperation of General McDowell was simply 
suspended, not revoked, and tlierefore I was not 
at liberty to abandon the northern approach. 

.\ very dashing and successful reconnoissance 
was made near Newbridge, on the 24th of May, 
by Lieutenant Bowcn, topographical engineers, 
escorted by the 4tii Micl)igan volunteers and a 
squadron of the United States cavalry, com- 
mimded. respectively, by Cohmel Woodbury and 
Captain Gordon. 

Our troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, 
and with little loss drove it back upon its brigade, 
killing a large number and capturing several 
prisoners. Great credit is due to the statt" officers, 
as well as to Colonel Woodbury, Captain Gor- 
don, and their commands, for their conduct on 
this occasion. 

The work upon the bridges was commenced 



65 



at once, and pushed forward Avith great vigor; 
but the rains, which from day to day continued 
to fell, flooded the valley, and raised the water 
to a greater height than had been known for 
twenty j'ears. 

This demolished a great amount of our labor, 
and our first bridges, with their approaches, 
wliich were not made with reference to such 
extreme high water, were carried olF or rendered 
impassable. We were obliged, with immense 
labor, to construct others, much longer, more 
elevated, and stable ; our men worked in the 
water, ex\3osed to the enemy's fire from the op- 
posite bank. 

On the 25th of May I received the following 
telegram : — 

" WA.SH1NGTON, May 25, 1862. 

" Your despatch received. General Banks was 
at Sharpsburg with about six thousand (6,000) 
men. Shields liaving been taken from iiim to 
swell <a column for McDowell to aidjou at Rich- 
mond, !^nd the rest of his force scattered at va- 
rious places. On the twenty-third (23d) a Rebel 
force of seven (7) to ten thousand (10,000) fell 
upon one regiment and two companies guarding 
the bridge at Port Royal, destroying it entir(!ly; 
crossed tlie Shenandoah, and on the twenty- 
fourth, (24th,) yesterday, pushed on to get north 
of Banks on the road to Winchester. General 
Banks ran a race with them, beating tliem into 
Winchester yesterday evening. This morning 
a battle ensued between the two forces, in wliich 
General Banks was beaten back into full, retreat 
towards Martinsburg, and probably is broken up 
into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas Gap 
railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now 
near Front Royal with ten thousand (10,000) 
troops, following up and supporting, as I undcr- 
etand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also, 
that another force of ten thousand is near Or- 
leans, f illowing on in the same direction. Strip- 
ped bare, as we are here, I will do all we can to 
prevent them crussir.ir t''e Potomac at Harper's 
Ferry or above. McDou'cU has about twenty 
thousand of his forces moving back to the vicin- 
ity of Port Royal; and Fremont, who was at 
Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg ; both these 
movements intended to get in the enemy's rear. 

" One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered 
through here to Harper's Ferry ; the rest of his 
forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. 
We are sending such regiments and dribs from 
here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's 
Ferry, supplying tlieir places in some sort, call- 
ing in militia from the adjacent States. We 
also have eighteen cannon on the road to Har- 
per's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single 
one at that point. This is now our situation. 

" If McDowell's force was now beyond ovr 
reach, we should be entirely helpless. Appre- 
hensions of something like this, and no unwil- 
lingness to sustain you, has always been my 
reason for withholding McDowell's forces from 
you. 

'• Please understand this, and do the best you 
can witli the forces you have. 

" A. LINCOLN, F)-csidcnt. 
' ** Major-General McCuaxLAJf ." 



On the 25th the following was also received. 

" Washington, May 25, 1802—2 p. m. 

" The enemy is moving north in sulDcient 
force to drive General Banks before him ; precise- 
ly in what force we cannot tell. He is also threat- 
ening Leesburg, and Geary on the Manassas Gap 
nxilroad, from botli nortli and south ; in ijrcscise- 
ly wluit force we cannot tell. 1 tliink the move- 
ment is a general and concerted one, such as 
would not be if he was actmg upon the purpose 
of a very desperate defcnce of RicJimond. I 
think the time is near wnen you must either at- 
tack Richmond or give up tlic job, and come to 
the defence of Washington. Let me hear from 
you instantly. 

"A. LINCOLN, President. 

"Major-General McClella.n." 

To which I replied as follows : — 

"Coal Harbor, May 25, 1862. 

" Telegram received. Independently of it, 
the time is very near when I shall attack Rich- 
mond. The object of tlie movement is prol)ahly 
to prevent reinforcements being sent to mo. 
All the information obtained from balloons, de- 
serters, prisoners, and contrabands, agrees in 
the statement that tlie mass of tlie Rel)el troops 
are still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, 
ready to defend it. I have no knowledge of 
Banks's position and force, nor what there is at 
I\Ianassas ; therefore cannot form a definite 
opinion as to the force against him. 

" I have two corps across Chickahominy, 
within six miles of Richmond ; the others on 
this side at other crossings within same dis- 
tance, and ready to cross when bridges are com- 
pleted. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
Major-General, Commanding. 

" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President." 

On the 26th I received the following : — 

" Washington, May 26, 1862—12.40 a. m. 
" We have General Banks's official report. 
He has saved his army and baggage, and has 
made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably 
safe at Williamsport. He reports the attacking 
force at fifteen thousand (15,000.) 

" A LINCOLN, PrcsidenJ. 

"Major-General McClellan." 

Oathe 26th I received the following: — 

" Washington, May 26, 1863. 
" Can you not cut the Aquia Creek railroad? 
Also, what impression have you as to intrenched 
works for you to contend with in front of Rich- 
mond? Can you get near enough to throw- 
shells into the city ? 

"A. LINCOLN, President. 

" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 
On the same day I sent the follomng : — 

"Coal Harbor, May 26, 1862. 
" Have cut the Virginia Central road in three 
places between Hanover Court House and the 
Cliickahominy. Will try to cut the other. I do 
not think Richmond intrenchments formidable; 
but am not certain. Hope very soon to be witliia 



m 



shelling distance. Have railroad in operation 
from White House to Chickaliominy. Hope to 
have Chickahominy bridge repaired to-night. 
Nothing of interest to-day. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General, Commanding. 
" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President." 

The interruption of the railroad here referred 
to, was ctFocted by tlie command of Brigadier- 
General Stoneraan, and was intended to prevent 
the enemy from drawing supplies by that route, 
or from sending reiaforccments to Anderson or 
Jackson. 

At 10 A. M. I also sent the following despatch. 

"Telegrams of last night received. I am 
glad to know affairs are not so bad as might have 
been. I would earnestly call your attention to 
my instructions to General Banks of March IG, 
to General Wadsworth of same date, and to my 
letter of April 1 to the Adjutant-General. I 
cannot but think that a prompt return to tlie 
principles there laid down would relieve all 
probability of danger. I will forward copies by 
mail. I beg to urge the importance of Manassas 
and Front lioyal in contradistinction to Fred- 
ericksburg. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 

" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President." 

Later on the 2Gth I sent the following : — 
" Cajip neak Np:w Beibge, 
" May 20, 18G2— 7.30 p. m. 
"Have arranged to carry out your last orders. 
We are quietly closing in upon the enemy, pre- 
paratory to the last struggle. Situated as I am, 
I feel forced to take every possible precaution 
against disaster, and to secure my flanks against 
the probably superior force in front of me. My 
arrangements for to-morrow are very important, 
and if successful, will leave me free to strike on 
the return of the force detached. 

"G. B.McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President." 

On tlie same day I received intelligence that a 
very considerable force of the enemy was in the 
vicinity of Hanover Court House, to the riglit 
and rear of our army, thus threatening our com- 
munications, and in a position citlier to rein- 
force Jackson, or to impede McDowell's junction, 
should he finally move to unite with us. On the 
same day I also received information from Gen- 
eral McDowell, through the Secretary of War, 
that the enemy hal fallen back from Fredericks- 
burg towards Richmond, and that General Mc- 
Dowell's advance was eight miles south of the 
Rappahannock. It was thus imperative to dis- 
lodge or defeat this force, independently even of 
the wishes of the President, as expressed in his 
telegram of the 26th. I intrusted this task to 
Brigadier-General Fitz-John Porter, command- 
ing the fifth corps, with orders to move at day- 
break on the 27th. 

Through a lieavy rain, and over bad roads, 
that ofliccr moved his command as follows : — 

Brigadier-General W. H. Emory led the ad- 
vance, with the 5tli and Gth regiments United 
States cavalry and Benson's horse battery of the 



2d United States artillery, taking the road from 
New Bridge via Mcchanicsville, to Hanover 
Court House. 

General Morell's division, composed of the 
brigades of Martiiidale, Butterfield, and Mc- 
Quade, with Berdan's regiment of sharpshooters, 
and three batteries under Captain Charles Grif- 
fin, 5th United States artillery, followed on the 
same road. 

Colonel G. K. Warren, commanding a provis- 
ional brigade, composed of the 5th and 13tli New 
York, the 1st Connecticut artillery, acting iuS 
infantry, the Gth Pennsylvania cavalry, and Wee- 
den's Rhode Island battery, moved from his sta- 
tion at Old Church by a road running to Hanover 
Court House, parallel to the Pamimkey. 

After a fatiguing march of fourteen miles 
tlirough the mud and rain. General Eaiory, at 
noon, reached a point about two miles from 
Hanover Coiu't House where the road forks to 
Ashland, and found a portion of tlie enemy 
formed in line aci'oss the Hanover Court House 
road. 

General Emory had, before this, been joined 
by the 25th of New York, (of Martindale's brig- 
ade,) and Beixlan's sharpshooters; these regi- 
ments were deployed with a section of Benson's 
battery, and adranced slowly towards the enemy 
until rcLolbrc-xl by General Butterfield witii four 
regiments of his brigade, when the enemy was 
chai'^ed and quickly routed, one of his guns 
being captiu-etl by the 17th New York, under 
Colonel Lansing, after having l>een disabled by 
vhe fire of Ben.son's battery. The firing here 
lasted alx)ut an hour. Tiie cavalry and Benson's 
battery were immediately ordered in pursuit, fol- 
lowed by Morrell's infantry and artillery, with 
the exception of Martindale's brigade. War- 
ren's brigade having been delayed by i-epairing 
bridges, &c., now arrived, too late to particixiate 
in this afiair; a portion of this command was 
sent to the Pamunkey to destroy bridges, and 
captured quite a number of prisoners ; the re- 
mainder followed Morell's division. In the 
mean time General Martindale, with the few re- 
maining regiments of his brigade and a section 
of artUlery, advanced on the Ashland road, and 
found a force of the enemy's infantry, cavalry, 
and artillery, in position near Beake's Station, on 
Virginia Central railroad; he soon forced them 
to retire towards Ashland. 

The 25th Now York having been ordered to 
rejoin him. General Martindale was directed to 
form his brigatle and move up the railroad to 
rejoin the rest of the command at Hanover 
Court House. 

He sent one regiment up the railroad, but re- 
mained with the 2d Maine, afterwards joined by 
the 25th New York, to guard the rear of the main 
column. 

The enemy soon retnrned to attack General 
Martindale, who at once formed the 2d Maine, 
25th New York, and a portion of the 44th New 
York, with one section of Martin's battery, on 
the New Bridge road, facing his own position of 
the morning, and then held his ground for an 
hour against large odds, until reinforced. 

General Porter was at Hanover Court House, 
near the head of his column, w'nen he learned 
that the rear Iiad been attacked by a large force. 
He at once faced the whole column about, re« 



67 



called the cavalry sent in pursuit towards Ash- 
land, moved the loth and 14th New York and 
Griffin's battery direct to Martindale's assistance, 
pushed the 9th Massachusetts and G2d Pennsyl- 
vania, of McQuade's brigade, through the woods 
on the right (our original left), and attacked the 
flank of the enemy, while Butterfield, with the 
83d Pennsylvania and IGth Michigan, hastened 
towards the scene of action by the railroad, and 
through the woods, further to the right, and com- 
pleted the rout of the enemy. During the re- 
mainder of this and the following day our cavalry 
was active in the pursuit, taking a number of 
prisoners. 

Captain Harrison, of the 5th United States cav- 
alry, with a single company, brought in as pris- 
oners two entire companies of infantry with their 
arms and ammunition, A part of Rush's lancers 
also captured an entire company with their arms. 

The immediate results of these affairs were, 
some two hundred of the enemy's dead buried by 
our troops, seven hundred and thirty priyoners 
eent to the rear, one 12-pound howitzer, one 
caisson, a large number of small arms, and two 
railroad trains, captured. 

Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded 
and missing. 

The force encountered and defeated was Gen- 
eral Branch's division, of North Carolina and 
Georgia troops, supposed to have been some 
9,000 strong. 

Their camp at Hanover Court House was taken 
and destroyed. 

Having reason to believe that General Ander- 
son, with a strong force, was still at Ashland, I 
ordered General Syke's division of regulars to 
move on the 28th from New Bridge toward Han- 
over Court House, to be in position to support 
General Porter. They reached a point within 
three miles of Hanover Court House, and re- 
mained there until the evening of the 29th, when 
they returned to their original camp. 

On tlic 2Sth General Stoneman's command of 
cavalry, horse artillery, and two regiments of 
infantry, were also placed under General Por- 
ter's orders. 

On the same day I visited Hanover Courv 
House, whence I sent the following despatch. 

" Hanover Court House, 

" May 28—2 p.m. 

" Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glo- 
rious victory ; too much credit cannot be given 
to his magnificent division and its accomplished 
leader. The rout of the Rebels was complete ; 
not a defeat, but a complete rout. Prisoners are 
constantly coming in ; two companies have tliis 
moment arrived with excellent arms. 

" There is no doubt that the enemy are con- 
centrating everything on Richmond. I will do 
my best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful 
whether I can. 

" It is the policy and duty of the Government 
to send me by water all the well-drilled troops 
available. I am confident that Washington is in 
no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers 
have been sent up to bring down Jackson's com- 
mand. 

"I may not be able to cut them off, but will 
try ; we have cut all but the Fredericksburg and 
Richmond railroad. The real issue is in the 



battle about to be fought in Vont of Richmond. 
All our available troops should he coUccUhI here] 
not raw regiments, but the well-drilh'd troops! 
It cannot bo ignored that a desperate l)attle is 
before us ; if any regiments of good troops re- 
main unemployed, it will he an irrei):iral)Io fault 
committed. G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
"Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War." 

Having ascertained the state of afl^airs, instruc- 
tions were given for the operations of the follow- 
ing day. 

On the 28th a party under Major Williams, 
Gth United States cavalry, destroyed tlio com- 
mon road bridges over the Pamunkey, and Vir- 
ginia Central railroad bridge over the South 
Ann. 

On the 29th he destroyed the Fredericksburg 
and Richmond railroad bridge over the South 
Ann, and the turnpike bridge over the same 
stream. 

On the same day, and mainly to cover the 
movement of Major Williams, General Emory 
moved a column of cavalry towards Ashland, 
from Hanover Court House. The advance of 
this column under Captain Chamhliss, 5tli United 
States cavalry, entered Ashland, driving out a 
party of the enemy, destroyed the railroad 
bridge over Stony Creek, broke up the railroad 
and telegraph. 

Another column of all arms, umlcr Colonel 
Wari;en, was sent on the same day by the direct 
road to Ashland, and entered it shortly after 
General Emory's column had retired, capturing 
a small party there. 

General Stoneraan on the same day moved on 
Ashland by Leach's Station, covering well the 
movements of the other columns. 

The objects of the expedition having been 
accomplished, and it being certain that the 1st 
corps would not join us at once, General Porter 
withdrew his command to their camps with the 
main army on the evening of the 29th. 

On the night of the 27th and 2Sth I sent the 
following despatch to the Secretary of War : — 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
'' Camp near New Bridge, May 28, 18G2 — 12.30 

A. M. 

" Porter has gained two complete victories 
over superior forces, yet I fcol obliged to 
move in the morning with reinforcements to 
secure the complete destruction of the Rebels in 
that quarter. In doing so, I run some risk here, 
but I cannot help it. The enemy are even in 
greater force than I had supposed. I will do 
all that quick movements can accomplish, but 
you must send me all the troops you can, and 
leave to me full latitude as to choice of com- 
manders. It is absolutely necessary to destroy 
the Rebels near Hanover Court House before I 
can advance. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- Geiieral. 

"Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

In reply to which I received the following 
from the President : — 

Washington, May 28, 1802. 
" I am very glad of General F. J. Poi ter's 



68 



victory; still, if it was a total rout of the ene- 
my, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond 
and Fredericksburg railroad was not seized 
again, as you say you have all the railroads but 
the Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puz- 
zled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, 
except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. 
The scrap of the Virginia Central, from Rich- 
mond to Hanover Junction, without more, is 
simply nothing. That the wliole of the enemy 
is concentrating on Richmond, I think, cannot 
be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at 
Harper's Ferry, informs us that large forces, 
supposed to be Jackson's and Ewell's, forced his 
advance from Charlestown to-day. General 
King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg that 
contrabands give certain information that iifteen 
thousand left Hanover Junction Monday morn- 
ing to reinforce Jackson. I am painfully im- 
pressed with the importance of the struggle 
before you, and shall aid you all I can consist- 
ently with my view of due regcird to all points. 
"A. LINCOLN. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

At 6 p. >i. of the 29th I sent the Secretary of 
"War the following despatch : — 

" Headquarters Army or the Potomac, 
" May 29, 1862— G p. m. 

" General Porter has gained information that 
General Anderson left his position in vicinity of 
Fredericksburg at 4 a. m. Sunday, with the fol- 
lowing troops : 1st South Carolina, Colonel 
Hamilton ; one battalion South Carolina rifles ; 
34th and 38th North Carolina; 45th Georgia; 
12th, 13th, and lith South Carolina; 3d Louisi- 
ana ; two batteries of four gnns each, namely, 
Letcher's Virginia and Mcintosh's Soutli Caro- 
lina batteries. General Anderson and his com- 
mand passed Ashland yesterday evening, en 
route for Richmond, leaving men behind to de- 
stroy bridges over the telegraph road which they 
travelled. This information is reliable. It is 
also positively certain that Branch's command 
was from Gordonsville bound for Richmond, 
whither they have now gone. 

" It may be regarded as positive, I think, that 
there is no Rebel force between Fredericksburg 
and Junction. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

The following was also sent on the same day. 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"May 29, 18G2. 
" A detachment from General F. J. Porter's 
command, under Major Williams, Gth cavalry, 
destroyed the South Ann railroad bridge at 
about 9 A. M. to-day; a large quantity of Con- 
federate public property was also destroyed at 
Ashland this morning. 

"R. B. MARCY, 

" Chief of Staff. 
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 



In reply to wliich, the following was received. 

" Washington, May 29, 1862. 
" Your despatch as to the South Ann and 
Ashland being seized by our forces this morning 
is received. Understanding these points to be 
on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, 
I heartily congratulate the country, and thank 
General McClellan and his army for their seizure. 
"A. LINCOLN. 
" General R. B. Marcy." 

On the 80th I sent the following : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" May 30, 18G2. 

"From the tone of your despatches and the 
President's, I do not think that you at all appre- 
ciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. 
It has entirely relieved my right flank, which 
was seriously threatened ; routed and demoral- 
ized a considerable portion of the Rebel forces ; 
taken over seven Inindred and fifty prisoners ; 
killed and wounded large numbers ; one gun, 
many small arms, and much baggage taken. It 
was one of the handsomest things in the war, 
both in itself and in its results. Porter has re- 
turned, and my armj' is again well in hand. 
Another day will make the probable field of 
battle passable for artillery. It is quite certain 
tliat there is nothing in front of McDowell at 
Fredericksburg. I regai'd the Inirning of South 
Anna oridges as the least important result of 
Porter's movement. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

"Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

The results of this brilliant operation of Gen- 
eral Porter were the dispersal of General 
Branch's division, and the clearing of our right 
flank and rear. It was rendered impossible for 
the enemy to communicate by rail with Fred- 
ericksburg, or with Jackson via Gordonsville, 
except by the very circuitous route of Lynch- 
burg, and the road was left entirely open for the 
advance of McDowell had he been permitted to 
join the army of the Potomac. His withdrawal 
towards Front Royal was, in my judgment, a 
serious and fatal error ; he could do no good in 
that direction, while, had he been permitted to 
carry out the orders of May 17, the united forces 
would have driven the enemy within the imme- 
diate intrenchments of Richmond, before Jack- 
son could have returned to its succor, and prob- 
ably would have gained possession promptly of 
that place. I respectfully refer to the i-eports 
of General Porter and his subordinate command- 
ers for the names of the officers who deserve 
especial mention for the parts they took in these 
aflairs, but I cannot omit here my testimony to 
the energy and ability here displayed by General 
Porter on this occasion, since to him is mainly 
due the successes there gained. 

On the 20th of May a reconnoissance was or- 
dered on the south side of the Chickahommy 
towards James River. This was accomplished 
by Brigadier-General H. M. Naglee, who crossed 



69 



his brigade near Bottom's Bridge, and pushed 
forward to within two miles of James River 
without serious resistance, or finding tlie enemy 
in force. The rest of the 4th corps, commanded 
by General E. D. Keyes, crossed the Chiclia- 
hoininy on the 23d of May. 

On the 24th, 25th, and 26th, a very gallant 
reconnoissance was pushed by General Naglee, 
with his brigade, beyond the Seven Pines, and 
on the 25th the 4th corps was ordered to take up 
and fortity a position in.the vicinity of the Seven 
Pines. The order was at once obeyed ; a strong 
line of rifle-i)its opened, and an abatis construct- 
ed a little in the rear of the point where the nine- 
mile road comes into tlie Williamsburg road. 

On the same day General Heintzelman was 
ordered to cross with his corps, (the 3d,) and 
take a position two miles in advance of Bottom's 
Bridge, watching the crossing of White Oak 
swamp, and covering the left and the rear of the 
left wing of the army. Being the senior ofiiccr 
on that side of the river, lie was placed in com- 
mand of both corps, and ordered to hold the 
Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw 
the troops from the crossings of White Oak 
Swamp unless in an emergency. 

On the 2Sth General Keyes was ordered to 
advance Casey's division to Fair Oaks, on the 
Williamsburg road, some three quarters of a 
mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving Gen- 
eral Couch's division at the line of rifle-pits. A 
new line of rifle-pits and a small redoubt for six 
field guns were commenced, and much of the 
timber in front of this line was felled on the two 
days following. The picket line was establish- 
ed, reaching from the Chickahominy to White 
Oak Swamp. 

On the 30th General Heintzelman, represent- 
ing that the advance had met with sharp opposi- 
tion in taking up their position, and that lie con- 
sidered the point a critical one, requested and 
obtained authority to make such dispositions of 
his troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. 
He immediately advanced two brigades of 
Kearney's division about the fourth of a mile in 
fi'ont of Savage's Station, thus placing them 
within supporting distance of Casey's division, 
which held the advance of the 4th corps. 

On the 30th the troops on the south side of 
the Cliickahominy were in position as follows : 
Casey's di%asion on the right of the Williams- 
burg road, at right angles to it, the centre at 
Fair Oaks ; Couch's division at the Seven Pines ; 
Kearney's division on the railroad, from near 
Savage's Station towards the bridge; Hooker's 
division on the borders of White Oak Swamp. 
Constant skirmishing had been kept up between 
our pickets and those of the enemy; while these 
lines were being taken up and strengthened, 
large bodies of Confederate troops were seen 
immediately to the front and right of Casey's 
position. 

During the day and night of the 30th of May 
a very violent storm occurred, the rain fall- 
ing in torrents rendered work on the rifle-pits 
and In-idges impracticable ; made the roads al- 
most impassable, and threatened the destruction 
of the bridges over the Chickahominy. 

The enemy perceiving the unfavorable posi- 
tion in which we were placed, and the possibility 
of destroying that part of our army which was 



apparently cut off from the main liody by the 
rapidly rising stream, threw an overwlieiming 
force (grand divisions of Generals I). H. Uill, 
Hugcr, Longstreet, and (}. W. Smith) upon the 
position occupied by Casey's division. 

It appears from the official reports of General 
Keyes and his subordinate couuManders, that at 
ten o'clock a. m. on the 3Ist of May, an aide-de- 
camp of GeneralJ. E. Johnston was captured by- 
General Naglee's pickets. But little intormation 
as to the movements of the enemy w;is o))tained 
from him, but his presence so near our lines ex- 
cited suspicion and caused increased vigilance, 
and the troops were ordered by General Keyes 
to be under arms at eleven o'clock. Between 
eleven and twelve o'clock it was reported to 
General Casey that the enemy were approaching 
in considerable force on the Williamsburg road. 
At this time Casey's division was disposed as 
follows : Naglee's brigade extending from the 
Williamsburg road to the Garnett held, having 
one regiment across the railroad ; General Wes- 
sel's brigade in the rifle-pits, and General Pal- 
mer's in the rear of General Wessel's ; one bat- 
tery of artillery in advance with General Naglee ; 
one battery in rear of rifle-i)its to the right of the 
redoubt; one battery in rear of the redoubt, and 
another battery, unharnessed, in the redoubt. 
General Couch's division, holding the second 
line, had General Abercrombi-e's brigade on the 
right, along the nine-mile road, with two regi- 
ments and one battery across the railroad near 
Fair Oaks Station; General Peck's brigade on 
the right, and General Devins's in the centre. 

On the approach of the enemy. General Casey 
sent forward one of General Palmer's regiments 
to support the picket line, but this regiment gave 
way without making much, if any, resistance. 
Heavy firing at once commenced, and the pick- 
ets were driven in. General Keyes ordered 
General Couch to move General Peck's brigade 
to occupy the ground on the left of the Williams- 
burg road, which had not before been occupied 
by our forces, and thus to support General Ca- 
sey's left, where the first attack was the most 
severe. The enemy now came on in heavy 
force, attacking General Casey simultaneously 
in front and on both flanks. General Keyes 
sent to General Hemtzelman for reinforcements, 
but tlie messenger was delayed, so that orders 
were not sent to Generals Kearney and Hooker 
until nearly 3 o'clock, and it was nearly 5 p. m. 
when Generals Jameson and Perry's brigades, of 
General Kearney's division, arrived on the field. 
General Birney was ordered up the railroad, but 
by General Kearney's order halted his brigade 
before arriving at the scene of action. Orders 
were also despatched for General Plooker to 
move up from White Oak Swamp, and he ar- 
rived after dark at Savage's Station. 

As soon as the fire was heard at headquarters, 
orders were sent to General Sumiwr to get his 
command under arms and be ready to move at 
a moment's warning. Plis corps, consisting of 
Generals Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions, 
was encamped on the north side of the Chicka- 
hominy, some six miles above Bottom's Bridge ; 
each division had thrown a bridge over the 
stream opposite to its own position. 

At one o'clock General Sumner moved the 
two divisions to their respective bridges, with 



70 



instructions to halt and await further orders. 
At two o'clock orders were sent from headquar- 
ters to cross these divisions witliout deliiy, and 
push them rapidly to Genaral Heintzelman's 
support. This order was received and commu- 
nicated at half past two, and the passage was 
immediately commenced. In the mean time 
General Naglee's brigade, with the batteries of 
General Casey's division, which Genei-al Naglee 
directed, struggled gallantly to maintain the re- 
doubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelming 
masses of the enemy. They were reinforced by 
a regiment from General Peck's brigade. T!i3 
artillery under command of Colonel G. D. 
Bailey, 1st New York artillery, and afterwards 
of General Naglee, did good execution on the 
advancing column. The left of this position was, 
however, soon turned, and a sharp cross-fire 
opened upon the gunners and men in tlie rifle- 
pits. Colonel Bailey, Major Van Valkenberg, 
and Adjutant Ramsey, of the same regiment, 
were killed ; some of the guns in the redoubt 
were taken, and the whole line was driven back 
upon the position occupied hy General Couch. 
The brigades of Generals Wessel and Palmer, 
with the reinforcements which had been sent 
tliem from General Couch, had also been driven 
from the field with heavy loss, and the whole 
position occupied by General Casey's division 
was taken by the enemy. 

Previous to this time General Keyes ordered 
General Couch to advance two regiments to 
relieve the pressure upon General Casey's right 
flank. In making this movement. General 
Couch discovered large masses of the enemy 
pushing towards our right, and crossing the 
railroad, as well as a heavy column which had 
been held in reserve, and which was now mak- 
ing its way towards Fair Oaks Station. General 
Couch at once engaged this column with two 
regiments ; but, though reinforced by two ad- 
ditional regiments, he was overpowered, and the 
enemy pushed between him and the main body 
of his division. With these four regiments and 
one battery General Couch fell back about half 
a mile towards the Grapevine Bridge, where, 
hearing that General Sumner had crossed, he 
formed line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station, 
and prepared to hold the position. 

Generals Berry and Jameson's brigades had 
by this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. 
General Berry was ordered to take possession of 
the woods on the left, and pushed forward so as 
to have a flank fire on the enemy's lines. This 
movement was executed brilliantly, General 
Berry pushing his regiments forward through 
the woods until their rifles commanded the left 
of the camp and works occupied by General 
Casey's division in the morning. Their fire on 
the pursuing columns of the enemy was very de- 
structive, and assisted materially in checking the 
pursuit in that part of the field. He held ids 
position in these woods' against several attacks 
of superior numbers, and after dark, being cut 
off' by the enemy from the main body, he fell 
back towards White Oak Swamp, and by a cir- 
cuit brought his men into our lines in good 
order. 

General Jameson, with two regiments, (the 
other two of iiis brigade having been detached, — 
one to General Peck and one to General Birney,) 



moved rapidly to the front on the left of the 
Williamsburg road, and succeeded for a time in 
keeping the abatis clear of the enemy. But 
large numbers of the enemy pressing past the 
right of his line, he, too, was forced to retreat 
through the woods towards White Oak Swamp, 
and in that way gained camp under cover of 
night. 

Brigadier-General Devins, who had held the 
centre of General Couch's division, had made 
repeated and gallant eflbrts to regain portions of 
the ground lost in front, but each time was 
driven back, and finally withdrew behind the 
rifle-pits near Seven Pines. 

Meantime General Sumner had arrived with 
tlie advance of his corps. General Sedgwick's 
division, at the point held by General Couch 
with four regiments and one battery. The 
roads leading from the bridge were so miry that 
it was only by the greatest exertion General 
Sedgwick had been able to get one of his bat- 
teries to the front. 

The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, Colonel 
Sully) was immediatelj' deployed to the right of 
Couch, to protect the flank, and tiie rest of the 
division formed in line of battle, Kirby's battery 
near the centre, in an angle of the woods. One 
of General Couch's regiments was sent to open 
communication with General Heintzelman. No 
sooner were these dispositions made than the 
enemy came in strong force and opened a heavy 
fire along the line. He made several charges, 
but was each time repulsed witli great loss by 
the steady fire of the infantry and the splendid 
practice of the battery. After stistaining the 
enemy's fire for a considerable time. General 
Sumner ordered five regiments (the 34rth New 
York, Colonel Sinter ; 8:id New York, Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Hudson; 15th Massachusetts, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Kimliall; 20th Massachu- 
setts, Colonel Lee ; 7th Michigan, Major Rich- 
ardson,— the three former of General Gorman's 
brigade, the two latter of General Dana's bri- 
gade,) to advance and charge with the bayonet. 
This charge was executed in the most brilliant 
manner. Our troops springing over two fences 
which were between them and tlie enemy, rushed 
upon his lines, and drove him in confu.-iou from 
that part of the field. Darkness now ended the 
battle for that day. 

During the night dispositions were made for 
its early renewal. General Couch's division, 
and so much of General Casey's as could be 
collected together, with General Kearney's, oc- 
cupied the rifle-pits near jeven Pines. Gen- 
eral Peck, in falling back on the left, had 
succeeded late in the afternoon in rallying a con- 
siderable number of stragglers, and was taking 
them once more into the action, when he was 
ordered back to the intrenched camp by General 
Kearney. General Hooker brought up his di- 
vision about dark, having been delayed by the 
heaviness of the roads and the throng of fugi- 
tives from the field, through whom the colonel 
of the leading regiment (Starr) reports he " was 
obliged to force his way with tlie bayonet." This 
division bivouacked for the night in rear of the 
right of the rifle-pits, on the other side of the rail- 
road. General Richardson's division also came 
upon the field about sunset. He had attempted the 
passage of the Chickahominy by the bridge op- 



71 



posite his own camp, but it was so far destroyed 
that he was forced to move Generals Howard 
and Meagher's brigades, with all his artillery, 
around by General Sedgwick's bridge, wliile 
General French's brigade, with the utmost diffi- 
culty, crossed by the other. General Sedg- 
wick's division, with the regiments under Gen- 
eral Couch, held about the same position as 
when the fight ceased, and General Richardson 
on his arrival was ordered to place his division 
on the left to connect with General Kearney ; 
General French's brigade was posted along the 
railroad, and Generals Howard and Meagher's 
brigades in second and third lines. All his artil- 
lery had been left behind, it being impossible to 
move it forward through the deep mud as rapidly 
as the infantry pushed towards the field, but dur- 
ing the night the three batteries of the division 
were brought to the front. 

About five o'clock on the morning of the first 
of June sldrmishers and some cavalry of the ene- 
my were disc:overed in front of General Rich- 
ardson's division. Captain Pettit's battery, (B, 
1st New York,) having come upon the ground, 
threw a few shells ;unong them, when they dis- 
persed. There was a wide interval between 
General Richardson and General Kearney. To 
close this, General Richardson's line was ex- 
tended to the left and his first line moved over 
the railroad. Scarcely had they gained the po- 
sition, when the enemy appearing in large force 
from the woods in front, opened a heavy fire of 
musketry at short range along the whole line. 
He approached very rapidly with columns of at- 
tiick formed on two roads which crossed the rail- 
road. These columns were supported by infan- 
try in line of battle on each side, cutting General 
I'rench's line. He threw out no skirmishers, 
but appeared determined to carry all before him 
by one crushing blow. For nearly an hour the 
first line of General Richardson's division stood 
and returned the fire, the lines of the enemy 
being reinforced and relieved time after time, 
till finally General Howard was ordered with his 
brigade to go to General French's assistance. 
He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a 
few minutes the fire of the enemy ceased and 
his whole line fell back on that part of the field. 
0.1 the opening of the firing in the morning 
Ge'.ieral Hooker pushed forward on the railroad 
witli two regiments (5th and 6th New Jersey,) 
followed by General Sickles's brigade. It was 
found impossible to move the artillery of this 
division fiom its position on account of the mud. 
On coming near the woods, which were held by 
the enemy in force. General Hooker found Gen- 
eral Birney's brigade. Colonel J. Hobart Ward 
in command, in line of battle. He sent back 
to hasten General Sickles's brigade, but ascer- 
tained that it had been turnec* off to tlie left by 
General Heintzelman to meet a column advanc- 
ing in tliat direction. He at once made the at- 
tack with ilie two New Jersey regiments, calling 
upon Colonel Ward to supi)ort him with General 
Birney's brigade. This was well done, our troops 
advaiR-ing into the woods under a heavy fire, and 
pusliiiig the enemy before them for more than 
an liour of hard fighting. A charge with the 
bayonet was then ordered by General Hooker 
with the nth and Gth New Jersey, 3d Maine, and 
3Sth and 40th New York, and the enemy fled in 



confusion, tlirowing down arms and even cloth- 
ing in his tliglit. General Sickles, having been 
ordered to the left, formed line of baUle on hoth 
sides of the Williamshurg road and advanced 
under a sharp fire from the enemy, deplovud in 
the woods in front of him ; after a l)ri^k inter- 
change of musketry fire while crossing the open 
ground, the K.xcelsior brigade dashed into the 
timber with the bayonet and put the enemv to 
flight. ^ 

On the right the enemy opened fire after half 
an hour's cessation, wliicli was proni])tly respond- 
ed to by General Richardson's division. Again 
the most vigorous eflbrts were made to break 
our line, and again they were frustrated by the 
steady courage of our troops. In about an hour 
General Richardson's whole line advanced, pour- 
ing in their fire at close range, which threw the 
line of the enemy back in some confusion. Tills 
was followed up by a bayonet charge led by 
General French in person, with the 57th and 6Gth 
New York, supported by two regiments sent by 
General Heintzelman, the 71st and 7.'3d New- 
York, which turned the confusion of the enemv 
into precipitated flight. One gun captured the 
previous day was retaken. 

Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines 
held by them on the 3 1st before the attack. On 
the battle-field there were found many of our 
own and the Confederate wounded, arms, cais- 
sons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, 
abandoned by the enemy in his rout. The state 
of the roads and impossibility of manoeuvring 
artillery prevented further pursuit. On the next 
morning a reconnoissance was sent forward, 
which pressed back the pickets of the enemy to 
within five miles of Richmond; but again the 
impossibilitjr of forcing even a few batteries for- 
ward precluded our holding permanently this 
position. The lines held previous to the battle 
were therefore resumed. General J. E. John- 
ston reports loss of the enemy in Longstreet's 
and J. W. Smith's divisions at 4,283 ; General 
D. H. Hill, who had taken the advance in the 
attack, estimates his loss at 2,500 ; which would 
give the enemy's loss G,7S3. Our loss was, in 
General Sumner's corps, 1,223; General Heint- 
zelman's corps, 1,304; General Keyes's corps, 
3,120— total, 5,737. 

Previous to the arrival of General Sumner 
upon the field of battle, on the 31st of May, 
General Heintzelman, the senior corps command- 
er present, was in the immediate command of 
the forces engaged. The first information I re- 
ceived that the battle was in progress was a 
despatch from him stating that Casey's division 
had given way. During the night of the 31st I 
received a despatch from him, dated 8.45 p. m. 
in which he says : "I am just in. When I got to 
the front the most of General Casey's division 
had dispersed. * * * xhe rout 

of General Casey's men had a most di,-piriting 
effect on the troops as they came up. I saw no 
reason -why we should have been driven back." 

This official statement, together with other ac- 
counts received previous to my arrival upon the 
battle-field, to the efl'ect that Casey's division 
had given way without making a proper resist- 
ance, caused me to state, in a telegram to the 
Secretary of War on the first, that this division 
"gave way unaccountably and discreditably." 



72 



Subsequent investigations, however, greatly 
modified the impressions first received, and i 
accordingly advised the iSecretary of War of 
tliis in a despatch on the 5th of June. 

The otticial reports of Generals Keyes, Casey, 
and Naglee show that a very considerahle portion 
of this division fought well, and that the brigade 
of General Kaglee is entitled to credit for its gal- 
lantry. This division, among the regiments of 
wliich were eight of comparatively new troojis, 
was attacked by superior numbers ; yet, accord- 
ing to the reports alluded to, it stood the attack 
" for three hours before it was reinforced." A 
portion of the division was thrown into great 
confusion ujjon the first onslaught of the enemy; 
but the personal etibrts of General Naglee, 
Col. Bailey, and other oflficers, who boldly went 
to the front and encouraged the men by their 
presence and example, at tliis critical juncture, 
rallied a great part of the division, and thereby 
enabled it to act a prominent part in this severe- 
ly contested battle. It therefore aiibrds me great 
satisfaction to withdraw the expression contained 
in my first despatch, and I cordially give my in- 
dorsement to the conclusion of the division com- 
mander, " that those parts of his command which 
behaved discreditai)ly were exceptional cases." 

On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks 
commenced, we had two of our bridges nearly 
completed ; but the rising waters fiooded the log- 
way approaches and made them almost impassa- 
ble, so that it was only by the greatest efibrts 
that General Sumner crossed his corps and par- 
ticipated in that hard-fought engagement. The 
bridges became totally useless after this corps 
had jiassed, and others on a more permanent 
plan were commenced. 

On my way to headquarters, after the battle of 
Fair Oaks, 1 attempted to cross the bridge where 
General Sumner had taken over his corps on the 
day previous. At the time General Stmmer 
crossed this was tiie only available bridge above 
Bottom's Bridge. I found the approach from 
the right bank for some 400 yards submerged to 
the depth of several feet, and on reaching the 
place where the bridge had been, I fotmd a great 
part of it carried away, so that I could not get 
my horse over, and was obliged to send him to 
Bottom's Bridge, six miles below, as the only 
practicable crossing. 

The approaches to New and Mechanicsville 
bridges were also overflowed, and both of them 
were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries estab- 
lished upon commanding heights on the opposite 
side. These batteries were supported by strong 
forces of the enemy, having munerous rifle-pits 
in their front, which would have made it neces- 
sary, even had the approaches been in the best 
possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary 
battle, with but little prospect of success, before 
a passage could have been secured. 

The only available means, therefore, of unit- 
ing our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance <ni 
Richmond soon after the battle, was to march 
the troops from Mechanicsville, and other points, 
on the left banks of the Chickahominy down to 
Bottom's Bridge, and thence over the Williams- 
burg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a dis- 
tance of about twenty-three (23) miles. In the 
condition of the roads at that time this march 
could not have been made with artillery in less 



than two days, by which time the enemy would 
have been secure within his intrenchmenis 
around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting 
the two wings of the army in time to make a 
vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the pros- 
pect of overtaking him betore he reached Rich- 
mond, only five miles distant from the field of 
battle is sim^jly absurd, and was, I presume, 
never for a moment seriously entertained by any 
one connected with the army of the Potomac. 
An advance, involving the separation of the two 
wings by the impassable Chickahominy, would 
have exposed each to defeat in detail. There- 
fore I held the position already gained, and conj- 
pleted our crossings as rapidly as possible. 

In the mean time the troops at Fair Oaks were 
directed to strengthen their positions by a strong 
line of intrenchments, which protected tliein 
while the bridges were being built, gave security 
to the trains, liberated a larger fighting force, 
and ofiered a safer retreat in the event of dis- 
aster. 

On the 2d of June I sent the following de- 
spatch : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Aew Bridge, June 2, 18G2 — 10.30 a. m. 

" Our left is everywhere advanced considera- 
bly beyond the positions it occupied before the 
battle. I am in strong hopes tliat the Chicka- 
hominy will fall sufficiently to enable me to 
cross the right. We have had a terril)le time 
with our communications, — bridges and cause- 
ways, built with great care, having been washed 
away by the sudden freshets, leaving us almost 
cut off frcmi comnmnication. All that human 
labor can do is being done to accomplish our 
purpose. 

" Please regard the portion of this relating to 
condition of Chickahominy as confidential, as it 
would be serious if the enemy were aware of it. 
I do not yet know our loss ; it has been very 
heavy on both sides, as the fighting was desper- 
ate. Our victory complete. I expect still more 
fighting before we reach Richmond. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
"Hon. E. M, Stanton, 

" Secretary of War. 

On the same day I received the following from 
the Secretary of War : — 

Wash.^ngton, June 2, 1862. 

" Your telegram has been received, and we 
are greatly rejoiced at your success, — not only 
in itself, but because of the dauntless spirit and 
courage it displays in your troops. You have 
received, of course, the order made yesterday, 
in respect to Fortress Monroe. Tiie object was 
to place at your command the disposable force 
of that department. The indications are that 
Fremont or McDowell will fight Jackson to-day, 
and as soon as he is disposed of another large 
body of troops will be at your service. 

" The intelligence from Halleck shows that 
the Rebels are fleeing, and pursued in force, 
from Corinth. All interest now centres iu your 



73 



operations, and full confidence is entertained in 
your brilliant and glorious success. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

On the 3d I received the following from the 
President : — 

" Washington, June 3, 1862. 
" W^ith these continuous rains, I am very 
anxious about the Chickahominy, — so close in 
your rear, and crossing your line of communi- 
cation. Please look to it. 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President. 
"Major-General McClellan." 

To which I replied as follows : — 

" Headquakteks Army of the Potomac, 

" New Bridge, June 3, 1862. 
" Your despatch of 5 a. m. jusC received. As 
the Chickahominy has been almost the only ob- 
stacle ill my way for several days, your Excel- 
lency may rest assured that it has not been over- 
looked. Every efibrt has been made, and will 
continue to be, to perfect the communications 
across it. Nothing of importance, except that 
it is again raining. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-General Commanding. 
" A. Lincoln, President, Washington." 

My views of the condition of our army on 
the 4th are explained in the following despatch 
to the President : — 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'■'■New Bridge, June 4, 1862. 

"Terrible rain, storm during the night and 
morning, — not yet cleared off. Chickahominy 
flooded, bridges in bad condition. Are still 
hard at work at them. I have taken every pos- 
sible step to insure the security of the corps on 
tiie right bank, but I cannot reinforce them here 
until my bridg' s are all safe, as ray force is 
too small to irsure my right and rear, should 
the enemy attack in that direction, as they may 
probably attempt. I have to be very cautious 
now. Our loss in the late battle will probably 
exceed (5,000) five thousand. I have not yet 
full returns. On account of the effect it might 
have on our own men and the enemy, I request 
that you will regard this information as confi- 
dential for a few days. I am satisfied that the 
loss of the enemy was very considerably greater ; 
they were terribly punished. 1 mention these 
facts now merely to show you that the army of 
the Potomac has had serious work, and that no 
child's play is before it. 

"You must make your calculations on the 
supposition that 1 have been correct from the 
beginning in asserting that the serious opposition 
was to be made here. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-General Commanding. 

" A. Lincoln, President." 

And in the following to the Secretary of War, 
on the same day : — 

10 



" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

New Bridge, June 4, 1332. 

"Please inform me at once what reinforce- 
ments, if any, I can count upon having at For- 
tress Monroe or AVhite House within llie next 
three days, and when each regiment may i)e ex- 
pected to arrive. It is of the utuKj.st importance 
that I should know this iuimediately. The losses 
in the battle of the 31st and 1st will amount to 
(7,000) seven thousand. Regard this as confi- 
dential for the present. 

" If I can have (5) five new regiments for Fort 
Monroe and its dependencies, I can withdraw (3) 
three more old regiments from there safely. I can 
well dispose of four more raw regiments on my 
communications. I can well disi)ose of from 
(15) flYteen to (20) twenty well drilled regiments 
among the old brigades in bringing them up to 
their original effective strength. Piecruits are 
especially necessary for the regular aud volun- 
teer batteries of artillery, as well as for the reg- 
ular and volunteer regiments of infantry. After 
the losses in our last battle, I trust tliat 1 will no 
longer be regarded as an alarmist. 1 believe we 
have at least one more desper iti- i)attle to fight. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Coinmanding. 

"Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

Also in my despatch to the Secretary of War, 
on the 5th : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" New Bridge, June 5, 1SG2. 

" Rained most of the night; has now ceased, 
but is not clear. The river still very high and 
troublesome. Enemy opened with several bat- 
teries on our bridges near here this morning; 
our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced 
them, though some firing still kept up. The 
rain forces us to remain in statu quo. With 
great diiBculty a division of infantry has been 
crossed this morning to support the troops on 
the other side, should the enemy renew attack. 
I felt obliged to do tliis, although it leaves us 
rather weak here. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
^^ Major-General Commanding. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me as 
follows : — 

" Washington, June 5, 18G2— 8.30 p. m. 
"I will send you (5) five new regiments as 
fast as transportation can take them ; the first to 
start to-morrow from Baltimore. I intend send- 
ing you a part of McDowell's force as soon as it 
can return from its trip to Front Royal, proba- 
bly as many as you want. The order to ship 
the new regiments to F^ort Monroe has already 
been given. I suppose that they may be sent 
directly to the fort. Please advise me if this be 
as you desire. 

" EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 

" Major-General McClellan." 



74 



On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows. 

" Headquarters Army of ru^ Potomac, 
"June 7, ] 8(32—4.40 p. m. 

" In reply to your despatch of 2 p. m. to-day, 
I have the lionor to state that the Chickahomiiiy 
River has risen so as to Hood the entire bottoms 
to the depth of tln-ee and four feet. I am push- 
ing forward tlie bridges in spite of this, and the 
men are working night and day, up to their 
waists in water, to complete them. 

" The whole face of the country is a perfect 
bog, entirely impassable for artillery, or even 
cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads, 
which Venders any general movement, either of 
this or the Kebel army, entirely out of the ques- 
tion, until we have more favorable weather. 

" I am glad to learn that you are pressing for- 
ward reinforcements so vigorously. 

" I shall be in perfect readiness to move for- 
ward and take Richmond the moment McCall 
reaches liere and the ground will admit the pas- 
sage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets 
about a mile to-day, driving oti' the Rebel pickets 
and securing a very advantageous position. 

" The Rebels have several batteries established, 
commanding the debouches from two of our 
bridges, and tire upon our working parties con- 
tinually, but as yet they have killed but very 
few of our men. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Commanding. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

As I did not think it probable that any rein- 
forcements would be sent me in time for the ad- 
vance on Richniond, I stated in the foregoing 
despatch that I should be ready to move when 
General IMcCall's division joined me; but I did 
not intend to be understood l)y this that no more 
reinforcements were wanted, as will be seen 
from the following despatch. 

"June 10, 18G2— 3.30 p. m. 

" I have again information that Beauregard 
has arrived, and that some of his troops are to 
follow him. No great reliance — perhaps none 
whatever — can be attaclicd to tiiis ; but it is pos- 
sible, and ought to be their policy. 

" I am completely checked Ijy the weather. 
The roads and fields are literally impassable for 
artillery, almost so for infantrj'. The Chicka- 
hominy is in a dreadful state ; we have another 
rain-storm on our liands. 

" I shall attack as soon as the weather and 
ground will permit ; but there will be a delay, 
the extent of which no one can foresee, for the 
season is altogether abnormal. 

" In view of these circumstances, I present 
for your consideration the propriety of detaching 
largely from Halleck's army to strengthen this; 
for it would seem that llalleck has now no 
large organized force in front of him, while 
we have. If this cannot be done, or even in con- 
nection with it, allow me to suggest the movement 
of a heavy column from Dalton up(m Atlanta. If 
but the one can l)e done, it would better conform 
to military principles to strengthen this army. 
And even althou,i;,h the reinforcements might not 
arrive in season to take part in the attack upon 
Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and 



they would furnish valuable assistance in vi- 
terior movements. 

" I wish to be distinctly understood that, . 
whenever the weather permits, I will attack with i 
whatever force I may have, although a larger 
force would enable me to gain much more de- 
cisive results. 

" I would be glad to have McCall's infantry 
sent forward by water at once, without waiting 
for his artillery and cavalry. 

" If General Prim returns via Washington, 
please converse with him as to the condition of 
affairs here. 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-General Commanding. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War." 

Our work upon the bridges continued to be 
pushed forward vigorously until the 20th, during 
which time it rained almost every day, and the 
exposure of the men caused much sickness. 

On tlie lltli the following was received from 
the Secretary of War : — 

"Washington, June 11, 1862. 

"Your despatch of three thirty, (o.oO.) yes- 
terday, has been i-eceived. I am fully impressed 
with the difficulties mentioned, and wliich no 
art or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am 
striving to the uttermost to render you every aid 
in the power of the Government. Your sugges- 
tions will be immediately communicated to Gen- 
eral Halleck, with a request tliat he shall con- 
form to them. At last advice he contemplated 
sending a column to operate with Mitchell 
against Chattanooga, and thence upon East Ten- 
nessee. Buel reports Kentucky and Tennessee 
to be in a critical condition, demanding immedi- 
ate attention. Halleck says the main body of 
Beauregard's force is with him at Okolona. 
McCall's force was reported yesterday as having 
embarked, and on its way to join you. It is in- 
tended to send the residue of McDowell's force 
also to join you as speedily as possible. 

" Fremont had a hard tight, day before yester- 
day, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight 
miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, 
but was pretty badly handled. It is clear that a 
strong force is operating with Jackson for the 
purpose of detaining tlie forces liere from you. 
I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies. 

" Be assured, General, that there never has 
been a moment when my desire has been other- 
wise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, 
and strength, since the hour we first met; and, 
whatever others may say for their own purposes, 
you have never had, and never can have, any 
one more truly your friend, or more anxious to 
support you, or more joyful than I shall be at 
the success which I have no doubt will soon be 
achieved by your arms. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 

"Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

On the 12th and 13th General McCall's di- 
vision arrived. 

On the 13th of June two squadrons of the 5th 
United States cavalry, under the command of 
Captain Royall, stationed near Hanover Old 
Church, were attacked and overpowered by a 



75 



force of the enemy's cavalry, numbering about 
fifteen Imndred men, with four guns. They 
pushed on towards our depots, but at some dis- 
tance from our main body, and, though pursued 
very cleverly, made the circuit of the army, re- 
passing the Cliickaliominy at Long Bridge. The 
burning (jf two schooners laden witli forage, and 
fourteen government wagons, the destruction of 
some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the 
guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, some 
little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a 
little eclat, were tlie precise results of this expe- 
ditii)n. 

On the 14th I sent the following to the Secre- 
tary of War : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Camp Lincoln, June 14, 1862 — midnight. 

" Ail quiet in every direction. The stampede 
of last night has passed away. Weather now 
very favorable. I hope two days more will make 
the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon 
as the bridges are completed, and the ground fit 
for artillery to move. At the same time I would 
be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to 
me. I can use several new regiments to advan- 
tage. 

" It ought to be distinctly understood that Mc- 
Dowell and his troops are completely under my 
control. I received a telegram from him re- 
questing that McCall's division might be placed 
so as to join him immediately on his arrival. 

"That request does not breathe the proper 
spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be 
disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not 
feel that, in such circumstances as those in 
which I am now placed, General McDowell 
should wi.-h the general interests to be sacrificed 
for the purpose of increasing his command. 

" If I cannot fully control all Ms troops, I want 
none of them, but would prefer to fight the bat- 
tle with what I have, and let others be responsi- 
ble for the results. 

" The department lines should not be allowed 
to interfere with me; but General McD., and 
all other troops sent to me, should be placed 
completely at my disposal, to do with them as I 
think best. In no other way can they be of 
assistance to me. I therefore request that I 
may have entire and full control. The stake at 
issue is too great to allow personal considera- 
tions to be entertained ; you know that I have 
none. 

" The indications are, from our balloon recon- 
noissances and from all other sources, that the 
enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in num- 
bers, and determined to fight desperately. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

^'' Major- General Commanding. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

^'■Secretary of War." 

On the 20th the following was communicated 
to the President : — 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp Lincoln, June 20, 18G2 — 2 p. m. 

"Your Excellency's despatch of (11) eleven 
A. M. received, also that of General Sigel. 

" I have no doubt that Jackson has been rein- 
forced from here. There is reason to believe 



that General R. S. Ripley has recently joined 
Lee's army, with a brigade or division from 
Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from 
Goldsboro'. There is not the slightest reason 
to suppose that the enemy intends evacuating 
Richmond ; he is daily increasing his defences. 
I find him everywhere in force, and uvery recon- 
noissanee costs many lives, yet i am obliged to 
feel my way, foot by foot, at whatever cost, so 
great are the difficulties of the country ; by to- 
morrow night the defensive works, covering our 
position on this side of the Chiekahominy, should 
be completed. I am forced to this by my infe- 
riority in numbers, so that I may bring the 
greatest possible numbers into action, and s»jcure 
the army against the consequences ot unforeseen 
disaster. I would be glad to have permission to 
lay before your Excellency, by letter or tele- 
graph, my views as to the present state of mili- 
tary affairs throughout the whole country. In 
the mean time I would be pleased to learn the 
disposition, as to numbers and position, of the 
troops not under my command, in Viryinia and 
elsewhere. rG. B. McCLELLAN, 

"3Iajor- General Coiamanding. 

" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President." 

To which I received this reply : — 

" Washington, June 21, 18G2— G p.m. 

" Your despatch of yesterday, two (2) p. m., 
was received this morning. If it would not di- 
vert too much of your time and attention from 
the army under your immediate command, I 
would be glad to have your views as to the pres- 
ent state of military aff'airs throughout the 
whole country, as you say you would be glad to 
give them. I would rather "it should be by letter 
than by telegraph, because of the better chance 
of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of 
the troops not under your command, in Virginia 
and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accu- 
racy, which I cannot, I would rather not trans- 
mit either by telegraph or letter, because of the 
chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be 
very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave 
your camp, and I cannot well leave here. 

" A. LINCOLN, President. 

" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

To which I sent the following reply : — 

" Camp Lincoln, June 22 — 1 p. m. 
" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 
of your telegram of 8 p. m. yesterday. Under 
the circumstances, as stated in your despatch, 
I perceive that it will be better at least to defer, 
for the present, the communication I desired to 
make. G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General Commanding. 
" His Excellency the President." 

All the information I could obtain, previous 
to the 24th of June, regarding the movements of 
General Jackson, led to the belief that he was 
at Gordonsville, where he was receiving re- 
inforcements from Richmond via Lynchburg 
and Stanton; but what his purposes were did 
not appear until the date specified, when a young 
man, very intelligent, but of suspicious appear- 
ance, was brought in by our scouts from the di- 
rection of Hanover Court House. He at first 



76 



stated that he was an escaped prisoner, from 
Colonel Kenley's Maryland regiment, captured 
at Front Royal, but iinally confessed himself to 
be a deserter from Jackson's command, which 
he left near Gordonsville on tiie 21st. Jackson's 
troops were then, as he said, moving to Freder- 
ickshall, along the Virginia Central railroad, for 
the purpose of attacking my rear on the 28th. 
I immediately despatched two trusty negroes to 
proceed along the railroad and ascertain the 
truth of the statement. They were unable, how- 
ever, to get beyond Hanover Court House, where 
they encountered tlie enemy's pickets, and were 
forced to turn back without obtaining the desir- 
ed information. On that day I sent the follow- 
ing despatch : — 

*' Headquauteks Armt of the Potomac, 
"June 24, 1862—12 p. m. 

" A very peculiar case of desertion has just 
occurred from the enemy. The party states that 
he left Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell, (fifteen 
brigades.) at Gordonsville on the 21st ; that they 
were moving to Frederickshall, and that it was 
intended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would 
be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, 
the most exact information you have as to the 
position and movements of Jackson, as well as 
the sources from which your information is de- 
rived, that I may the better compare it with 
what I have. G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General." 

The following is his reply : — 

" Washington, June 25, 1862. 

" We have no definite information as to the 
numbers or position of Jackson's force. Gen- 
eral King yesterday reported a deserter's state- 
ment that Jackson's lorce was, nine days ago, 
forty thousand men. Some reports place ten 
thousand Rebels under Jackson, at Gordonsville ; 
others, that his force is at Port Republic, Har- 
risonburg, and Luray. Fremont yesterday re- 
ported rumors that Western Virginia was threat- 
ened ; and General Kelly, that Ewell was ad- 
vancing to New Creek, where Fremont has his 
depots. The last telegram from Fremont 
contradicts this rumor. The last telegram 
from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong 
in advance at Luray ; the people decline to give 
any information of his whereabouts. Within 
the last two (2) days the evidence is strong that 
for some purpose the enemj'' is circulating ru- 
mors of Jackson's advance in various directions, 
with a view to conceal the real point of attack. 
Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor 
Banks and Fremont, wlio are at Middletown, 
appear to have any accurate knowledge of the 
subject. A letter transmitted to the department 
yesterday, purported to be dated Gordousville on 
the fourteenth (1-ith) instant, stated that the act- 
ual attack was designed for Washington and 
Baltimore as soon as you attacked Richmond, 
but that the report was to be circulated that 
Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mis- 
lead. This letter looked very mucli like a blind, 
and induces me to suspect tliat Jackson's real 
movement now is towards Richmond. It came 
from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like 
the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I 
tliinkj thei cfore, that while the warning of the 



deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could 
not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to 
you any further information on this subject that 
may be received here. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 
" Major-Gencral McCleli.an." 

On the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments 
being at last completed, an advance of our picket 
line of the left was ordered, preparatory to a 
general forward movement. 

Immediatel}' in front of the most advanced 
redoubt on the Williamsburg road was a large 
open field ; beyond that a swampy belt of timber, 
some five liundred yards wide, which had been 
disputed ground for many days. Further in ad- 
vance was an open field, crossed by the Wil- 
liamsburg road and the railroad, and commanded 
by a redoubt and rifle-pits of the enemy. 

It was decided to push our lines to the other 
side of these woods, in order to enable us to as- 
certain the nature of the ground, and to place 
Generals Heintzelman and Sumner in position 
to support the attack intended to be made on the 
Old Tavern, on the 26tli or 27th, by General 
Franklin, by assailing that position in the rear. 

Between 8 and 9 o'clock, on the morning ot 
the 25th, the advance was begun by General 
Heintzelman's corps. The enemy were found 
to be in strong force all along the line, and con- 
tested the advance stubbornly, but by sunset our 
object was accomplished. The troops engaged 
in this affair were the whole of Heintzelman's 
corps. Palmer's brigade of Couch's division of 
Keyes's corps, and a part of Richards(jn's divis- 
ion of Sunnier's corps. For the details I refer 
to tlie report of General Heintzelman. 

The casualties (not including those in Palm- 
er's brigade, whicli have not been reported) were 
as follows : officers killed, 1 ; wounded, 1-4 ; 
missing, I; enlisted men killed, 50; wounded, 
387; missing, 63; total, 516. 

The following telegrams were sent to the Sec- 
retary of War, during the day, from the field of 
operations : — 

"Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862— 1.30 p. m. 

" We have advanced our pickets on the left 
considerably, under sharp resistance. Our men 
behaved very handsomely. Some firing still 
continues. G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General Commanding. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton." 

" Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862—3.15 p. m. 

" The enemy are making a desperate resist- 
ance to the advance of our picket's lines. Kear- 
ney's and one half of Hooker's are where I want 
them. 

" I have this moment reinforced Hooker's 
right with a brigade and a couple of guns, and 
hope in a few minutes to finisli the work intend- 
ed for to-day. Our men are behaving splendid- 
ly. The enemy are fighting well also. This is 
not a battle ; merely an aflair of Heintzelman's 
corps, supported by Keyes, and thus far all goes 
well. We hold every foot we have gained. 

"If we succeed in what we have undertaken, 
it will be a very important advantage gained. 
Loss not large thus far. The fighting up tc this 
time has been done by General Hookers division, 



77 



which has behaved as usual, — that is, most 
splendidly. 

"On our right, Porter has silenced the en- 
emy's batteries in his front. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General, Commanding. 
" Hon. E. M. Stanto.v, 

" Secretary of War." 

"Redodbt No. 3, June 25, 1SG2— 5 p. m. 
'•• The affair is over, and we have gained our 
point fully, and with but little loss, notwithstand- 
ing the strong opposition. Our men have done 
all that could be desired. The atl'air was par- 
tially decided by two guns that Captain De- 
Kussey brought gallantly into action under very 
difficult circumstances. The enemy was driven 
from the camps in front of this place, and is now 
quiet. "G. B. McOLELL AN, 

" Major- Oeneral Commanding. 
" Hon. E. M. Stantox, 

" Secretary of War." 

Also, on the same day, the following : — 

•' Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862 — 6. 15 p. m. 

" I have just returned from the field, and find 
your despatch in regard to Jackson. 

" Several contrabands, ju>t in, give informa- 
tion confirming the supposition that Jackson's 
advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and 
that Beauregard arrived, with strong reinforce- 
ments, in Kichmond, yesterday. 

" I incline to think that Jackson will attack 
my right and rear. The Rebel force is stated 
at two hundred thousand (200,000,) including 
Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to con- 
tend against vastly superior odds if these reports 
be true. But this army will do all in the power 
of men to hold their position, and repulse any 
attack 

" I regret my great inferiority in numbers, 
but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, 
as J have not failed to represent repeatedly the 
necessity of reinforcements, that this was the de- 
cisive point, and that all the available means of 
the Government should be concentrated here. I 
will do all that a general can do with the splen- 
did army I have the honor to command, and, if 
it is destroyed by overwiielming numbers, can at 
least die with it and share its fate. But if the 
result of the action which will probably occur 
to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, 
the responsibility cannot be thrown on my 
shoulders ; it must rest where it belongs. 

" Since I commencpil this I have received ad- 
ditional intelligence confirming the supposition 
in regard to Jackson's movements and Beaure- 
gard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to- 
morrow, and now go to the other side of the 
Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that 
side. I feel that there is no use in again asking 
for reinforcements. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

The report of the chief of the "secret service 
corps," herewith forwarded, and dated the 2Gth 
of June, sh'^ws the estimated strength of the en- 
emy, at the "iiae of the evacuation of Yorktown, 



to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The 
same report puts his numbers, on the 2Gth of 
June, at about 180,000, and the speciHcinf,)rma- 
tion obtained reg irding their organization war- 
rants the belief that this estimate did not exceed 
his actual strength. It will be observed that the 
evidence contained in the report shows the fol- 
lowing organizations, viz : two hundred regi- 
ments of infantry and cavalry, including the 
forces of Jackson and Ewell. just arrived; eight 
battalions of independent troops ; iivo battalions 
of artillery ; twelve; companies of infantry and 
independent cavalry, besides forty-six companies 
of artillery ; amounting, in all, to from forty to 
fifty brigades. There were undoubtedly many 
others whose designations we did not learn. 

The report also shows tiiat numerous and 
heavy earthworks had been completed for the 
defence of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of 
these were mounted some two hundred guns. 

On the 2Gth, the day upon which I had decided 
as the time for our final advance, the enemy at- 
tacked our rigiit in strong force, and turned my 
attention to the protection of our communica- 
tions and depots of supply. 

The event was a bitter confirmation of the 
military judgment which had been reiterated to 
my superiors from the inception and through the 
progress of the Peninsula campaign. 

I notified the Secretary of War in the follow- 
ing despatch : — 

" Headquarters Akmt of the Potomac, 

" Camp Lincoln, June 2G, 1862 — 12 m. 

" I have just heard that our advance cavalry 
pickets on the left bank of Chickahominy are 
being driven in. It is probably Jackson's ad- 
vanced guard. If this be true, you may not 
hear from me for some days, as my communica- 
tions will probably be cut off. The case is per- 
haps a diflicult one, but I shall resort to des- 
perate measures, and will do my best to out- 
manoeuvre, out-wit, and out-figiit the enemy. 
Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be 
discouraged if you learn that my communica- 
tions are cut off and even Yorktown in posses- 
sion of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I 
will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed 
in me. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 

♦' Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp Lincoln, June 2G, 1862 — 2,o0 p. m. 

" Your despatch and that of the President 
received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, &c., 
on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is 
impossible to tell where reinforcements ought to 
go, as I am yet unable to predict result of ap- 
proaching battle. It will probably be better that 
they should go to Fort Monroe, and thence ac- 
cording to state of affairs when they arrive. 

" It is not probable that I can maintain tele- 
graphic communication more than an hour or 
two longer. " G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-GenerdU 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

'■'■Secretary of War." 



78 



On the same day I received the following de- 
spatches from the Secretary of War : — 

'* Washington, June 25, 18()2— 11.20 p. m. 

"Your telegram of 6.15 lias just been received. 
The circumstances that have hitherto rendered 
it impossible for the Government to send you any 
more reinforcements than has been done, have 
been so distinctly stated to you by the President 
that it is needless for me to repeat them. 

''Every etibrt has been made by the Presi- 
dent atad myself to strengthen you. King's divis- 
ion has reached Falmoutli, Shields's division 
and Ricketts's division are at Manassas. The 
President designs to send a part of that force to 
aid you as speedily as it can be done. 
"E. M. STANTON, 

'■ Secretary of War. 

" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

Washington, June 26, 1862—6 p. m. 

" Arrangements are being made as rapidly as 
possible to send you five thousand (5,000j men 
as fast as they can he brought from Manassas to 
Alexandria and embarked, which can be done 
sooner than to wait for transportation at Freder- 
icksburg. They will be followed by more, if 
needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force 
will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and 
will operate promptly in your aid by land. Noth- 
ing will be spared to sustain you, and I have 
undoubting faith in your success. Keep me ad- 
vised fully of your condition. 

'■'EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War, 

" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

But 5,000 of the reinforcements spoken of in 
these communications came to the army of the 
Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's 
iBar, after the seven days. 

In anticipation of a speedy advance on Rich- 
mond, to provide for the contingency of our com- 
munications with tlie depot at the White House 
being severed by the enemy, and at the same 
time to be prepared for a change of the base of 
our operations to James River, if circumstances 
should render it advisable, I had made arrange- 
ments more than a week previous (on the 18th) 
to have transports with supplies of provisions 
and forage, under a convoy of gunboats, sent up 
James River. They reached Harrison's Land- 
ing in time to bo available for the army on its 
arrival at that point. Events soon proved this 
change of base to be. though most hazardous and 
difficult, the only prudent course. 

In order to relieve the troops of the 6th corps, 
on the 19th of June General Reynolds's and 
General Seymour's brigades, of General Mc- 
Call's division, (Pennsylvania reserves,) were 
moved from Gaines's farm to a position on 
Beaver Dam Creek, General Meade's brigade 
being held in reserve in front of Gaines's farm. 
One regiment and a battery were thrown forward 
to the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, and a 
line of pickets extended along the Cliiekahominy 
River between the Mechanicsville and Meadow 
bridges. As has been already stated, I re- 
ceived, wliile engaged on the 25th in directing 
the operations of lleintzelman's corps, informa- 
tion which strengthened my suspicions that Jack- 
eon was advancing with a large force upon our 



right and rear. On this day General Casey, at 
the Wliite House, was instructed to prepare for a 
vigorous resistance, and defensive works were 
ordered at Tunstall's Station. Early on the 
25th General Porter was instructed to send out 
reconnoitring parties towards Hanover Court 
House to discover the position and force of the 
enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the Tolo- 
potamoy as fer as possible. 

Up to the 2Gth of June the operations against 
Richmond had been conducted along the roads 
leading to it from the east and northeast. The 
reasons (the President's anxiety about covering 
Wasiiington from Fredericksburg, McDowell's 
promised cooperation, partial advance, and im- 
mediate withdrawal) which compelled the choice 
of this line of approach, and our continuance 
upon it have been attended to above. 

The superiority of the James River route, aa 
a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to 
need exposition. My own opinion on that sub- 
ject had been early given, and need not be re- 
peated here. The dissipation of all hope of the 
cooperation by land of General McDowell's 
forces, deemed to be occupied in the defence of 
Washington, tlieir inability to hold or defeat 
Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, 
and a new danger to my right, and to the long 
line of supplies from the White House to the 
Chickahominy, and forced an immediate cliange 
of base across the Peninsula. To that end, from 
the evening of the 2Gth, every energy of the 
army was bent. Such a change of base, in the 
presence of a powerful enemy, is one of tiie most 
difficult undertakings in war. I was confident of 
the valor and discipline of my brave army, and 
knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat 
or advance, and to fight the series of battles now 
inevitable, whether retreating from victories or 
marching through defeats ; and, in short, I had 
no doubt whatever of its ability, even against 
superior numl)ers, to fight its way through to 
the James River, and gei >, position whence a 
successful advance upon Richmond would be 
again possible. Their superb conduct through 
the next seven days justified my faith. 

On the same day General Van Vliet, chief 
quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, by 
my orders, telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, quar- 
termaster at the White House, as follows : '■ Run 
the cars to the last morjient, and load them with 
provisions and ammunition. Load every WMgon 
you have with subsistence, and send them to 
Savage's Station, by way of Bottom's Bridge. 
If you are obliged to abandon White House, 
burn everything that you cannot get oflT. You 
must throw all our supplies up the James River 
as soon as possible, and accompany them your- 
self with all your force. It will be of vast im- 
portance to establish our depots on James River 
without delay if we abandon White House. I 
will keep you advised of every movement so 
long as the wires work ; after that you must ex- 
ercise your own judgment." 

All these commands were obeyed. So excel- 
lent were the dispositions of the different offi'.'ers 
in command of the troops, depots, and gunboars, 
and so timely the warning of the approach of the 
enemy, that almost everything was saved, and 
but a small amount of stores destroyed to prevent 
their falling into the hands of the enemy. 



79 



General Stoneman's communications with the 
main army being cut off, he fell hack upon the 
White House, and thence to Yorktown, when tlie 
White House was evacuated. 

On the 2Gtli orders were sent to all the corps 
commanders on the riglit bank of the Chicka- 
hominy to be prepared to send as many troops 
as they could spare on the following day to the 
left bank of the river, as will be seen by the ap- 
pended telegrams. General Franklin receiv^-d 
instructions to hold General Slocum's division in 
readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy 
firing should at that time be heard in the direc- 
tion of General Porter, to move at once to his 
assistance without further orders. 

At noon on the 26th the approach of the 
enemy-, who had crossed above Meadow Bridge, 
was discovered by the advanced pickets at that 
point, and at 12.30 p. m. they were attacked and 
driven in. All the pickets were now called in, 
and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville 
withdrawn. 

Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve 
in rear of tlie line, and shortly after Martin- 
dale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, 
were moved forward and deployed on the right 
of McCall's division, towards Shady Grove 
Church, to cover that tlank. Neither of these three 
brigades, liowever, were warmly engaged, though 
two of Griffin's regiments relieved a portion of 
Reynolds's line just at the close of the action. 

The position of our troops was a strong one, 
extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam 
Creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy, 
and the right in tliick woods beyond the upper 
road from Mechanicsville to Coal Harbor, The 
lower or river road crossed the creek at Ellison's 
Mills. Seymour's brigade Iield the left of the 
line, from the Chickahominy to beyond th'; mill, 
partly in woods and partly in clear ground, and 
Reynolds's the right, principally in the woods 
and covering the upper road. The artillery oc- 
cupied positions commanding the roads and the 
open ground across the creek. 

Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the 
position generally prepared with a care that 
greatly contributed to the success of the day. 
The passage of the creek was difficult along the 
whole front, and impracticable for artillery, ex- 
cept by the two roads where the main efforts of 
the enemy were directed. 

At 3 r. M. he formed his line of battle, rapidly 
advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our 
whole line, making at the same time a determin- 
ed attempt to force the passage of the u[)perroa.d, 
which was successfully resisted by General Rey- 
nolds. After a severe struggle he was forced to 
retire with very heavy loss. 

A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmish- 
ing, was maintained along the wliole front, while 
the enemy massed his troops for another effort 
at the lower road about two hours later, which 
was likewise repulsed by General Seymour with 
heavy slaughter. 

The firing ceased, and the enemy retired about 
9 p. Ji., the action having lasted six hours, 
with entire success to our arms. But few, if 
any, of Jackson's troops were engaged on tliis 
day. Tlie portion of the enemy encounter- 
ed were chiefly from the troops on the right bank 



of the river, who crossed near Meadow Bridge 
and at Mechanicsville. 

The information in my possession soon after 
the close of this action convinced me that Jack- 
son was really approaching in large force. Tho 
position on Beaver Dam Creek, although so 
successfully defended, had its right flank too 
much in the air, and was too far from the main 
army to make it ava.ilable to retain it longer. I 
therefore determined to send the heavy guns at 
Hogan's and Gaines's houses over the Chicka- 
hominy during the night, with as many of the 
wagons of the rnh corps as possible, and to with- 
draw the corps itself to a position stretching 
around the bridges, where its flanks would be 
reasonably secure, and it would be within sup- 
porting distance of the main army. General 
Porter carried out my orders to that effect. 

It was not advisable, at that tinne, even had it 
been practicable, to withdraw the 5th corps to 
the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a 
movement would have exposed the rear of the 
army, placed as between two fires, and enabled 
Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement 
to James River, l)y crossing the Chickahominy in 
the vicinity of Jones's bridge before we could 
reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I deter- 
mined then to resist Jackson with the 5th corps, 
reinforced iiy all our disposable troops in the 
new position near the bridge heads, in order to 
cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy 
guns, and to give time for the arri'.ngemen:s *o 
secure the adoption of the James River as ouie' 
line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey. 

The greater part of the heavy guns and wag- 
ons having been removed to tlie right bank of 
the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of 
withdrawing the troops from Beaver Dam Creek 
was commenced shortly before daylight, and 
successfully executed. 

Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first 
to leave the ground ; Seymour's brigade covered 
the rear with the horse batteries of Captains 
Robertson and Tidball, but the withdrawal was 
so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of the 
preceding daj' so complete, that althougii the 
enemy followed the retreat closely, and some 
skirmishing occurred, he did not ajipear in front 
of the new line in force till about noon of the 
27tli, when we were prepared to receive him. 

About this time General Porter, believing that 
General Stoneman would be cut off from him, 
sent him orders to fall back on the White House, 
and afterwards rejoin the army as best he could. 

On the morning of the 27th of June, during 
the withdrawal of his troops from Mechaiiicsville 
to the selected position already mentioned, Gen- 
eral Porter telegraphed as follows : — 

" I hope to do without aid, though I request 
that Franklin, or some other command, be held 
ready to reinforce me. The enemy arc so close 
that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope 
to have a portiim in position to cover the retreat. 
This is a delicate movement, but relying on the 
good qualities of the commanders of divisions 
and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the 
new line." 

This shows how closely Porter's retreat was 
followed. 

Notwithstanding all the efforts usod during tne 
entire night to remove the heavy guns and wag- 



80 



ons, some of the siegre guns were still in posi- 
tion at Gaines's house after sunrise, and were 
finally hauled off by hand. The new position 
of the 5th corps was about an arc of a circle, 
covering the approaches to tlie bridges which 
connected our ritj;iit wing with the troops on the 
opposite side of the river. 

Morell's division held the left of the line in a 
strip of woods on the bank of the Gains's Mill 
stream, resting its left Hank on the descent 
to the Chickaliominy, which was swept by our 
ajtillery on both sides of the river, and extend- 
ing into open ground on the right towards Now 
Coal Harbor. In this line General Butterficld's 
brigade held the extreme left, General Martin- 
dale's joined his right, and General Griffin, still 
further to the right, joined the left of General 
Sykos's division, which, partly in woods and 
partly in open ground, extended in the rear of 
Coal Harbor. 

Each brigade had in reserve two of its own 
regiments. McCall's division having been en- 
gaged on the day before, was formed in a second 
line in the rear of the first, Meade's brigade on 
the left near the Chickaliominy, Reynolds's bri- 
gade on the right, covering tlie approaches from 
Coal Harbor and Despatch Station to Sumner's 
bridge, and Seymour's in reserve to the second 
line, still further in the rear. General P. St. 
George Cooke, witli five companies of the 5th 
regular cavalry, two squadrons of tlie 1st regu- 
lar and three squadrons of the 6tii Pennsylvania 
cavalry, (lancers,) was posted beliind a hill in 
rear of the position, and near the Cliickahomi- 
ny, to aid in watching the left flank and defend- 
ing the slope of the river. 

The troops were all in position by noon, with 
the artillery on the commanding ground, and in 
the intervals between the divisions and brigades. 
Besides the division batteries, there were Kob- 
ertson's and Tidball's horse batteries, from tlie 
artillery reserve ; the latter posted on the right 
of Sykes's division, and tiie former on the extreme 
left of the line, in the valley of the Chickaliominj'. 
Shortly after noon the enemy were discovered 
approaching in force, and it soon became evident 
that the entire position was to be attacked. His 
skirmishers advanced rapidly, and soon the 
firing became heavy along our whole front. At 
2 p. M. General Porter asked for reinforce- 
ments. Slocum's division of tlie 6th corps was 
ordered to cross to the left bank of the river, by 
Alexander's Bridge, and proceed to his support. 

General Porter's first call for reinforcements, 
through General Barnard, did not reach me, nor 
his demand for more axes, through the same 
officer. 

By 3 p. M. the engagement had become so 
severe, anil the enemy were so greatly superior 
in numbers, that tiie entire second line and re- 
serves had been moved forward to sustain the 
first line against repeated and desperate assaults 
along our whole front. 

At 3.o0 p. M. Slocum's division reached the 
field and was immediately brought into action at 
the weak i)oints of our line. 

On the left the contest was for the strip of 
woods running almost at right angles to the 
Chickahominy, in front of Adams's house, or 
between tliat and Gaines's house. The enemy 
severals times charged up to this wood, but were 



each time driven back with heavy loss. The 
regulars, of Sykes's division, on the right, also 
repulsed several strong attacks. 

But our own loss under the tremendous fire 
of such greatly superior numbers was very se- 
vere, and the troops, most of whom had been un- 
der arms more than two days, were rapidly be- 
coming exhausted by the masses of fresh men 
constantly brought against them. 

When General Slocum's division arrived on 
the ground it increased General Porter's force to 
some 35,000, who were probably contending 
against about 70,000, of the enemy. The line 
was severely pressed in several points, and as 
its being pierced at any one would have been 
fatal, it was unavoidable for General Porter, who 
was required to hold his position until night, to 
divide Slocum's division, and send parts of it, 
even single regiments, to the points most threat- 
ened. 

About 5 p. M., General Porter having reported 
his position as critical, French's and IMeagher's 
brigades, of Richardson's divison. (3d corps,) 
were ordered to cross to his support. The ene- 
my attacked again in great force at 6 p. m., but 
f;uled to break our lines, though our loss was 
very heavy. 

About 7 p. M. they threw fresh troops against 
General Porter with still greater fury, and finally 
gained the woods held by our left. This reverse, 
aided l)y the confusion that followed an unsuc- 
cessful charge by five companies of the 5th cav- 
alry, and followed as it was by more determined 
assaults on the remainder of our lines, now out- 
flanked, caused a general retreat from our posi- 
sition to the hill in rear overlooking the bridge. 

French's and Meagher's brigades now appear- 
ed, driving before them the stragglers who were 
thronging towards the bridge. 

These brigades advanced boldly to the front, 
and by their example, as well as by the steadi- 
iness of their bearings reanimated our own 
troops and warned the enemy that reinforcements 
had arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy, al- 
ready repulsed several times with terrible slaugh- 
ter, and hearing the shouts of the fresh troops 
failed to follow up their advantage. This gave an 
opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades 
of Generals French and Meagher, and they again 
advanced up the hill ready to repulse another 
attack. During the night our thin and exhausted 
regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and by 
the following morning all had reached the other 
side of the stream. The regular infantry formed 
the rear guard, and about 6 o'clock on the 
morning of tlie 2Sth crosed the river, destroying 
the bridge behind them. 

Our loss in this battle in killed, wounded, and 
missing, was very heavy, especially in officers, 
many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken 
prisoners while gallantly leading on their men 
or rallying them to renewed exertions. 

It is impossible to arrive at the exact ntimbers 
lost in this desperate engagement, owing to the 
series of battles which followed each other in 
quick succession, and in which the whole army 
was engaged. No general rcttirns were made 
until after we had arrived at Harrison's Landing, 
when the losses during the whole seven days 
were estimated together. 

Although we were finally forced from our first 



81 



line after the enemy had been repeatedly driven 
back, yet the objects sought for had been ob- 
tained. The enemy was held at bay Our siege 
guns and material were saved, and the right wing 
had now joined tiie main body of the army. 

The number of guns captured by the enemy 
at this battle was 22, three of which were lost 
by being run otf the bridge during the final 
withdrawal. 

Great credit is due for the efficiency and 
bravery with which this important arm of the 
service (the artillery) was fought, and it was 
not until the last successful charge of the enemy 
that the cannoneers were driven from their 
pieces, or struck down, and the guns captured. 
Deidrich's, Knierim's, and Grimm's batteries 
took position during the engagement in tlie front 
of General Smith's line on the right liank of the 
stream, and witli a battery of siege guns, served 
by the 1st Connecticut artiller}', helped to drive 
back the enemy in front of General Porter. 

So threatening were the movements of the 
enemy on both banks of the Chickahominy, that 
it was impossible to decide until tlie afternoon 
where th-e real attack would be made. Large 
forces of infantry were seen during the day near 
the old tavern, on Franklin's right, and threat- 
ening demonstrations were frequently made 
along the entire line on this side of the river, 
wliich rendered it necessary to hold a considera- 
ble force in position to meet them. 

On tlie 2Gth a circular was sent to the corps 
commanders, on the right bank of the river, 
asking them how many of their troops could be 
spared to reinforce General Porter, after re- 
taining sufficient to hold their positicius for 
twenty-four hours. 

To this the following replies were received : — 

" Headquarters Third Corps, 

" June 26 — 4 p. m. 
" I think T can hold the intrenchments vrith 
four brigades for twenty-four hours. Tliat would 
leave two bi'igades dispo^a'de for service on the 
other side of the river, but the men are so tired 
and worn out that I fear they would not be in 
a condition to fight after making a march of any 
distance. ***** 

"S. P. HEINTZELMAN, 

" Brigadier- General. 
" General R. B. Marcy." 

Telegrams from General Heintzelman, on the 
25th and 2Gth, had indicated that the enemy was 
in large force in front of Generals Hooker 
and Kearney, and on the Charles City road, 
(Longstreet, Hill, and Huger,) and General 
Heintzelman expressed the opinion, on the night 
of the 2oth, that he could not hold his advanced 
position without reinforcements. 

General Keyes telegraphed, — 

" As to how many men will be able to hold 
this position for twenty-four hours, I must 
answer, all I have, if the enemy is as strong as 
ever in front, it having at all times appeared to 
me that our forces on tliis flank are small 
enough." 

On the morning of the 27th, the following 
despatch was sent to General Sumner : — 
11 



" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"June 27 — 8.45 a. m. 
" General Sraitli just reports that six or eight 
regiments have moved down to the woods in 
front of General Sumner. 

"R. B. MARCY, 

" Chief of Staff." 
"General E. V. Sumner, 

" Comd'g Second Army Corps." 

At 11 o'clock A. M. General Sumner tele- 
graphed, as follows : — 

" The enemy threaten an attack on my right, 
near Smith." 

At 12.30 p. M. he telegraphed — 

" Sharp shelling on both sides." 

At 2.45 p. M. — 

"Sharp musketry firing in front of Burns; 
we are replying with artillery and infantry. 
The man on tlie lookout reports some troops 
drawn up in line of battle ahout opposite my 
riglit and Smith's left; the number cannot be 
made out." 

In accordance with orders given on the night 
of the 2Gth, General Slocum's division commenc- 
ed crossing the river to support General Porter 
soon after daybreak on the morning of the 27th; 
but as the firing in front of General Porter 
ceased, the movement was suspended. At 2 p. m. 
General Porter called for reinforcements. I or- 
dered them at once, and at 3.25 p. m. sent him 
the following : — 

" Slocura is now crossing Alexander's Bridge 
with liis whole command ; enemy lias commenced 
an infantiy attack on Smith's left; I have order- 
ed down Sumner's and Heintzehnan's reserves, 
and you can count on the whole of Slocum's. 
Go on as you have begun." 

During the day the following despatches were 
received, wliich will ^how the condition of aifairs 
on the right bank of the Cliickahominy : — 

"June 27, 1862. 
" General Smith thinks the "nemy are massing 
heavy cohimns in the cleark |s to the right of 
James Garnett's house, and on the other side of 
the river opposite it. Three regiments are re- 
ported to be moving from Sumner's to Smith's 
front. The arrangements are very good, made 
by Smith. W. B. FRANKLIN, 

" Brigadier- General. 
" Colonel A. V. Colburn, 

" Assistant Adj utant- General." 

Afterwards he telegraphed : — 

" The enemy has begun an attack ou Smith's 
left with infantry. I know no details." 

Afterwards the following : — 

" The enemy has opened on Smith from a bat- 
tery of three pieces to the right of the White 
House. Our shells are bursting well, and Smith 
thinks Sumner will soon have a cross fire upon 
them that will silence them." 

Afterwards (at 5.50 p. m.) the following was 
sent to General Keyes : — 

" Please send one brigade of Couch's division 
to these headciuarters, without a moment's dehiy. 



82 



A staff officer will be here to direct tlie brigade 
where to go." 

Subsequently the following was sent to Gener- 
als Sumner and Franklin : — 

" Is there any sign of the enemy being in force 
in your front ? Can you spare any more force 
to be sent to General Porter ? Answer at once." 

At 5.15 p. M. the following was received from 
General Franklin : — 

" I do not tliink it prudent to take any more 
troops from here at present." 

General Sumner replied as follows : — 
" If the general desires to trust the defence of 
ray position to my front line alone, I can send 
French with three regiments, and Meagher with 
his brigade, to the right; everything is so uncer- 
tain, that I think it would be hazardous to do it." 
These two brigades were sent to reinforce Gen- 
eral Porter, as has been observed. 

At 5.25 p. M. I sent the following to General 
Franklin : — 

"Porter is hard pressed; it is not a question 
of prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possi- 
bly maintain your position until dark with two 
brigades ? I have ordered eight regiments of 
Sumner's to support Porter; one brigade of 
Couch's to this place. 

" Heintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sum- 
ner. If possible, send a brigade to support 
Porter. It sliould follow the regiments ordered 
from Sumner." 

At 7.. "5 p. M. the following was sent to General 
Sumner : — 

" If it is possible, send another brigade to re- 
inforce General Smith ; it is said three heavy 
columns of infantry are moving on him." 

From the foregoing despatches it will be seen 
that all disposable troops were sent from the 
right bank of the river to reinforce General Por- 
ter, and that the cor^js commanders were left 
with smaller forces to hold their positions than 
they deemed adequate. To have done more, 
even though Porter's reverse had been prevent- 
ed, would have had the still more disastrous re- 
sult of impo rilling the whole movement across 
the Peninsula, 

The operations of this day proved the numeri- 
cal superiority of tli« enemy, and made it evident 
that while he had a large army on the left bank 
of the Chickahominy, .which had already turned 
our right, and was in position to intercei)t the 
communications with our .depot at the White 
House, he was also ji;i large force between our 
army and Richmojid.; I ,tbere|bi;e effected a 
junction of our forces. 

This might probably have been execiited on 
either side of the Chickahominy ; and if the 
concentration had been etfe^ted on the left Laiik, 
it is possible we might, with our entire -force, 
have defeated the enemy thc-cc; but at that time 
they held the roads leading U) the White House, 
so that it would have been impossible to have 
sent forward supjjly trains in advance of the army 
in that direction, and the guardirjgof tliose trains 
would have seriously embarrassed our operations 
in the battle ; we would have been compelled to 
fight, if (CQReentrated on that baak of the river. 



Moreover, we would at once have been followed 
by the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side 
of the river operating upon our rear, and if, in 
the chances of war, we had been ourselves de- 
feated in the effort, Ave would have been forced 
to fall back to the White House, and probably 
to Fort Monroe ; and, as Ijoth our flanks and 
rear would then have been entirely exposed, our 
entire su[)ply train, if not the greater part of the 
army itself, might have been lost. 

The movements of the enemy showed that 
they expected this, and, as they themselves 
acknowledged, they were prepared to cut off our 
retreat in that direction. 

I therefore concentrated all our forces on the 
right bank of the river. 

During the night of the 2Gth and morning of 
the 27th, all our wagons, heavy guns, &c., were 
gathered there. 

It may be asked, why, after the concentration 
of our forces on the right bank of the Chicka- 
hominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn 
away from Richmond upon the opposite side, I 
did not, instead of striking for James River, 
fifteen miles below that place, at once march 
directly on Richmond. 

It will be remembered that at this juncture the 
enemy was on our rear, and there was every 
reason to believe that he woidd sever our com- 
munications with the supply depot at the White 
House. 

We had on hand but a limited amount of ra- 
tions, and if we had advanced directly on 
Richmond, it wotild have required considerable 
time to carry the strong works around that place, 
during which our men would have bi-en destitute 
of food; and even if Richmond had fallen be- 
fore our arms, the enemy could still have occu- 
pied our sujiply communications between that 
place and the gunboats, and turned the disaster 
into victory. If, on the other hand, the enemy 
had concentrated all his forces at Richmond dur- 
ing the progress of our attack, and we had been 
defeated, we must in all probability have lost our 
trains before reaching the flotilla. 

The battles which continued day after day in 
the progress of our flank movement to the James 
River, with the exception of the one at Gaines's 
Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing 
engageuient of Malvern Hill was the most de- 
cisive of all. 

On the evening of the 27th of Jime I assem- 
bled the corps commanders at my headquarters, 
and informed them of my plan, its reasons, and 
my choice of route and method of execution. 

General Keyes was directed to move his corps, 
with its artillery and baggage, across the White 
Oak Swamp bridge, and to seize strong posi- 
tions on tlie opposite side of the swamp, to cover 
the passage of the other troops and trains. 

This was executed on the 2.St]i by noon. Be- 
fore daybreak on the 28th I went to Savage's 
Station, and remained there during tlie day and 
night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and 
supplies of the army. 

Orders were given to the different command- 
ers to load their wagons with ammunition and 
provisions, and the necessary baggage of the 
officers and men, and to destroy all property 
which could not be transported with the army. 

Orders were also given to leave with those of 



83 



the sick and wounded who could not be trans- 
ported, a proper complement of surgeons and 
attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations 
and medical stores. 

The large herd of 2,500 beef-cattle was, by 
the chief commissary, Colonel Clarke, trans- 
ferred to the James Uiver without loss. 

On t!ie morning of the 28th, wliile General 
Franklin was withdrawing his command from 
Golding's Farm, the enemy opened upon Gen- 
eral Smith's division from Garnett's Hill, from 
the valley above, and from Gaines's Hill on tlie 
opposite side of the Chickahominy ; and, shortly 
afterwards, two Georgia regiments attempted to 
carry the works about to be vacated, but this 
attack was repulsed by the 23d New York and 
the 49tii Pennsylvania volunteers on picket, and 
a section of Mott's battery. 

Porter's corps was moved across White Oak 
Swamp during the day and night, and took up 
positions covering the roads leading from Rich- 
mond towards White Oak Swamp and Long 
Bridge. McCall's division was ordered, on the 
night of the 28th, to move across the swamp and 
take a proper position to assist in covering the 
remaining troops and trains. 

During tlie same night the corps of Sumner 
and Heintzelman, and the divison of Smith, were 
ordered into an interior line, the left resting on 
Keyes's old intrenchments, and curving to the 
right, so as to cover Savage's Station. 

General Siocum's division, of Franklin's 
corps, was ordered to Savage's Station, in re- 
serve. 

They were ordered to hold this position until 
dark of the 29th, in order to cover the with- 
drawal of the trains, and then to fall back across 
the swamp and unite with the remainder of the 
army. 

On the 28th I sent the following to the Secre- 
tary of War : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'• Savage's Station, 

" June 28, 1862—12.20 a. m. 

"I now know the full history of the day. On 
this side of the river (the right bank) we re- 
pulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank 
our men did all that men could do, — all that sol- 
diers could accomplish, — but they were over- 
whelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after 
I brought my last reserves into action. The 
loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will 
prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. 
The sad remnants of my men behave as men. 
Those battalions who fought most bravely, and 
suffered most, are still in the best order. My 
regulars were superb ; and I count upon what 
are left to turn another battle, in company with 
their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I 
twenty thousand (20,000) or even ten thousand, 
(10,000,) fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could 
take Richmond; but I have not a man in re- 
serve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat, and 
save the material oaA personnel of the army. 

" If we have lost the day, we have yet pre- 
served our honor, and no one need blush for the 
army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle 
because my force was too small. 

" I again repeat tliat I am not responsible for 
this , and I say it with the earnestness of a gen- 



eral who feels in his heart tlie loss of every 
brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed 
to-day. 1 still liopc to retrieve our fortunes ; 
but to do this the Government niLi^t view tlie 
matter in the same earnest light that I do. You 
must send me very large reiiit'urcements, and 
send them at once. I shall draw back to this 
side of the Chickahominy, and tlunk I can v/ith- 
draw all our material. Please understand tliat 
in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and 
those tlie best wo have. 

"■ In addition to what I have already said, I 
only wish to say to the President that I think lie 
is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I 
said that my force was too weak. I merely in- 
timated a truth which to-day has been too plainly 
proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of 
ten thousand (10,000) fresh men, I could gain 
the victory to-inorrow. 

" I know that a few thousand more men 
would have changed this battle from a defeat to 
a victory. As it is, the Government must not 
and can not hold me responsible for the result. 

" I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen 
too many dead and wounded comrades to feel 
otherwise than that the Government has not sus- 
tained this army. If you do not do so now, the 
game is lost. 

"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly 
that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other 
persons in Washington. 

" You have done your best to sacrifice this 
army. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN. 

*' Hon. E. M. Stanton." 

The headquarters camp at Savage's Station 
was broken up early on tlie morning of the 29th, 
and moved across White Oak Swamp. As the 
essential part of this day's operation was the 
passage of the trains across the swamp, and 
their protection against attack from the direction 
of Newmarket and Richmond, as well as the 
immediate and secure establishment of our com- 
munications with the gunboats, 1 passed the day 
in examining the ground, directing the posting 
of troops, and securing the uninterrupted move- 
ment of the trains. 

In the afternoon I instructed General Keyes 
to move during the night to James River, and 
occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, 
to secure our extreme left Hank. 

General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow 
him, and prolong the line towards the right. 
The trains were to be pushed on towards James 
River in rear of these corps, and jilaced under 
the protection of the gunboats as they arrived. 

A sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry ear- 
ly this day on the Quaker road showed that his 
efforts were about to be directed towards imped- 
ing our progress to the river, and rendered my 
presence in that quarter necessary. 

BATTLE OF ALLEN's FARM. 

General Sumner vacated his works at Fair 
Oaks on June 29, at dayligiit, and marched Ids 
command to Orchard Station, halting at Allen's 
Field, between Orchard and Savage's Station. 
The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick were 
formed on the right of the railroad facing tow- 



84 



ards Richmond, Richardson holding the right, 
and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzehnan's 
corps. The first line of Richardson's division 
was held by General French, General Caldwell 
supporting' in tiie second. A log building in 
front of Richardson's division was held by Col. 
Brooks with one regiment, (53d Pennsylvania 
volunteers,) with Hazzard's battery on an ele- 
vated piece of ground, a little in rear of Colonel 
Brooks's command. 

At nine a. ji. the enemy commenced a furious 
attack on the right of General Sedgwick, but 
were i-epulsed. The left of General Richardson 
was next attacked, the enemy attempting in 
vain to carry tiie position of Colonel Brooks. 
Captain Hazzard's battery, and Pettet's battery, 
which afterwards replaced it, were served with 
great eifect, while the 5od Pennsylvania kept up 
a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compel- 
ling them at last to retire in disorder. The 
enemy renewed the attack three times, but were 
as often repulsed. 

BATTLE OF SAVAGE's STATION. 

General Slociira arrived at Savage's Station at 
an early hour on the 29th, and was ordered to 
ijross White Oak Swamp and relieve General 
Keyes's corps. As soon as General Keyes was 
thus relieved, he moved towards James River, 
which he reached in safety, with all his artillery 
and baggage, early on the morning of the 30th, 
and took up a position below Turkey Creek 
Bridge. 

During the morning General Franklin heard 
that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, 
was crossing tiie Chickalioininy in large force, 
and advancing towards Savage's Station. He 
communicated this information to General Sum- 
ner, at Allen's Farm, and moved Smith's division 
to Savage's Station. A little after noon General 
Sumner united his forces with tiiose of General 
Franklin, and assumed command. 

1 had ordered General lleintzelman, with his 
corps, to hold the Williamsburg road until dark, 
at a point where were several field-works, and a 
skirt of timber between these works and the 
railroad; but he fell back before night, and 
crossed White Oak Swamp at Brackett's Ford. 

General Sumner in his report of the battle of 
Savage's Station says : — 

" When the enemy appeared on the Williams- 
burg road 1 could not imagine why General 
Heintzelman did not attack him, and not till 
some time afterwards did I learn, to ray utter 
amazement, that General lleintzelman had left 
the field, and retreated with his whole corps 
(about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. 
This defection might have been attended with 
the most disastrous consequences ; and although 
we beat the enemy signally and drove him from 
the field, we should certainly have given him a 
more crushing blow if General lleintzelman liad 
been there with his corps." 

General Heintzelman in his report of the op- 
erations of his corps says : — 

"On the night of the 28th of June I received 
orders to withdraw the troops of my corps from 
the advance position they had taken on tlie 25th 



of June, and to occupy the intrenched lines 
about a mile in the rear. A map was sent me, 
showing the positions General Sumner's and 
General Franklin's corps would occupy. 

" About sunrise the next day our troops slowly 
fell back to the new position, cautiously fo'lowed 
by the enemy, taking possession of our camps as 
soon as we left them. 

" From some misapprehension General Sum- 
ner held a more advanced position than was in- 
dicated on the map furnished me, thus leaving 
a space of about three fourths of a mile between 
the right of his corps and General Smith's divis- 
ion of General Franklin's corps. 

"vVtll A. M. on the 29th the enemy com- 
menced an attack on General Sumner's troops, a 
few shell falling within my lines. Late in the 
forenoon reports reached me that the Rebels 
were in possession of Dr. Trent's house, only a 
mile and a half from Savage's Station. 1 sent 
several cavalry reconnoissances, and finally was 
satisfied of the fact. General Franklin came to 
my headquarters, when I learned of the interval 
between his left and General Sumner's right, in 
which space Dr. Trent's house is; also that the 
Ri'bels bad repaired one of the bridges across 
the ChickaUominy, and were advancing. 

" I rode forward to see General Sumner, and 
met his troops falling back on the Williamsburg 
road through my lines. General Sumner in- 
formed me that he intended to make a stand at 
Savage's Station, and for me to join him to de- 
termine upon tiie position. 

" Tins movement of General Sumner's un- 
covering my rigiit flank, it became necessary for 
me to at once withdraw my troops. * * * 

" I rode back to find General Sumner. After 
some delay, from the mass of troops in the 
fieUl, 1 found him, and learned that the course 
of action iiad been determined on; sol returned 
to give tiie necessary orders for the destruction 
of the railroad cars, ammunition, and provisions 
still remaining on tlie ground. 

'' Tlie wiu)le open space near Savage's Station 
was crowded witli troops, — more than I sujjposed 
could be brougiit into action judiciously. An 
.lid from the commanding general had in the 
morning reported to me to point out a road 
across tlie VVIiite Oak Swamp, starting from the 
left of General Kearney's position and leading 
by Brackett's Ford. ***** 

" The advance of the column reached the 
Cliarles City road at 6^ p. m., and the rear at 10 
p. M. without accident." 

The orders given by me to Generals Sumner, 
Heintzelman, and Franklin, were to hold the 
positions assigned them until dark. As stated 
by General lleintzelman. General Sumner did 
not occupy the designated position; but, as he 
was the senior officer present on that side of the 
White Oak Swamp, he may have thought that 
the movements of the enemy justified a devia- 
tion from the letter of the orders. It appears from 
his report that he assumed command of all the 
troops near Savage's Station, and determined to 
resist the enemy there ; and that he gave Gen- 



85 



eral Hemtzclman orders to hold the same posi- 
tion as I had assigned him. 

Tlie aid seit by me to General Heintzelnian 
to point out tlie road across the swamp was to 
guide him in retiiing after dark. 

On reaching Savage's Station, Sumner's and 
Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of 
battle in the large open field to the left of the 
railroad, the left resting on the edge of the 
woods, and the right extending down to the rail- 
road. General Brooks, with his brigade, held 
the wood to the left of the field, where he did 
excellent service, receiving a wound, but retain- 
ing his command. 

General Hancock's brigade was thrown into 
the woods on the right and front. At 4 r. m. 
the enemy commenced his attack in large force 
by the Williamsburg road. It was gallantly met 
by General Burns's brigade, supported and re- 
inforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by 
the New York G9th, Hazzard's and Pettet's bat- 
teries again doing good service. Osborn's and 
Bramhall's batteries also took part efiectively in 
this action, which was continued with great 
obstinacy until between 8 and t) p. m., when the 
enemy were driven from the field. 

Immediately after the battle the orders were 
repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross 
White Oak Swamp, which was accomplished 
during the night in good order. By midnight 
all tlie troops were on the road to White Oak 
Swamp bridge, General French, with liis brigade, 
acting as rear guard, and at 5 a. m. on the 30th 
all had crossed and the bridge was destroyed. 

On the afternoon of the 29th I gave to the 
corps commanders their instructions for the op- 
erations of the following day. As stated before. 
Porter's corps was to move forward to James 
lliver, and with the corps of General Keyes, to 
occupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, on a 
line perpendicular to the river, thus covering the 
Charles City road to Richmond, opening commu- 
nication with the gunboats, and covering the pas- 
sage of the supply trains, which were pushed 
forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's 
plantation. The remaining corps were pressed 
onward, and posted so as to guard the ajiproach- 
es from Richmond, as well as the crossings of 
the White Oak Swamp, over which the army had 
passed. General Franklin was ordered to hold 
the passage of Wlute Oak Swamp bridge, and 
cover the withdrawal of the trains from that point. 
His command consisted of his own corps, with 
General Richardson's division and General Na- 
glee's brigade placed under his orders for the oc- 
casion. General Slocum's division was on the 
right of the Charles City road. 

On the moi'ning of the 30th I again gave to the 
corps commanders witliin reach instructions for 
posting their troops. I found that, notwithstand- 
ing all the efibrts of my personal staff and other 
officers, the roads were blocked by wagons, and 
there was great difficulty in keeping the trains in 
motion. 

The engineer officers whom I had sent forward 
on the 28th to reconnoitre the roads had neither 
returned nor sent me any reports or guides. 
Generals Keyes and Porter had been delayed, — 
one by losing the road, and the other by repair- 
ing an old load, — and had not been able to send 
any information. We then knew of but one road 



for the movement of the troops and our immense 
trains. 

It was therefore necessary to post the troops 
in advance of this road as well as our limited 
knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to 
cover the movement of the trains in the rear. 

I then examined the whole line from the 
swamp to tlie left, giving final instructions for 
the posting of the troops and tlu' ()!)st;-nctions of 
the roads toward Richmond, and all corps com- 
manders were directed to hold their positions un- 
til the trains had passed, after which a more con- 
centrated position was to be taken up near James 
River. 

Our force was too small to occupy and hold the 
entire line from the White Oak Swninp to the 
river, exposed as it was to be taken in reverse by 
a movement across the lower part of the swamp, 
or across the Chickahominy, below the swamp. 
Moreover the troops were then greatly exhaust- 
ed, and required rest in a more secure position. 

I extended my examinations of the country as 
far as Haxall's. looking at all the approaches to 
Malvern, which position I perceived to be the 
key to our operations in this quarter, and was 
thus enabled to expedite very considerably the 
passage of the trains, and to rectify the positions 
of the troops. 

Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the 
different corps commanders to inform them what 
I had done on the left, and to bring me informa- 
tion of the condition of affairs on the right. I re- 
turned from Malvern to Haxall's and having 
made arrangements for instant communication 
from Malvern by signals, went on board of Cap- 
tain Rodgers's gunboat, lying near, to confer 
with him in reference to the condition of our sup- 
ply vessels, and the state of things on the river. 
It was his opinion that it would be necessary for 
the army to fall back to a position below City 
Point, as the channel there was so near the 
southern shore that it would not be possible to 
bring up the transports, should the enemy occu- 
py it. Harrison's Landing was, in his opinion, 
the nearest suitable point. Upon the termina- 
tion of this interview I returned to Malvern Hill, 
and remained there until shortly before daylight. 

BATTLE OF " NELSON's FARaM," OR " GLENDALE." 

On the morning of the 30tli General Sumner 
was ordered to march with Sedgwick's division 
to Glendale ( "Nelson's Farm.") General Mc- 
Call's division ( Pennsylvania reserves ) was 
halted during the morning on the New Market 
road, just in advance of the point where the road 
turns off to Quaker Church. This line was 
formed perpendicularly to the New Market road, 
with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on 
the left, and Reynolds's l)rigade, commanded by 
Colonel S. G. Simmons, of the 5th Pennsylva- 
nia, in reserve ; Randall's regular battery on the 
right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the 
centre, and Dietrich's and Kanerhun's batteries 
of the artillery reserve on the left, — all in front 
of the infantry line. The country in General 
McCall's fi'ont was an open field, intersected 
towards the right by the New Market road, and 
a small strip of timber jiarallel to it ; the open 
front was about 800 yards, its depth about 1,000 
yards. 

On the morning of the 30th General Heintzel- 



86 



man ordered the bridge at Bracketfs Ford to be 
destroyed, and trees to be felled across that road 
and tlie Charles City road. General Slocum's 
division was to extend to the Charles City road. 
General Kearney's left to connect with General 
Slocum's left. General MeCall's position was to 
the left of the Long Bridge road, in connection 
with General Kearney's left. General Hooker 
was on the left of General McCall. Between 12 
and 1 o'clock the enemy opened a fierce cannon- 
ade upon the divisions of Smith and Richardson, 
and Naglee's brigade, at White Oak Swamp 
bridge. This artillery fire was continued by the 
enemy through the day, and he crossed some in- 
fantry below our position. Ricliard^on's division 
Buffered severely. Captain Ayres directed our 
artillery witli great etl'ect. Captain Hazzard's 
battery, after losing many cannoneers, and Cap- 
tain Hazzard being mortally wounded, was com- 
pelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's bat- 
tery, which partially silenced the enemy's guns. 

General Franklin lield his position until after 
dark, repeated!}' driving back the enemy in their 
attempts to cross the White Oak Swamp. 

At two o'clock in the day the enemy were re- 
ported advancing in force by the Cliarles City 
road, and at half past two o'clock the attack was 
made down the road on General Slocum's left, 
but was checked by his artillery. After tliis the 
enemy, in large force, comprising the divisions 
of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked General 
McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, 
was compelled to retire. 

General McCall, in his report of the battle, 
Bays : — 

****** 

" About half past two my pickets were driven 
in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing, 
without loss on our part. 

"At three o'clock the enemy sent forward a 
regiment on the left centre and another on the 
right centre to feel for a weak point. They were 
under cover of a shower of shells, and boldly ad- 
vanced, but were both driven back, — on the left 
by the 12th regiment, and on the right by the 7th 
regiment. 

"For nearly two hours the battle raged hotly 
here." * * * " At last the ene- 

my was compelled to retire before the well-di- 
rected musketry fire of the reserves. The Ger- 
man batteries were driven to the rear, but I rode 
up and sent them l)ack. It was, however, of lit- 
tle avail, and they were soon after abandoned by 
the cannoneers." * * * * 

" The batteries in front of the centre were 
boldly charged upon, but the enemy was speedily 
forced back." * * * * 

" Soon after this a most determined charge 
was made on llandall's battery by a full brigade, 
advancing in wedge shape, without order, but in 
perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges 
had, I have . stated, been previously made on 
Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single regi- 
ments without success, they having recoiled be- 
fore tlie storm of canister hurled against them. 
A like result was anticipated by Randall's battery, 
and the 4th regiment was requested not to fire 
until the battery had done with them. 

" Its gallant connnander did not doul)t his 
ability to repel the attack, and his guns did, in- 
deed, mow down the advancing host, but still 



the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in 
upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns. 

" It was a perfect torrent of men, and they 
were in his battery before the guns could be re- 
moved. Two guns that were, indeed success- 
fully limbered, had their horses killed and 
wounded and were overturned on the spot, and 
the enemy, dashing past, drove the greater part 
of the 4tli regiment before them. 

" The left company, (B,) nevertheless, stood 
its ground, with its captain, Fred. A. Conrad, as 
did likewise, certain men of other companies. 
I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored 
to check them, but with only partial success." 
******** 

" There was no running. But my division, 
reduced by the previous battles to less than six 
thousand, (G,000,) had to contend with the divis- 
ions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered 
two of the strongest and best among many of 
the Confederate army, numbering that day 18,000 
or 20,000 men, and it was reluctantly compelled 
to give way before heavier force accumulated 
upon them." 

******** 

"General Heintzelman states that about 5 
o'clock p. M. General MeCall's division was at- 
tacked in large force, evidently the principal at- 
tack ; that in less than an hour the division gave 
way, and adds: "General Hooker being on his 
left, by moving to his right, repulsed the Rebels 
in the handsomest manner with great slaughter. 
General Sumner, who was with General Sedg- 
wick in MeCall's rear, also greatly aided with 
his artillery and infantry in driving back the 
enemy. They now renewed their attack with 
vigor on General Kearney's left, and were again 
repulsed with heavy loss." 

*******iii 

" Tliis attack commenced about 4 p. m., and 
was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost 
determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's 
battery, directed with great precision, firing 
double charges, swept them back. The whole 
open space, two hundred paces wide, was filled 
with the enemy; each repulse brouglit fresh 
troops. The third attack was only repulsed by 
the rapid volleys and determined charge of the 
63d Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the 
37th New York volunteers." 

General MeCall's troops soon began to emerge 
from the woods into the open field. Several 
batteries were in position and began to fire into 
the woods over the heads of our men in front. 
Captain DeRussy's battery was placed on the 
right of General Sumner's artillery with orders 
to shell the Avoods. General Burns's brigade was 
then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon 
drove him back; other troops began to return 
from the White Oak Swamp. Late in the day, 
at the call of General Kearney, General Tay- 
lor's first New Jersey brigade, Slocum's division, 
was sent to occupy a portion of General Me- 
Call's deserted position, a battery accompanying 
the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy, 
who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting 
themselves with keeping up a desultory filing 
till late at night. Between 12 and 1 o'clock at 
night General Heintzelman commenced to with- 
draw his corps, and soon after daylight both of 



87 



his divisions, with General Slocum's division 
and a portion of General Sumner's command, 
reached Malvern Hill. 

On the morning of the 30th General Sumner, 
in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to 
Glendale, and upon a call from General Frank- 
lin for reinforcements, sent him two brigades, 
which returned in time to participate and render 
good service in the battle near Glendale. Gen- 
eral Sumner says of this battle, — 

"The battle of Glendale was the most severe 
action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 
o'clock p. M. the action commenced, and after a 
furious contest, lasting till after dai'k, the enemy 
was routed at all points and driven from the 
field." 

The rear of the supply trains and the reserve 
artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about 
4 p. M. At about this time the enemy began to 
appear in General Porter's front, and at 5 o'clock 
advanced in large force against his left flank, 
posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, 
with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, 
while with his infantry and some artillery he at- 
tacked Colonel \Va- -en's brigade. A concentrat- 
ed fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear 
on the enemy, Avhich, with the infantry fire of 
Colonel Warren's command, compelled him to 
retreat, leaving two guns in tlie hands of Colonel 
Warren. The gunboats rendered most efficient 
aid at this time, and heliied to drive back the 
enemy. 

It was very late at night before my aids re- 
turned to give me the results of the day's fighting 
along the whole line, and the true position of 
affairs. While waiting to hear from General 
Franklin, before semling orders to Generals 
Sumner and Heintzelman, I received a message 
from the latter that General Franklin was fall- 
ing back; whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn, 
of my staff, with orders to verify this, and if it 
were true, to order in Generals Sumner and 
Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far 
when he met two officers sent from General 
Franklin's headquarters with the information 
that he was falling back. Orders were then sent 
to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman to fell baclt 
also, and definite instructions were given as to 
the movement which was to commence on the 
right. Tlie orders met these troops already en 
route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent 
to General Franklin as to the route he was to 
follow. 

General Barnard then received full instruc- 
tions for posting the troops as they arrived. 

I then returned to Haxall's and again left for 
Malvern soon after daybreak. Accompanied by 
several general officers, I once more made the 
entire circuit of the position, and then returned 
to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rod- 
gers to select the final location for the army 
and its depots. I returned to Malvern before 
the serious fighting commenced, and after riding 
along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel 
anxious about the right, remained in that vi- 
cinity. 

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 

The position selected for resisting the further 
advance of the enemy on the 1st of July was 
with the left and centre of our lines resting 



on Malvern Hill, while the right curved back- 
wards through a wooded country towards 
a point below Haxall's, on James River. Mal- 
vern Hill is an elevated plateau about a mile 
and a half by three fourths of a mile in area, 
well cleared of timber, and with several con- 
verging roads running over it. In front are 
numerous defensible ravines, and the ground 
slopes gradually toward the north and east to 
the woodland, giving clear ranges for artillery 
in those directions. Towards tlic northwest the 
plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine 
which extends to James River. From the posi- 
tion of the enemy his most obvious lines of at- 
tack would come from the direction of Ricli- 
mond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost 
of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, 
therefore, the lines were strengthened by mass- 
ing the troops and collecting the principal part 
of the artillery. Porter's corps held tho left of 
the line, (Sykes's division on the left, Morell's 
on the right,) with the artillery of his two divis- 
ions advantageously posted, and the artillery of 
the reserve so disposed on the high ground that 
a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be 
brought to bear on any i)oint in his front or left. 
Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, suc- 
ceeded in getting ten of his siege guns in posi- 
tion on the higliest point of the hill. 

Couch's division was placed on the right of 
Porter ; next came Kearney and Hooker ; next 
Sedgwick and Richardson ; next Smith and Slo- 
cum; then the remainder of Keyes's corps, ex- 
tending by a backwood curve nearly to the river. 
The Pennsylvania reserve corps was held in re- 
serve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's 
position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown 
to the left on the low ground to protect that fiank 
from any movement direct from the Richmond 
road. The line was very strong along the whole 
front of the open plateau, but from thence to the 
extreme right the troops were more deployed. 
This formation was imperative, as an attack 
would probably be made upon our left. The 
right was rendered as secure as possible by slash- 
ing the timber and by barricading the roads. 
Commodore Rodgers, commanding the flotilla 
on James River, placed his gunboats so as to 
protect our flank, and to command the approaches 
from Richmond. 

Between 9 and 10 a. m. the enemy commenced 
feeling along our whole left wing, witli his artil- 
lery and sldrmishers, as far to the right as Hook- 
er's division. 

About 2 o'clock a column of the enemy was 
observed moving towards our right, within the 
skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's corps, 
but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrange- 
ments were at once made to meet the anticipated 
attack in that quarter, but, though the column 
was long, occupying more than two hours in 
passing, it disappeared, and was not again heard 
of. The presumption is, that it retired by the 
rear, and participated in the attack afterwards 
made on our left. 

About 3 p. M. a heavy fire of artillery opened 
on Kearney's left and Couch's division, speedily 
followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on 
Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with 
good effect by our own, and the infantry of 
Couch's division remained lying on the ground 



until the advancing column was within short 
musliet range, when they sprang to their feet 
and poured in a deadly volley which entirely 
broke the attacking force and drove them in dis- 
order back over their own ground. This advan- 
tage was followed up until we had advanced the 
right of our line some seven or eight hundred 
yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, 
giving us a stronger position and a better fire. 

Sluirtly after four o'clock the firing ceased 
along the whole front, but no disposition was 
evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw 
from the field. Caldwell's brigade, having been 
detached from Richardson's division, was station- 
ed upon Couch's right by General Porter, to 
whom he had been ordered to report. The 
whole line was surveyed by the general, and 
everytliing held in readiness to meet the coming 
attack. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly 
opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole 
strength of his artillery, and at once began 
pushing forward his columns of attack to carry 
the hill. Brigade after brigade, formed under 
cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the 
open sjjace and charge our batteries, but the 
heavy fire of our guns, Avith the cool and steady 
volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them 
reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground 
with their dead and wounded. In several in- 
stances our infantry withheld their fire until the 
attacking column, which rushed through the 
storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had 
reached within a few yards of our lines. They 
then poured in a single volley and dashed for- 
ward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and 
colors, and driving the routed columns in confu- 
sion from the field. 

About 7 o'clock, as fresh troops were accu- 
mulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher 
and Sickles were sent with their brigades, as 
soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw 
any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's 
troops, to reinforce that part of the line and hold 
the position. These brigades relieved such regi- 
ments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as 
had expended their ammunition, and batteries 
from the reserve were pushed forward to replace 
those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the 
enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position 
so tenaciously defended ; but, desjjite his vastly 
superior numbers, his repeated and desperate 
attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and dark- 
ness ended the battle of Malvern Hill, tliough it 
was not until after 9 o'clock that the artillery 
ceased its fire. 

During the whole battle Commodore Rodgers 
added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy, 
by throwing shell among liis reserves and 
advancing columns. 

As the army in its movement from the Chicka- 
hominA' to Harrison's Landing was continually 
occupied in marching by night and fighting by 
day, its commanders found no time or ojiportunity 
for collecting data which Avould enable them to 
give exact returns of casualties in each engage- 
ment. The aggregate of our entire losses from 
the 2(ith of June to the 1st of July, inclusive, 
was ascertained, after arriving at Harrison's 
I anding, to be as follows : — 



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Although the result of the battle of Malvern 
was a complete victory, it was, nevertheless, 
necessary to fall l)ack still further, in order to 
reach a point where our supi)lies could be brought 
to us with certainty. As before stated, in the 
opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the 
gunboat fiotilla, this could only be done below 
City Point; concurring in iiis opinion, I selected 
Harrison's Bar as tlie new position of the army. 
Tlie exhaustiiin of our sui)]ilies of food, forage, 
and ammunition, made it imperative to reach 
the transports immediately. 

The greater portion of the transportation of 
the army having been started for Harrison's 
Landing during tlie niglit of the 30tli of June 
and 1st of July, the order for the movement of 
the troojis was at once issued upon the final re- 
pulse of the enemy at Malv<.-rn Hill. Tiie order 
])rescribcd a movement by the left and rear, 
General Keyes's corps to cover the manoeuvre. 
It was not carried out in detail as regards the 
divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat 
blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and 
Couch were not able to move out as early as liad 
been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary 
to place a rear guard between his command and 
the enemy. Colonel Averill, of the 3d Penn- 
sj'lvania cavahy, was intrusted with this delicate 
duty. He had under his command his own regi- 
ment and Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan's l)rigade 
of regular infantry and one battery. By a ju- 
dicious use of the resources at his command he 
deceived the enemy so as to cover the witlidrawal 
of the left wing without being attacked, remain- 



89 



ing himself on the previous day's battle-field 
until about 7 o'clock of the 2d of July. Mean- 
time General Keyes, having received liis orders, 
coininenced vigorous preparations for covei-ing 
llie movement of the entire army and protecting 
the trains. It being evident that the immense 
number of wagons and artillery carriages per- 
taining to tlic army could not move witli celerity 
along a single road. General Keyes took advan- 
tage of every accident of the ground to open new- 
avenues and to facilitate the movement. He 
made preparations for obstructing the roads, 
after the army had passed, so as to prevent any 
rajiid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey's 
Bridge, on the main road, and rendering other 
roads and approaches temporarily impassable bj' 
felling trees across them. He kept the trains 
well closed up, and directed the marcli so that 
the troops could move on each side of the roads, 
not obstructing the passage, but being in good 
position to repel an attack from any quarter. 
His dispositions were so successful that, to use 
liis own words, " I do not think more vehicles 
or more public property were abandoned on the 
march from Turkey Bridge than would have 
been left, in the same state of the roads, if the 
army had been moving towards the enemy in- 
stead of away from him. And when it is uader- 
12 



stood that the carriages and teams belonging to 
this army, streched out in one line, would ex- 
tend not far from forty miles, the enert;y and 
caution necessary for tlieir safe witlidrawal from 
the presence of an enemy, vastly superior in 
numbers, will be appreciated." The last of tlie 
wagons did not reacli the site selected at Har- 
rison's Bar until after dark on the od of July, 
and the rear guard did not move into their cauip 
until everything was secure. The enemy fol- 
lowed up with a small force, and on the 3d threw 
a few shells at the rear guard, but were quickly 
dispersed by our batteries and the fire of the 
gunboats. 

Great credit must be awarded to General 
Keyes for the skill and energy which character- 
ized his performance of the important and deli- 
cate duties intrusted to his charge. 

High praise is also duo to the officers and men 
of the 1st Coimecticut artillery, Colonel Tyler, 
for the manner in whicli they withdrew all the 
heavy guns during tlie seven days, and from 
Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of 
the roads the teams could not be brought within 
a couple of miles of the position, but these en- 
ergetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for 
that distance, leaving nothing behind. 



90 



THIRD PERIOD. 



On the 1st of July I received the following 
from the President : — 

" Washington, July 1, 1862—3.30 p, M. 

" It is impossible to reinforce you for your 
present emergency. If we had a million of men 
we could not get them to you in time. We have 
not, 'the men to send. If you are not strong 
enough to face the enemy, you must find a place 
of security, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain 
your ground if you can, but save the army at all 
events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. 
We still have strength enough in the country, 
and will bring it out. A. LINCOLN. 

"Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

In a despatch from the President to me, on 
2d of July, he says; — 

" If you think you are not strong enough to 
take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. 
Try just now to save the army, material and 
personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offen- 
sive again as fast as I can. The governors of 
eighteen States offer me a new levy of three 
hundred thousand, which I accept." 

On the 3d of July the following kind despatch 
was received from the President. 
[Extract.] 

" Washington, July 3, 1862 — 3 p. m. 

" Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I 

am satisfied that yourself, officers and men, have 

done the best you could. All accounts say better 

fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks 

for it. 

• ••♦**• 

"A. LINCOLN. 
" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

On the 4th I sent the following to the Presi- 
dent : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 1862. 

" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 
of your despatch of the 2d instant. 

" I shall make a stand at this place, and en- 
deavor to give my men the repose they so much 
require. 

" After sending my communication on Tues- 
day, the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and 
a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night ; they 
were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their 
attack succeeded, the consequences would have 
been disastrous in the extreme. This closed 
the hard fighting which had continued from the 
afternoon of the 20th ultimo, in a daily series of 
engagements wholly unparalleled on tliis conti- 



nent for determination and slaughter on both 
sides. 

" The mutual loss in killed and wounded is 
enormous. That of the enemy certainly great- 
est. On Tuesday morning, the 1st, our army 
commenced its movement from Haxall's to this 
point, our line of defence there being too ex- 
tended to be maintained by our weakened forces. 
Our train was immense, and about 4 p. M. on the 
2d a heavy storm of rain began, which continued 
during the entire day and until the ftrenoon of 
yesterday. 

*' The roads became horrible. Troops, artil- 
lery, and wagons moved on steadily, and our 
whole army, men and material, was finally 
brought safe into this camp. 

" The last of the wagons reached here at noon 
yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but 
the army preserved its morale, and would have 
repelled any attack which the enemy was in con- 
dition to make. 

" We now occupy a fine of heights, about two 
miles from the James, a plain extending from 
there to the river; our front is about three miles 
long ; these heights command our wliole position, 
and must be maintained. The gunboats can ren- 
der valuable support upon both flanks. If the 
enemy attack us in front we must hold our 
ground as we best may, and at whatever cost. 

"Our positions can be carried only by over- 
whelming numbers. The sjjivit of the army is 
excellent ; stragglers are finding their regiments, 
and the soldiers exhibit the test results of disci- 
pline. Our position is by no means impregnable, 
especially as a morass extends on this side of the 
high ground from our centre to the James on 
our right. The enemy may attack in vast num- 
bers, and if so, our front will he the scene of a 
desperate battle, which, if lost, will be decisive. 
Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded, 
and prisoners. 

" I cannot now approximate to any statement 
of our losses, but we were not beaten in any con- 
flict. 

" The enemy were unable, by their utmost 
efforts, to drive us from any field. Never did 
such a cliange of bise, involving a retrograde 
movement, and under incessant attacks from a 
most determined and vastly more numerous foe, 
partake so little of disorder. We have lost no 
guns except 25 on the field of battle, 21 of which 
were lost by the giving way of McCall's division, 
under the onset of superior numliers. 

"Our commuuications by the James River are 
not secure. There are points where the enemy 
can establish themselves with cannon or musketry 
and command the river, and where it is not cer- 
tam that our gunboats can drive them out. In 



91 



case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will 
still make every eifort to preserve, at least, the per- 
sonnel of the army, and the events of the last few 
days leave no question that the troojis will do all 
that their country can ask. Send such rein- 
forcements as you can ; I will do what I can. 
We are shippinon oiu* wounded and sick and land- 
ing supplies. The Navy Department should co- 
operate with us to the extent of its resources. 
Captain Rogers is doing all in his power in the 
kindest and most efficient manner. 

" When a'll the circumstances of the case are 
known, it will be acknowledged by all competent 
judges that the movement just completed by this 
army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Under 
the most difficult circumstances we have pre- 
served our trains, our guns, oiu- material, and, 
above all, our honor, 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-Gcueral, 

" Tlie President." 

To which I received the following reply : — 

" Washington, July 5, 1862—9 a. m. 
"A thousand thanks for the relief your two 
despatches, of twelve and one P. M. yesterday, 
gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of 
yourself and officers and men is, and forever will 
bb, appreciated. 

" If you can hold your present position we 
shall hive the enemy yet. 

"A. LINCOLN. 
" Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan, 

" Commanding Ai-my of the Potomac." 

The following letters were received from His 
Excellency the President : — 

" War Department, 
" Washington City, 1). C, July 4, 1862. 
" I understand your position as stated in your 
letter, and by General Marcy. To reinforce 
you so as to enable you to resume the offensive 
within a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. 
In addition to that arrived and now arriving from 
the Potomac, (about ten thousand men, I suj)- 
pose.) and about ten thousand, I hope, you will 
have from Burnside very soon, and about five 
thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not see 
how I can send you another man within a montli. 
Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the 
present, must be your only care. Save the army, 
first, where you are, if you can, and, secondly, 
by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, 
must be the judge as to which )ou will attempt, 
and of the means for effecting it I but give it as 
my opinion, that with the aid of the gunboats 
and the reinforcements mentioned above, you 
can hold your present position ; ijrovided, and so 
long as you can keep the James River open below 
you. If you are not tolerably confident you can 
keep the James River open, you had better re- 
move as soon as possible. I do not remember 
that you have expressed any apprehension as to 
the danger of having your communication cut on 



the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can 
have escajjcd your attention. 
" Yours, very trulv, 

"A. LINCOLN. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

" P. S.— If at any time you feel able to take 
the offensive, you are not restrained from doing 
so. A. L." 

The following telegram was sent on the 7th: — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Berkeley, July, 7, 1862 — BMO a. m. 
" As boat is starting, I have only time to ac- 
knowledge receipt of despatch by General Marcy. 
Enemy have not attacked. My position is very 
strong, and daily becoming more so. If not at- 
tacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. I have 
been anxious about my commu7iications. Had 
long consultation about it with Flag-Otiicer 
Goldsborougli last night ; he is confident he can 
keej) river open. He should have al! gunboats 
possible. Will see him again this morning. My 
men in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it 
again. 

" Alarm yourself as little as possil^le about me, 
and don't lose confidence in this arm v. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Maj or- General. 
" A. Lincoln, President." 

While General-in-Chief, and directing the op- 
erations of all our armies in the field, I had be- 
come deeply impressed with the importance of 
adopting and carrying out certain views regarding 
the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, 
were essential to its olijects and its success. 

During an active campaign of three months in 
the enemy's country, these were so fully con- 
firmed that I conceived it a duty, in the critical 
position we then occupied, not to withhold a can- 
did expression of the more important of these 
views from the Commander- in Cnief, whom the 
Constitution places at the head cf the armies 
and navies, as well as of the government of the 
nation. 

The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. 
Lincoln : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 

7, 1862. 
" Mr. President : You have been fully in- 
formed that the Rebel army is in the front, with 
the ])urpose of overwhelming tis by attacking our 
])osition or reducing us by blocking our river 
communications. I cannot but regard our condi- 
tion as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of 
possible contingencies to lay before your Excel- 
lency, for your jjrivate consideration, my general 
views concerning the existing state of the Rebel- 
lion, although they do not strictly relate to the 
situation of this army, or strictly come within the 
scope of my official duties. These views amount 
to convictions, and are deeply im])ressed upon 
my mind and heart. Our cause must never he 



92 



abandoned ; it is the cause of free institutions 
and self-goveriiment. The Constitution and the 
Union must be i)reservccl, whatever may be the 
cost in time, treasure, and blood. If Secession is 
successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be 
seen in the future. Let neitlier military disaster, 
IKjliticul faction, nor foreign war, shake your set- 
lied purpose to enforce the equal operation of the 
laws of the United States upon the peoj)le of 
every State. 

" The time has come when the Government 
must determine u])Oii a civil and militury pol.cy, 
covering the whole ground of our national trou- 
ble. 

" The res])onsibility of determining, declaring, 
and supporting such civil and military policy, and 
of directing the whole course of national af- 
fairs in regard to the Rebellion, must now be as- 
sumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be 
lost. The Constitution gives you power, even for 
the present terrible exigency. 

" This Rebellion has assumed the character of 
a war; as such it should be regarded, and it 
should be conducted ujjon the highest principles 
known to Christian civilization. It should not be 
a war looking to the subjugation of tiie people of 
any State, in any event. It should not be at all 
a war upon population, but against armed forces 
and political organizations. Neither confiscation 
of property, political executions of persons, terri- 
torial organization of States, or forcible abolition 
of slavery, should be contemplated for a mo- 
ment, 

'• In prosecuting the war, all private property 
and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, 
subject only to the necessity of military opera- 
tions ; all private property taken for military use 
should be jjaid or receip ed for ; pillage and 
waste should be treated as high crimes ; all un- 
necessary trespass sternly ])rohibited, and offen- 
sive demeanor by the military towards citizens 
promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not 
be tolerated, except in places where active hos- 
tilities exist ; and oaths, not required by enict- 
ments, constitutionally made, should be neither 
demanded nor received. 

" Military government should be confined to 
the preservation of public order and the protec- 
tion of political right. Military power should 
not be allowed to interfere with the relations of 
servitude, either by supporting or impairing the 
authority of the master, except for repressing 
disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband, 
under the act of Congress, seeking military pro- 
tection, should receive it. The right of the Gov- 
ernment to appropriate permanently to its own 
service claims to slave labor should be asserted, 
and the right of the owner to compensation 
therefor should be recognized. This principle 
might be extended, upon grounds of military 
necessity and security, to all the slaves of a par- 
ticular State, thus working manumission in such 
State ; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Vir- 
ginia, also, and possibly even in Maryland, the 
expediency of such a measure is only a question 



of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, 
and ])ervaded by the influences of Christianity 
and freedom, would receive the support of almost 
all truly loval men, would deeply im])ress the 
Rebel misses and all foreign natioi.s, and it might 
be humblv hoped that it would commend itself to 
the fovor of the Almighty. 

" Unless the principles governing the future 
conduct of our struggle shall be made known 
and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces 
will be almost hopeless. A declaraiion of radi- 
cal views, especiall" upon slavery, will rapidly 
disintegrate our present armies. The policy of 
the Government must be supported by concen- 
trations of military ])ower. The national forces 
should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of 
occupation, and numerous armies, but should be 
mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear 
upon the armies of the Confederate States. 
Those armies thornighly defeated, the political 
structure which they support would soon cease 
to exist. 

" In carrying out any system of policy which 
j-.)U may form, you will require a conimauder-in- 
chief of the army, one who possesses your confi- 
dence, understands your views, and who is com- 
petent to execute your orders, by directing the 
military forces of the nation to the accomplish- 
ment of the objects by you proposed. I do not 
ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve 
you in such position as you may assign me, and 
i will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate 
served superior. 

" I may be on the brink of eternity ; and as I 
hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written 
this letter with sincerity towards you and from 
love for my countr}'. 

" Very respectfullv, your obedient servant, 
" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
"Major- General Com mandlag. 
" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President" 

I telegi-aphed the President on the 11th as 
follows : — 

" IIeadquaktee :; Army of the Potomac, 
''Berkeley, July 11, 1862—3 P. M. 

« « * * * 

" "We are very strong here now, so far as de- 
fensive is concerned. Hope you will soon make 
us strong en ugh to advance and try it again. 
All in fine spirits. 

•♦ GEORGE B. McCLELLAN", 
" Mqjor-General Commanding. 
"A. Lincoln, President" 

These telegrams were sent on the 12th, I7th, 
and 18th, to his Excellency the President : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
''Berkeley, July 12, 1862—7.15 A. M. 

"Hill and Longstreet crossed into New Kent 
county, via Long Bridge. I am still ignorant 
what road they afterwards took, but will know 
shortly. 

" Nothing else of interest since last despatch. 



93 



Rair cea?ed, and everything quiet. Men resting 
well, but beginning to be impatient for another 
fight. 

" I am more and more convinced that this 
army ought not to be withdrawn from here, but 
promptly reinforced and thrown again upon 
Bichmond. IF we have a little more than half a 
chance we can take it. 

'' I dread the effects of any retreat upon the 
morale of the men. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
" Majoi'- General Commanding. 

" A. Lincoln, President." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Berkeley, July 17, 1862—8 a. m. 
" I have consulted fully with General Burnside, 
and -t'ould commend to your favorable considera- 
tion the general's plan for bringing (7) seven ad- 
ditional regiments from North Carolina, by leav- 
ing Newbern to the care of the gunboats. It 
ap])ears manifestly to be our policy to concentrate 
here everything we can possibly spare from less 
important points, to make sure of crushing the 
enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be 
the most important point in Rebeldom. Nothing 
should be left to chance here. I would recom- 
mend that General Burnside, with all his troops, 
be ordered to this army, to enable it to assume 
the ofEensive as soon as possible. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
'■'■Major- General Commanding. 
" A. Lincoln, President." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
''Berkeley, July 18, 1862—8 A. M. 

" No change worth reporting in the state of 
affiiirs. Some (20,000) twenty thousand to 
(25,000) twenty-five thousand of the enemy at 
Petersburg, and others thence to Richmond. 

" Those at Petersburg say they are a part of 
Beauregard's army. New troops ari'iving via 
Petersburg. Am anxious to have determination 
of Government, that no time may be lost in 
preparing for it. Hours are very precious now, 
and perfect unity of action necessary. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-General Commanding. 

"A. Lincoln, President." 

The following was telegraphed to General Hal- 
leck on the 28th : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Berkeley, July 28, 1862.-8 A. M. 

" Nothing especially new except corroboration 
of reports that reinforcements reaching Rich- 
mond from south. It is not confirmed that any 
of Bragg's troops are yet here. My opinion is 
more and more firm that here is the defence of 
Washington, and that I should be at once rein- 
foi'ced by all available troops to enable me to ad- 
vance. Retreat would be disasti-ous to the army 
and the cause. I am confident of that. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

'* Major-General. 

" Major-General H. W. Halleck. 
" Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C." 



On the 30t,h I sent the following to the gen- 
eral-in-chief : — 

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Berkeley, July 30, 1862 — 7 A. M. 

*•♦»»•» 

" I hope that it may soon be decided what is 
to be done by this army, and thit the decision 
may be to reinforce it at once. We are losino- 
much valuable time, and that at a monent when 
energy and decision are sadh- ncedt'd. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" Major-General H. W. ITallkck. 
"Commanding U. 8. Army, Washington, D. C." 

About half an hour after midnight, on the 
morning of August 1, the enemy brought some 
light batteries to Coggin's Point and the Coles 
House, on the right bank of James River, directly 
opposite Harrison's Landing, and opened a heavy 
fire upon our shipping and encam|)nients. It was 
continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, when 
they were driven back by the fire of our guns ; 
this affair was reported in the following despatch. 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Berkeley, August 2, 1862 — 8 A. M. 

"Firing of night before list killed some ten 
(10) men and wounded about (lo) fifteen. 

"No harm of the slightest consequence done 
to the shipping, although several were struck. 
Sent party across river yesterday to the Coles 
House, destroyed it and cut down the timber ; will 
complete work to-day, and also send party to 
Coggin's Point, which I wiU prol)ahIy occupy. I 
will attend to your telegraph about pressing at 
once; will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside, 
and I will stir these people up. I need more cav- 
alry; have only (3,700) thirty-seven hundred for 
duty in cavalry division. 

" Adjutant-General's office forgot to send 
Sykes's com nission as major-general, with those 
of other division commanders ; do me the favor 
to hurry it on. 

"G.B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-General Commanding. 

" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 
" Washington, D. C." 

To prevent another demonstration of this char- 
acter, and to insure a deliouche on the south bank 
of the James, it became necessary to occupy Cog- 
gin's Point, which was done on the 3d, and the 
enemy, as will be seen from the following de- 
spatch, driven b .ck towards Petersburg: — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Berkeley, August 3, 1862 — 10 P.M. 

" Coggin's Point was occupied 'to-day, and tim- 
ber felled so as to make it quite defensible. I went 
over the ground m\ self, and found that Duane 
had, as usual, selected an admirable position, 
which can be intrenched with a small amount of 
labor, so as in make it a formidible tcte de pont, 
covering the landing of a large for^'C. 

" I shall begin intrenching it by the labor of 
contrabands to-morrow. The position covers the 



94 



Ooles House, which is directly in front of Westo- 
ver. We have now a safe dcbouche on the south 
bank, and are secure against midnight cannon- 
ading. A few thousand more men w<,uld jjlice 
lis in condition at least to anno) and disconcert 
the enemy very much. 

"I sent Colonel Averill this morning with 
three hundred (300) cavalry to examine the 
country on the south side of the James, and try 
to catch some cavalry at Sycamore Church, 
which is on the main road from Petersburg to 
Suflblk, and some five (5) miles from Coles 
House. He found a cavah-y force of five hun- 
dred and fifty (550) men, attacked them at once, 
drove in their advance guards to their camp, 
where we had a sharp skirmish, and drove them 
off in disorder. 

" He burned their entire camp, with their 
commissai-y and quart-^rmaster's stores, and then 
returned and recrossed the river. He took but 
two (2) prisoners, had one man wounded by a 
ball, and one t)y a sabre cut. 

" Captain Mcintosh made a handsome charge. 
The troops engaged were of the fifth (5th) regu- 
lars, and the third (od) Pennsylvania cavalry. 

" Colonel Averill conducted this afiair, as he 
does everything he undertakes, to my entire satis- 
faction. 

« G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- Oeneral Commanding. 
"Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army, Wash- 
ington, D. C. 

On the 1st of August I received the following 
despatches : — 

" Washington, July 30, 1862—8 p. m. 
" A despatch just received from General Pope, 
says that deserters report that the enemy is mov- 
ing south of James River, and that the force in 
Richmond is very small. I suggest he be pressed 
in that direction, so as to ascertain the facts of 
the case. 

« H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major- Oeneral. 
** Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

" Washington, July 30, 1862—8 p. m. 
"In order to enable you to move in any di- 
rection, it is necessary to relieve you of your 
sick. The Surgeon-General has, therefore, been 
directed to mike arrangements for them at other 
places, and the Quartermaster-General to pro- 
vide transportation. I hope you will send them 
away as quickly as possible, and advise me of 
their removal. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major- General. 
♦'Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

It is clear that the General-in-Chief attached 
some weight to the report received from General 
Pope, and I was justified in supposing that the 
order in regard to the removing the sick contem- 
plated an ollensive movement rather than a re- 



treat, as I had no other data than the telegrams 
just given, from which to form an opinion as to 
the intentions of the Government, 

The following telegram strengthened me in 
that belief : — 

" Washington, July 31, 1862—10 a. m. 
" General Pope again telegraphs that the enemy 
is reported to be evacuating Riclwnond, and fall- 
ing back on Danville and Lvnchburg. 

"H, W.' HALLECK, 

'* Majo7'- General, 
" Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

In occupying Coggin's Point, as already de- 
scribed, I was influenced by the necessity of jios- 
sessing a secure debouche on the south of the 
James, in order to enable me to move on the 
communications of Richmond in that direction, 
as well as to prevent a repetition of midnight 
cannonades. 

To carry out General Halleck's first order, of 
July 30, it was necessary first to gain possession 
of Malvern Hill, which was occupied by the ene- 
my, apparently in some little force, and controlled 
the direct approach to Richmond. Its temporary 
occupation, at least, was equally necessary in the 
event of a movement upon Petersburg, or even 
the abandonment of the Peninsula. General 
Hooker, with his own division, and Pleasanton's 
cavalry, was therefore du'ected to gain possession 
of Malvern Hill on the night of the 2d of Au- 
gust. 

He failed to do so, as the following despatch 
recites : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Berkeley, August 3, 1862—10.20 P. M. 
" The movement undertaken up the river last 
night failed on account of the incompetency of 
guides. 

" The proper steps have been taken to-day to ■ 
remedy this evil, and I hope to be ready to-mor- 
row night to carry out yoirr suggestions as to 
pressing, at least to accomplish the first indispen- • 
sable step. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-General Commanding, 
" Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 

'* Commanding United States Army.'* 

On the 4th, General Hooker was reinforced 
by General S( dgwick's division, and having ob- 
tained a knowledge of the roads, he succeeded in 
turning Malvern Hill, and di-iving the enemy 
back towards Richmond. 

The following is my report of this affair at the 
time : — 

" Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862 — 1 p. M. 
" General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, at- 
tacked a very considerable force of infantry and 
artillery stationed at this place, and carried it 
handsomely, driving the enemy towards New- 
market, which is four miles distant, and where it 
is said they have a large force. We have cap- 



95 



tured 100 prisoners, killed and wounded several, 
■with a loss on our part of only three killed and 
eleven wounded ; among the latter, two officers. 

" I shall probably remain here to-night, ready 
to act as circumstances may require, after the 
return of my cavalry reconnoissances. 

" The mass of the enemy escaped under the 
cover of a dense fog ; but our cavalry are still in 
pursuit, and I trust may succeed in capturing 
many more. 

" This is a very advantageous position to cover 
an advance on Richmond, and only 14| miles 
distant ; and I feel confident that with reinforce- 
ments I would march this army there in five 
days. 

" I this instant learn that several brigades of 
the enemy are four miles from here on the 
Quaker Road, and I have taken steps to prepai'e 
to meet them. 

" General Hooker's dispositions were admira- 
ble, and his officers and men displayed their 
usual gallantry. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-Oeneral Commanding. 
' Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 
" Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862 — 8 p. m. 

" Since my last despatch Colonel Averill has 
returned from a reconnoissance, in the direction 
of Savage's Station, towards Richmond. He en- 
countered the 18th Virginia cavalry near White 
Oak Swamp bridge, charged and drove them 
some distance towards Richmond, capturing 28 
men aud hoi-ses, killing and wounding several. 

" Our troops have advanced (12) twelve miles 
in one direction, and (17) seventeen in another, 
towards Richmond to-day. 

" We have secured a strong position at Cog- 
gin's Point, opposite our quartermaster's depot, 
which will eti'ectually prevent the Rebels from 
using artillery hereafter against our camps. 

" I learn this evening that there is a force of 
20,000 men about six miles back from this point, 
on the south bank of the river. Wii it their ob- 
ject is I do not know, but wLU keep a sharp look- 
out on their movements. 

" I am sending off sick as rapidly as our 
transports will take them. I am also doing 
everything in my power to carry out your orders, 
to push reconnoissances towards the Rebel capi- 
tal, and hope soon to find out whether the re- 
ports regarding the abandonment of that place 
are true. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

'* Major- General. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck. 

" Commanding United States Army." 

To the despatch of 1 P. M. August 5, the fol- 
lowing answer was received : — 

•* Washington, August 6, 1862 — 3 a. m. 
" I have no reinforcements to send you. 
" H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major-Oeneral. 
"Major-General G. B. McClellan." 



And soon after the following : — 

" Washington, August 6, 1862. 
"You will immediately send a regiment of 
cavalry and several batteries of artillerv to Burn- 
side's command at Aqiiia Creek. It is rejjorted 
that Jackson is moving north with a very large 
force. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

'■ Major- Oeneralm 
" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

On the 4th I had received General Halleck's 
order of the 3d, (which appears below,) directing 
me to withdraw the army to Aquia, and on the 
same day sent an earnest jirotest against it. A 
few hours before this, General Hooker had in- 
formed me that his cavalry ])ickets reported large 
bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them 
in, and that he would probaldy be attacked at 
daybre ik. 

Under these circumstances I had determined 
to support him ; but as I could not get the whole 
army in position until the next afternoon, I con- 
cluded, upon the receipt of the above telegram 
from the General- iii-Chief, to withdraw Gener.d 
Hooker, that there might be the least possible 
delay in conforming to General Halleck's orders. 
I therefore sent to General Hooker the follow- 
ing letter : — 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Berkeley, August 6, 1862 — 10 P. M. 

" My dear General : I find it will not be 
possible to get the whole army into position be- 
fore some time to-morrow afternoon, which will 
be too late to support you, and hold the entire 
position, should tlie enemy attack in large force 
at daybreak, which there is sti'ong reasons to 
suppose he intends doing. 

" Should we fight a general battle at Malvern, 
it will be necessary to abandon the whole of our 
works here, and run the risk of getting back 
here. 

" Under advices I have received from Wash- 
ington, I think it necessary for you to abandon 
the position to-night, getting everything away 
before daylight. 

"Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, 
with orders to destroy the Turkey Creek bridge 
when they are forced back. 

" The roads leading into Haxall's from the 
right should be strongly watched, and Haxall's 
at least held by strong cavalry force and some 
hght batteries as long as possible. 

" I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely 
to your discretion. 

" Please signal to the fleet when the withdrawal 
is about completed. 

" Report frequently to these headquarters. 

" General Sumner was ordered up to support 
you, but will halt where tliis passes him, and will 
inform you where he is, 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" General J. Hooker, 

^'Commanding at Malvern HiM." 



9G 



And the following reply was sent to General 
Halleck: — 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Berkeley, August 6, 1862—11.30 P. M. 

" Despatch of to-day received. I have not 
quite (4,000) four thousand cavalry for duty in 
cavalry division, so tliat I cannot possibly spare 
any moie. 

" I really need many more than I now have to 
carry out yoiu- instructions. 

"The enemy are moving a large force on Mal- 
vern Hill. In view of your despatches, and the 
fact tiiat I cannot place the whole army in posi- 
tion before da\ tjreak, I have ordered Hooker to 
withdraw during the night if it is possible ; if he 
cannot do so, I must support him. 

" Until this matter is developed I cannot send 
anv batteries ; I hope I can do so to-morrow if 
transportition is on hand. 

" I wiil obey the order as soon as circumstances 
permit. Mv artillery is none too numerous 
now. I have only been able to send off some 
(1,200) twelve hundred sick. No transportation. 
There shall lie no delay that I can avoid. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Commanding. 
«* Major-General H. W. Halleck, 
" Commanding U. S. Army." 

Five baferies, with their horses and equip- 
ments complete, were embarked on the 7th and 
8th, simultaneously with General Hooker's oper- 
ations upon Malvern. 

I despatched a cavalry force under Colonel 
AveriU towards Savage's Stixtion, to ascertain if 
the enemy were aiaking any movements towards 
our right flank. 

He found a Rebel cavalry regiment, near the 
White Oak Swamj) bridge, and completely routed 
it, pursuing well towards Savage's S ation. 

These imjjortant jn-eliminary operations assist- 
ed my preparations for the removal of the army 
to Aquia Creek ; and the sending oft' our 
sick and supplies was pushed both day and night 
as rapidly as the means of transportation per- 
mitted. 

On the subject of the withdrawal of the army 
fi"om Harrison's Landing, the following corre- 
spondence passed between the General-in-Chief 
and myself, while the reconnoissances towai'ds 
Richmond were in progress. 

On the 2d of August I received the follow- 
ing : — 

" Washington, August 2, 1862—3.45 p. m. 

" You have not answered my telegram of July 
30, 8 r, M., about the removal of your sick. 
Remove them as rapidly as possible, and tele- 
gi-aph me when they will be out of your wav. 
The President wishes an answer as early as pos- 
sible. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major-General. 

" Major-General G, B, McClellan." 



To which this reply was sent : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Berkeley, August 3 — 11 P, M. 

" Your telegram of (2) second is received. 
The an-wer (to desjiatch of July 30) was sent 
this morning. 

"We have about (12, -500) twelve thousand 
five hundred sick, of whom perhaps (4,000) four 
thousand might make easy marches. We have 
here the means to transport (1,200) twelve 
hundred, and will emlxxrk to-morrow that num- 
ber of the worst cases, with all the means at the 
disposal of the medical director; the remainder 
could be shipped in from (7) seven to (10) ten 
days. 

" It is impossible for me to decide what cases 
to send off', unless I know what is to be done 
with this army. 

" Were the disastrous measures of a retreat 
adopted, all the sick who cannot march and 
fight should be despatched by water. 

" Should the army advance, many of the sick 
could lie of service at the depots. If it is to re- 
main here any length of time, the question 
assumes still a dift'eri'nt phase. 

" Until I am informed what is to be done, I 
cannot act understandinglv or for the good of 
the service. If I am kept longer in ignorance of 
what is to be effected, I cannot be expected to 
accomplish the object in view. 

" In the mean time I will do all in my power 
to carry out what I conceive to be your wishes. 
"GE0RG1<: B. McCLELLAN, 
^^ Major- General Commanding. 

" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army, 
WasMngto7i, U. C." 

The moment I received the instructions for re- 
moving the sick, I at once gave the necessary 
directions for carrying them out. 

Witfi the small amount of transportation at 
hand, the removal of the severe cases alone would 
necessarily take several days, and, in the mean 
time, I desired information to determine what I 
should do with the others. 

The order required me to send them away as 
quick Iv as possible, and to notify the General-in- 
Chief when they were removed. 

Previous to the receipt of the despatch of the 
2d of August, not having been advised of what 
the army under my command was expected to do, 
or which way it was to move, if it moved at all, 
I sent the following de-^patch : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 3, 1862. 

" I hear of sea steamers at Fort Monroe; are 
thev for removing my sick ? If .so, to what ex- 
tent am I required to go in sending them off? 
There are not many who need go. 

'• As I am not in any way informed of the in- 
tentions of the Government in regard to this 



I 



97 



army, I am unable to judge what Droportion of 
the sick should leave here, and iiuist ask for 
specific orders. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General Commanding . 
" Major-General II. W. Halleck, 
*' CovLinandinfj United States Army, Wash- 
ington." 

If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe, it 
was important that it should be unincumbered 
with any sick, wounded, or other men who 
might at all interfere with its mobility; but if 
the object was to operate directly on Richmond, 
from tlie position we then occupied, tliere were 
many cases of slight sickness which would speed- 
ily be cured, and the jjatients returned to duty. 

As the service of every man would be impor- 
tant in the event of a forward oHensive move- 
ment, I considered it to be of the utmost con- 
sequence that I should know wliat was to be 
done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the 
despatch of 11 p. m. on the 3d, before receiving 
the following telegram : — 

" Washington, August 3, 18(i2 — 7.45 p. m. 

" I have waited most anxiously to learn the 
result of your forced reconnoissance towards 
Kichmond, and also whether all your sick have 
been sent away, and I can get no answer to my 
telegram. 

" It is determined to withdraw your army from 
the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. You will take 
immediate measures to effect this, covering the 
movement t!ie best you can. 

" Its real object and withdrawal should be 
concealed even from yonr own officers. 

" Your material and transportation should be 
removed first. You will assume control of all 
the means of transportation within your reach, 
and apply to the naval forces for all the assist- 
ance they can render you. You will consult 
freely with the commander of these forces. The 
entire e;:eculion of the movement is left to your 
discretion and judgm 'nt. 

" You will leave such forces as you may deem 
proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other 
places, which we must occupy. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major-- General Commanding United States 
Army. 

" Major-General Geo. B. McClellan." 

1 proceeded to obey this order with all possible 
rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the con- 
viction that the withdrawal of the army of the Po- 
tomac from Harrison's Landing, where its commu- 
nications had by the cooperation of the gunboats 
been rendered perfectly secure, would, at that 
time, have the most disastrous effect upon our 
cause. 

I did not, as the commander of that array, 
allow the occasion to pass without distinctly sea- 
ting forth my views upon the subject to the 
authorities in the following telegram : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 4, 1862—12 m. 

"Your telegram of last evening is received. 

I must confess that it has caused me the greatest 

pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that 

the order to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek 

13 



will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will 
be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to 
complete the preparations for so iini)oriant a 
movement as this, and wliik' llicy are in progress, 
I beg that careful consideration may be given to 
my statements. 

" This army is now in excellent discipline and 
condition. We hold a debourhe on both banks 
of the James Kiver, so that we are free to act in 
any direction ; and, with tlic assistance of tlie 
gunboats, I consider our conununications as now 
secure. 

"We are twenty-five(25)miles from Kichmond, 
and are not likely to meet llie enemy in force 
sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched 
fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) miles, wliich brings 
us practically within ten (10) miles of Uiclnnond. 
Our longest line of land transportation would be 
from this point twenty-five (25) miles, but with 
the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army 
by watc'V during its advance, certainly to within 
twelve (12) miles of Kichmond. 

" At Aquia Creek we would be seventy-five 
(75) miles from Kichmond, with land transpor- 
tation all the way. 

" From here to Fort Monroe is a march of 
about seventy (70) miles, for I regard it as im- 
practicable to withdraw this army and its mate- 
rial, except by land. 

" The result of the movement would thus Iw 
a march of one hundred and forty-five (145) 
miles to reach a point now only twenty-five (25) 
miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely 
of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water 
transportation. 

"Add to this the certain demoralization of 
this army which would ensue, the terribly de- 
pressing effect upon the people of the North, 
and the strong probability that it would influence 
foreign powers to recognize our adversaries ; and 
these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it 
ray imperative duty to urge in the strongest 
terms afforded by our language that this order 
may be rescinded, and that far from recalling tliis 
army, it may be promptly reinforced to enable 
it to resume the offensive. 

"It may be said that there are no reinforce- 
ments available. I point to Burnside's force ; 
to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict 
defensive in front of Washington and Harper's 
Ferry; to those portions of the army of the 
West not required for a strict defensive there. 
Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart 
of the Rebellion; it is here that all our resources 
should be collected to strike the blow which will 
determine the fate of the nation. 

"All points of secondary importance else- 
where should be abandoned, and every available 
man brought here ; a decided victory here, and 
the military strength of the Rebellion is crushed. 
It matters not what i>artial reverses we may 
meet with elsewhere ; here is the true de- 
fence of Washington ; it is here, on the banks 
of the James, that the fate of the Union should 
be decided. 

"Clear in my convictions of right, strong in 
the consciousness that I have ever been, and 
still am, actuated solely by the love of my 
country, knowing that no ambitious or selSsh 
motives have intluencod me from the cf)m- 
mencement of this war, I do now, what I never 



98 



did in my life before, I entreat that tliis order 
may lie rescinded. 

" If iny counsel does not prevail, I will with 
a sad iieart obey your orders to the utmost of ray 
power, directing to the movements, which I clea.r- 
ly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and 
difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. What- 
ever the result may be — and may God grant that 
I am mistaken in my tV)rebodings — I shall at 
least have the internal satisfaction that I have 
written and spoken frankly, and have sought to 
dQ tlie best in my power to avert disaster from 
my country. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Commanding. 
"Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

Soon after sending this telegram, I received 
the following in reply to mine of 11 p. m. of 
the 3d : — 

"Washington, August 4, 18G1 — 12.45 p. m. 

" My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy 
you in regard to future operations ; it was ex- 
pected that you would have sent off your sick, 
as directed, without waiting to know what were 
or would be tlie intentions of the Government 
respecting future movements. 

"The President expects that the instructions 
which were sent you yesterday, with his appro- 
val, will be carried out with all possible de- 
spatch and caution. The Quartermaster-General 
is sending to Fort Monroe all the transportation 
he can collect. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 
" Major- General, 

" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

To which the following is my reply : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 5, 1862 — 7 a. m. 
" Your telegram of yesterday received, and is 
being carried out as promptly as possible. With 
the means at my command, no human power 
could have moved the sick in the time you say 
you expected them to be moved. 

:t. it * * * * * 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

My efforts for bringing about a change of pol- 
icy were unsuccessful, as wifll be seen from the 
following telegram and letter received by me in 
reply to mine of 12 m. of" the 4th : — 

" Washington, August 5, 18G2 — 12 m. 
" You cannot regret the order of the with- 
drawal more than I did the necessity of giving 
it. It will not be rescinded, and you will be ex- 
pected to execute it with all possible prompt- 
ness. It is believed that it can be done now 
without serious danger. This may not be so, if 
there should be any delay. I will write you my 
views more fully by mail. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 
^^ Major-General CommtLuding United States 

Army. 
"Major-General G. B. McClellan." 



Tlie letter was as follows : — 

" Headquarters op the Armt, 
" Washington, August (>, 18(52. 

"Genervl: Your telegram of yesterday was 
received this morning, and I immediately tele- 
graphed a brief reply, promising to write you 
more fully by mail. 

" You, General, certainly could not have been 
more pained at receiving my order than I was 
at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by 
liigli officers, in whose judgment I had great con- 
fidence, to make the order immediately on my 
arrival iiere, but I determined not to do so until 
I could learn your wishes from a personal inter- 
view. And even after that interview I tried 
every means in m^' power to avoid withdrawing 
your army, and delayed my decision as long as 
I dared to delay it. 

" I assure you. General, it was not a hasty and 
inconsiderate act, but one that caused me more 
anxious tiiougiits than any other of my life. 
But after full and mature consideration of all tlie 
pros and cons, I was reluctantly forced to the 
conclusion that the order must be issued. — there 
was to my mind no alternative. 

"Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in 
the case. 

" You and your officers at one interview esti- 
mated the enemy's forces in and around Rii;h- 
mond at two hundred thousand men. Since 
then, you and others report that they have re- 
ceived and are receiving large reinforcements 
from the South. General Pope's army, cover- 
ing Washington, is only about forty tuousand. 
Your effective force is only about ninety thou- 
sand. You are thirty miles from Richmond, and 
General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy 
directly between you, ready to tail with his su- 
perior numbers upon one or the other as he may 
elect ; neither can reinforce the other in case of 
such an attack. 

" If General Pope's army be diminished to 
reinforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Penn- 
sylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. 
If your force be reduced to strengthen Pope, 
you would be too weak to even hold the position 
you now occupy, sliould the enemy turn round 
and attack you in full force. In other words, 
the old army of the Potomac is split in two parts, 
with the entire force of the enemy directly be- 
tween them. They cannot be united by land 
without exposing both to destruction, and yet 
they must be united. To send Pope's forces by 
water to the Peninsula is, under present circum- 
stances, a military impossibility. Tiie only al- 
ternative is to send the forces on the Peninsula 
to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, 
where the two armies can be united. 

" Let me now allude to some of the objections 
which you have urged: You say that tlie with- 
drawal from the present position will cause the 
certain demoralization of the army, ' which is 
now in excellent discipline and condition.' 

'• I cannot understand why a simple change of 
position to a new and by no means distant base, 
will demoralize an army in excellent disci- 
pline unless the officers themselves assist in 
that demoralization, which I am satisfied they 
will not. 

"Your change of front from your extrema 



99 



right at Hanover Court Hon«e to your present 
position was over thirty miles, hut I have not 
heard that it demoralized your troops, notwith- 
standing the severe losses they sustained in ef- 
fecting it. 

" A new base on the Rappahannock at Freder- 
icksburg, brings you within about sixty miles of 
Riclimond, and secures a reinforcement of forty 
or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. 

" The change with such advantages will, I 
think, if properly represented to your army, 
encourage rather than demoralize your troops. 
Moreover you yourself suggested that a junc- 
tion might be effected at Yorktown, but that a 
flank march across the isthmus would be more 
hazardous than to retire to Fort Monroe. 

" You will remember that Yorktown is two or 
three miles further than Fredericksburg is. Be- 
sides, the latter is between Richmond and Wash- 
ington, and covers Washington from any attack 
of the enemy. 

" The political efiect of the withdrawal may 
at first be unfavorable ; but I think the public 
are beginning to understand its necessity, and 
that they will have much more confidence in a 
united army than in its separate fragments. 

" But you will reply, why not reinforce me 
here, so that I can strike Richmond from my 
present position? To do this, you said, at our 
interview, that you required thirty thousand ad- 
ditional troops. I told you that it was impossi- 
ble to give you so many. You finally thought 
that you would have ' some chance ' of success 
with twenty thousand. But you afterwards tel- 
egraphed me that you would require thirty-five 
thousand, as the enemy was being largely rein- 
forced. 

" If your estimate of the enemy's strength 
was correct, your requisition was perfectly rea- 
sonable ; but it was utterly impossible to fill it 
until new troops could be enlisted and organized, 
which would require several weeks. 

" To keep your army in its present position 
until it could be so reinforced would almost de- 
stroy it in that climate. 

" The months of August and September are 
almost fatal to whites who live on that part of 
James River ; and even after you received the 
reinforcements asked for, you admitted that you 
must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries 
before you could advance on Richmond. 

" It is by no means certain that the reduction 
of these fortifications would not require consid- 
erable time, — perhaps as much as those at York- 
town. 

" This delay might not only be fatal to the 
health of your army, but in the mean time Gen- 
eral Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy 
blows of the enemy without the slightest hope 
of assistance from you. 

" In regard to the demoralizing eflTect of a 
withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappa- 
hannock, I must remark that a large number of 
your highest oflicers, indeed a majority of those 
whose opinions have been reported to me, are 
decidedly in favor of the movement. Even 
several of those who originally advocated the 
line of the Peninsula now advise its aban- 
donment. 

" I have not inquired, and do not wish to 
know, by whose advice or for what reasons, the 



army of the Potomac was separated into two 
parts with the enemy between them. I must 
take things as I find them. 

" I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite 
them. Only one feasible plan has been pre- 
sented for doing this. If you, or any one else, 
had presented a better plan, I certainly should 
have adopted it. But all of your plans require 
reinforcements which it is impossible to give 
you. It is very easy to as/c for reinforcements, 
but it is not so easy to give them when you have 
no disposable troops at your command. 

" I have written very plainly as I understand 
the case, and I hope you will give nie credit for 
having fully considered the matter, although I 
may have arrived at very difierent conclusions 
from your own. 

" "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
" H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" Major-General G. B. McCleli.an, 

*' Commanding, ^c, Berkeley, Virginia." 

On the 7th I received the following tele- 
gram : — 

" Washington, August 7, 1862—10 a. m. 
" You will immediately report the number of 
sick sent off since you received my order, the 
number still to be shipped, and the amount of 
transportation at your disposal — that is, the num- 
ber of persons that can be carried on all the 
vessels which by my order you were authorized 
to control. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major- General. 
" Major-General G. B. McCleli.an." 

To which I made this reply : — 

" Headquarters Army of TtrE Potomac, 

" August 7, 18G2— 10.40 p. m. 

*' In reply to your despatch of 10 a. m. to-day, 
I report the number of sick sent off since I re- 
ceived your order, as follows : Three thousand 
seven hundred and forty, including some that 
are embarked to-night and will leave in the 
morning. The number still to be shipped is, as 
nearly as can be ascertained, five thousand 
seven hundred. 

" The embarkation of five batteries of artil- 
lery, with their horses, wagons, &c., required 
most of our available boats except the ferry- 
boats. All the transports that can ascend to 
this place have been ordered up ; they will be 
here to-morrow evening. Colonel Ingalls re- 
ports to me that there are no transports now 
available for cavalry, and will not be for two or 
three days. As soon as they can be obtained I 
shall send off the first New York cavalry. 

" After the transports with the sick and 
wounded have returned, including some heavy 
draft steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come 
to this point, we can transport twenty-five thou- 
sand men at a time. We have sonic propellers 
here, but they are laden with commissary sup- 
plies and are not available. 

" The transports now employed in transport- 
ing sick and wounded will carry 12,000 well in- 
f;mtry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, and of 
too heavy draft to come here, will carry S, 000 or 
10,000 infantry. Several of the largest steamers 



100 



liavebeen used for transporting prisoners of war, 
and have only become available for the sick 
to-day. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General, 
" Major-General II. W. Halleck, 

'• Commandiitg tlie United States Army." 

The report of my chief quarterraastei upon the 
subject is as follows : — 

** Headquartkrs Army of the Potomac. 

" Office of Chief Quartermaster, narrison's 
Landing, August 7, 1862. 

" General : I have the honor to return the 
papers herewith which you sent me, with the 
following reuKirks : — 

" We are embarking five batteries of artillery, 
with their horses, baggage, &c., which requires 
the detailing of most of our available boats, 
except the ferry-boats. The medical depart- 
ment has ten or twelve of our largest transport 
vessels, which, if disposable, could carry 12,000 
men. Besides, there are some heavy draft 
steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to 
this point, but which can carry 8,000 or 10,000 
infantry. 

" I have ordered all up here that can ascend 
to this depot. They will be here to-morrow 
evening. As it now is, after the details already 
made, we cannot transport from this place more 
than 5,000 infantry. 

" There are no transports now available for 
cavalry. From and after to-morrow, if the ves- 
sels arrive, I could transport 10,000 infantry. 
In two or three days a regiment of cavalry ('an 
be sent if required. If you wait, and ship from 
Yorktown or Fort Monroe after the sick and 
wounded transports are at my disposal, we can 
transport 25.000 at a time. The number that 
can be transported is contingent on circum- 
stances referred to. 

" Most of the propellers here are laden with 
commissary or otlier supplies, and most of the 
tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft also laden 
with supplies. 

" I am, very respectfully, your most obedient 
servant, 

"RUFUS INGALLS, 

" Chief Quartermaster. 

" General R. B. Marcy, 

" Chief of Staff." 

On the 9th I received this despatch : — 

" Washington, August 9, 1862—12.45 p. m. 

" I am of the opinion that the enemy is mass- 
ing his forces in front of Generals Pope and 
Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and 
n)ove forward to the Potomac. 

"You must send reinforcements instantly to 
Aquia Creek. 

" Considering the amount of transportation at 
your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. 
You must move with all possible celerity. 
"H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major-General. 

" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

To which I sent the following reply : — 



" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Berkeley, August 10, 1862—8 a. m. 
" Telegram of yesterday received. The bat- 
teries sent to Burnside took the last available 
transport yesterday morning. Enough have 
since arrived to ship one regiment of cavalry to- 
day. The sick are being embarked as rapidly 
as possible. There has been no unnecessary 
delay, as you assert — not an hour's — but every- 
thing has been and is being pushed as rapidly as 
possible to carry out your orders. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
'■'■'Major- General- Commanding. 
"Major-General H. W. Halleck. 

" Commanding United States Army." 

The following report, made on the same day 
by the ofl&cer then in cliarge of the transports, 
exposes the injustice of the remark in the de- 
spatch of the general-in-chief, that, "considering 
the amount of transportation at your disposal 
your delay is not satisfactory." 

" Assistant-Quartermaster's Office, 
" Army of the Potomac, 
" Hari-ison's Lan,ding, Virginia, August 10. 

"1862. 

" Colonel Ingalls, being himself ill, has re- 
quested me to telegraph to you concerning the 
state and capacity of the transports now here. 
On the night of the 8th I despatched eleven 
steamers, principally small ones, and six sclioon- 
ers, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery, 
none of whicli have yet returned. 

" Requisition is matle this morning for trans- 
portatiimof one thousand cavalry to Aquia Creek. 
All the schooners that had been ciiartered fjr 
carrying horses have been long since discharged, 
or changed into freight vessels. 

" A large proportion of the steamers now here 
are still loaded with stores or are in the floating 
hospital service engaged in removing the sick. 
To transport the one thousand cavalry to-day 
will take all the available steamers now here not 
engaged in the service of the harbor. These 
steamers could take a large number of infantry, 
but are not well adapted to the carrying of horses, 
and much space is thus lost. Several steam- 
ers are expected here to-day, and we are unload- 
ing schooners rapidly ; most of these are not 
chartered, but are being taken for the service 
required, at same rates of pay as other char- 
tered schooners. If you could cause a more 
speedy return of the steamers sent away from 
here, it would facilitate matters. 

"C. G. SAWTELLE, 
" Capiai'n and Assist ant- Quartermaster ^ 
commanding Depot. 
" General M. C. Meigs, 

" Quartermaster- General United States 
" Army, Washington." 

Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing 
were very limited, admitting but few vessels at 
one time. These were continually in use as 
long as they were disposable vessels, and the offi- 
cers of the medical and quartermaster's depart- 
ments, with all their available forces, were inces- 
santly occupied day and night in embarking and 
sending ofi' the sick men, troops, and material. 



101 



Notwithstanding the repeated representations 
I made to the general-in-chicf that such were the 
facts, on the 10th I received the following : — 

•' Wasuington, August 10, 1862 — 12 p. m. 
" The enemy is crossing the llapidan in large 
force. They are fighting General Pope to-day ; 
there must be no further delay in your move- 
ments ; that which has already occurred was 
entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily 
explained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and 
telegraph me daily what progress you have made 
in executing the order to transfer your troops. 
"H. W. PIALLECK, 

" Major- General. 
" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

To which I sent this reply : — 
" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
'* Berkeley, August 10, 1862—11.30 p. m. 

" Your despatch of to-day is received. I as- 
sure you again that there has not been any un- 
necessary delay in carrying out your orders. 

" You are probably laboring under some great 
mistake as to the amount of transportation avail- 
able here. 

" I have pushed matters to the utmost in get- 
ting off our sick, and the troops you ordered to 
Burnside. 

" Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed 
the Quartermaster-General of the condition of 
our water transportation. From the fact that 
you directed me to keep the order secret, I took 
it for granted that you would take the steps nec- 
essary to provide the requisite ti'ansportation. 

" A large number of transports for all arms of 
service, and for wagons, should at once be sent 
to Yorktown and Fort Monroe. 

" I shall be ready to move the whole army by 
land the moment the sick are disposed of. You 
may be sure that not an hour's delay will occur 
that can be avoided. I fear you do not realize 
the difficulty of the operation proposed. 

" The regiment of cavalry for Burnside has 
been in course of embarkation to-day and to- 
night; (10) ten steamers were required for the 
purpose; (1,258) twelve hundred and fifty-eight 
sick loaded to-day and to-night. 

"Our means exhausted, except one vessel 
returning to Fort Monroe in the morning, which 
will take some (^500) five hundred cases of slight 
sicknes.s. 

" The present moment is probably not the 
proper one for me to refer to the unnecessary, 
harsh, and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. 
It will, however, make no difference to my offi- 
cial action. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Commanding. 

" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

•' Commanding United States Army." 

On the eleventh this report was made : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Berkeleij, August 11, 1802—11.30 p. m. 
"The embarkation of (850) eight hundred and 
fifty cavalry, and (1) one brigade of infantry will 
be completed by (2) two o'clock in the morning; 
(500) five hundred sick were embarked to-day. 
Another vessel arrived to-night, and (600) six 
hundred more sick are now being embarked. I 



still have some (4000) four thousand sick to dis- 
pose of. You have been greatly misled as to 
the amount of transportation at my disposal. 

"Vessels loaded to their utmost capacity with 
stores, and others indisjiensable for service here, 
have been reported to you as available for carry- 
ing sick and well. I am sending off all that can 
be unloaded at Fort Monroe to have them return 
here. I repeat that I have lost no time in car- 
rying out your orders. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Commanding. 
" Major-General II. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

On the same day I received the following 
from the quartermaster in charge of the de- 
pot: — 

" Assistant Quartermaster's Office, 

" Army of the Potomac, 
^^ Harrison's Landing, August 11, 1862. 

" Colonel : In reply to the comuiunication 
from General Marcy, which was referred to me 
by you, I have to state that there are now in this 
harbor no disposable transports not already de- 
tailed, either for the use of the hospital depart- 
ment, for the transportation of the 1st N. Y. 
cavalry, or for the necessary service of the har- 
bor. I think the steamers loading and to be 
loaded with cavalry, could take in addition three 
thousand infantry. These boats are. however, 
directed to leave as fast as they are loaded; 
£Ome have already started. Tiie embarkation of 
this cavalry regiment is going on very slowly, 
and it is not in my power to hurr}' the matter, 
although I have had several agents of the depart- 
ment and one commissioned officer at the wharf, 
to render all the assistance possible. The entire 
army is this morning turning in, to be stored on 
vessels, knapsacks, officers' baggage, and other 
surplus property, and with our limited wharf 
facilities it is impossible, unless the regular 
issues of forage, &c., are suspended, to avoid 
great confusion and delay with what is already 
ordered to be done. Of course, if any infantry 
is ordered to embark on these cavalry trans- 
ports, the confusion and difficulties will be in- 
creased. 

" I know of no boats that may be expected 
here to-day, except the Soutli America and Fan- 
ny Cadwallader, a propeller which was ordered 
to be sent back from Fort Monroe. 

" The transports with the artillery left for 
Aquia Creek on the night of the 8th and the 
morning of the 9th. They were ordered to re- 
turn immediately. 

" I am, very respectfully, your obedient ser- 
vant, 

"C. G. SAWTELLE, 

" Captain and A. Q. M. commanding Depot. 

" Lieut.-Colonel Rurus Ingalls, 
"^. D. C. and Chief Quartermaster, Army of 
the Potomac.'" 

On the 12th I received the following : — 
" Washington, August 12, 1862— 12 m. 

" The Quartermaster-General informs me that 
nearly every available steam vessel in the coun- 
try is now under your control. To send more 
from Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York, 



102 



would interfere with the transportation of array 
supplies, and break up the channels of travel by 
which we are to brin^ forward the new troops. 
Burnsirle moved nearly thirteen thousand (13,- 
000) troops to Aquia Creek in less than two (2) 
days, and his transports were immediately sent 
back to you. All vessels in the James River 
and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your 
disposal, and it was supposed that eight (8) or ten 
(10) thousand of your men could be transported 
daily. 

"In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet 
of sailing vessels which could be used as trans- 
ports. 

" The bulk of your material on shore it was 
thought could l)e sent to Fort Monroe, covered 
by tliat part of tiie army which could not get 
water transportation. Such were the views of 
the Government here ; perhaps we were misin- 
formed as to the facts. If so, the delay could be 
explained. Nothing in my telegram was inten- 
tionally harsh or unjust, but the delay was so 
unexpected that an explanation was required. 
There has been, and is, the most urgent neces- 
sity for despat"h ; and not a single moment must 
be lost in getting additional troops in front of 
Washington. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

' ' Major- General. 

" Major-General McClellan." 

I telegraphed the following reply : — 
"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'■'■Berkeley, August 12, 1862—11 p. m. 

" Your despatch of noon to-day received. It 
is positively the fact that no more men could 
have been embarked hence tlian have gone, and 
that no unnecessary delay has occurred. Before 
your orders were received. Colonel Ingalls 
directed all available vessels to come from Mon- 
roe. OfBcers have been sent to take personal 
direction. Have heard nothing here of Burn- 
side's fleet. 

" Tliere are some vessels at Monroe, such as 
Atlantic and Baltic, which draw too much to 
come here. Hospital accommodations exhaust- 
ed this side New York. Propose filling Atlantic 
and Baltic with serious cases for New York, and 
to encamp slight cases for tlie present at Mon- 
roe. In this way can ])robably get off the thirty- 
four hundred (3,400) sick, still on hand, by 
day after to-morrow night. 

" I am sure tliatyou have been misinformed as 
to the availability of vessels on hand. We cannot 
use heavily loaded supply vessels for troops or 
animals ; and such constitute the mass of those 
here, which have been represented to you as ca- 
pable of transporting this army. 

" I fear you will find very great delay in em- 
barking troops and material at Yorktown and 
Monroe, both from want of vessels and of facili- 
ties of embarkation ; at least two additional 
v^harves should at once be built at each place. 
I ordered two at the latter some two (2) weeks 
ago, but you countermanded the order. 

"I learn that wharf accommodations at .\quia 
are altogether inadequate for landing troops and 
supplies to any large extent. Not an hour should 
be lost in remedying this. 

"Great delay will ensue there from shallow wa- 
ter. You will find a vast deficiency in horse trans- 



ports. We had nearly two hundred when we 
came here ; I learn of only twenty (20) pro- 
vided now ; they carry about fifty (50) liorses 
each. More hospital accommodations should be 
provided. We are much impeded here because 
our wharves are used night and day to land cur- 
rent supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty 
will occur. 

" With all the facilities at Alexandria and 
Washington, six (6) weeks about were occupied 
in embarking this army and its material. 

" Burnside's troops are not a fair criterion for 
rate of embarkation. All his means were in 
hand, his outfit specially prepared for the pur- 
pose, and his men habituated to the movement. 

" Tiiere shall be no unnecessary delay, but I 
cannot manufacture vessels. I state tliese diffi- 
culties from experience, and because it appears 
to me that we have been lately working at cross 
purposes, because you have not been properly 
informed by those around you, who ought to 
know the inherent difficulties of such an under- 
taking. It is not possible for any one to place 
this army where you wish it, ready to move, in 
less than a month. 

" If Washington is in danger now, this army 
can scarcely arrive in time to save it; it is in 
much better position to do so from here than 
from Aquia. 

" Our material can only be saved by using the 
whole army to cover it, if we are pressed. If 
sensibly weakened by detachments, the result 
might be the loss of mucli material and many 
men. I will be at the telegraph office to-mor- 
row morning. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C" 

To the reasons given in the foregoing de- 
spatch, to show why General Burnside's move- 
ment from Fort Monroe was not a feir criterion 
for our operations, tiie following may be added: 

He was not encumbered by either sick or 
wounded men. 

He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons, or teams. 
His force consisted of infantry alone, with a few 
ambulances and officers' horses. 

His baggage was already on the transports, 
where it had remained since his arrival from 
North Carolina, and his men had only to resume 
their places on board. 

The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my 
despatches of the 7th, lOtli, and 11th, were sent 
to supply his total deficiency in those arras. 

I may also repeat that the vessels used by 
General Burnside had not returned from Aquia 
Creek when the army left Harrison's Bar. 

It will be seen by the concluding paragraph of 
the foregoing despatch thiit in order to have a 
more direct, speedy, and full explanation of the 
condition of aflairs in the array than I could by 
sending a single despatch by steamer to the near- 
est telegraph office at Jamestown Island, some 
seventy miles distant, and waiting ten hours for 
a replv, I proposed to go in person to the office. 
This i did. 

On my arrival at Jamestown Island there was 
an interruption in the electric current, which 
rendered it necessary for me to continue on to 



103 



Fort Monroe, and across the Chesapeake Bay to 
Cherry Stone Inlet, on the "eastern shore," 
where I arrived late in the evening, and imme- 
diately sent the annexed despatches : — 
" Cherry Stone, August 13, 1862— 11.30 p.m. 

"Please come to the office; wish to talk to 
you. What news from Pope ? 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Waahingion." 

" Cherny Stone Inlet, August 14, 1862—12.30 a.m. 
" Started to Jamestown Island to talk with 
you ; found cable broken and came here. Please 
read my long telegram. (See above dispatch of 
August 12, 11 p. M.) All quiet at camp. Ene- 
my burned wharves at City Point yesterday. No 
Rebel pickets within eight (8) miles of Coggin's 
Point yesterd'ay. 

" Richmond prisoners state that large force 
with guns left Richmond northward on Sunday. 
"G. B. McLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" Major-General II. W. Halleck, 

Washington." 

To which the following reply was received : — 

" Washington, August 14."l862— 1.40 a.m. 
" I have read your despatch. There is no 
change of plans. You will send up your troops 
as rapidly as possible. There is no difficulty in 
landing them. According to your own accounts, 
there is now no difficulty in withdrawing your 
forces. Do so with all possible rapidity. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major General. 
"Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

Before I had time to decipher and reply to 
this despatch, the telegraph operator in Wash- 
ington informed me that General Halleck had 
gone out of the office immediately after writing 
this despatch, without leaving any intimation of 
the fact for me, or waiting for any further infoi'- 
mation as to the object of my journey across the 
bay. As there was no possibility of other com- 
munication with him at that time, I sent the fol- 
lowing despatch, and returned to Harrison's 
Landing : — 

" Cherry Stone Inlet, 

" August 14, 1862—1.40 a. m. 
" Yovir orders will be obeyed. I return at 
once. I had hoped to have had a longer and 
fuller conversation with you, after travelling so 
far for the purpose. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
" Major-General IL W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

On the 14th and 15th, and before we had been 
able to embark all our sick men, two army coi-ps 
were put in motion towards Fort Monroe. This 
was reported in the annexed despatch : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

''Berkeley, August 14, 1862—11 p. m. 
" Movement has commenced by land and water. 
All sick will be away to-morrow night. Every- 
thing being done to carry out your orders. I 



don't like Jackson's movements ; he will .sudden- 
ly appear when least expected. Will telegraph 
fully and understandingly in tlie inoi iiing. 
"G. B. McCLLLLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Washington, U. C." 

The phrase, " movement has commenced," it 
need not be remarked, referred obviously to the 
movement of the main army, after completing the 
necessary preliminary movements of the sick, 
&c., &c. 

The perversion of the term, to wiiich the gen- 
eral-in-chief saw fit to give currency in a letter 
to the Secretary of War, should have been here 
rendered impossible by the despatches which 
precede this of tlie 14th, which show that the 
movement really begun immediately after the re- 
ceipt of the order of August 4th. 

The progress made in the movement on the 
15th was reported in the following despatches :— 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

August 15, 1862—12 m. 

" Colonel Ingalls this moment reports that 
after embarking the remaining brigade of Mc- 
Call's division, with the sick, who are constantly 
accumulating, the transports now disposable will 
be all consumed. 

"Two of my army corps marclicd last night 
and this morning en route for Yorktown, — one 
via Jones's Bridge, and the other via Barrett's 
Ferry, where we have a pontoon bridge. The 
other corps will be pushed forward as fast as the 
roads are clear ; and I hope before to-morrow 
morning to have the entire army in motion. 

" A report has just been received from my 
pickets that the enemy in force is advancing on 
us from the Chickahominy, but I do not credit 
it; shall know soon. Should any more trans- 
ports arrive here before my departure, and the 
enemy do not show such a force in our front as 
to require all the troops I have remaining to 
insure the safety of the land movement with its 
immense train, I shall send every man by water 
that transports will carry. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commandinff U. S. A." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 15, 1862—1.30 p. m. 

" The advanced corps and trains are fairly 

started. I learn nothing more in relation to 

reported advance of Rebels via Jones's Bridge. 

Shall push the movement as rapidly as possible. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 15, 1862 — 10 p. m. 

" Coggin's Point is abandoned. The whole of 
McCall's division, with its artillery, is now en 
route for Burnsidc. We have not yet transpor- 
tation sufficient for our sick. I hoj^e we will get 
it to-morrow. 

"Porter is across the Chickahominy, near its 



104 



mouth, with his wagons and reserve artillery. 
Ilcintzclraan at Jones's Bridge with a portion of 
his corps. They will all be up by morning. 

"Avcrell's cavalry on the other side. All 
quiet thus far. I cannot get the last of the 
wagons as far as Charles City Court House before 
some time to-morrow afternoon. 

•' I am hurrying matters w itli the utmost rapid- 
ity possible. Wagons will move all night. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
"Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Waahingtoti, D. C." 

After the commencement of the movement, it 
was continued with the utmost rapidity, until all 
the troops and material were en route both by 
land and water, on the morning of the 16th. 

Late in the afternoon of that day, when the 
last man had disajipeared from the deserted 
camps, I followed with my personal staff in the 
track of the grand army of tlie Potomac ; bidding 
farewell to the scenes still covered with the 
marks of its presence, and to he forever memo- 
rable in history as the vicinity of its most bril- 
liant exploits. 

Previous to the departure of the troops, I had 
directed Captain Duane, of the engineer corps, 
to proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the mouth of 
the Chickahominy, and throw across the river 
at that i)oint a pontoon bridge. This was exe- 
cuted promptly and satisfactorily under the cover 
of gunboats ; and an excellent bridge of alwut 
two thousand feet in length was ready for the 
first arrival of troops. 

The greater part of the army, with its artillery, 
wagon trains, &c., crossed it rapidly, and in per- 
fect order and safety, so that on the night of the 
17th everything was across the Chickahominy, 
except the rear guard, which crossed early on 
the morning of the 18th, when the pontoon 
bridge was immediately removed. 

General Porter's corps, wJiich was the first to 
march from Harrison's Landing, had been pushed 
forward rapidly, and on the 16th reached Wil- 
liamsburg, where I had directed him to halt 
until the entire army was across the Chicka- 
hominy. 

(Jn his arrival at Williamsburg, however, he 
received an intercepted letter, which led to the 
belief that General Pope would have to contend 
against a very heavy force then in his front, 
(ieneral Porter, therefore, very jn'operly took 
^le responsibility of continuing his march direct- 
ly on to Newport News, ■v\iiich place he reached 
on the morning of the 18th of August, having 
ma relied his corps sixty miles in the short period 
of three days and one night, iialting one day at 
the crossing of the Chickahominy. 

The embarkation of this corps commenced as 
soon as transports were ready, and on the 20th 
it had all saded for A quia Creek. I made the 
following report from Barrett's Ferry : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Barrett's Ferry, Chickahominy , 
"August 17, 1862—11 A.M. 

" Everything is removed from our camp at 
Harrison's Bar. No property nor men left 
behind. 

" The (5th) fifth corps is at Williamsburg with 



all its wagons and the reserve artillery. The 
(3d) third corps is on the march from Jones's 
Bridge to Williamsburg, rid Diascund Bridge, 
and has probably passed the latter before this 
hour. Averell's cavalry watches everything in 
that direction. 

"The mass of the wagons have passed the 
pontoon bridge here, and are parked on the other 
side. Peck's wagons are now crossing; his 
division will soon be over. Headquarters wagons 
follow Peck's. I hope to have everything over 
to-night, and the bridge removed by daylight. 
May be delayed beyond that time. Came here 
to see Burnside, othei-wise should have remained 
with the rear guard. Thus tar all is quiet, and 
ncjt a shot that I know of since we began the 
march. 

" I shall not feel entirely secure until I have 
the whole army beyontl the Cliickahominy. I 
will then begin to forward troops by water as fast 
as transportation permits. 

"G. B. M.'CLELLAN, 
" Major-General Co)iimandi7ig. 

" Major-General H. W. Halleck. 

" Comm'g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C" 

On the ISth and 19th our march was continued 
to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th 
the remainder of the army was ready to embark 
at Yorktown, Fortress Monroe, and Newport 
News. 

The movement of the main body of the army 
on this uuirch was covered by General Pleasan- 
ton with his cavalry and horse artillery. That 
officer remained at Haxall's until the army had 
passed Charles City Court House, when he 
gradually fell back, ijicking up the stragglers as 
he proceeded, and crossed the bridge over the 
Chickahominy, after the main body had marched 
towards Williamsburg. His tro(3ps were the 
last to cross the bridge, and he deserves great 
credit for the manner in which he performed 
this duty. 

General Averell did a similar service, in the 
same satisfactory way, in covering the march of 
the 3d corps. 

As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated 
here, I cannot close this i)art of my report with- 
out giving an expression of my sincere thanks 
and gratitude to the officers and men whom I had 
the honor to command. 

From the conjmencoment to the termination 
of this most arduous campaign, the army of the 
Potomac always evinced the most perfect subor- 
dination, zeal, and alacrity in the performance of 
all the duties required of it. 

The amount of severe labor accomplished by 
this army in the construction of intrenchments, 
roads, bridges, &c.. was enormous; yet all the 
work was performed with the most gratifying 
cheerfulness and devotion to the interest of the 
service. 

During the campaign ten severely contested 
and sanguinary battles had been fought, l)esides 
numerous smaller engagements, in whicli the 
troops exhibited the most determined entiiusiasm 
and bravery. They submitted to exposure, sick- 
ness, and even death without a murmur. In- 
deed, they had become veterans in their coun- 
try's cause, and richly deserved the warm com- 
mendation of the Government. 



105 



It was in view of these facts that this seemed 
to uie an appropriate occasion for the general- 
in-chief to give, in general orders, some appreci- 
ative exuression of tlie services of the army 
while upon the Peninsula. Accordingly, on the 
18th I sent him the following dispatch : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"August 18, 1862—11 p. M. 
" Please say a kind word to my army that I 
can repeat to them in general orders in regard 
to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, 
West Point, Hanover Court House, and on the 
Cliickahominy, as well as in regard to the (7) 
seven days and the recent retreat. 

" No one has ever said anything to cheer them 
but myself. Say nothing about me. Merely 
give my men and officers credit for what they 
have done. It will do you much good, and will 
strengthen you much with them if you issue a 
handsome order to them in regard to what they 
have accomplished. They deserve it. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

*' Major- General. 
" Major-General Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

As no reply was received to this communica- 
tion, and no order was issued hy the general-in- 
chief, I conclude that suggestion did not meet, 
with his approbation. 

All the lyersoanel and material of the army 
had been transferred from Harrison's Landing to 
the different jioints of embarkation in the very 
brief period of tive days without the slightest 
loss or damage. Porter's troops sailed from 
Newport News on the 19th and 20th. Heintzel- 
man's corps sailed from Yorktown on the 21st. 
On that day 1 received the following telegram 
from the general-in-chief : — 

*' Washington, August 21, 18G2 — 6 p. si. 

" Leave such garrisons in Portress Monroe, 
Yorktown. &c., as you may deem proper. They 
will be replaced by new troops as rapidly as pos- 
sible, 

" The forces of Burnside and Pope ai-e hard 
pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can 
send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. 

" By all means see that the troops sent have 
plenty of ammunition. We have no time here 
to supply them. Moreover, they may have to 
light as soon as they land. 

" H. "W. HALLECK, 
'•'• Maj-Gen. Commanding United States Army. 

" General McClellan." 

To which the following are replies : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potojiac, 
" Fortress Monroe, August 21, 1862—7.30 p. m. 

" Your despatch of (6) six p. m. received. I 
have not lost an hour in sending troops, nor will 
I. Franklin is here, and I will try to get some 
of his troops on board to-night. I had already 
ord(2red all the ammunition forward. 

" I will put headquarters on board sliip early 
to-morrow morning, so that I can leave at a mo- 
ment's notice. 1 hope that I can get off to-mor- 
row. Shall I go in person to Aquia, or do you 
wish to see me first at Washington? If you 
14 



wish it I can probably ship quite an amount of 
ammunition for other troops than this army. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
. "■ Major- Utntral. 

"Major-General IIam.eck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

"Headquarters Akmy ov tiik Potomac, 
" Fort Mo7iroe, August 21, 18G2— 10.25 p. m. 

" I have ample supplies of ammunition for in- 
fantry and artillery, and will have it u]> in time. 
I can supply any deiiciency that may exist 
in General Pope's army. Quite a number of 
rifled field guns are on hand lie*,>. 

" The forage is the only question for you to 
attend to ; please have that reaily for "me at 
Aquia. I want many more schooners for cavalry 
horses ; they should have water on hand when 
they come here. 

" If you have leisure, and there is no objec- 
tion, please communicate to me fully the state of 
affairs, and your plans. I will tlien be enabled 
to arrange details undcrstandingly. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

•■ Major- General. 

" Major-General Halleck, 

" Washington." 

Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe, I gave 
directions for strengthening the defences of 
Yorktown, to resist any attack from the direction 
of Richmond, and left General Keyes, with his 
corps, to perform the work, and temporarily gar- 
rison the place. 

I telegraphed as follows on the 22d : — 
" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Fort Monroe, August 22, 1862—2.15 p. m. 
" Dispatch of to-day received. Franklin's 
corps is embarking as rapidly as possible. Sum- 
ner's corps is at Newport News, ready to embark 
as fast as transportation ari-ives. Keyes is still 
at Yorktown, putting it in a proper state of de- 
fence. I think that all of Franklin's corps will 
get off to-day, and hope to commence with Sum- 
ner to-morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry 
and wagons. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" Major-General H. W. Haileck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Fort Monroe, August 22, 1862—3.40 p. m. 
" Two (2) good ordnance sergeants are needed 
immediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The 
new defences are arranged and commenced. 

" I recommend that five thousand (5,000) 
new troops be sent immediately to garrison York 
and Gloucester. They should be commanded by 
an experienced general officer, who can diseij)line 
and instruct them. About (900) nine hundred 
should be artillery. I recommend that a new 
regiment, whose colonel is an artillery officer, or 
graduate, be designated a heavy artillery, and sent 
there. A similar regiment is absolutely neces- 
sary here. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 



106 



On the 23cl Franklin's corps sailed. I report- 
ed this in the fullowing despatch : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'^Fori Monroe, August 23, 18G2 — 1.30 p. m. 
" Franklin's corps has started. I shall start 
for Aquia in about half an hour. No transports 
yet for iSumner's corps. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
"Major-General H. W. IIalleck, 

" Commanding United Stales Army." 

On that evening I sailed with my staff for 
Aquia Creek, where I arrived at daylight on the 
following morning, reporting as follows : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
''Aquia Creek, August 24, 18G2. 
" I have reached here, and respectfully report 
for orders. G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
"Major-General Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Armij/' 

I also telegraphed as follows : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
'■'■Aquia Creek, August 24, 18(32 — 2 p. m. 

" Your telegram received. Morell's scouts 
report Rappahannock Station burned and aban- 
doned by Pope, without any notice to Morell or 
Sykes. This was telegraphed you some hours 
ago. Reynolds, Reno, and Stevens are sup- 
posed to be with Pope, as nothing can be heard 
of them to-day. Morell and Sykes are near 
Morrisville Post Office, watching the lower fords 
of Rappahannock, with no troops between there 
and Rappahannock Station, wiiich is reported 
abandoned by Pope. 

" Please inform me immediately exactly where 
Pope is, and what doing; until I know that I 
cannot regulate Porter's movements ; he is much 
exposed now, and decided measures should be 
taken at once. Until I know what my command 
and position are to be, and whetlier you still 
intend to place me in the command indicated in 
your tirst letter to me, and orally through Gen- 
eral Burnside, at the Cliickahoniiny, I cannot 
decide where I can be of most use. If your 
determination is unchanged, 1 ought to go to 
Alexandria at once. Please define my position 
and duties. G. B. McCLELLAN, 

Major -General. 

" Major-General H. W. Haleeck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

ToAvhich I received the following reply : — 
Washington, August 24, 1862. 
"You a^k me tor information which I cannot 
give. I do not know either where General Pope 
is, or where the enemy in force is. These are 
matters which I have all day been most anxious 
to ascertain. H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 

" Major-General McClellan." 

On the 2Gth I received the following: — 
Washington, August 20, 1862—11 a. m. 

" There is reason to believe that the enemy is 
moving a large force into the Shenandoah Val- 
ley. Recoouoissances will soon determine. 



General Heintzelinan's corps was ordered to 
report to General Pope, and Kearney's will prob- 
ably be sent to-day againat the enemy's flank. 
Don't draw any troops down the Rappananock 
at present; we shall probably want them all in 
the direction of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you 
had better leave General Burnside in charge at 
Aquia Creek, and come to Alexandria, as very 
great irregularities ai-e reported there. General 
Franklin's corps will march as soon as it receives 
transportation. 

" II. W. IIALLECK, 

" Gcncral-in-Ohief. 
"Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

On receipt of this I immediately sailed for 
Alexandria, and reported as follows : — 

" Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 8 a. m. 
"I arrived liere last night, and have taken, 
measures to ascertain the state of affairs here, 
and that proper remedies may be applied. Just 
received a rumor that railway bridge over BuU 
Kuu was biu-ned last night. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General, 
"Major-Gener.al H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

Alexandria, August 27, 18G2— 9.40 a. m. 
"The town is quiet, although quite full of 
soldiers, who are said to be chiefly convalescents. 
"The affairs of the quartermaster's depart- 
ment are reported as going on well. 

"It is said that Bull's Run bridge will be re- 
paired by to-moirow. The disembarkation ol 
Sumner's corps commenced at Aquia yesterday 
afternoon. I found that he could reach Rappa- 
hannock Station earlier that way than from here. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

On the same day I received the following : — 
" Washington, August 27, 1862. 

" Telegrams from General Porter to General 
'Burnside, just received, say that Banks is at 
Fayetteville; McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketta 
near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is 
marching on Warrenton Junction, to reinforce 
Pope. Nothing said of Keintzelman. Porter 
reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's 
corps should move out by forced marches, carry- 
ing three or four days' provisions, and to be 
supplied, as far as possible, by railroad. Per- 
haps you may prefer some other road than to 
Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just telegraphed 
about sending out troops. Please see him, and 
give him your directions. There has been some 
serious neglect to guard the railroad, which 
should be immediately remedied. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 

" Major-G<)Tieral McClellan." 

I replied as follows : — 
" Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10 A. M. 

" Telegraph this moment received. I have 
sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march 
with his corps at once, and to repair herein per- 



107 



son to inform mc as to his means of transpor- 
tation. 

'•Kearney was yesterday at Rappahannock 
Station ; Porter at Ecaiton, Keliip, Barnells, &.c. 

JSuinner will commence rcacliin;^ Falmouth to- 
day. Williams's JMassachusetts cavalry will be 
mostly at Falmouth to-day. 

" I loaned Burnside my personal escort (one 
squadron 4th regulars) to scout down the liap- 
pahannock. 

" I have sent for Couch's division to come at 
once. As fast as I gain my information I will 
forward it, although you may already have it. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General. 
" Major-Greneral H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

I also receired the following telegrams : — 

"Washington, August 27, 1862. 
" Direct General Casey to furnish you about 
five thousand of the new troops under his com- 
mand. 

" Take entire direction of the sending out of 
the troops from Alexandria. 

" Determine questions of priority in transpor- 
tation, and the places they shall occupy. Pope's 
lieadquarters are near VVarrenton Junction, but 
I cannot ascertain the present position of his 
troops. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Cliief. 
*' Major-Goneral McClellan." 

" Washington, August 27, 1862. 
" I can get no satisfactory information from the 
front, either of the enemy or of our troops. 
There seems to have been great neglect and 
carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's corps 
should march in that direction as soon as pos- 
sible. A competent officer should be sent out to 
take direction of affairs in that vicinity. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Cliief. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent 
the following telegram to Generals Heintzel- 
man and Porter : — 

" Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10.30 a. m. 
" Where are you, and what is state of affairs 
— what troops in your front, right, and left ? 
Sumner is now landing at Aquia. Where is 
Pope's left, and what of enemy? Enemy burned 
Bull Run bridge last night with cavalry force. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
•' Major-General Heintzelman, Warrenton. 
" lilajor-General Porter, Bcalion. 
" P. S. — If these general officers are not at 
the places named, nearest operator will please 
have message forwarded." 

I also telegraphed to the general-in-chief as 
follows : — 

" Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 10.50 a. m. 

" I have sent all the information I possess 
to Burnside, instructing him to look out well 
for his right flank, between the Rappahannock 
and Potomac, and to send no trains to Por- 



ter without an escort. T fear the cavalry who 
dashed at Bull Run last night may trouble Bum- 
side a little. I have sent to communicate with 
Porter and Heintzelman, ria Falmouth, and 
hope to give you some definite iTiforniation in a 
few hours. 1 shall land the next cavalry I get 
hold of here, and send it out to keep open the 
communication between Pope and Porter, also 
to watch vicinity of Manassas. Please send me 
a number of copies of the best maps of present 
field of operations. I can use tifiy (50) to ad- 
vantage. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

^'' Major-General. 
" Major-General Hai-leck, 

" Commanding United States Armi/." 

" Alexandria, August 27, 1862—12.50 a. m. 
"In view of Burnside's despatch, just re- 
ceived, would it not be advisable to throw the 
mass of Sumner's corps here, to move out with 
Franklin to Centreville or vicinity ? If a deci- 
sive battle is fought at Warrenton, a disaster 
would leave any troops on the lower Rappalian- 
nock in a dangerous position. 

" They would do better service in front of 
Washington. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

'^ Major-General. 
" Major-General Halleck, 
" Washington, D. C." 

" ALEXA.NDRIA, August 27, 1862—12.5 p. m. 
" My aid has just returned from General 
Franklin's camp; reports that Generals Frank- 
lin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washing- 
ton. He gave the order to the next in rank 
to place the corps in readiness to move at once. 
I learn that heavy firing has been heard this 
morning at Centreville, and have sent to ascer- 
tain the truth. I can find no cavalry to ,«end 
out on tlie roads. Are the works garrisonedand 
ready for defence ? 

"G. B. McCLTn:.LAN, 

" Major-General. 
"Major-General, Halleck, 

" Washington." 

" Alexandria, August 27, 1862— 12J?0r m. 
"What bridges exist over Bull Run? Have 
steps been taken to construct bridges for the ad- 
vance of troops to reinforce Pope, or to enable 
him to retreat if in trouble ? 

" There should be two gunboats at Aquia 
Creek at once. Shall I push the rest of Sum- 
ner's corps here, or is Pope so strong as to be 
reasonably certain of success? I have sent to 
inspect the works near here and their garrisons. 
"As soon as I can find General Casey, or 
some other commanding officer, I will see to the 
railway, &c. It would be well to liave them re- 
port to me, as I do not know where they are. I 
am trying to lind them, and will lose no time 
in carrying out your orders'. Would like to see 
Burnside. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Wasliington." 
"Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—1.15 p.m. 
" Franklin's artillery have no horses, except for 
four (4) gims without caissons. I can pick up no 



108 



cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be 
well to push Sumner's coi-ps here hy water as 
rajjidly as possilile, to make immediate arrange- 
ments for plaeing the works in front of Wash- 
ington in an ethcient condition of defence? 1 
have no means of knowing the enemy's force 
between Pope and ourselves. 

" Can Franklin, without his artillery or caval- 
ry, effect any useful purpose in front? 

''Should not Burnside take steps at once to 
evacuate Falmouth and Acpiia, at the same time 
covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who 
may fall back in that direction? 

" I do not see that we have force enough in 
hand to form a connection with Pope, whose 
exact position we do not know. Are we safe in 
the direction of the vallcv? 

"G. B." McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General" 

*' Major-General IIallkck, 

" Washington." 

"Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—1.35 p. m. 

" I learn that Taylor's brigade, sent this morn- 
ing to Bull Eun Bridge, is either cut to pieces or 
captured. 

" That the force against them had many guns, 
and about (5,000) five thousand infantry, receiv- 
ing reinforcements every minute ; also, that 
Gainesville is in possession of the enemy. 
Please send some cavalry out towards Drains- 
ville, via Chain Bridge, to watch Lewinsville 
and Drainsville, and go as far as they can. If 
you will give me even one squadron of good cav- 
alry here I will ascertain the state of the case. 
I think our policy now is to make these works 
perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as 
soon as possible, but not to advance them until 
they can liave their artillery and cavalry. I have 
sent for Colonel Tyler to place his artillerymen 
in the works. 

"Is Fort Marcy securely held? 

"G. B. MoCLELLAN, 

" Major- General." 

" General Halleck." 

" Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—2.30 p. m. 

" Sumner has been ordered to send here all 
of his corps that are within reach. Orders have 
been sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown 
with ths least possilile delay. But one squadron of 
mj cavahy has arrived ; that will be disembarked 
at once and sent to the front. 

"If there is any cavalry in Washington it 
should be ordered to report to me at once. 

"I still think that we should first provide for 
the immediate defence of Washington on both 
sides of the Potomac. 

" I am not responsible for the past, and cannot 
be for the future, unless I receive authority to 
dispose of the available troops according to my 
judgment. Please inform me at onee what my 
position is. I do not wish to act in the dark. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major-General. 

"Major-General II. W. Hallkck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

" Alexandkia, Aug. 27, 1862—6 p. m. 
" I have just received the copy of a despatch 
from General Pope to you, dated 10 a. m. this 



morning, in which he says : ' All forces now sent 
for'.vard should be sent to right at Gainesville. 

" I now have at my cUsposal here about (10,000) 
ten thousand men of Franklin's corps, about 
(2,800) twenty-eight hundred of General Tyler's 
brigade and Colonel Tyler's first Connecticut 
artillery, which I recommend should be held in 
hand for the defence of Washington. 

" If you wish me to order any part of this 
force to the front, it is in readiness to march at 
a moment's notice to any point you may indicate. 

" In view of the existing state of things in our 
front, I have deemed it best to order General 
Casey to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness 
to move, but not to send them otf till further 
orders. G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

"Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

On the 28th I telegraphed as follows : — 

"Headquarters Camp near Alexandria, 

"August 28, 1862—4.10 p. m. 
"General Franklin is with me here. I will 
know in a few minutes the condition of artillery 
and cavalry. 

" We are not yet in condition to move ; may 
be by to-morrow morning. 

"Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the 
plan I suggested. I have ordered troops to gar- 
rison the works at Upton's Hill. They must be- 
held at any cost. As soon as I can see the way 
to spare them, I will send a corps of good troops 
there. It is the key to Washington, which can- 
not be seriously menaced as long as it is held. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 
" Major-General Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

I received the following from the geueral-in-» 
chief: — 

" Washington, August 28, 1862. 

"I think you had better place Sumner's corps' 
as it arrives near the guns, and particularly ati 
the Chain Bridge. 

"The principal thing to be feared now is ar 
cavalry raid into this city, especially in the night 
time. 

" Use Cox's and Tyler's brigade, and the new 
troops for the same object, if you need them. 

" Porter writes to Burnside from Bristow, 9.30 
A. Ji. yesterda_y, that Pope's forces were then 
moving on Manassas, and that Burnside would 
soon hear of them by way of Alexandria. 

" General Cullum has gone to Harper's Ferry, 
and I have only a single regular officer for duty 
in the office. 

" Please send some of your officers to-day to 
see that every precaution is taken at the forts 
against a raid ; also at the bridge. Please an- 
swer. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

"General-in- Chief. 

" Major-General McClellan." 

On the 29th the following despatch was tele- 
graphed : — 

" Camp near Alexandria, 
"August 29, 1862—10.30 a. m. 

"Franklin's corps is in motion; started about 
six (6) A. M. I can give him but two squadrons 



109 



of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to 
Upton's Hill, to liold that important point with 
its works, and to pusli cavalry scouts to Vienna, 
\'a Freedom Hill and Hunter's lane. Cox has (2) 
vfvo squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once 
whether this meets your approval. I have di- 
ro'jted Woodbury, with the engineer brigade, to 
bold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached, last night, 
two regiments to vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen 
and Marcy. Meagher's brigade is still at Aquia. 
If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us 
without any relial)le troops in and near Washing- 
ton. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What 
shall be done? No more cavalry arrived ; have 
but three (3) squadrons. Franklin has but forty 
(40) rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to 
move more. I do not think Franklin is in con- 
dition to accomplish much if lie meets with 
serious resistance. I should not have moved 
him but for your pressing order of last night. 
What have you from Vienna and Drainsville ? 
" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

'■'■Major- General. 
" Major-General Halleck, 

" WasJiington, D. C. 

To which the following is a reply : — 

" Washington, August 29, 18C2 — 12 m. 
" Upton's Hill arrangement all right. We 
must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin 
as fast as they arrive. 

" Meagher's brigade ordered up yesterday. 
Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, 
in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. 
I have nothing from Drainesville. 

•'H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

On the same day the following was received 
from His Excellency the President : — 

" Washington, 
"August 29, 18G2— 2.30 p. m. 
" What news from direction of Manassas 
Junction ? What, generally ? 

"A. LINCOLN. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

To which I replied as follows : — 

"Camp near Alexandria, 
" August 29, 18G2— 2.45 p. m. 

" The last news I received from the direction 
of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect 
that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and 
retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This by no 
means reliable. 

" I am clear that one of two courses should be 
adopted : 1st, to concentrate all our available 
forces to open communications with Pope ; 2d, 
to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at 
once to use all our means to make the capital 
perfectly safe. 

" No middle ground will now answer. Tell 
nie what you wish me to do, and I will do all in 
my power to accomplish it. I wish to know 
what my orders and authority are. I ask for 
nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. 
I only ask a prompt decision that I may at once 



give the necessary orders. It will not do to de- 
lay longer. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, i/o/or-GeneroZ. 
" A. Lincoln, President." 

And copy to General Halleck. 

To which the following is a reply : — 

" Washington, August 29, 18(52—4.10 p.m. 

" Yours of to-day just received. I think 
your first alternative, to wit, ' to concentrate all 
our available forces to open communication with 
Pope,' is the right one, but I wish not to con- 
trol. That I now leave to General Halleck, 
aided by your counsels. 

"A. LINCOLN. 

" Major-General McClellan." 

It had been officially reported to me from 
Washington that the enemy, in strong force, was 
moving through Vienna in the direction of the 
Chain Bridge, and had a large force in Vienna. 
This report, in connection with the despatch of 
the general-in-chief on tlie 28th, before noted, 
induced me to direct Franklin to halt his com- 
mand near Anandale until it could be deter- 
mined, by reconnoissances to Vienna and to- 
wards Manassas, whether these reports were 
true. General Cox was ordered to send his 
small cavalry force from Upton's Hill towards 
Vienna and Drainsville in one direction, and 
towards Fairfax Court House in the other, and 
Franklin to push his two squadrons as far to- 
wards Manassas as possible, in order to ascer- 
tain the true position of the enemy. 

With the enemy in force at Vienna, and 
towards Lewinsville, it would have been very 
injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small 
force beyond Anandale. It must be remem- 
bered that at that time we were cut off from di- 
rect communication with General Pope ; that 
the enemy was, by the last accounts, at Manas- 
sas in strong force, and that Franklin had only 
from 10.000 to 11,000 men, with an entirely in- 
sufficient force of cavalry and artillery. 

In order to represent this condition of affairs 
in its proper light to the general-in-chief, and to 
obtain definite instructions from him, I tele- 
graphed as follows : — 

" Camp near Alexandria, 

"August 29, 1862— 12 m. 

"Have ordered most of the (12th) Pennsyl- 
vania cavalry to report to General Barnard for 
scouting duty towards Rockville, Poolesville, &c. 
'"If you apprehend a raid of cavalry on your 
side of river, I had better send a brigade or 
two of Sumner's to near Tenallytown, where, 
with two or three old regiments in Forts Allen 
and Marcy, they can watch both Chain Bridge 
and Tenallj-town. 

" Would it meet your views to post the rest 
of Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort 
Corcoran, whence they can either support Cox, 
Franklin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenally- 
town ? 

"Franklin has only between ten thousand 
(10,000) and eleven thousand (11,000) for duty. 

" How far do you wish this force to advance? 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

" Major-General Halleck, Washington." 



no 



" Camp near Alexandria, 
" August 29, 1802—1 p. m. 

** I anxiously await reply to ray last despatch 
in regard to Sumner. Wish to give the order 
at once. 

" Please authorize me to attach new regiments 
permanently to ray old brigades. I can do 
much good to old and new troops in that way. 
1 shall endeavor to hold a line in advance oi" 
Forts Allen and Marcy, at least with strong 
advanced guards. I wish to hold the line 
through Prospect Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and 
Hall's Hill. Tliis will give us timely warn- 
ing. .ShaU I do as seems best to me with all the 
troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, who 
I really tlank ought not, under present circum- 
st-ances, to advance beyond Anandalc ? 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 

" General Halleck." 

On the same day I received a despatch from 
the General-in-Chief, in which he asks me why 
I halted Franklin in Anandale, to which I re- 
plied as follows : — 

"Camp near Alexandria, 

" August 29, 18G2— 10.30 a. m. 

*' By referring to ray telegrams of 10.30 a. m., 
12 M., and 1 p. m., together with your reply of 
2.48 p. M., you will see why Franklin's corps 
halted at Anandale. His small cavalry force, all 
I had to give him, was ordered to push on as far 
as possible towards Manassas. 

" It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond 
Anandale, under the circumstances, until we 
knew what was at Vienna. 

"General Franklin remained here until about 
1 p. M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies 
for his command. I am responsible for both 
these circumstances, and do not see that either 
was in disobedience to your orders. 

" Please give distinct orders in reference to 
Franklin's movements of to-morrow. I have 
sent to Colonel Haupt to push out construction 
and supply trains as soon as possible. 

" General Tyler to furnish the necessary 
guards. 

" I have directed General Banks's supply 
trains to start out to-night at least as far as An- 
andale, with an escort from General Tyler. 

" In regard to to-morrow's movements I de- 
sire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable 
to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I 
have simply exercised the discretion you com- 
mitted to me. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major- General. 

" Major-General Halleck, 

" Washington, D- C." 

On the same evening I sent the following 
despatches : — 

" Camp near Alexandria, 
"August 29, 18G2— 10 p. m. 

" Not hearing from you, I have sent orders 
to General Franklin to i)Iace himself in commu- 
nication with Genera) Pope as soon as possible. 



and at the same time to cover the transit of Pope's 
supplias. 

" Orders have been given for railway and 
wagon trains to move to Pope with least possible ' 
delay. 

" I am having inspections made of all the forts 
around th(? city by merabers of my staff, with 
instructions to give all requisite orders. 

" I inspected Worth and Ward myself this 
evening ; found them in good order. 

" Reports, so far as heard from, are favorable 
as to condition of works. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

"Major-General Halleck, Washington." 

" Camp near Alexandria, 
" August 29, 1862—10 p. m. 

"Your despatch received. Franldin's corps 
has been ordered to march at G o'clock to-mor- 
row morning. Sumner has about fourteen thou- 
sand infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. 
Cox's brigade of four regiments is here, with two 
batteries of artillery. Men of two regiments, 
much fatigued, came in to-day. Tyler's brigade 
of three new regiments, but little drilled, is also 
here ; all these troops will be ordered to hold 
themselves ready to march to-morrow morning, 
and all except Franklin's to await further orders. 

" If you wish any of them to move towards 
Manassas, please inform me. 

" Colonel Wagner, 2d New York artillery, has 
just come in from the front. He reports strong 
infantry and cavalry force of Rebels near Fairfax 
Court House. Reports rumors from various 
sources that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, 
are at Manassas. 

"That the enemy, with 120,000 men intend 
advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain 
Bridge, with a view of attacking Washington 
and Baltimore. 

" General Barnard telegraphs me to-night 
that the length of the line of fortifications on 
this side of the Potomac requires 2,000 additional 
artillerymen, and additional troops to defend 
intervals, according to circumstances ; at all 
events, he says an old regiment should be added 
to the force at Chain Bridge, and a few regi- 
ments distributed along the lines to give confi- 
dence to our new troops. I agree with him 
fully, and think our fortifications along the upper 
part of our line on this side the river very 
unsafe with their present garrisons, and the 
movements of the enemy seem to indicate an 
attack upon those works. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-General, 

" General H. W. Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, United States Army, 
Washington, D. C." 

"Camp near Alexandria, 

"August 30, 1862—11.30 a. m. 
"Your telegram of 9 a m. received. Ever 
since General Franklin received notice that he 
was to march from Alexandria, he has been en- 
deavoring to get transportation from the quar- 
termaster at Alexandria, but he has uniformly 
been told that there was none disposable, and 
his command marched without wagons. After 



Ill 



the departure of his corps he procured twenty 
wagons to carry some extra ammunition, by un- 
loading Banks's supply train. 

'•General Sumner endeavored by application 
upon the quartermaster's department, to get 
wagons to carry his reserve ammunition, but 
without success, and was obliged to march with 
what he could carry in his cartridge boxes. 

" I have this morning directed that all my 
headquarters wagons that are landed be at once 
loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Frank- 
lin; but they will not go far towards supplying 
the deficiency. 

" Eighty-iive wagons were got together by 
the quartermasters last night, loaded with sub- 
sistence, and sent forward at 1 a. m. with an es- 
cort, t;?'a Anandale. Every effort has been made 
to carry out your orders promptly. The great 
difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the 
greater part of the transportation on hand at 
Alexandria and Washington has been needed for 
current supplies of tlie garrisons. Such is the 
state of the case as represented to me by the 
quartermasters, and it appears to be true. 

" I take it for granted that this has not been 
properly explained to vou. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" 3Iaj or- General. 

" Major-General Halleck, 

" General-in- Cliief.'" 

On the morning of the 30th heavy artillery 
firing was heard in the direction of Fairfax Court 
House, which I reported to the general-in- 
chief. 

At 11 A. M. the following telegram was 
sent : — 

" Camp near Alexandria, 

" August 30, 1862—11 a. m. 
" Have ordered Sumner to leave (1) one bri- 
gade in vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the 
rest via Columbia Pike on Anandale and Fairfax 
Court House. 

"Is this the route you wish them to take? 
fTe and Franlclin are both instructed to join Pope 
as promptly as possible. 

" Shall Couch move out also when he arrives? 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

' ' Major- General. 
" Major-General Halleck, Washington." 

On the same day I received the following : — 

Washington, August 30, 1862 — 1.45 p. m. 
" Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, 
must be immediately sent forward to Centreville 
for General Pope. It must be done with all 
possible despatch. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in- Cliief, 
" General McClellan." 

To which this reply was made : — 

" Camp near Alexandria, 
" August 30, 1862—2.10 p. m. 
" I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's ar- 
tillery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance 
officer to load up all the wagons sent to him. I 
have already sent all my headquarters wagons. 



You will have to sec that wagons are sent from 
Washington. I can do nothing more than give 
the order that every available wagon in Alexan- 
dria shall be loaded at once. 

" The order to the brigade of Sumner that I 
directed to remain near (Jhain Bridge and Ten- 
allytown, should go from your headquarters to 
save time. I understand you to intend it also 
to move. I have no sharpshooters except the 
guard around my camp. I have sent off every 
man but those, and will now send them with the 
train, as you direct. I will also send my only 
remaining squadron- of cavalry with General 
Sumner. I can do no more. You now have 
every man of the army of the Potomac within 
my reach. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

" Major-General H. W. Halleck." 

At 10.30 p. M. the following telegram was 
sent : — 

*' Camp near Alexandria, 
August 30, 1862—10.30 p. m. 

" I have sent to the front all my troops, with 
the exception of Couch's division, and have given 
the orders necessary to insure its being disposed 
of as you directed. I hourly expect the return 
of one of my aids, who will give authentic news 
from the fi(;ld of battle. 

" I cannot express to you the pain and morti- 
fication I have experienced to-day in listening to 
the distant sound of the firing of my men. As , 
■can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask 
that, if there is a probability of tlie conflict being 
renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go 
to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be 
with my own men, if nothing more ; they will 
fight none the worse for my being with them. If 
it is not deemed best to intrust me with the com- 
mand even of my own army, I simply ask to be 
permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. 

"Please reply to this to-night. 

" I have been engaged for the last few hours 
in doing what I can to make arrangements for 
the wounded. I have started out all the ambu- 
lances now landed. As I have sent my escort 
to the front, I would be glad to take some of 
Gregg's cavalry with me, if allowed to go. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

" Major-General IF. W. Halleck, 
" Commanding United States Army, Wash- 
ington, D. C" 

To which, on the following day I received this 
answer : — 

Washington, August 31, 1862—9.18 a. m. 
"I have just seen your telegram of 11.5 last 
night. The substance was stated to me when 
received, but I did not know that you asked for 
a reply immediately. I cannot answer without 
seeing the President, as General Pope is in com- 
mand, by his orders, of the department. 

" I think Couch's division should go forward 
as rapidly as possible and find the battle-field. 
"H. W. HALLECK. 

" General-in-Chief" 
" Major-General McClellan." 



112 



On the same day the following was re- 
ceived : — 

'• Washington, August 31, 1862 — 12.45 p. m. 

" Tile sul)sistence department are making 
Fairfax Station their principal depot. It should 
])e well guarded. Tlie officer in cliarge sliould 
he directed to secure the depot by abatis against 
cavalry. As many as possihk> of the new regi- 
ments sliould i)e prepared to take the field. Per- 
]ia])s some more sliould be sent to the vicinity of 
C'liain liridge. 

" H. VV. HALLECK, 

•' Ge?ieral-in- Chief. 

'* Major-General McClellan." 

At 2.30 P.M. tlie following despatch was tele- 
grapiied : — 

*' Camp near Alexandria, 
" August :n. 18G2— 2.30 p.m. 

" Major Haller is at Fairfax Station with my 
provost and lieadquarters guard and other troops. 
I have requested (4) four more companies to be 
sent at once, and the pn cautions you direct to 
be taken. 

" Under the War Department order of yester- 
day I have no control over anytliing except my 
staff, some one liundred men in my camp liere, 
and the few remaining near Fort Monroe. I 
liave no control over the new regiments — do not 
know where they are, or anything about ttieni, 
except those near here. Their commanding 
officers and those of the works are not under 
me. 

" Where I have seen evils existing under my 
eye I have corrected tliem. I think it is the bus- 
iness of General Casey to prepare the new regi- 
ments for tlie field, and a matter between him 
and General Barnard to order others to the vi- 
cinity of Chain Bridge. Neitlier of tliem is under 
luy conimaud, and t)y the War Department order 
I have no right to give them orders. 

" G. B. MeCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 

" General Halleck, Washington.'" 

" To which tlie following is an answer : — 

" Washington, August 31, 1862 — 10.7 p.m. 

" Since receiving your despatch, relating to 
command, I have not been able to answer any 
not of absolute necessity. I have not seen the 
order as published, but will write to you in the 
morning. You will retain tlie command of ev- 
erything in tills vicinity not temporarily belong- 
ing to Pojie's army in the field. 

" I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with 
your ability and experience. I am entirely tired 
out. H. W. HALLECK, 

'^ General-in-Chief. 

" General McClellan." 

The order referred to in the preceding de- 
spatch was as follows : — 

" War Department, August 30, 1862. 

" The following are the commanders of the 
armies operating in Virginia: — 

" General Uurnside commands his own corps, 
excoi)t those lliat have been temporarily detached 
and assigned to General Pope. 



" General McClellan commands that portion 
of the army of tlie Potomac that has not been 
sent forward to General Pope's command. 

" General Pope (;ommands tlie army of Vir- 
ginia and all the forces temporarily attaclied to 
it. All the forces a "e tinder tlie command of 
Major-General Halleck, general-in-chief. 
" E. D TOWNSEND, 
^'■Assistant Adjutant- General." 

I was informed by Colonel Townsend that the 
above was published by order of the Secretary of 
War. 

At 11.30 P.M. I telegraphed the following: — 

" Camp near Alexandria. 

" August 31, 18G2— 11.30 p. m. 

" The squadron of 2d regular cavalry that I 
sent with General Sumner was captured to-day 
about 2 p. M. some three miles from Fairfax 
Court House, beyond it on the Little Kiver Pike, 
by Fitz Hugh Lee, with three tliousand cavalry 
and three liglit batteries. 

•• I have conversed with the 1st sergeant, who 
says that when he last saw them they were with- 
in a mile of J'airfax. Pope had no troops on that 
road ; this squadron getting tliere by mistake. 
There is nothing of ours on the right of Centre- 
ville but Sumner's corps. There was much ar- 
tillery firing during the day. A Rebel major 
told the sergeant that the Kebels had driven in 
our entire left to-day. He says the road is filled 
with wagons and stragglers coming towards Al- 
exandria. 

" It is clear from the sergeant's account that 
we were badly beaten yesterday, and that Pope's 
right is entirely exposed. 

" I recommend that no more of Couch's divis- 
ion be sent to the front, thatBurnsidebe brought 
here as soon as practicable, and tliat everything 
available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, 
including tlie mass of the troops on the railroad. 
I apprehend tliat the enemy will, or have by this 
time occupied Fairfax Court House and cut off 
Pope entirely, unless he falls back to-night via 
Sangster's and Fairfax Station. 

" I think these orders should be sent at once. 
I have no confidence in the dispositions made as 
I gather them. To speak frankly — and the oc- 
casion requires it — there appears to be a total 
absence of brains, and I fear the total destruc- 
tion of the army. I have some cavalry here that 
can carry out any orders you may have to send. 
The occasion is grave, and demands grave meas- 
ures. The question is, the salvation of the coun- 
try. I learn that our loss yesterday amounted 
to fifteen thousand. We cannot afford such losses 
without an object. 

" It is my deliberate opinion that the interests 
of the nation demand that Pope should fall back 
to-night if possible, and not one moment is to be 
lost. 

" I will use all the cavalry I have to watch 
our right. Please answer at once. I feel con- 
fident that you can rely upon the information I 
give you. 

" I shall be up all night, and ready to obey any 
orders you give me. 

"G. B. MeCLELLAN, 

' ' Major- General. 

" General Halleck, Washington." 



113 

To which this reply was received : — mation before I can order a retreat, as the falling 

hack oil the line of works must necessarily be 

"Washington, September 1, 18G2— 1.30 a. m. directed in case of a serious disaster. Give me 

" Burnside was ordered up very early yester- all additional news that is reliable, 
day morning. Retain remainder of Couch's " I shall be up all night, and ready to actus 

forces, and make arrangements to stop all re- circumstances may require. I am fully aware 

treating troops in line of works, or where you of the gravity of the crisis, and have lieen for 

can best establish an entire line of defence. My weeks. H. W. HALLKCK, 

news from Pope was up to 4 p. m. ; he was then " Gtneral-in- Chief. 

all right. I must wait for more definite infor- " Major-General McClellan." 

15 



114 



FOUETH PERIOD. 



On the 1st of September I -went into "Wash- 
ington, where I had an interview with the gen- 
eral-in-chief, wlio instrncted me, verbally, to 
take comniani! ot its defences, expresslj' limiting 
my jurisdiction to tlie works and their garrisons, 
and ])ri)hibiting me from exercising any control 
over tlu> troops actively engaged in front under 
Grneral i'oi)e. During tliis interview 1 suggest- 
ed to the general-in-cliief the necessity of his 
going in person, or sending one of his personal 
statf, to the army under General Pope, for the 
purpose of ascertaining tlie exact condition of 
afTairs ; he sent Colonel Kelton, his assistant 
adjutant-general. 

During the afternoon of the same day I re- 
ceived a message from the general-in-chief, to 
the efiect that he desired me to go at once to liis 
house to see tlie President. 

The President informed me tliat he had reason 
to believe that the army of the Potomac was not 
cheerfully cooperating with and supporting 
General Pope; that he had "always been a 
friend of mine ; " and now asked me, as a special 
favor, to use my influence in correcting this 
state of things. I replied, substantially, that I 
was confident that he was misinformed ; that I was 
sure, whatever estimate the army of the Poto- 
mac might entertain of General Pope, that tliey 
woukl obey his orders, support him to the fullest 
extent, and do their whole duty. The President, 
who was much moved, asked me to telegraph to 
" Fitz-John Porter, or some other of my friends," 
and try to do away with any feeling that might 
exist; adding, that I could rectify the evil, and 
that no one else could. 

I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully 
telegraph to General Porter, or do anything else 
in my power to gratify his wishes and relieve 
his anxiety; upon which he thanked me very 
warmly, assured me that he could never forget 
my action in the matter, &c., and left. 

I tiien wrote the following telegram to Gen- 
eral Porter, which was sent to him by the 
general-in-chief : — 

Washington, September 1, 1862. 

"I ask of you, for my sake, that of the 
country, and the old army of the Potomac, that 
you and all my friends will lend the fullest and 
most cordial cooperation to General Pope, in 
all the operations now going on. The destinies 
of our country, the honor of our arms, are at 
stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful 
cooperation of all in the field. This week is 
the ci-isis of our fate. Say the same thing to my 
friends in the army of the Potomac, and that tlie 
last request I have to make of them is, that, for 
their coimtry's sake, they will extend to General 
Pope the same support they ever have to me. 

" 1 am in charge of the defences of Washing- 



ton, and am doing all I can to render your re- 
treat safe, should that become necessary. 

"GEO. E. McCLELLAN. 
" Major-General Pohtku." 

To which he sent the following reply : — 

"Fairfax Court House, 10 a. m. 
" September 2, 1862. 
" You may rest assured that all your friends,' 
as well as every lover of his country, will even 
give, as they have given, to General Pope their 
cordial coiiperation and constant sui)port in thei 
execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, 
wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our de- 
voted duty. 

"F. J. PORTER. 
" General Geo. B. McClellan, 

^'- Maj.-Gen. Commaiidinrj, Washington." 

Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor 
at any other time, did I think for one moment 
that General Porter had been, or v.'ould be, in 
any manner derelict in the i)orformance of liis 
duty to the nation and its cause. Such an im- 
pression never entered my mind. The despatch 
in question was written pi^rely at the request of I 
the President. 

On the morning of the 2d the President and 
General Halleck came to my house, when the 
President informed me that Colonel Kelton had 
returned from the fron'. ; that our allairs were in 
a bad condition ; that the army was in full re- 
treat upon the defences of Washington; the 
roads filled with stragglers, &c. He instructed 
me to take steps at once to stop and collect the 
stragglers ; to place the works in a proper state 
of defence, and to go out to meet and take com- 
mand of the army, when it approaclied the vi- 
cinity of the works, then to place the troops in 
the best position — committing everything to my 
hands. 

I immediately took steps to carry out these or- 
ders, and sent an aid to General Pope with the 
following letter : — 

" Headquarters, Washington, 

" September 2, 1862. 

" General : General Halleck instructed me 
to report to you the order he sent tliis morning 
to withdraw your army to Washington, without 
unnecessary dcla3^ He feared that his messen- 
ger might miss you, and desired to take this 
double precaution. 

" In order to bring troops upon ground with 
which they are already familiar, it would l)e best 
to move Porter's corps upon Upton's Hill, that 
it may occupy Hall's Ilili, &c. ; McDowell's to 
Upton's Hill ; Franklin's to the works in front 
of Alexandria; Heintzelman's to the same' vi- 
cinity ; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practiea- 



115 



ble, to the Chain Bridge ; Sumner either to Fort 
Albany or to Alexandria, as may be most con- 
venient. 

" In haste, General, very truly yours, 
"GEO. 13. McCLELLAN, 

" Maj.-Gcn. United States Army. 
"Major-General John Pope, 

" Commanding Army of Virginia." 

In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and 
rode to the front, and at Upton's Hill met the 
advanee of McDowell's corps, and with it Gen- 
erals Pope and McDowell. After getting what 
information I could from them, I sent the few 
aids at my disposal to the left to give instruc- 
tions to the troops approaching in the direction 
of Alexandria; and hearing artillery firing in the 
direction of the Vienna and Langley road, by 
which the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Sigel 
were returning, and learning from General Pope 
that Sumner was probably engaged, I went, 
with a single aid and three orderlies, by the 
shorteit line to meet that column. I reached 
the column after dark, and proceeded as tar as 
Lcwinsville, where I became satisfied that the 
rear corps (Sunmer's) would l)e able to reach its 
intended position without any serious molestation. 

I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and 
Sigel the positions they were to occupy, sent in- 
structions to General Sumner, and at a late 
hour of the night returned to Washington. 

Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, 
and was engaged in rectifying the positions of 
the troops, and giving orders necessary to secure 
the issuing of the necessary supplies, &c. 

I felt sure on this day that we could repui.se 
any attack made by the enemy on the south 
side of tiie Potomac. 

On the 3d tlie enemy had disappeared from 
the front of Washington, and tlie information 
which I received induced me to believe that he 
intended to cross the upper Potomac into Mary- 
land. This materially changed the aspect of 
alfairs, and enlarged the spliere of operations ; 
for, in case of a crossing in force, an active cam- 
paign would be necessary to cover Baltimore, 
prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania, and clear 
Maryland. 

I therefore, on the third, ordered the 2d and 
12th corps to Tenallytown, and the 9th corps to 
a point on the Seventh Street road near Wash- 
ington, and sent such cavahy as was available to 
the fords near Poolesville, to watch and impede 
the enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. 

On September 5, the 2d and 12th corps were 
moved to Rockville, and Couch's division ( the 
only one of the 4th corps that had been brought 
from the Peninsula) to Offut's Cross-roads. 

On the Gth the 1st and !)th corps were ordered 
to Leesburg; the Gth corps, and Sykes's division 
of the 5th corps, to Tenallytown. 

On the 7th the Gth corps was advanced to 
Rockville, to which place my headquarters were 
moved on the same day. 

Al l the necessary arrangements for the de- 



fence of the city, under tlic new condition of 
things, had been made, and General Banks was 
left in cominand, having received his instruc- 
tions from me. 

It will be seen from what has preceded that I 
lost no time that could be avoided in moving the 
army of the I'otomac from the Peninsula to llie 
support of the arniy of Virginia; tliai 1 spared no 
ehort to hasten the embarkation of the troops at 
Port Monroe, Newport News, and Vorklown, re- 
maining at Port Monroe myself until ihe mass of 
the army had sailed; and that, after my arrival at 
Alexandria, 1 lett nothing in my jiower undone 
to forward sui)plies and reinforcements to Gen- 
eral Pope, i sent, wiih the troops that moved, 
all the cavalry I could get hold of. Even my 
personal escort was sent out upon tlie line of the 
railway as a guard, with the provost and camp 
guards at heackiuarters, retaining less thin one 
hundred men, many of whom were orderlies, 
invalids, members of bands, &c. All the head- 
quarters teams that arrived were sent out with 
sui)|)lies and ammunition, none being retained 
even to move the headquarters camp. I'lic squad- 
ron that habitually served as my personal escort 
was left at Falmouth with General Burnside, as 
he was deficient in cavalry. 

I left Washington on the 7th of September. 
At this time it was known that the mass of the 
Rebel army had passed up the south side of the 
Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that 
a portion of that army had crossed into Mary- 
land ; but whether it was their intention to cross 
their whole force with a view to turn Wasiiington 
by a tiank movement down the north bank of the 
Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade 
Pennsylvania, were questions which, at that time 
we had no means of determining This uncertain- 
ty as to the intentions of the enemy obliged me, 
up to the 13th of September, to inarch cautiously 
and to advance the army in such order as con- 
tinually to keep Washington and IJaltiinoro 
covered, and at the same time to hold the troops 
v/ell in hand so as to be able to concentrate and 
follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of 
Pennsylvania; or to return to the defence of 
Washington, if. as was greatly ie.ired by the au- 
thorities, the enemy should be merely making a 
feint with a small force to draw off our army, 
while with their main forces they stood ready to 
seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the 
capital. 

In the mean time the process of reorganiza- 
tion, rendered necessary after the demoralizing 
effects of the disastrous campaign upon the 
other side of the Potomac, was rapidly i)rogrcss- 
ing, the troops were regaining confidence, and 
their former soldierly ap])earance and discijiline 
were fiist returning. My cavalry was pushed 
out continually in all directions, and all possible 
steps were taken to learn the positions and 
movements of the enemy. 

The following table shows tlie movements of 
tlie army, from day to day, up to the 14th of 
September. 



116 

Movements of the Army. 





September 4. 


September 6. 


September 9. 


September 10. 


BlfKNSIDE. 

0th corps, Ueno 

1st corps, Hooker 

SUMNER. 
12th corps, Williams.. 
2d corps, Sumner 

FRANKLIN, 

6th corps, Franklin., . . 


Seventh Street road. 
Upton's Hill 






























Alex. Seminary 








OflTut's Cross Roads.. 


Mouth of Seneca 





















September 11. 



September 12. 



September 13. 



Septemb'^r 14. 



BUnNSIDE. 

9th corps, Reno , 

1st corps, Hooker. . . . , 

SUMNEK. 

12th corps, Williams., 
2cl corps, Sumner..... 

FRAXKLIN. 

6th corps, Franklin,.., 
Couch's division 



New Market. 



Frederick. 



Sykes's division , 



Damascus.., 
Clarksburg., 

Barasville .. 
Poolesville., 

lliddleburg , 



Ridgeville, New Mar- 
ket, camp on the 
Monocacy. 

Tjnmsville Cross 

Uo.ids. 
Urbana 



Liekenwell Cross 

Road. 
Barusviile. 



Urljana. 



Middleburg.. 
Frederick.... 

Frederick.... 
Frederick. . . . 

Buckeystown 
Sicksville .... 

Frederick.... 



South Mountain . 
South Mountain . 

South Mountain . 
South Mountain. 

Burkettsville.... 
Burkettsville 

Middletown 



The right wing, consisting of the 1st and 9th 
corps, under tlie command of Major-General 
Burnside. moved on P'rcderick ; the first corps 
via Broolvsville, Cooksville, and Ridgcville, and 
the 9th corps via Damascus and Newmarket. 

Tlie 2d and 12tli corps, forming the centre, 
under tlie command of General Sumner, moved 
on Frederielv, the former ria Chirlcsl)urg and 
Urbana, the 12tli corps on a Literal road between 
Urbana and New Market, tlms maintaining the 
communication witli the right wing, and cover- 
ing tlie direct road from Frederick to Wasliing- 
ton. Tlie Gth corps, under the command of 
General Franklin, moved to Buckeystown via 
Darnestown, Dawsonville, and Barnesville, cov- 
ering the road from tlie mouth of the Monocacy 
to Rockville, and being in a position to connect 
with and support tlie centre, should it have been 
necessary (as was supposed) to force the line of 
the Monocacy. 

Couch's division moved by the " river road," 
covering that ajiproach, watching the fords of 
the rotornac, and ultimately following and sup- 
porting (he (!th corps. 

The following extracts from telegrams, receiv- 
ed by me after my departure froni Washington, 
will show how little was known there about the 
enemy's movements, and the fears which were 



entertained for the safety of the capital. On the 
9th 'of September, General Halleck telegraphed 
me as follows : — 

" Until we can get better advices about the 
numbers of the enemy at Drainsville, I think 
we must be very cautious about strijiping, too 
much, the forts on the Virginia side. It may be 
the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our 
forces and then attempt to attack from the Vir- 
ginia side of the Potomac. Think of this." 

Again, on the 11th of September, General 
Ilalleck telegraphed me as follows : — 

" Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel? I 
think the main force of the enemy is in your 
front; more troops can be spared fi"om here." 

This despatch, as published by the Committee 
on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the 
general-in-chief, reads as follows : — 

"Why not order forward Porter's corps or 
Sigel's? If the main force of the enemy is in 
your front, more troops can be spared from 
here." 

I remark that the original despatch, as re- 
ceived by me from the telegraph operator, is in 
the words quoted above, " / think the main 
force of the enemy," &c. 

In accordance with this suggestion I asked. 



117 



on the same day, that all the troops that could 
be spared should at once be sent to reinforce me, 
but none carae. 

On the 12th I received the following telegram 
from His Excellency the President : " Govern- 
or Curtm telagraplis me, ' I have advices that 
Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, 
and prol,;Jjly the whole Rebel army will be drawn 
from Maryland.' " The President adds : " lle- 
ceiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martins- 
burg to-day,and positive information from Wheel- 
ing that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that 
the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please 
do not let him get ot!' without behig hurt." 

On the loth General Halleck telegraphed as 
follows : '* Until you know more certainly the 
enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are 
wrong in thus uncovering the capital. 1 am of 
the opinion that the enemy will send a small col- 
umn towards Pennsylvania to draw your forces 
in that direction, then suddenly move on Wash- 
ington with the forces south of the Potomac and 
those he may cross over." Again on the l-lth, 
General Halleck telegraphed me that "scouts 
report a large force still on the Virginia side of 
the Potomac. If so, 1 fear you are exposing 
your left and rear." 

Again, as late as the 16th, after we had the 
most positive evidence that Lee's entire army 
was in front of us, I received the following : — 

" War Departmeft, 

September 10, 18G2— 12.3 p.m. 
" Yours of 7 A. M. is this moment received. 
As you give me no information in regard to the 
position of your forces, except tliat at Sliarpsburg, 
of course I cannot advise. I think, however, 
you will lind that the whole force of the enemy 
in your front has crossed the river ; I fear now 
more than ever that they will recross at Har- 
per's Ferry, or below, and turn your left, thus 
cutting you off from Wasliington. This has ap- 
peared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence 
my anxiety on the subject. A heavy rain might 
prevent it. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" Ckneral-in Chief. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

The importance of moving with all due cau- 
tion, so as not to imcover the national capital 
until the enemy's position and plans were devel- 
oped, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me ; 
and as my troops extended from the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad to the Potomac, with the ex- 
treme left flank moving along that stream, and 
with strong pickets left in rear to watch and 
guard ail the available fords, I did not regard my 
left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it ap- 
pears from the foregoing telegrams that the gener- 
al-in-chief was of a different opinion, and that my 
movements were, in his judgment, too precij^i- 
tate, not only for the safety of Washington, but 
also for the security of my left and rear. 

The precise nature of these daily injunctions 
against a precipitate advance may now be i)er- 
ceivcd. The general-in-chief, in his testimony 
before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
says : "In respect to General McClellan going 
too last or too slow from Washington, there can 
be found no such telegram from me to him. He 
had mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I 



sent him. I telegraphed him that ho was going 
too far, not from Washington, but from tliu Po- 
tomac, leaving Gem'ral l^ce the opportunity to 
come down the Potomac and get belwocn him 
and Washington. I thought General McClellan 
should keep more on the Potomac, and press 
forward his left rather than his right, so as the 
more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry." 

As I can find no telegram from the general- 
in-cliief recommending me to keep my left flank 
nearer the Potomac, 1 am compellvil to believe 
that when he gave this testimony he had forgot- 
ten the purport of the telegrams above quoted, 
and had also ceased to remember the fact, well 
known to him at the time, that my left, from the 
time I left Washington, always rested on the 
Potomac, and my centre was continually in posi- 
tion to reinforce the left or right, as occasion 
miglit require. Had I advanced my left flank 
along the Potomac more rapidly than the other 
columns marched upon the roads to the right, I 
should have thrown that flank out of supporting 
distance of the other troops, and greatly exposed 
it. And if I had marcheil the entire army in one 
column along the bank of the river instead of 
upon Ave different parallel roads, the column, 
with its trains, would have extended about fifty 
miles, and the enemy might have defeated the 
advance before the rear could have reached the 
scene of action. Moreover, such a movement 
would have uncovered the communications with 
Baltimore and Washington on our right, and ex- 
posed our right and rear. I presume it will be 
admitted by every military man that it was neces- 
sary to move the army in such order that it could 
at any time be concentrated for battle ; and I am 
of opinion that this object could not have been 
accomplished in any other way than the one 
employed. Any other disposition of our forces 
would have subjected them to defeat in detached 
fragments. 

On the 10th of September I received from my 
scouts information which rendered it quite proba- 
ble that General Lee's army was in the vicinity 
of Frederick, but whether his intention was to 
move towards Baltimore or Pennsylvania was 
not then known. On the 11th I ordered General 
Burnside to push a strong reconnoissance across 
the National Road and the Baltimore and Ohio 
railroad, towards New Market, and if he learned 
that the enemy had moved towards Hagerstown, 
to press on rapidly to Frederick, keeping Ids 
troops constantly ready to meet the enemy in 
force. A corresponding movement of all the 
troops in the centre and on the left was' ordere(f 
in the direction of Urbana and Poolesville. 

On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered 
Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outskii'ts 
of the city and in the streets. 

On the loth the main bodies of the right wing 
and centre passed through Frederick. It was 
soon ascertained that tlie main body of the ene- 
my's forces had marched out of the city on the 
two previous days, taking the roads to Boons- 
boro' and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendering it 
necessary to force the passes through the Catoc- 
tin and South Mountain ridges, and gain posses- 
sion of Boonsl)oro' and Rolirersville before any 
relief could be extended to Colonel Miles at Har- 
per's Ferry. 

On the 13th an order fell into my hands, 



118 



issued by General Lee, wliich fully disclosed his 
plans, and I immediately gave orders for a rapid 
and vigorous fi)r\vard movement. 

Tlie following is a copy of tlie order referred 
to:— 

" SPECIAL ORDERS No. 191." 

"Headquarteus Army of Northern Virginia, 
September 9, 18G2. 

" The army will resume its march to-morrow, 
taking the Ilager.stown road. GeneralJaekson's 
comm ml will form the advance, and, after pass- 
ing Mid iletown, with such portion as he may 
select, t ike the route towards Sharpsburg, cross 
the I'oLomac at the most convenient point, and, 
by Friday njght, take possession of the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad, capture such of the enemy as 
may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as 
may attempt to escape from Harper's Feri-y. 

" General Longstreet's command will pursue 
the same road as far as Boonsboro', where it 
will halt with the reserve, supply and baggage 
trains of the army. 

" General McLaws, with his own division and 
that of General R. II. Anderson, will follow 
General Longstrcet; on reaching Middletown, 
he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and, 
by Friday morning, possess himself of the Mary- 
land Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy 
at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. 

"General Walker, with his division, after 
accomplisliing the object in which he is now 
engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's 
Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take 
possession of Loudon Heights, if practicable, by 
Friday morning; Keys"s Ford on his left, and 
the road between the end of the mountain and 
the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as 
practicable, cooperate with General McLaws 
and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat 
of t!ie enemy. 

" General I). II. Hill's division will form the 
rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken 
by the main body. The reserve artillery, ord- 
nance and supply trains, &c., will precede 
General Hill. 

"General Stuart will detach a squadron of 
cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals 
Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the 
main body of the cavalry, will cover the route 
of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may 
have been left behind. 

"The t;ammands of Generals Jackson, Mc- 
Laws, and Walker, after accomplishing the ob- 
jects for wliich they have been detached, will 
join the main body of the army at Boonsboro' 
or Ilagerstown. 

" Each regiment on the march will habitually 
carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, 
for use of the men at their encampments, to pro- 
cure wood, &c. 

"By command of General R. E. Lee. 
"R. 11. CHILTON, 
" Assistant Ad juia at- General. 
"Major-General 1). II. Hill, 

" Cjmmanding Division." 

In the report of a military commission, of 
which Major-General D. Hunter was president, 
which convened at Wasliington for the purpose 



of investigating the conduct of certain officers in 
connection with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, 
I find the following: — 

"The commission has remarked freely on 
Colonel Miles, an old ofBcer, who has been 
killed in the service of his country, and it can- 
not, from any motives of delicacy, refrain from 
censuring those in high command when it thinks 
such censure deserved. 

" Tiie general-in-chief has testified that Gen- 
eral McClellan, after having received orders to 
repel the enemy invading the State of Mary- 
land, marched only six miles j>er day, on an 
average, when pursuing the invading army. 

" The general-in-chief also testifies that, in 
his opinion, he could and should have relieved 
and protected Harper's Ferry, and in tliis opin- 
ion tlie commission fully concur." 

I have been greatly surprised that this com- 
mission, in its investigations, never called upon 
me, nor upon any officer of my staff, nor, so far 
as I know, upon any oflicer of the arnjy of the 
Potomac able to give an intelligent statement of 
the movements of that army. But another 
paragraph in the same report makes testimony 
from such sources quite superfluous. It is as 
follows : — 

" By a reference to the evidence it will be 
seen that, at the very moment Colonel Ford 
abandoned Maryland Heights, his little army 
was in reality relieved by Generals Franklin's 
and Sumner's corps at Crainpton's Gap, within 
seven miles of his position." 

Tiie corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner 
were a part of the army wliicli I at tiiat time 
had the honor to command, and they were act- 
ing under my orders at Crampton's Gap and 
elsewhere ; and if, as the commission states, 
Colonel Ford's " little army was in reality re- 
lieved " by those officers, it was relieved by me. 

I had, on the morning of the lOLh, sent the 
following despatch in relation to the command 
at Harper's Ferry : — 

" Camp near Rockville, 
" September 10, 18G2— 9.4o a. m. 
" Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, 
as I understand, with nine thousand troops. He 
can do nothing where he is, but could be of 
great service if ordered to join me. I Luiggest 
tiiat he be ordered to join me by the most prac- 
tical route. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

Major- General, 
" Major-Goneral IIallecic, ^ 

Wasliington, D. C." 

To this I received the following reply : — 

" There is no v/ay for Colonel Miles to join 
you at present ; his only chance is to defend his 
works till you can open communication with 
liiiu. 

"H. W. HALLECK. 
" George B. McClellan, 
" Major-General. 

It seems necessary, for a distinct understand- 
ing of this matter, to state that I was directed 
on the 12th to assume command of the garrison 
of Harper's Ferry as soon as I should open com- 



119 



munications with that place, and that when I 
received tliis order all communication from the 
direction from which I was approaching was cut 
off. Up to that time, however. Colonel Miles 
could, in my opinion, have marched his com- 
mand into Pennsylvania, by crossing the Poto- 
mac at Williamsport or above ; and tliis opinion 
was confirmed by tiie fact that Colonel Davis 
marched the cavalry part of Col. Miles's com- 
mand from Harper's Perry on the 14th, taking 
the main road to ilagL^rstown, and he encounter- 
ed no enemy except a small picket near the 
mouth of the Antietam. 

Before I left Washington, and when there 
certainly could have been no enemy to prevent 
the withdrawal of the forces of Colonel Miles 
I recommended to the proper authorities that 
the garrison of Plarper's Ferry should be with- 
drawn via Ilagorrito'.y:!, to aid in covering the 
Cumberland Valley ; or that, taking up the pon- 
toon bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, 
it should fill back to the Maryland Heights, and 
there hold oat to t:ic last. 

In this position it ought to have maintained 
itself for many days. It was not deemed proper 
to adopt either of these suggestions, and when 
the matter was left to my discretion it was too 
late for me to do anything but endeavor to relieve 
the garrison. I accordingly directed artillery to 
be fired by our advance at frequent intervals as 
a signal that relief v/as at hand. This was done, 
and, as I al'terwards learned, the reports of the 
cannon were distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry. 
It was confidently expected that Colonel Miles 
would hold out until v/e had carried the moun- 
tain passes, and wore in condition to send a de- 
tachment to his relief. The left was therefore 
ordered to nuvc through Crampton's Pass in 
front of Biirkittsville, while the centre and 
right marclied upon Turner's Pass in front of 
Middlctown. 

It may bo asked by those who are not ac- 
quainted with I lie ti)pograpghy of the couniry 
in the vicinity ol Harper's Ferry, why Franklin, 
instead of iiiarcliingliis column over the circui- 
tous road ironi Jelfersoii vie Burkittsville and 
Brownsville, was not ordered to move along the 
direct turnpike to Iviioxville, and thence up the 
river to Harper's Ferry. 

It was for the reason that I had received in- 
formation that the enemy were anticipating our 
approach in tliat direction, and had established 
batteries on the south side of the Potomac 
which cominnndod all the approaches to Knox- 
ville; moreover the road from that point winds 
dire(;ily along t!ie river bank at the foot of a 
precipitous mountain, where there was no op- 
portunity of forming in line of battle, and where 
the enemy could have placed batteries on both 
sides of the river, to enfilade our narrow ap- 
proaching columns. 

The approacii tiirough Crampton's Pass, which 
debouches into Pleasant Valley in the rear of 
Maryland Heights, was the only one which af- 
forded any reasonable prospect of carrying that 
formidable position ; at the same time, the troops 
upon that road were in better relation to the 
main body of our forces. 

On the morning of the 14th a verbal message 
reached me from Colonel Miles, which was the 
first authentic intelligence I had received as to 



the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The 
messenger informed me that on the j-.receding 
afternoon IMaryland Heiglits had been ahandonod 
by our troo[)s alter repelling an attack of iho 
llebels, and that Colonel Mdes"s eniire Ibrce 
was concentrated at Ilarper'.s Ferry, the Mary- 
land, Loudon, and Bolivar lleightr< having been 
abandoned Ijy him, and occu[)ieil by the enemy. 
The messenger also stated that there was no ap- 
parent reason for the abaiulonment of the Mary- 
land Heights, and that Colonel Miles instructed 
him to say that he could hold out with certainty 
two (lays longer. 

1 directed him to make his way back, if possi- 
ble, with the information that I was approaching 
ra[)idiy, and felt confident that 1 cuuld relievo 
the place. 

On the same afternoon I wrote the following 
letter to Colonel Miles, and despatched three 
copies by three different couriers on different 
routes, I did not, however, learn that anyof thcso 
men succeeded in reaching Harper's Feiry : — 

Minm.ETOWx. September 14, 1802. 

" Colonel: The army is being rapidly con- 
centrated here. \Ve are now attacking the i)as3 
on t!ie llagerstown road over the Blue llidgc. 
A column is about attacking the Burki.tsvilleand 
Boonsboro' Pass. You m;iy count on our m ik- 
ing every efibrt to relieve you. You may rely 
upon my speedily accomplishing that oliject. 
Hold out to the last extremity. If it is possible, 
reoccupy the Maryland Heiglits with your whole 
force, if you can do that, i will certainly be 
able to relieve you. As the Catoetin valley is 
in our possession, you can safely cross the river 
at Berlin or its vicinity, so far as opposition on 
tills side of the river is concerned. Hold out to 
the last. 

" GEOHGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General Commanding. 

" Colonel D S. Miles." 

On the previous d;iy I had sent General Frankr 
lin the following instructions : — 

" IIeadqdauteus Army of the Potomac, 

" C.iMp n:-ir Freleric'c, Septemoer Id, 1662 — 
G.20 p. M. 

"General: I have now full information as 
to movements and intentions of the enemy. 
Jackson has crossed the upper Potomac to cap- 
ture the garrison at Martinsburg and cut off 
Miles's retreat towards the west. A division on 
the south side of the Potomac was to carry Lou- 
don Heights and cut off his retreat in that direc- 
tion. McLaws with his own convnand and the 
division of 11. H. Anderson was to move by 
Boonsboro' and Kohrersvillcto carry tiie Mary- 
1 inl Heights. The signal officers inform me that 
lij is now in Pleasant Valley. The firing shows 
that Miles still holds out. Longstreet was to 
move to Boonsboro', and there halt with the 
reserve corps; D. H. Hill to form tlic rear 
guard; Stuart's cavalry to bring up stragglers, 
&c. We have cleared out all the cavalry this 
side of the mountains and north of us. The 
last I heard from PIcasanton he occupied Mid- 
dletown, after several sharp skirmisiies. A di- 
vision of Burnside's command started several 
hours ago to support him. The whole of Burn- 



120 



Blip's command, including Hooker's corps, march 
ttiis evening and early to-morrow morning, fol- 
lowed by the corps of Sumner and Banks, and 
Sykes's division, upon Boonshoro' to carry tliat 
position. (Joucli has been ordered to concen- 
trate his division and join you as rapidly as pos- 
sible. Without waiting for the whole of that 
division to join, you will move at daybreak in 
the morning by Jeti'erson and Ikirkittsville upon 
the road to liohrersville. I have reliable infor- 
mation that the mountain pass by this road is 
practicable for artillery and wagons. If this 
pass is not occupied by the enemy in force, seize 
it as soon as practicable, and debouch upon 
liohrersville in order to cut oti'the retreat of or 
destroy McLaws's command. If you find this 
pass held by the enemy in large force, make all 
your dispo^itions for the attack and connnence 
it about half an hour alter you hear severe firing 
at the pass on the Ilagerstown Pike, where the 
main body will attack. Having gained the pass 
your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or 
capture McLaws's command and relieve Colonel 
Miles. If you effect this you will order him to 
join you at once with all his disposable troops, 
first destroying the bridges over the Potomac, if 
not already done, and, leaving a sufficient gar- 
rison to prevent the enemy from pas^ing the 
ford, you will then return by liohrersville on the 
direct road to Boonsboro', if the main column has 
not succeeded in its attack. If it has succeeded, 
take the road to Rohrersville, to Sharpsburg and 
Williamsport, in order either to cut off' the 
retreat of Hill and Longstreet towards the Po- 
tomac, or prevent the repassage of Jackson. 
My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and 
beat him in detail. I believe I have sufficiently^ 
explained my intentions. I ask of you, at this im- 
portant moment, all your intellect and the ut- 
most activity that a general can exercise. 
" Gi OHGE B. McCLELLAN. 
" Major- General Coinmanding. 
"Major-General W. B. Fkanklin, 

'• Commanding 6th Corps." 

Again, on the 14th, I sent him the follow- 
ing:— 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Frederick, September H. 18U2 — 2 p. m. 
*' Your despatch of 12.30 just received. Send 
back to hurry up Couch. Mass your troops 
and carry Burkittsville at any cost. We shall 
have strong opposition at both passes. As fast 
as the troops come up 1 will hold a reserve in 
readiness to support you. If you find the enemy 
in very great force at any of the passes let me 
know at once, and amuse them as best you can 
go as to retain them there. In that event I 
will prolialjly throw the mass of the army on the 
pass in front of here. If I carry that it will clear 
the way for you. and you must follow the enemy 
as rapidly as possible. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Commanding. 
" Major-General Franklin." 

Gi neral Franklin pushed his corps rapidly 
forward towards Crampton's Pass, and at about 
12 o'clock on the 14th, arrived at Burkittsville, 
immediately in rear of which he found the ene- 
my's infantry posted in force on both sides of 



the road, vrith artillery in strong positions to 
defend the approaches to the pass. Slocum's 
division was formed upon the right of the road 
leading through the gap. and Smith's upon the 
left. A line formed of Bartlett's and Torbeti's 
brigades, supported by Newton, whose activity 
was conspicuous, advanced steadily upon the 
enemy at a charge on the rigiit. The enemy 
were driven from their position at the base of 
the mountain, where they were protected by a 
stone wall, steadily forced back up the slope un- 
til they reached the position of their Imttery on 
the road, well up the mounuiin. There they 
made a stand. They were, however, driven back, 
retiring their artillery in echelon until, after an 
action of three hours, the crest was gained, and 
tlie enemy hastily fled down the mountain on the 
other side. 

On the left of the road, Brooks's and Irvin's 
brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the pro- 
tection of Slocum's flank, charged up the moun- 
tain in the same steady manner, driving the ene- 
my before them until tlie crest was carried. Four 
hundred prisoners from seventeen different or- 
ganizations, seven hundred stand of arms, one 
piece of artillery, and three colors, were cap- 
tured by our troops in tliis brilliant action. It 
was conducted by General Franklin in all its 
details. These details are given in a report of 
General Franklin, herewith submitted, and due 
credit awarded to the gallant officers and men 
engaged. 

The loss in General Franklin's corps was one 
hundred and fifteen killed, fotir hundred and six- 
teen wounded, and two missing. The enemy's 
loss was about the same. The enemy's position 
was such that otir artillery could not be used 
with any effect. The close of thj action found 
General Franklin's advance in Pleasant Valley 
on the night of the 14th, within three and a half 
miles of the point on Maryland Heights where he 
might, on the same night, or on the morning of 
the 15th. have formed a junction with the garri- 
son of Harper's Ferry, had it not been previous- 
ly withdrawn from Maryland Heights, and within 
six miles of Harper's Ferry. 

On the night of the 14th the following despatch 
was sent to General Franklin : — 

Bolivar, September 15 — 1 a. m. 
"General: — ***** 
"The commanding general directs that you 
occupy, with your command, the road from Roh- 
rersville to Harper's Ferry, placing a sufficient 
force at Rohrersville to hold that position in case 
it should be attacked by the enemy from Boons- 
boro". Endeavor to open communication with 
Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking and 
destroying such of the enemy as you may find 
in Pleasant Valley. Should yoti succeed in 
opening communication with Colonel Miles, di- 
rect him to join you with his whole command, 
with all the guns and public ])roperty that he can 
carry with him. The remainder of the guns will 
be spiked or destroyed; the rest of the public 
pjroperty will also be destroyed. You will then 
proceed to Boonsboro', which place the com- 
manding general intends to attack to-morrow, 
and join the main body of the army at that place ; 
should you find, however, that the enemy have 
retreated from Boonsboro" towards Sharpsburg, 



121 



^u will endeavor to fall upon him and cut off 
his retreat. 

"By command of Maior-Geueral McClellan. 
"GEOIIGE D. KUGGLES, 
" Colonel and Aid-de-Camp. 
" General Franklin." 

On the 15th the following were received from 
General Franklin : — 

"At the foot of Mount Pleasant, 
" 111 Pleasant Valleij, three miles from Rohrers- 
ville, September 15 — 8.50 a. m. 

" General : My command .started at daylight 
this morning, and I am waiting to have it closed 
up here. General Couch arrived about 10 o'clock 
last night. I have ordered one of his brigades 
and one battery to Rohrersville or to the strong- 
est point in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn up 
in line of battle about two miles to our front, one 
brigade in sight. As soon as I am sure that 
llolu'ersville is occupied I shall move forward to 
attack the enemy. This may be two hours from 
now. If Harper's Ferry has fallen — and the 
cessation of tiring makes me fear that it has — 
it is my opinion that I should be strongly I'ein- 

forci'd. 

If******* 

"W. B. FRANIvLIN, 

" Majo7-- General Commanditig Corps. 
" General G. B. McClellan." 

" September 15 — 11 a. m. 
" General : I have received your despatch by 
Captain O'Heefe. The enemy is in large force 
in my front, in two lines of battle stretching 
across tlie valley, and a large column of artillei-y 
and infantry on the right of the valley looking 
towards Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me 
two to one. It will of course not answer to pur- 
sue tlie enemy under these circumstances. I 
shall communicate with Burnside as soon as pos- 
sijik^. 1 1 the mean time I shall wait here \mtil I 
learn what is V-f prospect of reinforcement. I 
have not the force to .i'.i--tify an attack on the 
force I see in front. 1 have had a very close 
view of it, and its position is very strong. 
" Respectfully, 

"W. B. FRANKLIN, 

" Major- General. 
" General G. B. McClellan, Commanding. 

Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at 
8 a. m. on the 15th, as the cessation of the firing 
indicated, and General Franklin was ordered to 
remain where he was to watch the large force 
in front of him, and protect our left and rear 
until the night of the 16th, when he was ordered 
to join the main body of the army at Keedys- 
ville, after sending Couch's division to Maryland 
Heights. While the events which have just been 
described were taking place at Crampton's Gap, 
the troops of the centre and right wing, wlucli 
had united at Frederick on the 13th, were en- 
gaged in the contest for the possession of Tur- 
ner's Gap. 

On the morning of the 13th General Pleasan- 
ton was ordered to send McRcynolds's brigade 
and a section of artillery in the direction of Get- 
tysburg, and Rush's regiment towards Jefferson 
to communicate with Franklin, to whom the Cth 
United Stsies cavalry and a section of artillery 



had previously been sent, and to proceed with 
the remainder of his force in the direction of 
Middletown in pursuit of the enemy. 

After skirmishhig with ilie eni,:niy all the 
morning, and driving them from several strong 
positions, he reached Turner's Gap of the South 
Mountain in the afternoon, and iuund tlir i-iieiny 
in force and apparently detenniiu'il to defend the 
pass. lie sent back for infantry to General 
Burnside, who had been directed to .support him, 
and proceeded to make a recennoissauce of the 
position. 

The South Mountain is at this point about one 
thousand feet in height, and its general direetioL. 
is from northeast to southwest. The national 
road from Frederick to llagerslown crosses it 
nearly at right angles through Turner's Gap, a 
depression wliich is some four hundred feet in 
depth. 

The mountain on the north side of the turn- 
pike is divided into two crests, or ridges, by a 
narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, 
becomes a slight depression at about a mile to 
the north. There are two counwy roads, one to 
the right of the turnpike and the other to the 
left, which give access to the crests overlooking 
the main road. The one on the left, called the 
" Old Sharpsburg road," is nearly parallel to 
and about half a mile distant from the turnpike, 
until it reaches the crest of the mountain, when 
it bends off to the left. The other road, called 
the " Old Hagerstown road," passes up a ravine 
in the mtmntains about a mile from the turnpike, 
and bending to the left over and along the first 
crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain 
House, near the summit of the pass. 

On the night of the 13th the positions of the 
different corps were as follows : — 

Reno's corps at Middletown, except Redman's 
division at Frederick. 

Hooker's corps on the Monocacy, two miles 
from Frederick. 

Sumner's corps near Frederick. 

Banks's corps near Frederick. 

Sykes's division near Frederick. 

Franklin's corps at Buckeystown. 

Couch's division at Licksville. 

The orders from headquarters for the march 
on the 14th were as follows : — 

13th, 11.30, p. M.— Hooker to march at day- 
light to Middletown. 

13th, 11.30 F. M. — Sykes to move at 6 a. m., 
after Hooker on the Middletown and Hagers- 
town road. 

14th, 1 A. M. — Artillery reserve to follow 
Sykes closely. 

13th, 8.45 p. M.— Turner to move at 7 a. m. 

14th, 9 a. m.— Sumner ordered to take the 
Shookstown road to Middletown. 

13th, 6.45 p. M.— Couch ordered to move to 
Jefferson with his whole division. 

On the 14th General Pleasanton continued his 
reconnoissance. Gibson's battery and afterwards 
Benjamin's battery (of Reno's corps) were 
placed on high ground to the left of the turnpike, 
and obtained a direct fire on the enemy's posi- 
tion in the gap. 

General Cox's division, wliich had been 
ordered up to support General Pleasanton, lett 
its bivouac, near Middletown, at 6 A. m. The 



122 



1st bric^ade rcacliod the scene of action abont 9 
A. M.. and was sent up the ohl Sh;irpshurg roail 
by General I'leasantou to feel the enemy and 
ascertain if he licld the crest on that side in 
strons^ force. This was soon found to be the 
case; and (loneral Cox having arrived with tlic 
other brigade, ard information iiaving been re- 
ceived from General lleno that the colinnn 
wouhl lie supp!)rted by the wliole corps, tlie di- 
vision was ordered to assaidt the position. Two 
20-pounder Parrotts of Siannons's battery and 
two seclion-; of MeMuUan's battery were left in 
tlie rv.xv ill position near the turnpike, wliere 
they did good service during tlie day ag.anst the 
enemy's l).ilteries in the gap. Colonel Seam- 
mon's hrigide was deployed, and, well covered 
by skirmishers, moved up tlie slope to the left of 
the roail with tlie ol)jeet of turning the enemv's 
right, if possible. It succeeded in gaining tlie 
crest and establishing itself there, in spite of tlie 
vigorous efforts of tlie enemy, who was posted 
behind stone walls and in the edges of timber, 
and the lire of a battery which poured in canis- 
ter and case shot on the regiment on the right 
of the iirig.ide. Colonel Cruoke's brigade 
marched in columns at supporting distance. 
A section of iMe.MuUan's battery, under l>ieu- 
tenant (Broome, (killed while serving one of his 
guns.) was moved up with great difficulty, and 
opened with cani--ter at vary sliort range on 
the enemy's infantry, by whom (after having 
done considerable execution) it was soon 
silenced and forced to withdraw. 

One regiment of Crook's brigade was now de- 
ployed on Seamnion's left, and the other two in 
liis rear, and they several times entered the first 
line and relieved the regiments in front of them 
when hard pressed. A section of Sumner's 
battery was brought up and placed in the open 
space in the woods, where it did good service 
during the rest of the day. 

Tlie enemy several times attempted to retake 
the crest, advancing with boldness, but were 
each time repulsed. They then withdrew their 
battery to a ]ioint more to the right, and formed 
columns on both our flanks. It was now about 
noon, and a lull occurred in the contest which 
lasted about two hours, during which the rest of 
the cor[)s was coining up. General Wilcox's 
division was the first to arrive. When he reached 
the base of the mountain. General Cox advised 
him to consult General rieasant(m as to a posi- 
tion. The latter indicated that on the right, 
afterwards taken by General Hooker. General 
Wilcox was in the act of moving to occuiiy this 
ground, wlienhe received an order from General 
Keno to move up the old Sharps burg road and 
take a po-ition to its right, overlooking the turn- 
pike. Two regiments were detached to siqiport 
General Cox, at iiis request. One section of 
Cooke's bittery was placed in position near the 
turn of the roid, (on the crest,) and opened fire 
on the enemy's batteries across the g;ip. The 
division was proceeding to deploy to the right 
of the road, when the enemy suddenly opened 
(at one hundred and fifty yards) with a battery 
which enfiladed the road at this point, drove off 
Cook's cannoneers with their limbers, and caused 
a tempiir irv panic in which the guns were nearly 
lost. But the 79th New York and 17th Michi- 



gnn promptly rallied, changed front under a 
heavy fire, ■ind moved out to protect the guns 
with which Captain Cook had remained. Order 
was soon restored, and the division formed in 
line on the right of Cox, and was kept concealed 
as mucli as possible under the hillside until the 
whole line advanced. It was exposeil not only 
to the fire of the battery in front, liut also to that 
of the liatteries on the other side of the turnpike, 
and lost heavily. 

Sliortly before this time Generals Burnside 
and Keno arrived at tlie base of the mountain ; 
and the former directed the latter to move up 
the divisions of General Sturgis and Kodnian to 
the crest held by Cox and \Vilcox, and to move 
upon the enemy's jiosition with his whole force as 
soon as lie was informed that General Hooker 
(who had just been directed to attack on the 
riglit) was well advanced up the mountain. 

General Reno then went to the front and as- 
sumed the direction of afliiirs, the positions hav- 
ing been explained to him by General Pleasan- 
ton. Shortly before this time I arrived at the 
])oint occupied by General Burnside, and my 
lieadquarters were located there until the con- 
clusion of the action. General Sturgis had left 
his camp at 1 p. m. and reached the scene of ac- 
tion about S'i r. m. Clark's liattery, of his divis- 
ion, was sent to assist Cox's left. Ity order of 
General Reno, and two regiments (2d Maryland 
and Gth New Hampshire) were detached by Gen- 
eral Reno and sent forward a short distance on 
the left of the turnpike. His division was form- 
ed in rear of Wilcox's, and Rodman's division 
was divided ; Colonel Fairchilds's brigade being 
placed on the extreme left, and Colonel Har- 
land's, under General Rodman's personal super- 
vision, on the right. 

My order to move the whole line forward and 
take or silence the enemy's batteries in front was 
executed with enthusiasm. Tlie enemy made a 
desperate resistance, charging our advancing 
lines witli fierceness, but they were everywhere 
routed and fled. 

Our chief loss was in Wilcox's division. The 
enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge 
and beyond the reach of our infantry; but its 
position was made untenaVile, and it was hastily 
removed and not again put in positicn near us. 
But the batteries across the gap still kept up a 
fire of shot and shell. 

General Wilcox praises very higlily the con- 
duct of the 17th Michigan in this i'.dvance — a 
regiment which had been organized scarcely a 
month, but which charged the advancing enemy 
in Hank in a manner worthy of veteran troops ; 
and also that of the 45th Pennsylvania, which 
bravely met them in front. 

Cook's battery now reopened fire. Sturgis's 
division was moved to the front of Wilcox's, 
occupying the new groniid gained on the further 
side of the slope, and bis artillery opened on the 
batteries across the gap. 'J'he enemy made ail 
effort to turn our left about dark, but were re- 
pulsed by Fairchilds's brigade and Clark's bat- 
tery. 

At about 7 o'clock the enemy made another 
eflfbrt to regain the lost ground, attacking along 
Sturgis's front and part of Cox's. A lively fire 
was kept up until nearly 9 o'clock, several 



123 



charges being made by the enemy nnd repulsed 
with shiugliter, nnd we finally occupied the high- 
est part <if the luountain. 

General Keno was killed just before sunset, 
while iiiakia;;- a rceonnoissance to the front, and 
the comrn ind of tlie corps devolved upon Gen- 
eral (V)x. In General lieno tlie nation lost one 
of its best general officers. He was a skilful 
soldier, a brave an<l honest man. 

Tiierc was no firing after 10 o'clock, and the 
troo[)s slept on their arms ready to renew the 
fight at d.iylight; but the enemy quietly retired 
front our front dui-ing the night, abandoning 
their woundod, ami leaving their dead in large 
numhers scattered over the fiehi. While these 
operations were progressing on the left of the 
main column, the right under General Hooker 
was actively engaged. His corps left the Mono- 
cacy eirly in tlie morning, and its advance 
readied tlie (,'atoctin Creek about 1 p. m. Gen- 
eral Hooker then went forward to examine the 
ground. 

At about 1 o'clock General Meade's division 
was ordered to make a diversion in favor of 
Reno. The following is the order sent : — 

Skptember 14 — 1 p. M. 

Gkvf.ral : General Reno requests tiiat a divis- 
ion of yours may move up on the right (northj of 
the main road. Gen. McClellan desires you to 
comj)!y with this request, holding your wlu)Ie 
corps in readiness to support the movement, and 
taking charge of it yourself. 

'•Sumner's and Banks's corps have com- 
menccnl arriving. Let General McClellan be 
informed as soon as you commence your move- 
ment. 

" GEORGE D. RUr.GLES, 
" Colonel^ Assistant Adjutant- General and Aide- 
de-Camp. 

" Major-General Hooker." 

Meade's division left Catoctin Creek about two 
o'clock, and turned oflTto tlie right from the main 
road on tiie old Ilagerstown road to Mount 
Tabor church, where General Hooker was, and 
deployed a short distance in advance, its right 
resting about one and a half mile from the turn- 
pike. The enemy fired a few shots from a bat- 
tery on the mountain side, but did no considera- 
ble damage. Cooper's battery " B," 1st Penn- 
sylvania artillery, was placed in position on high 
ground at about three and a half o'clock, and 
fired at the enemy on the slope, but soon ceased 
by order of (ieneral Hooker, and the position of 
our lines prevented any further use of artillery 
by us on thi-; part of the field. Tlie first Massa- 
chusetts cavalry was sent up the valley to the 
right, to observe the movements, if any, of the 
enemy in that direction, and one regiment of 
Meade's division was posted to watch a road 
coming in the same direction. The other divis- 
ions were deployed as they came up. General 
Hatch's on the left, and General Ricketts's, 
which arrived at 5 p. m. in the rear. General 
Gibbon's brigade was detached from Hatch's di- 
vision by General Burnside, for the purpose of 
making a dc-monstration on the enemy's centre, 
up tlie main road, as soon as the movements on 
the right and left had sufficiently progressed. 
The \»l Pennsylvania rifles, of General Sey- 



mour's brigade, were sent fonvard as skirmish- 
ers to feci the enemy, and it was found that he 
was in force. Meade was then directed to ad- 
vance bis division to the right of the road, so as 
to outliank them if possible, and then to move 
forward and attack, wliile Hatch was directed 
to take with his division the crest on the left of 
the old Hagerstown road, liicketis s division 
being held in reserve. Seymour's brig ide was 
sent up to the top of the hlope, on the right cf 
the ravine through which the road runs; and 
then moved along the summit parallel to the 
road, while Colonel Gallagher's and C.donel 
Magiltou's-lMigades moved in the same direction 
along the slojie and in the ravine. 

The ground was of tlie most difficult character 
for the movement of troops, the hillside being 
very steep and rocky, and obstructed liy stone 
walls and timber. The enemy was vc-ry soon 
encountered, and in a short time the action be- 
came general ahmg the whole front of the divis- 
ion. The line advanced steadily up the moun- 
tain-side, where the enemy was posted behind 
trees and rocks, from which he was gr.idually 
dislodged. During this advance CJolonel Gal- 
lagher, commanding ;:5d brigade, was severely 
wounded; and the command devolved upon 
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Ander.-on. 

General Meade having reason to believe that 
the enemy were attempting to ouiHank him on 
his right, applied to General Hooker for rein- 
forcements. General Duryea's brigade of Uick- 
etts's division was ordered up, but it did not 
arrive until the close of the acti(m. It was ad- 
vanced on Seymour's left, but only one regiment 
could o()en fire before the enemy retired and 
darkness intervened. 

General i\Ieade speaks highly of General Sey- 
mour's skill in hantlling bis brigade on the ex- 
treme right, securing by his manoeuvres the 
great .jbject of the movement, the outdanking of 
the enemy. 

While General Meade was gallantly driving 
the enemy on the right. General Hatch's division 
was engaged in a severe contest for the jjosi^es- 
sion of the crest on the left of the ravine; it 
moved up the mountain in the following order: 
two regiments of Gen. Patrick's brigade deployed 
as skirmishers, with the other regiments of the 
same brigade supporting them. C(j1. Plielps's bri- 
gade in line of battalions in mass at deoloying 
distance. General Doublcday's brigade in the 
same order bringing up the rear. The Hist New 
York having gone straight up the slope instead 
of around to tlie right, as directed, the 2d United 
States sharpshooters was sent out in its place. 
Phelps's and Doubleday's brigades were de- 
ployed in turn as they reached the wood-^, which 
began about half up the mountain. General Pa- 
trick with his skirmishers soon ilrew the fire of 
the enemy, and found him strongly posted be- 
hind a fence which boun»led the cleared space 
on the top of the ridge, having on his front the 
woods through which our line was advanemg, 
and in his rear a cornfield full of rocky b-dgcs, 
which afibrded good cover to fall back to if dis- 
lodged. 

Pheli>s's brigade gallantly advanced, under a 
hot fire, to close quarters, and after ten or fif- 
teen minutes of heavy firing on both sides, (in 
which General Hatch was wounded while urging 



124 



on his men.) the fence was carried by a charge, 
and our line advanced a few yards beyond it, 
somewhat sheltered by the slope of the hill. 

Doubled.iy's brigade, now under tlie command 
of Lieutenant-Colonel Hoflman, (Colonel Wain- 
wright having been wounded,) relieved Phelps, 
and continued firing for an hour and a half; the 
enemy behind ledges of rocks, some thirty or 
forty paces in our front, making a stubborn re- 
sistance, and attempting to charge on the least 
cessation of our lire. About dusk Colonel 
Christian's brigade of Riclietts's division came 
up and relieveii Doul>leday's brigade, which fell 
back into line l)eliind Phelps's. Christian's bri- 
gade continued tiie action for thirty or forty 
minutes, when the enemy retired, after having 
made an attempt to flank us on the left, which 
was repulsed by the 75th New York and 7th 
Indiana. 

Tlie remaining brigade of Tlicketts's division 
(General Hartsuff 's) was moved up in the centre, 
and connected Meade's left with Doubleday's 
right. We now had possession of the summit 
of the first ridge which commanded the turnpike 
on both sides of the mountain, and the troops 
were ordered to hold their positions until further 
orders, and slept on their arms. Late in tlie 
afternoon. General Gibbon, with his brigade and 
one section of Gibbon's battery, (B, 4th artillery,) 
was ordered to move up the main road on the 
enemy's centre. lie advanced a regiment on 
each side of the road, preceded by skirmishers, 
and followed by the other two regiments in 
double colunm; the artillery moving on the 
road until within range of the enemy's guns, 
which were firing on the column from the 
gorge. 

The brigade advanced steadily, driving the 
enemy from his positions in the woods and be- 
hind stone walls, imtil they reached a point well 
up towards the top of the pass, when the enemy, 
having been reinforced by three regiments, 
opened a heavy fire on the front and on both 
flanks. The fight continued until 9 o'clock, the 
enemy being entirclj' repulsed ; and the brigade, 
after having sufl'ered severely, and having ex- 
pended all its ammunition, including even the 
cartridges of the dead and wounded, continued 
to hold the ground it had so gallantly won until 
12 o'clock, when it was relieved by General 
Gorm.an's brigade of Sedgwick's division, Sum- 
ner's corps, (except the Gtli Wisconsin, wliich 
remained on the field all night.) General 
Gil)bon, in this delicate movement, handled his 
brigade with as much precision and coolness as 
if upon parade, and the bravery of lus troops 
could not be excelled. 

The 2d corps (Sumner's) and the 12th corps 
(Williams's) reached their final positions shortly 
after dark. General lUchardson's division was 
placed near Mount Tabor Church, in a position 
to support our right, if necessary ; the 12th 
corps and Sedgwick's division bivouacked around 
Bolivar, in a position to support our centre and 
left. 

General Sykes's division of regulars and the 
artillery reserve halted for the night at Middle- 
town. Thus, on the night of the Ltth the wliole 
army was massed in the vicinity of the field of 
battle, in readiness to renew the action the next 
day, or to move in pursuit of the enemy. At 



daylight our skirmishers were advanced, and 
it was found that he liad retreated during the 
night, leaving his dead on the field, and his 
wounded uncared for. 

About fifteen liundred prisoners were taken 
by us during the battle, and the loss to the enemy 
in killed was much greater than our own, and, 
probably, also in wounded. It is believed that 
the force opposed to us at Turner's Gap con- 
sisted of D. H. Hill's corps, (15,000,) and a part, 
if not the whole, of Longstreet's, and perhaps 
a jjortion of Jackson's, probably some 30,oDO 
in all. 

We went into action with about 30,000 men, 
and our losses amounted to 1,568 aggregate 
(312 killed, 1,23-i wounded, and 22 missing). 

On the next day I had the honor to receive 
the following very kind despatch from His 
Excellency the President : — 

"War Department, 
" WasMngfon, September 15, 18G2 — 2.45 p. m. 
"Your despatch of to-day received. God 
bless you, and all with you; destroy the Rebel 
army if possible. 

"A. LINCOLN. 
"Major-General McClellan." 

" ANTIETAM." 

On tlie night of the battle of South Mountain, 
orders were given to the corps commanders to 
press forward the pickets at early dawn. This 
advance revealed the fact that the enemy had 
left his positions, and an immediate pursuit was 
ordered; the cavalry, under General Plcasanton, 
and the three corps under Generals Sumner, 
Hooker, and Mansfield, (the latter of whom had 
arrived that morning and assumed command of 
the 12tli, Williams's corps,) by the National 
turnpike and Boonsboro'; the corps of Generals 
Burnside and Porter (the latter command at 
that time consisting of but one weak division, 
Sykes's) by the old Sharpsburg road, and Gen- 
eral Franklin to move into Pleasant Valley, 
occupy Rohrersville by a detachment, and en- 
deavor to relieve Harper's Ferry. 

Generals Burnside and Porter, upon reaching 
the road from Boonsboro' to Rohrersville to re- 
inforce Franklin, or to move on Sharpsburg, 
according to circumstances. 

Franklin moved towards Brownsville and 
found there a force of the enemy, much superior 
in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong 
position to receive him. At this time the cessa- 
tion of firing at Harper's Ferry indicated the 
surrender of that place. 

The cavalry overtook the enemy's cavalry in 
Boonsboro', made a daring charge, killing and 
wounding a number, and capturing 250 prisoners 
and two guns. 

General Richardson's division of the 2d corps 
pressing the rear guard of the enemy with vigor, 
passed Boonsboro' and Keedysville, and came 
upon the main body of the enemy, occupying in 
large force a strong position a few miles beyond 
the latter place. 

It had been hoped to engage the enemy during 
the loth. Accordingly, instructions were given 
that if the enemy were overtaken on the march 
they should be attacked at once ; if found in 



125 



heavy force and in position, the corps in advance 
should be pUiced in position for attack, and await 
my arrival. On reaching the advanced position 
of our troops, I found but two divisions, Rich- 
ardson's and Sykes's, in position; the other 
troops were halted in the road; the head of the 
column some distance in rear of Richardson. 

The enemy occupied a strong position on the 
heights, on the west side of Antietam Creek, 
displaying a large force of infantry and cavalry, 
witii numerous batteries of artillery, which 
opened on our columns as they appeared in sight 
on the Keedysville road and Sharpsburg turn- 
pike, which fire was returned by Captain Tid- 
ball's liglit battery, 2d United States artillery, 
and Pettit's battery, 1st New York artillery. 

The division of General Richardson, follow- 
ing close on the heels of the retreating foe, 
halted and deployed near Antietam River, on the 
riglit of the Sharpsburg road. General Sykes, 
leading on the division of regulars on the old 
Sharpsburg road, came up and deployed to the 
left of General Richardson, on the left of the 
road. 

Antietam Creek, in this vicinity, is crossed by 
four stone bridges — the upper one on the Kee- 
dysville and Wiiliamsport road; the second on 
the Kecdysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, some 
two and a half miles below ; the tliird about a 
mile below the second, on the Rohrersville and 
Sharpsburg road; and the fourth near the mouth 
of Antietam Creek, on the road leading from 
Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some three miles 
below the third. Tho stream is sluggish, with 
few and difficult fords. After a rapid examina- 
tion of the position, I found that it was too late 
to attack that day, and at once directed the 
placing of the batteries in position in the centre, 
and indicated the bivouacs for the different 
corps, massing them near and on both sides of 
the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps were not 
all in their positions until the next morning after 
sunrise. 

On the morning of the 16th, it was discovered 
that the enemy had changed the position of his 
batteries. The masses of his troops, however, 
were still concealed behind the opposite heights. 
Their left and centre were upon and in front of 
the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, hid- 
den by weeds and irregularities of the ground ; 
their extreme left resting upon a wooded emi- 
nence near the cross-roads to the north of J. 
Miller's farm ; their left resting upon the Poto- 
mac. Their line extended south, the right rest- 
ing upon the hills to tlie south of Sharpsburg, 
near Shaveley's farm. 

The bridge over the Antietam, described as 
No. 3, near this point, was strongly covered by 
riflemen protected by rifle-pits, stone fences, 
&c., and enfiladed by artillery. The ground in 
front of this line consisted of undulating hills, 
their crests in turn commanded by others in their 
rear. On all favorable points the enemy's artil- 
lery v/as posted and their reserves hidden from 
view by the hills, on which their line of battle 
was formed, could manoeuvre unobserved by our 
army, and from the shortness of their line could 
rapidly reinforce any point threatened by our 
attack. Their position, stretching across the 
angle formed by the Potomac and Antietam, 
their flanks and rear protected by these streams, 



was one of the strongest to be found in this re- 
gion of country, which is well adapted to defen- 
sive warfare. 

On the right, near Keedysville, on both sides 
of the Sharpsburg turnpike, were Suumer's and 
Hooker's corps. In advance, on tiie right 
of the turnpike and near the Antietam 
River, General Uiciiardson's division of General 
Sumner's corps was posted. General Sykes's 
division of General Porter's corps was on tiie 
left of the turnpike and in line with General 
Richardson, protecting the bridge No. 2, over 
the Antietam. The left of the line, opposite to 
and some distance from bridge No. 3, was occu- 
jjied by General Purnside's corps. 

Before giving General Hooker his orders to 
make the movement which will presently bo 
described, I rode to the left of the line to satisfy 
myself that the troops were properly posted 
there to secure our left flank from any attack 
made along the lel\ bank of the Aniietain, as 
well as to enable us to carry bridge No. 3. 

I found it necessary to make considerable 
changes in the position of General Burnside's 
corps, and directed him to advance to a strong 
position in the immediate vicinity of the bridge, 
and to reconnoitre the approaches to the bridge 
carefully. In front of General Sunmer's and 
Hooker's corps, near Keedysville, and on the 
ridge of the first line of hills overlooking the 
Antietam, and between the turnpilie and Fry's 
house on the right of the road, were placed 
Captain Taft's, Langner's, Von Kleizers and 
Lieutenant Weaver's batteries of twenty-pounder 
PaiTOtt guns. On the crest of the hill in the 
rear and right of bridge No. 3, Captain Weed's 
three-inch and Lieutenant Benjamin's twenty- 
pounder batteries. General Franklin's corps 
and General Couch's division held a position in 
Pleasant Valley in front of Brownsville, with a 
strong force of tne enemy in their front. General 
Morell's division of Porter's corps was e>i route 
from Boonsboro', and General Humphrey's divis- 
ion of new ti'oops en route from Frederick, 
Maryland. About daylight on the IGth the ene- 
my opened a heavy fire of artillery on our guns 
in position, which was promptly returned ; their 
fire was silenced for the time, but was frequently 
renewed during the day. In the heavy fire of 
the morning. Major Arndt, commanding first 
battalion first New York artillery, was mor- 
tally wounded while directing tiie operations of 
his batteries. 

It was afternoon before I could move the 
troops to their positions for attack, being com- 
pelled to spend the morning in reconnoitring 
the new position taken up by the enemy, examin- 
ing the ground, finding fords, clearing the ap- 
proaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and 
supply trains, which had been delayed by the 
rapid march of the troops over the few practica- 
ble approaches from Frederick. These had been 
crowded by the masses of infantry, cavalry, and 
artillery pressing on ^vitli the hope of overtaking 
the enemy before he could form to resist an 
attack. Many of the trooijs were out of rations 
on the previous day, and a good deal of their 
ammunition had been expended in the severe 
action of the 14th. 

My plan for the impending general engage- 
ment was to attack the enemy's left with the 



126 



corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by 
Sumner's, and if necessary by Franklin's ; and, 
as soon as matters looked fivorjlily there, to 
move the corps of Burnsidc against the enemy's 
extreme right, upon t'.ie ridge running to the 
south and rear of Sliarpsburg, and having car- 
ried tlieir position, to press along the crest to- 
wards our right; and whenever cither of these 
flank movements sliould be successful, to ad- 
vance our centre with all tlij forces then dis- 
posable. 

AI)out 2 p. M. General Hooker, with his corps, 
consisting of General Ilicketts's, Meade's and 
Uoubieday's divisions, was ordered to cross the 
Antietam at a ford, and at bridge No. 1, a short 
distance above, to attack, and, if possible, turn 
the enemy's left. General Sumner was ordered 
to cross tiie corps of General Mansfield (the 
12th) during the night, and liuld ins own (^the 2d) 
corps ready to cross early the next morning. On 
reacliing tlie vicinity of the enemy's left a sharp 
contest commenced with the Pennsylvania re- 
serves, the advance of General Hooker's corps, 
near the house of D. Miller. The enemy were 
driven from the strip of woods where he was 
first met. The firing lasted until after dark, 
when General Hooker's corps rested on their 
arms on ground won from the enemy. 

During the night General Mansfield's corps, 
consisting of Generals Williams's and Green's 
divisions, crossed the Antietam at tlie same ford 
and bridge that General Hooker's troops had 
passed, and bivouacked on the farm of J.Fofl'en- 
bergor, about a mile in rear of General Hooker's 
position. At daylight on the 17th the action was 
commenced by the skirmishers of the Pennsyl- 
vania reserves. The whole of General Hooper's 
corps was soon engaged, and drove the enemy 
from the open field in front of the first line of 
woods into a second line of woods beyond, 
which runs to the eastward of and nearly paral- 
lel to the Sliarpsburg and Ilagerstown turnpike. 

This contest was obstinate, and as the troops 
advanced tlie opposition became more deter- 
mined and the number of the enemy greater. 
General Hooker then ordered up the corps of 
General Mansfield, wliich moved promptly toward 
the scene of action. 

The first division. General Williams's, was 
deployed to the right on approaching the enemy ; 
General Crawford's brigade on the right, its right 
resting on the Hagerstown turnpike ; on his 
left General Gordon's brigade. The second divis- 
ion. General Green's, joining the left of Gor- 
don's, extended as far as the burnt buildings to 
t!ie north and east of the white church on the 
turnpike. During the deployment, that gallant 
veteran General Mansfield fell mortally wounded, 
while examining the ground in front of his 
troops. General Hartsuff, of Hooker's corps, 
was severely wounded, while bravely pressing 
forward his troops, and was taken from the 
field. 

The command of the twelfth corps fell upon 
General Williams. Five regiments of first divis- 
ion of this corps were new troops. One brigade 
of the second division was sent to support Gen- 
eral Doul)l('(lay. 

The one hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsyl- 
vania volunteers were pushed across the turnpike 



into t^e woods beyond J. Miller's house, with 
orders to hold the position as long as possible. 

The line of battle of this corps was formed, 
and it became engaged about seven a. m., the 
attack being opened by Knapp's (Pennsylvania), 
Cothran's (New York), and Hampden's (Pitts- 
burg) batteries. To meet this attack the enemy 
had pushed a strong column of troops into the 
op.'u fi^lJi in f-ont of the turnpike, while he 
occupied the woods on the west of the turnpike 
in strong force. The woods (as was found by 
subsequent observation) were traversed by out- 
cropping ledges of rock. Several hundred yards 
to the right and rear was a hill which commanded 
the debouche of the woods, and in the fields 
between was a long line of stone fences, con- 
tinued by breastworks of rails, which covered 
the enemy's infantry from our musketry. The 
same woods formed a screen behind which his 
movements were concealed, and his batteries ou 
the hill and the ril3e works covered from the fire 
of our artillery in front. 

For about two hours the battle raged with 
varied success, the enemy endi;avoring to drive 
our troops into the second line of wood, and 
ours in turn to get possession of the line in 
front. 

Our troops ultimately succeeded in forcing the 
enemy back into the woods near the turnpike, 
General Green with his two brigades crossing 
into the woods to the left of the Dunbar church. 
During this conflict General Crawford, com- 
manding first division after General Williams 
took command of the corps, was wounded and 
left the field. 

General Green being much exposed and ap- 
plying for reinforcements, the thirteenth New 
Jersey, twenty-seventh Indiana, and the third 
Maryland were sent to his support with a section 
of Knapp's battery. 

At about nine o'clock r. m. General Sedgwick's 
division of General Sumner's corps arrived. 
Crossing the ford previously mentioned, this di- 
vision marched in three columns to the support 
of the attack on the enemy's left. On ncaring 
the scene of action the columns were halted, 
faced to the front, and established by General 
Sumner in three parallel lines by brigade, facing 
towards the south and west; General Gorman's 
brigade in front, General Dana's second, and 
General Howard's third, with a distance between 
tlie lines of some seventy paces. The division 
was then put i:i motion and moved upon the field 
of battle, under fire from the enemy's concealed 
batteries on the hill beyond the roads. Passing 
diagonally to the front across the open space and 
to tiie front of the first division of General Wil- 
liams's corps, this latter division withdrew. 

Entering the woods on the west of the turn- 
pike, and driving the enemy before them, the 
first line was met by a heavy fire of musketry 
and shell from the enemy's breastworks and the 
batteries on the hill commanding the exit from 
the woods; meantime a heavy column of the 
enemy had succeeded in crowding back the 
troops of General Green's division, and appeared 
in rear of the left of Sedgwick's division. By 
command of General Sumner, General Howard 
faced the third line to the rear preparatory to a 
change of front to meet the column advancing 



127 



on tho left; hut this lino now snfTpring from a 
destructive fire both in front and on its left, 
wliicli it was unable to return, ojave way towarrls 
the riccht and rear in considerable confusion, and 
was soon followed liy the first and second lines. 

General Gorman's brigade, and one regiment 
of General Dana's, soon rallied and checked the 
advance of the snemy on the right. The second 
and third lines now formed on tho left of Gener- 
al Gorman's brigade, and poured a destructive 
fire upon the eneuiv. ■ 

During General Sumner's attack, he ordered 
General Williams to support him. Brigadier- 
General Gordon, with a portion of his brigade, 
moved forward, but when he reached the woods 
tho left of General Sedgwick's division had given 
way; and finding himself, as the smoke cleared 
up, oppo'^ed to the enemy in force with his small 
conim lud, he withdrew to the rear of the batt(!- 
rios at the second line of woods. As General 
Gordon's troops unmasked our batteries on the 
left, they opened with canister; the batteries of 
Capt. Cothran, 1st New York, and I, 1st artillery, 
commanded by Lieutenant Woodruff", doing good 
service. Unal)le to withstand this deadly fire in 
front and the musketry fire from the right, the 
enemy again sought shelter in the woods and 
rocks beyond the turnpike. 

During this assault Generals Sedgwick and 
Dana were seriously wounded and taken from 
the field. General 8edgwick, though twice 
wounded, and faint from loss of blood, retained 
command of his division for more than an hour 
after his first wound, animating his command 
by his presence. 

About the time of General Sedgwick's ad- 
vance. General Hooker, while urging on his 
command, was severely wounded in the foot and 
taken from the field, and General Meade was 
placed in command of bis corps. General How- 
ard assumed command after General Sedgwick 
retired. 

The repulse of the enemy offered opportunity 
to rearrange the lines and reorganize the com- 
mands on the right, now more or less in confu- 
sion. The batteries of the Pennsylvania reserve, 
on higli ground, near I. Potf'enl)urger's liouse, 
opened fire, and checked several attempts of tho 
enemy to establish batteries in front of our right, 
to turn that flank and enfilade the lines. 

While the conflict was so obstinately raging 
on the riglit. General French was pushing his 
division against the enemy still further to tlie 
U'ft. This division crossed the Antietani at the 
same ford as General Sedgwick, and immedi- 
ately in his rear. Passing over the stream in 
three columns, the division marched about a mile 
from the ford, then facing to the left, moved in 
three lines towards the enemy ; General Max 
Weber's brigade in front; Colonel Dwight Mor- 
ris's brigade of raw troops, unurilled, and moving 
for the first time under fire, in the .second, and 
General Kimball's brigade in the third. The di- 
vision was first assailed by a fire of artillery, but 
steadily advanced, driving in the enemy's skir- 
mishers, and encountered the infantry in some 
for(;e at the group of houses on Houlette's farm. 
General Weber's brigade gallantly advanced 
with an unwavering front, and drove the enemy 
from their position about tho houses. 

While General Weber was hotly engaged with 



the first lino of the enemy. General French re- 
ceived orders from General Sunnu'r. bis corps 
commander, to push on with renewed vigor to 
mtike a diversion in favor of the attack on tho 
right. lAviving the new troops, who had been 
thrown into some confusion from their march 
through cornfields, over fences, &c , to f)rm as 
a reserve, he ordered the i)rigade of General 
Kimball to the front, passing to the left of Gen- 
eral Weber. The enemy was pressed back to 
near the crest of the hill, where he was encoun- 
tered in greater strength posted in a sunken road 
forming a natural rifle-pit running in a north- 
westerly direction. In a cornfield in rear of this 
road were also strong bodies of the enemy. As 
the line reached the crest of the hill a grilling firo 
was opened on it from tin; sunken road and corn- 
field. Here a terrific fire of musketry burst from 
both lines, ami the battle raged along the whole 
lino with great slaughter. 

The enemy attempted to turn tho left of the 
line, but were met by the 7th Virginia and 132d 
Pennsylvania volunteers and repulsed. Foiled 
in this, the enemy made a dcternKued assault 
on the front, but were met by a charge from our 
lines, whici) drove them back with severe loss, 
leaving in our hands some three hundred prison- 
ers, and several stand of colors, 'i'lie eneoiy 
having been repulsed by the terrible execution of 
the batteries and tho musketry fire on the extreme 
right, now attempted to assist tho attack on Gen- 
eral French's division, by assailing him on his 
right, and endeavoring to turn this llink, bu» 
this attack was met and checked by tlie 14th In- 
diana and 8th Ohio volunteers, and by canister 
from Capt. Tompkins's battery, 1st Uhode Island 
artillery. Having been under an almost contin- 
uous fire for nearly four hours, and tlie ammu- 
nition nearly expended, this division now took 
po-iition immediately below the crest of the 
heights on which they had so gallantly fought, 
the enemy making no attempt to regain theii* 
lost ground. 

On the left of General French, General Rich- 
ardson's division was hotly engaged. Having 
crossed the Antiotam about 9.o0 a. nr. at the 
ford crossed by the other divisions of Sumner's 
corps, it moved on a line nearly parallel to the 
Antietam, and formed in a ravine behind the 
liigh grounds overlooking Roulette's house; the 
2d (Irish) brigade, commanded by General 
Meagher, on the right; the 3d brigade, com- 
manded by General Caldwell, on his left, and 
the brigade commanded by Colonel Brooks, 53d 
Pennsylvania volunteers, in support. As the 
division moved forward to take its position on 
the field, the enemy directed a fire of artillery 
against it, but owing to the irregularities of the 
ground did but little damage. 

Meagher's brigade advancing steadily soon 
became engaged with the enemy posted to the 
left and in front of Roulette's house. It contin- 
ued to advance, under a heavy fire, nearly to the 
crest of the hill overlooking Piper's house, the 
enemy being posted in a continuation of the 
sunken road and cornfield before referred to. 
Here the brave Irish brigade opened upon the 
enemy a terrific musketry fire. 

All of General Siimner's corps was now en- 
gaged; General Sedgwick on the riglit; General 
French in the centre, and General liichardson 



128 



on the left. The Irish brigade sustained its well- 
earned reputation. After suffering terribly in 
officers and men, and strewing the ground witli 
their enemies as they drove them baclc, their 
ammunition nearly expended, and their com- 
mander, General Meagher, disaliled l:)y the fall 
of liis horse shot under him, tliis brigade was 
ordered to give place to General Caldwell's bri- 
gade, whicli advanced to a short distance in its 
rear. The lines were passed by the Irish bri- 
gade breaking by company to the rear, and 
General Caldwell's by company to the front as 
steadily as on drill. Colonel Brooks's brigade 
now became the second line. 

The ground over which Generals Richardson's 
and French's divisions were fighting was very 
irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, hills 
covered with growing corn, enclosed by stone 
walls, behind wliich the enemy could advance 
unobserved upon any exposed point of our lines. 
Taking advantage of this, the enemy attempted 
to gain the right of Richardson's position in a 
cornfield near Roulette's house, where the divis- 
i >n had become separated from that of General 
French's. A change of front by the 52d New 
York and 2d Delaware volunteers, of Colonel 
Brooks's brigade, under Colonel Frank, and the 
attack made by the 5od Pennsylvania volunteers, 
sent further to the right by Colonel Brooks to 
close this gap in the line, and the movement 
of the 132d Pennsylvania and 7th Virginia volun- 
teers of General Frenclvs division, before re- 
ferred to, drove the enemy from the cornfield 
and restored the line. 

The brigade of General Caldwell, with deter- 
mined gallantry, pushed the enemy back opposite 
the left and centre of this division, but sheltered 
in the sunken road, they still held our forces on 
the right of Caldwell in check. Colonel Barlow 
commanding tlie (51 st and fi4th New York regi- 
ments of Caldwell's brigade, seeing a fovorable 
opportunity, advanced the regiments on the left, 
taking tiie line in the sunken road in flauk, and 
compelled them to surrender, capturing over 
three hundred prisoners and three stands of 
colors. 

The whole of the brigade, with the 57th and 
66th New York regiments of Colonel Brooks's 
brigade, who had moved these regiments into 
the first line, now advanced with galhmtry, driv- 
ing the enemy before them in confusion into the 
cornfield beyond the sunken road. The left of 
the division was now well advanced, when the 
enemy, concealed by an intervening ridge, en- 
deavored to turn its left and rear. 

Colonel Cross, 5tli New Hampshire, by a change 
of front to the left and rear, brought his regiment 
fiacing the advancing line. Here a spirited con- 
test arose to gain a commanding height, the two 
opposing forces moving parallel to each other, 
giving and receiving fire. The 5th gaining the 
atlvantage, faced to the right and delivered its 
volley. The enemy staggered, but rallied and 
advanced desperately at a charge. Being rein- 
forced Ijy the 8 1st Pennsylvania, these regiments 
met the advance by a counter charge. The ene- 
my fled, leaving many killed, wounded, and pris- 
oners, and the colors of the 4th North Carolina, 
in our hands. 

Anotlu>r column of the enemy, advancing un- 
der shelter of a stone wall and cornfield, pressed 



down on the right of the division ; but Colonel 
Barlow again advanced the Gist and G4th New 
York against these troops, and with the attack of 
Kimball's brigade on the right, drove them from 
this position. 

Our troops on the left of this part of the line 
having driven the enemy far back, they, with 
reinforced numbers, made a determined attack 
directly in front. To meet this, Colonel Barlow 
brought his two regiments to their position in 
line, and drove the enemy througli the cornfield 
into the orchard beyond, under a heavy fire of 
musketry, and a fire of canister from two pieces 
of artillery in the orchard, and a battery further 
to the right, throwing shell and case shot. This 
advance gave us possession of Piper's house, the 
strong point contended for by the enemy at this 
part of the line, it being a defensible building 
several hundred yards in advance of the sunken 
road. The musketry fire at this point of the line 
now ceased. Holding Piper's house. General 
Richardson \\'ithdrew the line a little way to the 
crest of a hill, a more advantageous position. 
Up to this time the division was without artillery, 
and in the new position suffered severely from 
artillery fire which could not be replied to. A 
section of Robertson's horse battery, commanded 
by Lieutenant Vincent, 2d artillery, now arrived 
on the ground and did excellent service. Sub- 
sequently a battery of brass guns, commanded 
by Captain Graham, 1st artillery, arrived, and 
was posted on the crest of the hill, and soon 
silenced the two guns in the orcliard. A heavy 
fire soon ensued between the battery further to 
the right and our own. Captain Graham's bat- 
tery was bravely and skilfully served, but unable 
to reach the enemy, who had rifled guns of great- 
er range than our smooth-bores, retired by order 
of General Ricliardson, to save it from useless 
sacrifice of men and horses. The brave genera^', 
was liiraself mortally wounded wlule personally 
directing its fire. 

General Hancock was placed in command of 
the division after the fall of General Ivichardson. 
General Meagher's brigade, now commanded by 
Colonel Burke, of the G3d New York, having 
filled their cartridge-l>oxes, was again ordered 
forward, and took position in the centre of the 
line. The division now occupied one line in 
close proximity to the enemy, who had taken up 
a position in the rear of Piper's house. Colonel 
Dwight Morris, with the 14:tli Connecticut and a 
detachment of the 108th New York, of General 
French's division, was sent by General French 
to the support of General Richardson's division. 
This command was now placed in an interval in 
the line between General Caldwell's and the Irish 
bi'igades. 

The requirements of the extended line of battle 
had so engaged the artillery that the application 
of General Hancock for artillery for the division 
could not be comjjlied with immediately by the 
chief of artillery or the corps commanders in his 
vicinity. Knowing the tried courage of the 
troops. General Hancock felt confident tliat he 
could hold his position, although sufl'ering from 
the enemy's artillery, but was too weak to attack, 
as the great length of the line he was obliged to 
hold prevented him from forming more than one 
line of battle, and, from his advanced position, 
this line was already partly enfiladed by the bat- 



129 



teriL'S of the enemy on the riglit, which were 
protected from our batteries opposite them by 
the woods at the Danker church. 

Seeing a body of the enemy advancing on some 
of our troops to the left vf his position, General 
Hanc ick obtained Hcxamer's battery from Gen- 
eral Franklin's corps, which assisted materially 
in frustrating this attack. 1 rlso assisted the at- 
tack of the 7th Maine, of Franklin's corps, which, 
without other aid, made an attack against the ene- 
my's line, and drove in skirmishers v/ho were an- 
noying our artillery and troops on the riglit. Lieu- 
tenant Woodruff, with battery I, 2d artillery, 
relieved Captain Hexainer, whose ammunition 
was expended. The enemy at one time seemed 
to be aoout making an attack in force upon this 
part of the line, and advanced a long column 
of infantry towards this division; but on nearing 
the position. General Pleasanton opening on them 
with sixteen guns, they halted, gave a desultory 
fire and retreated, closing the operations on this 
portion of the field. I return to the incidents 
occurring still further to the right. 

Between 12 and 1 p. m. General Franklin's 
corps arrived on the field of battle, having left 
tiieir camp near Cranipton's Pass at V> a. m. leav- 
ing General Couch with orders to move with his 
division to occupy Maryland Heights. General 
Smith's division led the column, followed by 
General Slocum's. 

It was first intended to keep this corps in re- 
serve on tlie east side of the Antietam, to operate 
on either tiank or on the centre, as circumstan- 
ces might require ; but on nearing Keedysville, 
the strong opposition on the right, developed by 
the attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered it 
necessary at once to send this corps to the as- 
sistance of the right wing. 

On nearing the field, hearing that one of our 
batteries, (.A.,) -tth United States Artillery, com- 
manded by Lieutenant Thomas, who occupied 
tlie same position as Lieutenant Woodruff's bat- 
tciy in the morning, was hotly engnged without 
supports. General Smith sent two regiments to 
its ridief from General Iluicock's brigade. On 
inspecting the ground. General Smith ordered 
the other regiments of Hancock's brigade, wrth 
Frank's and Cowen's batteries, 1st New York 
artillery, to the threatened position. Lieuten- 
ant Thomas and Captain Cothran, commanding 
batteries, bravely held tlieir positions against the 
advancing enemy, handling their batteries with 
skill. 

Finding the enemy still advancing, the 3d 
brigade, of Smith's division, commanded by Col- 
onel Irwin, 49th Pennsylvania volunteers, was 
ordered up, and passed through Lieutenant 
Thomas's battery, charged upon tlie enemy, and 
drove back the advance until abreast of the Dun- 
ker church. As the right of the brigade came 
opposite the woods it received a destructive fire, 
which checked the advance and threw the bri- 
gade somewhat into confusion. It formed again 
behind a rise of ground in the open space in 
advance of the batteries. 

Gener.al French having reported to General 
Franklin that his ammunition was nearly ex- 
pended, that officer ordered General Brooks, 
with his brigade, to reinforce him. General 
Brooks formed his brigade on the right of Gen- 
eral French, where they remained during the 
17 



remainder of the day and night, frequently under 
the fire of the enemy's artillery. 

It wa.- soon after the brigade of Colonel Irwin 
had fallen back behind the ri.-.e of groun.l that 
the Tth Maine, by order of Colonel Irwin, niado 
the gallant attack already referred to. 

The advance of General Franklin's corps was 
opjtortune. The attack of tlie enemy on this po- 
sition, but for the tinu-ly arrival of his corps, 
must have been disastrous, had it succeeded in 
piercing the line between Generals Sedgwick's 
and French's divisions. 

General Franklin ordered two brigad(>s of Gen- 
eral Slocum's division, General ^awKju's and 
Colonel Torbert's, to form in colunm to assault 
the woods that had been so hotly contested be- 
fore by Generals Sumner and Hooker. General 
Bartlett's brigade was ordered to form as a re- 
serve. At this time General Sumner, having 
command on the right, directed further offensive 
operations to be postponed, as the repulse of 
this, the only remaining corps available for at- 
tack, would peril the safety of the whole army. 

General Porter's corps, consisting of General 
Sykcs's divifion of regulars and volunteers, and 
General Morell's division of volunteers, occupied 
a position on the east side of Antietam Creek, 
upon the mam turnpike leading to Siiarpsburg, 
and directly opposite the centre of the enemy's 
line. This corps filled the interval between the 
right wing and General Burnside's command, 
and guarded the main approach from the enemy's 
position to our trains of supply. It was neces- 
sary to watch this part of our line with the ut- 
most vigilance, lest the enemy should take ad- 
vantage of the first exhibition of weakness here 
to push upon us a vigorous assault, for the pur- 
pose of piercing our centre and turning our rear, 
as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains. 
Once having penetrated this line, the enemy's 
passage to our rear could have met with but fee- 
ble resistance, as there were no reserves to rein- 
force or close up the gap. 

Towards the middle of the afternoon, proceed- 
ing to the right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's, 
and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. 
Several general officers had been carried from 
the field severely wounded, and the aspect of 
aftairs was anything but promising. At the risk 
of greatly exposing our centre, I ordered two 
brigades from Porter's corps, the only available 
troops, to reinforce the right. Six battalions of 
Sykes's regulars had been thrown forward across 
the Antietam bridge on the main road to att^ick 
and drive back the enemy's sharpshooters, who 
were annoying Pleasanton's horse batteries in 
advance of the bridge; Warren's brigade of Por- 
ter's corps, was detached to hold a position on 
Burnside's right and rear; so that Porter was 
left at one time with only a portion of Sykes's 
division and one small brigade of Morell's divis- 
ion (but little over three thousand men) to hold 
his important position. 

General Sumner expressed the most decided 
opinion again-t another attempt during that day 
to assault the enemy's position in front, as por- 
tions of our troops were so much scattered and 
demoralized. In view of tliese circumstances, 
after making changes in the position of some of 
the troops, I directed the different commanders 
to hold their positions, and being satisfied that 



130 



this could be done without the assistance of the 
two brigades from the centre, I countermanded 
the order, wliicli was in course of execution. 

General Slocain's division rephiced a portion 
of General Surnnei-'s troops, and positions were 
selected for batteries in front of the woods. Tlie 
enemy opened several heavy tires of artillery on 
the position of our troops after this, but our bat- 
teries soon silenced them. 

On the morning of the 17th General Pleasan- 
ton, with his cavalry division and the horse bat- 
teries, under Captains Robertson, Tidball, and 
Lieutenant Haines, of the 2d ai-tillery, and Cap- 
tain Gibson, 3d artillery, was ordered to advance 
on the turnpike towards Sharpsburg, across 
bridge No. 2, and support the left oi General 
Sumnei-'s line. The bridge being covered by a 
fire of artillery and sharpshooters, cavalry skir- 
mishers were thrown out, and Captain Tidball's 
batter}' advanced by piece and drove off the 
sharpshooters with canister sufficiently to estab- 
lish the batteries above mentioned, whicli opened 
on the enemy with etFect. The firing was kept 
up for about two hours, when, the enemy's fire 
slackening, the batteries were relieved by Ran- 
dall's and Van Reed's batteries, United States 
artillery. About 'd o'clock Tidball, Robertson, 
and Haines returned to their positions on the 
west of Antietam, Captain Gibson having been 
placed in position on the east side to guard the 
approaches to the bridge. These batteries did 
good service, concentrating their fire on the col- 
umn of the enemy about to attack General Han- 
cock's position, and compelling it to find shelter 
behind the hills in rear. 

General Sykes's division had been in position 
since the 15th, exposed to the enemy's artillery 
and sharpshooters. General Morell had come 
up on the IGtli, and relieved General Richardson 
on the right of General Sykes. Continually, 
under the vigilant watch of the enemy, this corps 
guarded a vital point. 

The position of the batteries under General 
Pleasanton being one of great exposure, the bat- 
talion of the 2d and 10th United States Infantry, 
under Captain Pollard, 2d infantry, was sent to 
his support. Subsequently four battalions of 
regular infantry, under Captain Dryer, 4th in- 
fantry, wore sent across to assist in driving off 
the sharpshooters of the enemy. 

The battalion of the 2d and 10th infantry, ad- 
vancing far beyond the batteries, compelled the 
cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abandon 
their guns. Few in numbers, and unsupported, 
they were unable to bring them off. The heavy 
loss of this small bodyof men attest their gallantry. 

The troops of General Burnside held the left 
of the line opposite bridge No. 3. The attack on 
the right was to have been supported by an at- 
tack on the left. Preparatory to this attack, on 
the evening of the IGth, General Burnside's corps 
was moved forward and to the left, and took up 
a position nearer the bridge. 

I visited General Burnside's position on the 
16'Ji, and after pointing out to him the proper 
dispositions to be made of his troops during tlie 
day and night, informed him that he would prob- 
ably be required to attack the enemy's right on 
the follov/ing morning, and directed hun to make 
careful reconmussances. 

General Burnside's corps, consisting of the 



divisions of Generals Cox, Wilcox, RodcnaTi, 

and Sturgis, was posted as follows : Colonel 
Brooks's brigade. Cox's division, on the right, 
General Sturgis's division immediately in rear. 
On the left was General Rodman's division, with 
General Scammon's brigade, Cox's division, in 
support. 

General Wilcox's division was held in reserve. 

The corps bivouacked in position on the night 
of the IGth. 

Early on the morning of the 10th I ordered 
General Burnside to form his troops, and hold 
tliem in readiness to assault the bridge in his 
front, and to await further orders. 

At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieu- 
tenant V/ilson, topographical engineer, to carry 
the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights 
beyond, and to advance along their crest upon 
Sharpsburg and its rear. 

After some time had clasped, not hearing from 
him, I despatched an aid to ascertain what had 
been done. The aid returned with the infor- 
mation that but little progress had been made. I 
then sent him back with an order to General 
Burnside to assault the bridge at once, and carry 
it at all hazards. The aid returned to me a 
second time with the report that the bridge was 
still in the possession of the enemy. Where- 
upon I directed Colonel Sackett, inspector gen- 
eral, to deliver to General Burnside my positive 
order to push forward his troops without a mo- 
ment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the 
bridge at the point of the bayonet; and I ordered 
Colonel Sackett to remain with General Burnside 
and see that the order was executed promptly. 

After these three hours' delay, the bridge was 
carried at one o'clock by a brilliant charge of the 
51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania volunteers. 
Other troops were then thrown over, and the 
opposite banK occupied, the enemy retreating to 
the heights beyond. 

A halt was then made by General Burnside's 
advance until 3 p. m., upon hearing which, I 
directed one of my aids. Colonel Key, to inform 
General Burnside that I desired him to push for- 
ward his troops with the utmost vigor, and carry 
the enemy's position on the heights ; that the 
movement was vital to our success ; that this 
was a time when we must not stop for loss of life, 
if a great object could thereby be accomplished. 
That if, in his judgment, his attack would fail, 
to inform me so at once, that his troops might 
be withdrawn and used elsewhere on ihe field. 
He replied that he would soon advance, and 
would go up the hill as far as a battery of the 
enemy on the left would permit. Upon this re- 
port, I again immediately sent Colonel Key to 
General Burnside with orders to advance at once, 
if possible to flank the battery, or storm it and 
carry the heights ; repeatiiig that 'i£ he considered 
the movement impracticable, to inform me so, 
that his troops might be recalled. The advance 
was then gallantly resumed, the enemy driven 
from the guns, the heights handsomely carried, 
and a portion of the troops even reached the out- 
skirts of Sliarpsburg. By this time it was nearly 
dark, and strong reinforcen>ents just then reach- 
ing the enemy from Harper's Ferry, attacked 
General Burnside's troops on their left flank, and 
forced them to retire to a lower line of hills 
nearer the bridge. 



131 



If this important movement had been consum- 
mated two hours earlier, a position would have 
been secured upon tlie heights, from wliich our 
batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of 
the enemy's line, and turned their right and rear, 
our victory might thus have been much more 
decisive. 

The following is the substance of General 
Burnside's operations as given in his report : — 

Colonel Crook's brigade was ordered to storm 
the bridge. This bridge, No. 3, is a stone struc- 
ture of three arches with stone parapets. The 
banks of the stream on the opposite side are 
precipitous, and command the eastern approaches 
to the bridge. On the hill side, immediately by 
the bridge, was a stone fence running parallel to 
the stream ; the turns of the roadway, as it 
wound up the hill, were covered by rifle-pits and 
breastworks of rails, &c. These works, and the 
woods that covered the slopes, were filled with 
the enemy's riflemen, and batteries were in posi- 
tion to enfilade the bridge and its approaches. 

General Rodman was ordered to cross the 
ford below the bridge. From Colonel Crook's 
position it was found impossible to carry the 
bridge. 

General Sturgis was ordered to make a detail 
from his division for that purpose. He sent 
forward the 2d Maryland and the 6th New 
Hampshire. These regiments made several suc- 
cessive attacks in the most gallant style, but 
were driven back. 

The artillery on the left were ordered to con- 
centrate their fire on the woods above the bridge. 
Colonel Crook brought a section of Captain 
Simmons's battery to a position to command 
the bridge. The 51st New York and 51st Penn- 
sylvania were then ordered to assault the bridge. 
Taking advantage of a small spur of the hill 
which ran parallel to the river, they moved to- 
wards the bridge. From the crest of this spur 
they rushed with bayonets fixed and cleared the 
bridge. 

The division followed the storming party, also 
the brigade of Colonel Crook's as a support. 
The enemy withdrew to still higher ground, 
some five or six hundred yards beyond, and 
opened a fire of artillery on the troops in the new 
positiron on the crest cf the hill above the bridge. 

General Rodman's division succeeded in cross- 
ing the ford after a sharp fire of musketry and 
artillery, and joined on the left of Sturgis, 
Scammon's brigade crossing as support. Gen- 
eral Wilcox's division was ordered to take posi- 
tion on General Sturgis's right. 

These dispositions being completed about 3 
o'clock, the command nrwved forward, except 
Sturgis's division, left in reserve. Clark's and 
Durell's batteries accompanied Rodman's divis- 
ion; Cook's battery with Wilcox's division, and 
a section of Simmons's battery with Colonel 
Crook's brigade. A section cf Simmons's bat- 
tery and Mullenburgh's and McMullan's batteries 
were in position. The order for the advance 
was obeyed by the troops with alcarity. Gen- 
eral WLlcox's division, with Crook in support, 
moved up on both sides of the turnpike leading 
from the bridge to Sharpsburg, General Rod- 
man's division, supported by Scammon's brigade, 
on the left of General Wilcox. The enemy re- 
treated before the advance of the troops. The 



9th New York, of General Rodman's division, 
captured one of the enemy's batteries and held 
It tor some time. As the command was driving 
the enemy to the main heigiits on tiie left of the 
town, the light division of General A. V Hill 
arrived upon the field of battle from Harper's 
Ferry, and with a heavy artillery fire made a 
strong attack on the extreme left. To meet this 
attack the left division diverged from tiie line 
of march intended, and opened a gap between it 
and the right. To fill up this it was necessary 
to order the troops frtwu the second line. During 
these movements General Rodman was mortally 
wounded. Colonel Harland's brigade, of General 
Rodman's division, was driven hack. Colonel 
Scammon's brigade, by a change of fr(jnt to rear 
on his right flank, saved the left from being 
driven completely in. The fresh troops of the 
enemy pouring in, and the accumulation of artil- 
lery against this command, destroyed all hope 
of its being able to accomplish anything more. 

It was now nearly dark. General Sturgis was 
ordered forward to support tlie left. Notwith- 
standing the hard work in the early part of the 
day, his division moved forward with spirit. 
With its assistance the enemy were checked and 
held at bay. 

The command was ordered to fall back by 
General Cox, who commanded on the field the 
troops engaged in this affliir beyond the Antie- 
tam. The artillery had been well served duXng 
the day. Night closed the long and desperately 
contested battle of the 17th. Nearly two hun- 
dred thousand men and five hundred pieces of 
artillery were for fourteen hours engaged in this 
memorable battle. We had attacked the enemy 
in a position selected by the experienced engineer 
then in person directing their-operations We 
had driven them from their line on one flank, and 
secured a footing within it on the other. The 
army of the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral 
effect incident to previous reverses, had achieved 
a victory over an adversary invested with the 
prestige of recent -success. Our soldiers slept 
that night conquerors on a field won by their 
valor and covered with the dead and wounded of 
the enemy 

The night, however, brought with it grave 
responsibilities. Whether to renew the attack 
on the 18th, or to defer it, even with the risk of 
the enemy's retirement, was the question before 
me. 

After a night of anxious deliberation and a 
full and careful survey of the situation and con- 
dition of our army, the strength and position of 
the enemj', I concluded that the success of an 
attack on the I8th was not certain. I am aware 
of the fact that, under ordinary circumstances, 
a general is expected to risk a battle if he has a 
reasonable prospect of success ; but at this criti- 
cal juncture I should have had a narrow view of 
the condition of the country had I been willing 
to liazard another battle with less than an abso- 
lute assurance of success. At that moment — 
Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland 
invaded — the national cause could afford no 
risks of defeat. One battle lost, and almost all 
would have been lost. Lee's army might then 
have marched as it pleased on Washington, Bal- 
timore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could 
have levied its supplies from a fertile and uude- 



132 



vastated country ; extorted tribute from wealthy 
and populous cities ; and nowhere east of the 
Alleghanies was tliere another organized force 
able to arrest its march. 

The following are among the considerations 
which led me to doubt the certainty of success 
in attacking before the 19th : — 

The troops were greatly overcome by the 
fatigue and exhaustion attendant upon the long 
continued -and severely contested battle of the 
17th, togetlu-r with the long day and night 
marches to which tliey had been subjected during 
the previous three days. 

The supply trains were in the rear, and many 
of the troops had suffered from hunger. They 
required rest and refreshment. 

One division of Sumner's and all of Hooker's 
corps, on the right, had, after fighting most 
valiantly for several hours, been overpowered 
by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and 
much scattered, so that they were for the time 
somewhat demoralized. 

In Hooker's corps, according to the return 
made by General Meade, commanding, there 
were but G.l'I'.) men present on the 18th; where- 
as, on the morning of the 22d, there were 13,093 
men present for duty in the same corps, showing 
that previous to and during the battle 6,364 men 
were separated from their command. 

General Meade, in an official communication 
upon this subject, dated September 18, 1862, 
says : — 

" I enclose a field return of the corps made 
this afternoon, which I desire you will lay before 
the Commanding General. 1 am satisfied the 
great reduction in the corps since the recent 
engagements is not due solely to the casualties 
of battle, and that a consideraltle number of men 
are still in the rear, some having dropped out 
on the march, and many dispersing and leaving 
yesterday during the fight. I think the efficiency 
of the corps, so far as it goes, good. To resist 
an attack in our jjresent strong position, I think 
they may be depended on, and 1 hope tiiey will 
perform duty in case we malce an attack, though 
1 do not think their morale is as good for an 
offensive as a defensive movement." 

One division of Sumner's corps had also been 
overpowered, and was a good deal scattered and 
demoralized. It was not deemed by its corps 
commander in proper condition to attack the 
enemy vigorously the next day. 

Some of the new troops on the left, although 
many of them fought well during the battle, and 
are entitled to great credit, were, at the close of 
the action, driven back, and their morale 
impaired. 

On the morning of the 18th General Burnside 
requested me to send him another division to 
assist in holding his position on the other side 
of the Antietam, and to enable him to withdraw 
his corps if he should l)e attacked by a sujierior 
force. He gave me the impression that if he 
were attacked again that morning he would 
not be able to make a very vigorous resistance. 
I visited his position early, determined to send 
General Morell's division to his aid, and directed 



that it should be placed on this side of the Antie- 
tam, in order that it might cover the retreat of 
his own corps from the other side of the Antie- 
tam, should that become necessary, at the same 
time it was in position to reinforce our centre or 
right, if that were needed. 

Late in the afternoon I found that, although 
he had not been attacked. General Burnside had 
withdrawn his own corps to this side of the Antie- 
tam, and sent over Morell's division alone to hold 
the opposite side. 

A large number of our heaviest and most effi- 
cient batteries had consumed all their ammuni- 
tion on the 16th and 17th, and it was impossible 
to supply them until late on the following day. 

Supplies of provisions and forage had to be 
brought up and issued, and infantry ammunition 
distributed. 

Finally, reinforcements to the number of 
14,000 men — to say nothing of troops expected 
from Pennsylvania — had not arrived, but were 
expected during the day. 

The 18th was, therefore, spent in collecting 
the dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, remov- 
ing the wounded, burning the dead, and the 
necessary preparations for a renewal of the 
battle. 

Of the reinforcements, Couch's division, 
marching with commendable rapidity, came up 
into position at a late hour in the morning, 
Humphrey' s division of new troops, in their 
anxiety to participate in the battle which was 
raging, when they received the order to march 
from Frederick, at about half past three p. m., 
on the 17th, pressed forward during the entire 
night, and the mass of the division reached the 
army during the following morning. Having 
marched more than twenty-three miles after half 
past four o'clock on the preceding afternoon, they 
were, of course, greatly exhausted, and needed 
rest and refreshment. Large reinforcements ex- 
pected from Pennsylvania never arrived. During 
the 18th orders were given for a renewal of the 
attack at daylight on the lOtli. 

On the night of the 18th the enemy, after 
passing troops in the latter part of the day from 
thi> Virginia shore to their position behind 
Sharpslinrg, as seen by our officers, suddenly 
formed the design of abandoning their position, 
and retreating across the river. As their line 
was but a short distance from the river, the 
evacuation presented but little difficulty, and was 
effected before daylight. 

About 2,700 of the enemy's dead were, under 
the direction of Major Davis, assistant inspector 
general, counted and buried upon the battle-field 
of Antietam. A portion of their dead had been 
previously buried by the enemy. This is con- 
clusive evidence that the enemy sustained much 
greater loss than we. 

Thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of 
fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and more 
than six thousand prisoners, were the trophies 
wdiich attest the success of our army in the battles 
of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and Antie- 
tam. 

Not a single gun or color was lost by our army 
during these battles. 



133 



Tabular Report of the Casualties in the Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Antietam on 
the IQth and 11 th of September, 18G2, 





Generjil 
officers. 


Other oflScers. 


Enlisted men. 


Aggregate. 




Corps and Divisions, 


12 


0) 

■a 
a 

3 
O 


— 
j3 


•a 

o 
■c 
a 
a 
o 


•6 


0) 

■c 

B 

S 

o 


ti 

a 

1 


•6 
5 


•o 

it 
•o 
a 
a 
o 


ti) 


& 

to 

3 

•a 
i 

o 


FIRST CORPS. 

Major-Goner.'il Hooker, 
















98 
157 
97 


669 
89.S 
449 


95 
137 
23 


802 

1,188 

569 


















































Total 
















348 


2,016 


255 


2,610 


SKCOND CORPS. 

Major-General Sumner, 




1 
1 


20 


39 


192 
355 
272 


860 
1,577 
1,271 


24 

321 
203 


212 
355 
293 


900 
1,579 
1,322 


24 
321 
203 


1,136 
2, '^5 
1,818 










21 


50 






Total 




4 


41 


89 


819 


3,708 


548 


860 


3,!- 01 


548 


5,209 


FIFTH CORPS. 

Major-General F. J. Porter, 
































2 


13 

7 


92 
13 


1 
1 


13 

8 


94 
13 


1 

1 


108 








1 
1 


22 











Total 


2 


20 


105 


2 


21 


107 


2 


130 












SIXTH CORPS. 

Major-General Franklin. 
















5 

65 


277 


2 
31 


05 


















373 




















Total 
















70 


335 


33 


438 


NINTH CORPS. 

Major-ijJeneral Burnside, 






2 
7 
8 
5 


20 
29 
40 

7 


44 

121 

212 

33 


2fi4 
493 
743 
145 


7 
20 
70 
23 


46 

128 

220 

38 


284 
5J2 
783 
152 


7 
20 
70 
23 


337 








670 








1,073 
213 
















Total 






22 


90 


410 


1,045 


120 


432 


1,741 


120 


2,293 












TWELFTH CORPS. (Gen. Banks.) 
Brig.-Gen. Williams, commaud'g 






9 
6 


35 
20 


151 
107 

1 


827 

481 

15 


54 

30 

1 


160 

113 

1 


862 

507 

15 


54 

30 

1 


1,076 








650 








17 














Total 




15 


61 


259 


1,323 


85 


274 


l,3,s4 


85 


1,743 










1 




8 






9 
23 




9 


Bri;,'-.-Gen. Ploasauton, cavalry 










5 


28 
























4 


79 


249 


1,508 


0,789 


755 


2,010 


9,4! 6 


1,013 


12,469 









Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Camp near Sharpsburg, September 29, 1862. 



Official. 



S. WILLIAMS, 
Assistant Adjutant- General. 



134 



An estimate of the forces under the Confeder- 
ate General Lee, made up by dh-ection of Gen- 
eral Banks, from information obtained by the 
examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, &c., 

{)revious to the battle of Antietam, is as fol- 
ows : — 

General J. J. Jackson's corps, 24,778 men. 

General James Longstreet's corps, 23,342 " 

General D. H. Hill's 2d division, 15,525 " 

General J. E. B. Stuart, cavalry, 6,400 " 
General Ransom's and Jenkins's 

brigade, 3,000 " 

Forty-six regiments not included in 

above, 18,400 " 

Artillery, estimated at 400 guns, 6,000 " 



Total, 



97,445 



These estimates give the actual number of men 
present and fit for duty. 

Our own forces at the battle of Antietam were 
as follows : — 

1st corps, 14,856 men. 

2d corps, ^ _ 18,813 " 

5th corps (one division not arrived), 12,930 " 

6th corps, 12,300 " 

9th corps, 13,819 " 

12th corps, 10,126 " 

Cavalry division, 4,320 " 



Total in action, 



87,164 " 



When our cavalry advance reached the river on 
the morning of the 19th, it was discovered that 
nearly all the enemy's forces had crossed into 
Virginia during tiie night, their rear escaping 
under cover of eight batteries, placed in strong 
positions upon the elevated bluft's on the opposite 
bank. General Porter, commanding the 5th 
corps, ordered a detachment from Griffin's and 
Barnes's brigades, under General Griffin, to cross 
the river at dark, and carry the enemy's batteries. 
This was gallantly done under the fire of the 
enemy ; several guns, caissons, &c., were taken, 
and their supports driven back half a mile. 

The information obtained during the progress 
of this affair indicated that the mass of the enemy 
had retreated on the Charlestown and Martins- 
burg roads, towards Winchester. To verify this, 
and to ascertain how far the enemy had retired. 
General Porter was authorized to detach from 
his corps, on the morning of the 20tli, a recon- 
noitring party in greater force. This detach- 
ment crossed the river, and advanced about a 
mile, when it was attacked by a large body of the 
enemy lying in ambush in the woods, and driven 
back across the rivtr with considerable loss. 
This reconnoissance showed that the enemy was 
still in force on the Virginia bank of the Poto- 
mac, prepared to resist our further advance. 

It was reported to me on the 19th that Gen- 
eral Stuart had made his appearance at Wil- 
liams|jort with some four thousand cavalry and 
six pieces of artillery, and that ten thousand 



infantry were marching on the same point from 
the direction of Winchester. I ordered General 
Couch to march at once with his division, and a 
part of Pleasanton's cavalry, with Franklin's 
corps, within sujjporling distance, for the pur- 
pose of endeavoring to capture this force. Gen- 
eral Couch made a prompt and rapid march to 
Winiamsport, and attacked the enemy vigor- 
ously, but they made their escape across the 
river. 

I despatched the following telegraphic report 
to the General-in-Chief: — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Shai-psburg, September 19, 1862. 

" I have the honor to report that Maryland is 
entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, 
who has been driven across the Potomac. No 
fears need now be entertained for the safety of 
Pennsylvania. I shall at once occupy Harper's 
Ferry. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Commanding. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

On the following day I received this tele- 
gram r — 

Washington, September 20, 1862 — 2 p. m. 

" We are still left entirely in the dark in re- 
gard to your own movements and those of the 
enemy. This should not be so. You should 
keep me advised of both, as far as you know 
them. 

«'H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

To which I answered as follows : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Near Sharpsbury, Sept. 20, 1862 — 8 p. M. 

"Your telegram of to- day is received. I tele- 
graphed you yesterday all I knew, and had 
nothing more to inform ) ou of until this evening. 
Williams's corps (Banks's) occupied Maryland 
Heights at 1 P. M. to-day. The rest of the 
army is near here, except Couch's division, which 
is at this moment engaged with the enemy in 
front of Williamsport ; the enemy is retiring via 
Cliarlestown and Martinsburg, on Winchester. 
He last night reoccupied Williamsport by a 
small force, but will be out of it by morning. I 
think he has a force of infantry near Shepherds- 
town. 

" I regret that you find it necessary to couch 
every despatch I have the honor to receive from 
you in the sph'it of fliult-finding, and that you 
have not yet found leisure to say one word in 
commendation of the recent achievements of this 
array, or even to allude to them. 

" I have abstained from giving the number of 
guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, &c., captured, 
uiitil I could do so with some accm-acy. I hope 



135 



by to-morrow evenihg to be able to give at least 
an approximate statement. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-Oencrcd Commwidiiig. 
" Major-General IIalleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washington." 

On the same day I telegraphed as follows : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" September 20, 1862. 
" As the Rebel army, now on the Virginia side 
of the Potomac, must in a great measure be de 
pendent for supplies of ammunition and ))rovis- 
ions upon Richmond, I would res|)ectfully sug- 
gest that General Banks be directed to seiid out 
a cavalry force to cut their supply communication 
opposite Washington. This would seriously em- 
barrass their operations, and will aid tliis army 
materially. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-General Commanding. 
" Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

Maryland Heights were occupied by General 
Williams's corps on this day, and on the 22d 
General Sumner took possession of Harper's 
Ferry. 

It will be remembered that at the time I was 
assigned to the command of the forces for the 
defence of the national capital, on the 2d day of 
September, 1862, the greater part of all the 
available troops were suffering under the dis- 
heartening influences of the serious defeat they 
had encountered din-ing the brief and unfortunate 
campaign of General Pope. Their numbers 
were greatly reduced by casualties, their confi- 
dence was much shaken, and they had lost 
something of that ^'■esprit du corps," which is 
indispensable to the efficiency of an army. 
Moreover, they had left behind, lost, or worn 
out, the greatest part of their clothing and camp 
equipage, which required renewal before they 
could be in proper condition to take the field 
again. 

The intelligence that the enemy was crossing 
the Potomac into Maryland was received in 
Washington on the 4th of September, and the 
army of the Potomac was again put in motion, 
under my direction, on the following day, so that 
but a very brief interval of time was allowed to 
reorganize or procure supplies. 

The sanguinary battles i f South Mountain and 
Antietam fought by this army a few days after- 
wards, with the reconnoissances nnmediately fol- 
lowing, resulted in a loss to us of ten general 
officers, many regimental and company officers. 
and a large number of enlisted men, amounting 
in the aggregate to fifteen thousand two hundred 
and twenty (15,220). Two army c irps had 
been sadly cut up, scattered, and somewhat de- 
moralized in the action on the 17th. 

In General Sumner's corps alone forty-one 
(41) commissioned officers and eight hundred 
and nineteen (819) enlisted men had been killed; 



four (4) general officers, eighty-nine (89) other 
commissioned olRcers and three thousand ^cven 
hundred and eight (;5,7()8) enlisted men iiad been 
wounded, besides five hundred and foriy-f-i-dit 
(548) missing; making tiie aggregate h.ss^in 
this splendid veteran corps, in tliis one battle, 
five thousand two hundred and nine (5,209). 

In General Hooker's corjjs the casu.lles of 
the same engagement amounted to two thousand 
SIX hundred and nineteen (2,019). 

The entire army had been groallv exhausted 
by unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, 
hunger, and want of sleep and re.st, inevious to 
the last battle. 

When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into 
Virginia the means of transportation at my dis- 
posal were inadequate to furnish a single day's 
supply of subsistence in advance. 

Many of the troops were new levies, some of 
whom had fought like veterans, but the morale. 
of others had been a good deal impaired in tho-e 
severely contested actions, and thev required 
time to recover as well as to acquire "the neces- 
siry drill and discipline. 

Under these circumstances I did not feel au- 
thorized to cross the river with the main army 
over a very deep and difficult ford in ])ursuit of 
the retreating enemy, known to be in strong 
force on the south bank, and therebv place that 
stream, which was liable at any time to rise 
above a fording stage, between my army and its 
base of supply. 

I telegrai)hed on the 22d to the General-in- 
Chief as follows : — 

" As soon as the exigencies of the service will 
admit of it, this army should be reorganized. It 
is absolutely necessary, to secure its efficiencv, 
that the old skeleton regiments should be filled 
up at once, and officers ap]jointed to supply the 
numerous existing vacancies. There are in- 
stances where captains are commanding regi- 
ments, and companies are without a single com- 
missioned officer." 

On the 23d the following was telegraphed to 
the General-in-Chief: — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"NcarShepherdsfoum, Sept. 23,1862— 9.30 A. M. 
" From several different sources I learn that 
General R. E. Lee is stid opposite to my posi- 
tion at Leestown, bet^veen Shepherdst i\vn and 
Martinsburg, and that GeneralJackson is on the 
Opequan Creek, about three miles above its 
mouth, both with large forces. There are also 
indications of heavy reinforcements moving 
towards them from Winchester and Charles- 
town. I have therefore ordered General Frank- 
lin to take position with his corps at the cross- 
roads about one mile northeast of Bakersville, on 
the Bakersville and Williamsport rv^ad, and 
General Conch to establish his division near 
Downsville, leaving sufficient force at Williams- 
port to watch and guard the ford at tha; [uace. 
The fact of the enemy's remaining so long in our 



136 



front, and the indications of an advince of rein- 
forcements, seem to indicate that he will give us 
another liattle with all his avai]al)le force. 

"As I mentioned to you before, our army has 
been very much reduced by casualties in the re- 
cnt battles, and in my judgment all the rein- 
forcements of old troops that can possiI)ly be 
dispensed with around Washington and otiier 
places, should be instantly pushed forward by 
rail to this army. A defeat at this juncture 
would be ruinoi.s to our cause. I cannot think 
it possible that the enemy will bring any forces 
to hear upon Washington till after the question 
is decided here ; hut if he should, troojjs cm soon 
be sent back from this army by rail to reinforce 
tlie garrison there. 

" The evidence I have that reinforcements are 
coming to the R'_'bel army, consists in the feet 
Uiat long columns of dust, extending from Win- 
chester to Charlestown and from Charlestown in 
this direction, and also troops moving this way, 
were seen last evening. This is corroborated by 
citizens. General Sumner, with his corps and 
Williams's (Banks's), occupies Harper's Feriy 
and the surrounding heights. I think he will be 
able to hold his position until reinforcements 
arrive. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Afajor-General. 
" Major-General H. W. IIalleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washington." 

On the 27th I made the following report : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" September 27, 1862—10 A. M. 

" All the information in my possession goes to 
prove that the main body of the enemy is con- 
centrated not far from ISIartinsburg, with some 
troops at Charlestown ; not many in Winchester. 
Their movements of late have been an extension 
towards our right and beyond it. They are re- 
ceiving reinforcements in Winchester, mainly, I 
think, of conscripts — perhaps entirely so. 

" This army is not now in condition to under- 
take another campaign, nor to bring on another 
battle, unless great advantages are offered by 
some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military 
exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly 
deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments 
are reduced to mere skeletons. The new regi- 
ments need instruction. Not a day should be 
lost in filling the old regiments — our main de- 
pendence — and In suppljing vacancies among the 
officers by promotion. 

" My j)resent purpose is to hold the army 
about as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry se- 
cure and watching the river closely, intending to 
attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to 
this side. 

" Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us 
the great advantage of a secure debouche, but we 
cannot avail ourselves of it until tlie railroad 
bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise 
supply a greater number of troops than we now 
have on the Virginia side at that point. When 



the river rises so that the enemy cannot cross In 
force, I purpose concentrating the army some- 
where near Harper's Ferry, and then acting 
according to circums'ances, viz: moving on Win- 
chester, if from the position and attitude of the 
enemy we are likely to gain a great advantage 
by doing so, or else devoting a reasonable time 
to the organization of the array and instruction of 
the new troops, preparatory to an advance on 
whatever lln'; may be determined. In any event, 
I regard it as absolutely nece-*sary to send new 
regiments at once to the old corps, for ])urposes 
of in-;truction, and that the old regiments be filled 
at once. I have no fears as to an attack on 
Washington by the line of .Manissas. Holding 
Harper's Ferry as I do, they will not run the 
risk of an attack on their flank and rear while 
thev have the garrison of W.shington in their 
front. 

" I rather a])prehend a renewal of the attemj)! 
in Maryland, should the river remain low for a 
great length of time, and should the) receive 
considerable addition to their force. I would be 
glad to hive Peck's division as soon as possible, 
I am surprised that Slgel's men should have been 
sent to Western Virginia without my knowledge. 
The last I heard from you on the subject was that 
they were at my disposition. In the last battles 
the enemy was undoubtedly greatly superior to 
us in number, and it was only h) very hird fight- 
ing that we gained the advantage we did. As it 
was, the result was at oae period very doubtful, 
and we had all we could do to win t!ie day. If 
the enemy receives considerable reinforcements 
and we none. It Is possible that I may have too 
much on my hands in the next battle. My own 
view of the proper policy to be ])ursued is to re- 
tain in Washington merely the force necessary to 
garrison It, and to send everything else available 
to veinf )rce this armv. The railways give us the 
means of promptly reinf rclng Washington should 
it become necessary. If I am reinforced, as I ask , 
and am allowed to take my own course, I will 
hold myself responsible for the safety of Washing- 
ton. Several persons recently from Richmond 
say that there are no troops there except con- 
scripts, and they few in number. I hope to give 
you details as to late battles by this evening, I 
am about starting again for Harper's Ferry. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Commanding. 
" Major-General Halleck, 

" General-in-C hif'f, Washington." 

The work of reorganizing, drilling, and sup])ly- 
Ing the army, I began at t le earliest moment. 
The different corps were stationed along the river 
in the best posltl ms to cover and guard the fords. 
The great extent of the river front, from near 
Washington to Cumberland, (some one hundred 
and fifty m.les,) together with the line of the 
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was to be carefully 
watched and guarded, to jirevent, if possible, the 
enemy's raids. Reconnoissances upon the Vir- 
ginia side of the river, for the purpose of learn- 
ing the enemy's positions and movements, were 



137 



made frequently, so that our cavalry, which from 
the tune we left Washington had performed the 
most laborious service, and had from the com- 
mencement been deficient in numbers, was found 
totally inadequate to the requirements of the 
army. 

This overwork had broken down the greater 
part of the horses ; disease had appeared among 
them, and but a very small portion of our original 
cavalry force was lit for service. 

To such an extent had this arm become re- 
duced, that when (jeneral Stuart made his raid 
into Pennsylvania on the 11th of October with 
two thousand men, I could only mount eight 
hundred men to follow him. 

Harper's Ferry was occuj)ied on the 22d, and 
in order to prevent a cat istrophe similar to the 
one which had happened to Colonel Miles, I im- 
mediately ordered Maryland, Boliver, and Loudon 
Heights, to be strongly fortified. This was done 
as far as the time and means at our disposal per- 
mitted. 

The main army of the enemy, during this time, 
remained in the vicinity of Martinsburg and 
Bunker Hill, and occupied itself in drafting and 
coercing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, 
forcibly taking their property, where it was not 
voluntarily ottered, bm'ning bridges, and destroy- 
ing railroads. 

On the first day of October, his Excellency 
the President honored the army of the Potomac 
with a visit, and remained several days, during 
which he went through the ditterent encamp- 
ments, reviewed the 'roops, and went over the 
battle-fields of South Mountain and Antietam. 
I hid the opportunity during this visit to describe 
to him the operations of the army since the time 
it left Washington, and gave him my reasons for 
not following the enemy after he crossed the Po- 
tomac. 

On the 5th of October the division of General 
Cox (al)out 5,000 men) was ordered from my 
command to Western Virginia. 

On the 7th of October I received the follow- 
lowing telegram : — 

" Washington, D. C, October 6, 1862. 
" I am instructed to telegraph you as follows : 
The President directs that you cross the Poto- 
mac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him 
south. Your army must move now, while the 
roads are good. If you cross the river between 
the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter 
by your operation, you can be reinforced with 
30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the 
Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 
can be sent to you. The President advises the 
interior line between Washington and the enemy, 
but does not order it. He is very desirous that 
your army move as soon as possible. You will 
immediatsly report whit line you adopt, and 
when you intend to cross the river ; also to what 
point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is 
necessary that the plan of your operations be 
positively determined on, before orders are given 



for building bridges and repairing railroads. I 
am directed to add, that tiie SecreUiry of War 
and the General-in-Chief fully concur "witii the 
President in these in^truciioiis. 

"II. W. IL\LLECK, 

" Maj.-Gen. McClellan." 

At this time General Averill, with the greater 
part of our etficicnt cav^dry, was in the vicinity 
of Ctnnberland, and Gen'end Kelly, the com- 
manding otticer, had that day reported that a 
large force of the enemy was advancing on 
Colonel Campbell, at Saint John's lliver. This 
obliged me to order General Averill to proceed 
with his force to the supi)ort of Colonel Camp- 
bell, which delayed his return to the army f )r 
several days. 

On the 10th of October Stuart crossed the 
river at McCoy's Ferry, with 2,000 cavalry and 
a battery of horse artillery, on his raid into 
Maryland and Pennsylvania, making it necessary 
to use all our cavalry against him. This ex- 
hausting service completely broke down neirly 
all of our cavalry horsey and rendered a remount 
absolutely indispensable before we could advance 
on the enemy. 

The following were the disposition of troo))3 
made by me to defeat the purposes of this 
raid : — 

General Averill, then at Green Spring, on the 
upper Potomac, was ordered to move ra])idly 
down upon the north side of the river, with all 
his disposable c.ivaliy, using every exertion to 
get upon the trail of the enemy, and follow it up 
vigorously. 

General Pleasanton, with the remninlngcaralry 
force, was ordered to take the road by Cavetown, 
Harmon's Gaj), and Mechmicsville, and cut off 
the retreat of the enemy should he make for any 
of the fords below the position of the main army. 
His orders were to jjursue them Avith the ut- 
most ra])idity, not to spare' his men or horses, 
and to destroy or capture them If possible. 

General Crook, at that ti i.e commanding 
Cox's division, at Hancock, en route for Western 
Virginia, was ordered to halt, place his men in 
cirs, and remain in readiness to move to any 
point above should the enemy return in that 
direction, keeping his scouts well out on all the 
roads leading from the direction of Chambers- 
burg to the u])per Potomac. 

The other commandprs between Hancock and 
Harper's Ferrj- were instructed to keej) a vigi- 
lant watch upon all the roads and fords, so as to 
prevent the escape of the Rebels within these 
limits. 

General Burnside was ordered to send two 
brigades to the Monocacy crossing, there to re- 
main in cars, with steam up, ready to move to 
any point on the railroad to which Stuart might 
be aiming, while Colonel Hush, at Frederick, 
was directed to keep his lancers scouting on the 
approaches from Chambersburg, so as to give 
timely notice to the commander of the two bri- 
gades at the Monocacy crossing. 



138 



General Stoneraan, whose headquarters were 
then at Poolesville, occupying with his division 
the different fords on the river below the mouth 
of the Monocacy, was directed to keep his caval- 
ry well out on the approaches from the direction 
of Frederick, so as to give him time to mass his 
troops at any point where the enemy might at- 
tempt to cross the Potomac in his vicinity. He 
was informed of General Pleasanton's move- 
ments. 

After the orders were given for covering all 
the fords upon the river, I did not think it possi- 
ble for Stuart to recross, and I believed that the 
capture or destruction of his entire force was per- 
fectly certain; but owing to th« lact that my 
orders were not in all cases carried out as I ex- 
pected, he effected his escape into Virginia with- 
out much los^. 

The troops sent by General Burnside to the 
Monocacy, owing to some neglect in not giving 
the necessary orders to the commander, instead 
of remaining at the railroad cro-sing, as 1 direct- 
ed, marched four miles into Frederick, and there 
remained until after Stuart had passed the rail- 
road, only six miles below, near which point it 
was said he halted for breakfist. 

General Pleasanton ascertained, after his ar- 
rival at Mechanicsville, that the enemy were only 
about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty 
retreat towards the mouth of the Monocacy. 
He pushed on vigorously, and, near its mouth, 
overtook th^m with a part of his force, having 
marched seventy-eight miles in twenty-four 
hours, and having left many of his horses broken 
down up:)n the road. He at once attacked with 
his artillery, and the firing continued for several 
hours, during which time he sta'es that he 
received the support of a small portion of Gener- 
al Stoneman's command, not sufficient to inflict 
any material damage upon the enemy. 

"General St meman repr.rts that, in accordance 
with his instruction*, he gave all necessary orders 
for intercepting the return of the Rebels, and 
Colonel Staples, commanding one of his brigades, 
states that he sent two regiments of infantry to 
the mouth of the Monocacy, and one regiment to 
White's Ford; that on the morning of the 12th, 
about ten o'clock, he, by General Stoneman's 
order, marched the remaining three regiments of 
his command from Poolesville towards the mouth 
of the Monocacy ; that before getting into action 
he was relieved by General Ward, who states 
that he reported to General Pleasanton with his 
command, while the enemy was crossing the 
river, and was informed by him (General Pleas- 
anton) that he was too late; and that nothing 
could be done then. 

General Pleasanton, in his report of this affair, 
says: "It was at this time that Colonel Ward 
reported to me from General Stoneman's di- 
vision, with a brigade of infantry, a regiment of 
cavalry, and a section of artillery. I told him 
thit his command could be of no use, as the 
enemy had then crossed the river. Tliese are 
the only troo])s, that I knew of, that were in that 



vicinity, and this was the first intimation I 
received that any troops were endeavoring to 
assist me in capturing the Rebels. I succeeded 
in preventing the enemy from cross. ng at the 
mouth of the Monocacy, and dro-\e him to 
White's Ford, three miles below. Had White's 
Ford been OLCupied by any force of ours ])reviou3 
to the time of the occu|)ation by the enemy, the 
cajjture of Stuart's whole f'rce would have been 
certain and inevitiible. With my small force, 
Avliich did not exceed one fourth of the enemy's, 
it was not practical )le for me to occupy that ford 
while the enemy was in front." 

It would seem from the report of General 
Stoneman, that the disjjosition he made of his 
troops, ])revious to the arrival of Stuart, was a 
good one. He stationed two regiments at the 
mouth of Monocacy, and two regiments at 
White's Ford, the latter in the very place where 
the crossing was made, and the former only 
three miles off, with a reserve of three regiments 
at Poolesville, some six miles distant. General 
Pleasanton's report shows that from the time 
the firing commenced until the enemy were 
across the river was about four and a half hours. 
General Stoneman states that he started the re- 
serve from Poolesville at about nine o'clock, but 
it appears, from the report of General Pleasan- 
ton, that it did not reach him until half-past 
one. 

At the time I received the order of October 6, 
to cross the river and attack the enemy, the 
army was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large 
])art of our troops were in the want of shoes, 
blankets, and other indispensable articles of cloth- 
ing, notwithstanding all the ettbrts that had been 
made since the battle of Antietam, and even 
prior to that date, to refit the army with clothing, 
as well as horses. I at once consulted with 
Colonel Ingalls, the Chief Quartermaster, who 
believed that the necessary articles could be sup- 
plied in about three days. Orders were imme- 
diately issued to the different commanders who 
had not already sent in their requisitions, to do 
so at once, and all the necessary steps were forth- 
with taken by me to insure a jjrompt delivery of 
the su])plies. The requisitions were forwarded to 
the proper department at Washington, and I ex- 
pected that the articles would reach our depots 
during the three days specified ; but day after 
day elapsed, and only a small portion of the 
clothing arrived. Corps commanders, upon re- 
ceiving notice from the quartermasters that they 
might expect to receive their su]jplles at certain 
dates, sent the trains for them, which, after wait- 
ing, were compelled to return empty. Several 
instances occurred where these trains went back 
and forth from the camps to the depots, as often 
as four or five different times, without receiving 
their supplies, and I was informed by one corps 
commander that his wagon train had travelled 
over 150 miles, to and from the depots, before 
he succeeded in obtaining his clothing. 

The corps of General Franklin did not get its 
clothing until after it had crossed the Potomac, 



139 



and was moving into Virginia. General Reynolds's 
corps was delayed a day at Berlin, to complete 
its sup])lies, and General Porter only completed 
his on reaching the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. 

.1 made every exertion in my power, and my 
quartermasters did the same, to have these sup- 
plies hurried forward rapidly ; and I was repeat- 
edly told that they had filled the requisitions at 
Washington, and that the su])plies had been 
forwarded. But they did not come to us, and of 
course were inaccessible to the army. I did not 
fail to make frequent representation of this con- 
dition of things to the general-in-chief, and it 
appears that he referred the matter to the 
quartermaster-general, who constantly replied 
that the sujjpiies had been jiromjjtly orJered. 
Notwithstanding this, they did not reach our 
depots. 

The following extracts are from telegrams 
upon this subject : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 11, 18G2— 9 A. M. 

"We haye been making every effort to get 
supplies of clothing for this army, and Colonel 
Ingalls has received advices that it has been 
forwarded by railroad ; but, owing to bad man- 
agement on the roads, or from some other cause, 
it comes in very slowly, and it will take a much 
longer time than was anticipated to get articles 
that are absolutely indispensable to the army, 
unless the railroad managers forward supplies 
more rapidlv. 

"" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-Geiio'ol. 
" Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Wasldngton." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"October 11, 1862. 

" I am compelled again to call your attention 
to the great deficiency of shoes, and other indis- 
pensable articles of clothing, that still exists in 
some of the corps in this army. Upon the as- 
surances of the chief quartermaster, who based 
his calculation upon information received fnm 
Washington, that clothing would be forwarded 
at certain times, corps commanders sent their 
wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for 
it. It did not arrive as promised, and has not 
yet arrived. Unless some measures are taken to 
insure the prompt forwarding of these supplies, 
there will necessarily be a corresponding delay in 
getting the army ready to move, as the men can- 
not march without shoes. Everything has been 
done that can be done at these headquarters, to 
accomplish the desired result. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
^^ Major- General Commanding. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commander-in-Cidef, Washington." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 15, 1862—7 P. M. 

• •••*•* 

" I am using every possible exertion to get 



this army ready to move. It was only yestcrduy 
that a part of our shoes and clothing arrived at 
Hagerstown, It is behig issued to tiie troops aa 
rapidly as possible. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
** Major-Gcneral. 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 15, 1862— 7.:J0 p. M. 
" General Franklin reports that there is by no 
means as much clothing as was called for at 
Hagerstnwn. I think, therefore, you iiad better 
have additional sup])lies, esjieci.illy of shoes, for- 
warded to Harper's Ferry as soon as possible. 
" R. B. MARCY, 
" Chief of Staff." 
" Colonel R. Ingat.ls, 
" Care of Colonel Bucker, Quartermaster, WasJi- 
ington." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"October 16, 1862. 
" General J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs as 
follows: ' My quartermaster reports that there 
are no shoes, tents, blankets, or knapsacks at 
Hagerstown. He was able to procure only a 
complete supply of overcoats and pants, with a 
few socks, drawers, and coats. This leaves many 
of the men yet without a shoe. My requisitions 
call for 5,255 pairs of shoes.' 

" Please push the shoes and stockings up to 
Harper's Ferry as fast as possible. 

"R. B. MARCY, 

" Chief of Staff. 
" Colonel R. Ingalls, 
" Care of Colonel Rucher, Quartermaster, Wash- 
ington." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Knoxville, Md., Oct. 9, 1862. 
" You did right in sendmg clothing to Harper's 
Ferry. You will not be able to send too much 
or too quickly. We want blankets, shoes, can- 
teens, &c., very much. 

"RUFUS INGALLS, 
" Lieutenant- Colonel and Aide-de- Camp, 

" Chief Quartermaster. 
" Colonel C. G. Sawtelle, 

" Depot Quartermaster, Washington." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Knoxville, Aid., Oct. 10, 1862. 
" Shi]jments to Hagerstown must !)e made di- 
rect through, to avoid the contemptible delays at. 
Harrisburg. If Colonel Crosman was ordered to 
send clothing, I hope he has sent it, for the suf- 
fering and impatience are excessive. 

"RUFUS INGALLS, 
^^ Lieutenant- Colonel and Aide de-Camp, 

" Chief Quartermaster. 
" Captain AUGUSTUS Boyd, 

" Quartermaster, Philadelphia." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Knoxville, October 13, 1862. 
" Has the clotbmg arrived yet ? If not, do 



14 



you know where it is ? "What clothing was taken 
by the Ptehels at Chambersburg ? Did they 
capture any property that was en route to you ? 
Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg? Send 
an agent over the road to ol)tain information, 
and hurry up the supplies. Re])ly at once. 
"IIUFUS INGALLS, 
" Lieutenant- Culonel and Aldc-de-Gamp, 

" Chief' Quartermaster. 

" Captain George H. Weeks, 

" Depot Quartermaster. Ilagerstown." 

" Sh-^rpsbukg, October 15, 1862. 
" I have just returned from Hagerstown, where 
I have been for the clothing for the corps. There 
was nothing there but overcoats, trowsers, and a 
few uniform coats and socks. There were not 
any shoes, blankets, shirts, or shelter tents. 
Will you please tell me where and when the bal- 
ance "can be had ? Shall I send to Harper's 
Ferry for them tomorrow? The corps surgeon 
has just made a requisition for 45 hospital tents. 
There are none at Hagerstown. Will you please 
to inform me if I can get them at Harper's 
Ferry ? 

"FIELDING LOWRY, 
" Captain and Quartermaster. 
" General Ingalls." 

" Hagerstown, October 15, 1862. 
"I want at least, ten thousand (10,000) suits 
of clothing in addition to what I have received. 
It should be here now. 

" G. W. WEEKS, 
*^ Assistant-Quartermaster. 
*' Colonel Ingalls, 
" Quartermaster." 

" Harper's Ferry, October 22, 1862. 
" We have bootees, 12,000 ; gi-eatcoats, 4,000 ; 



drawers and shirts are pone ; blankets and stock- 
ings nearly so; 15,000 each of these four articles 
are wanted. 

"ALEX. BLISS, 
" Captain and Assistant-Quartermaster. 
" General Ingalls, 

" Chief Quartermaster, tfcc." 

" McClellan's Headquarters, 

" October 24, 1862—11 a. m. 
"Please send to Captain Bliss, at Harper's 
Ferry, 10.000 blankets, 12,000 caps, 5,000 over- 
coats 10,000 pairs bootees, 2,000 pairs artillery 
and cavalry boots, 15,000 pairs stockings, 15,000 
drawers, and 15,000 pants. The clothing ar- 
rives slowly. Can it not be hurried along 
faster ? May I ask you to obtain authority for 
this shipment? 

" RUFUS INGALLS, 
'^Lieutenant-Colonel and Aide-dc-Camp, 

" Chief Quartermaster. 
" Captain D. G. Thomas, 

" Military Storekeeper, Wasliington." 

" Hagerstown, October 30. 
" Clothing has arrived this morning. None 
taken by Rebels. Shall I supply Franklin, and 
retain portions for Porter and Reynolds until 
called for? 

" G. W. AVEEKS, 
" Captain and Assistant-Quartermaster. 
" Colonel Ingalls." 

The following statement, taken from a report 
of the Chief Quartermaster with the army, will 
show what progress was made in su])plying the 
army with clothing from the 1st of Sejitember to 
the date of crossing the Potomac on the 31st of 
October, and that a greater part of the clothing 
did not reach our depots until after the 14th of 
October : — 



Statement of Clothing and Equipage received at the different Depots of the Army of tha 
Potomac from September 1, 1862, to October 31, 1862. 



Kecelved at the depot. 



From September 1 to October 6. 
From October to October 15.. . 
From October 15 to October 25.. 
From October 25 to October 31.. 



Total , 



10,700 
17,000 
40,(X)0 
.30,000 



97,700 



E^ 



4,000 
11,000 

iy,5oo 



34,500 



cc 



0,200 4,190 

22,025 

05,200 

30,000 



123,425 



4,190 



3,000 

500 

1,250 

1,500 

6,250 



0,000 
10,221 
9,000 
3,008 

28,229 



6,200 
18,325 
18,876 

2,200 

45,.301 



6,000 
12,989 
5,000 
9,900 

33,889 



4,200 
1,000 
2,500 
5,000 

12,700 



4,200 
0,000 
3,000 
20,040 

.33,840 



11,100 
3,000 
9,000 



23,100 



141 



Statement of Clothing and Equipage received, ^c. — Continued. 















•a 


















^ 


. 




a 

3 






^ 












o 






o 




















































































Eeoeived at the depot. 




m* 


X 


_e8 




<c 




y 


"t 




« 




^ 


=3 


s! 


£• 


V 


O 


2 




fci 




1 




p. 

1 


0) 


o 


3 
< 


a 
a 


> 
O 






.2 
a 


o 
u 
H 


c 
o 

ea 






799 


2,030 


3 500 


1 200 


20 


1 ''OO 




2,000 
12,000 


2,000 
9,500 
39,r)20 
25,000 


2,000 

7,000 

52,900 






1,302 


2,100 


12 000 


500 








2,655 
2,424 
11,595 




1,894 


4,500 


14 770 






3,500 

2,015 








1,000 


4,384 




7,500 










Total 


3,905 


8,630 


30,270 


4,450 


10,904 


7,590 


9,200 


44,060 


76,120 


61,900 


16,674 





Colonel Ingalls, chief quartermaster, in his 
report upon this subject, says : — 

" There was great delay in receiving our 
clothing. The orders were promptly given by 
me and approved by General Meigs, but the 
roads were slow to transport, particularly the 
Cumberland Valley road. 

" For instance, clothing ordered to Hagers- 
town on the 7th Octolier for the corps of Frank- 
lin, Porter, and Reynolds did not arrive there 
until about the 18th, and by that time, of 
course, tfiere were increased wants and changes 
in position of troops. The clothing of Sumner 
arrived in great quantities near the last of Octo- 
ber, almost too late for issue, as the army was 
crossing into Virginia, We finally left 50,000 
suits at Harper's Ferr), partly on the cars just 
uiTtved, and partly in store." 

The causes of the reduction of our cavalry 
force have already been recited. The dilticulty 
in getting new supplies from the usual sources 
led me to ap()ly for and obtain authority for the 
cavalry and artillery officers to purchase their 
own hoi'ses. The following are the telegrams 
and letters on this subject: — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"October 12, 1862—12.45 P. M. 
" It is absolutely necessary that some energetic 
means be taken to supply the cavalry of this 
army with remount horses. The present rate of 
supply is (1,050) ten hundred and fifty per week 
for the entire army here and in front of Wash- 
ington. From this number the artillery draw 
for their batteries. 

♦' GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
*^ Major- General Com manding. 
" Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 

•* General-in- Chief." 

The genera 1-in-chief, in a letter to me dated 
Washington, D. C, October 14, 1862, replies to 
this despatch in the following language : — 

" I have caused the matters complained of in 



your telegrams of the 11th and 12th to be in- 
vestigated. 

^» * • ♦ # • • 

"In regard to horses, you say that the present 
rate of sujjjily is only 150 per week for the 
entire army here and in front of Washington. I 
find from the records that the issues for the last 
six weeks have been 8,754, making an average 
per week of 1,459." 

One thousand and fifty (1,050) is the number 
stated in the original desimtch, now in my pos- 
session ; and as not only figures were used, but 
the number was written out in full, I can hardly 
see how it is possible for the telegraphic opera- 
tor to have made a mistake in the transmission 
of the message. 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" October 14, 1862 — 7 P. M. 

" With my small cavalry force it is impossible 
for me to watch the line of the Potomac proper- 
ly, or even make the reconnoissances that are 
necessary for our movements. This makes it 
necessary for me to weaken my line very much, 
by extending the infantry to guard the innumer- 
able fords. This will continue until the river 
rises, and it will be next to impossible to prevent 
the Rebel cavalry raids. My cavalry force, as I 
urged this morning, should be largely and imme- 
diately increased, under any hypothesis, whether 
to guard the river, or advance on the enemy, or 
both. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major-General. 
" Major-General H. W. Hali.ec'k, 

" Commander-in-Chief." 

The following is an extract from the official 
report of Colonel Iiigalls : — 

" Immediately after the battle of Antictam 
efforts were made to supply deficiencies in cloth- 
ing and horses. Large requisitions were prepared 
and sent in. The artillery and cavalry required 



142 



large numbors to cover losses siistained in battle, 
on the march, and by diseases. Both of these 
arms were deficient when tliey left Washington. 
A most violent and destructive disease made its 
appearance at this time, which put nearly 4,000 
animals out of service. Horses reported perfect- 
ly well one day would be dead lame the next, 
and it w is difficult to foresee where it woidd end, 
or what numlier would cover the loss. They 
were attacked in tlie hoof and tongue. No one 
seemed able to account for the a})pearance of 
this disease. Animals kept at rest would recover 
in time, hut could not he icorkcd. I made ajjpli- 
cation to send West and ])urchase horses at once, 
but it was refu'^ed, on the ground that the out- 
standing contracts pi'ovided for enough, hid they 
tcere nek delivered sufficientlu fast, nor in suffi- 
cient numbers until late in October and early in 
November. I was authorized to buy 2,500 late 
in October, but the delivery was not completed 
until in November, after we had reached War- 
renton." 

In a letter from General Meigs, written on the 
14th of October, and addressed to the general- 
in-chief, it is stated : " There have been issued, 
therefore, to the army of the Potomac, since the 
battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, 
(9,254) nine thousand two hundred and fifty- 
four horses." 

Whit number of horses were sent to General 
Pope before his return to Washington I have no 
means of determining ; but the following state- 
ment made upon my order, by the chief quarter- 
master with the army, and who had means for 
gaining accurate information, force upon my mind 
the conclusion that the Quartermaster-General 
was in error : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Chief Quartermmtefs Office, Oct. 31, 1862. 
"Horses purchased since September 6, 
1862, by Colonel Ingalls, Chiff Quar- 
termaster, and issued to the forces 
under the immediate command of 
Major-General George R. McClellan, 1,200 
" Issued and turned over to the above 
force by Captain J. J. Dana. Assistant- 
Quartermaster (in Washington), 2,261 
" Issued to forces at and near Washing- 
ton which have since joined the com- 
mand, 352 



" Total purchased by Colonel Ingalls and 
issued and turned over by Captain 
Dana to the forces in this immediate 
command, 3,813 

" Issued by Captain J. J. Dana, Assistant- 
Quartermaster, to the forces in the 
vicinity of Washington, 3,363 



" Grand total purchased by Colonel R. 
Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, and is- 
sued and turned over by Captain J. J. 
Dana, Assistant-Quartermaster, to the 
entire army of the Potomac and the 
forces around Washington, 7,176 



" About 3,000 horses have been turned over to 
the quartermaster's department by officers as 
unfit for service ; nearly 1,500 should now be 
turned over also, being worn out and diseased. 
" Respectfully submitted, 

"FRED. MYERS, 
"Lieutenant-Colonel and Quartermaster.^* 

This official statement, made up from the re- 
ports of the quartermasters who received and dis- 
tributed the horses, exhibits the true state of the 
case, and gives the total numlier of horses re- 
ceived by the army of the Potomac, and the 
troops around Washington, during a period of 
eight weeks, as (7,176) seven thousand one hun- 
dred and seventy-six, or (2,078) two thousand 
and seventy-eight less than the number stated by 
the quartermaster- general. 

Supposing that (1,500) fifteen hundred were 
issued to the army under General Pope, i)revious 
to its return to Washington, as General Meigs 
states, there would still remain (578) five hun- 
dred and seventy-eight horses which he does not 
account for. 

The letter of the general-in-chief to the Secre- 
tary of War on the 28th of October, and the let- 
ter of General Meigs to the general-in-chief on 
the 14th of October, convey the impression that, 
upon my repeated applications for cavalry and 
artillery horses for the army of the Potomac, I 
had received a much greater number than was 
really the case. 

It will be seen from Colonel Myers's report 
that, of all the horses alluded to by General 
Meigs, only (3,813) three thousand eight hun- 
dred and thirteen came to the army with which I 
was ordered to follow and attack the enemy. Of 
course the remainder did not in the slightest de- 
gree contribute co tlie efficiency of the cavalry or 
artillery of the army with which I was to cross 
the river. Neither did they in the least ficiiitate 
any preparations for carrying out the order to 
advance upon the enemy, as the general-in- chiefs 
letter might seem to imply. 

During the same period that we were receiving 
the horses alluded to, about (3,000) three thou- 
sand of our old stock were turned into the quar- 
termaster's department, and 1,500 more reported 
as in such condition that they ought to be 
turned in as unfit for service ; thus leaving the 
active army some 700 short of the number re- 
quired to make good existing deficiencies, to say 
nothing of providing remounts for men whose 
horses had died or been killed during the cam- 
paign and those previously dismounted. Not- 
withstanding all the eflbrts made to obtain a re- 
mount, there were, after deducting the force 
engaged in picketing the river, but about a 
thousand serviceable cavalry horses on the 21st 
day of October. 

In a letter dated October 14, 1862, the gen- 
eral-in-chief says : — 

'* It is also reported to me that the number of 
animals with your army in the field is about 
31,000. It is believed that your present propor- 



143 



tion of cavalry and of animals is much larger 
than that of any other of our armies." 

What number of animals our other armies had 
I am not prepared to say ; but milicary men in 
European armies have been of the opinion that 
an army, to be efficient, while carrying on active 
operations in the field, should have a cavalry 
force equal in numbers to from one sixth to one 
fourth of the infantry force. My cavalry did 
not amount to one twentieth part of the army, 
and hence Ihe necessity of giving every one of 
my cavah')' soldiers a serviceable horse. 

Cavalry may be said to constitute th« antcnnce 
of an army. It scouts all the roads in front, on 
the flanks and in the rear of the advancing 
columns, and constantly feel the enemy's. The 
amount of labor foiling on this arm during the 
Maryland campaign was excessive. 

To persons not f miiliar with the movements of 
troops, and the amount of transportation required 
for a large army marching away from water or 
railroad communications, the number of animals 
mentioned by the general-in-chief may have ap- 
peared unnecessarily large ; but to a military man, 
who takes the trouble to enter into an accurate 
and detailed computation of the number of pounds 
of subsistence and forage required for such an 
army as that of the Potomac, it will be seen that 
the 31,000 animals were considerably less than 
was absolutely necessary to an advance. 

As we were required to move through a coun- 
try which could not be depended upon for any of 
our supplies, it became necessary to transport 
everything in wagons, and to be prepared for all 
emergencies. I did not consider it safe to leave 
the river without subsistence and forage for ten 
days. 

The official returns of that date show the ag- 
gregate strength of the army for duty to have 
been about 110,000 men of all arms. This did 
not include teamsters, citizen employes, officers' 
servants, &c., amounting to some 12,000, which 
gave a total of 122,000 men. 

The subsistence alone of this army for ten 
days required for its transportation 1,830 wag- 
ons at 2,000 pounds to the wagon, and 10,980 
animals. 

Our cavalry horses at that time amounted to 
5,046, and our artillery horses to 6,836. 

To tran'jport full fi.rage for these 22,862 ani- 
mals for ten days required 17,832 addit onal ani- 
mals ; and iliis forage would only supply the en- 
tire number (40,094) of animals with a small 
fraction over half allowance for the time speci- 
fied. 

It will be observed that this estimate does not 
embrace the animals necessary to transport quar- 
termasters' supplies, baggage, camp equipage, 
ambulances, reserve ammunition, forage f r offi- 
cers' horses, &c., which would greatly augment 
the necessary transportation. 

It may very truly be said that we did make 
the march with the means at our disposal, but it 
will be remembered that we met with no serious 
opposition from the enemy ; neither did we 
encounter delays from any other cause. The 



roads were in excellent condition, and the troops 
marched with the most commendable order and 
celerity. 

If we had met with a determined resistance 
from the enemy, and our progress had been very 
much retarded thereby, we would have consumed 
our supplies before they could have been re- 
newed. A proper estimate of my responsibili- 
ties as the commander of that armv did not 
justify me in bising my jircparations for tlie ex- 
pedition upon the supposition that I was to have 
an uninterrupted march. On the contrary, it was 
my duty to be jjrejjared for all emergencies ; and 
not the least inijiort^mt of my responsihilities was 
the_ duty of making ample" i)rovision for sup- 
plying my men and animals with rations and 
forage. 

Knowing the solicitude of the President for an 
early movement, and sharing with him fully 
his anxiety for prompt action, on the 21st of 
October I telegraphed to the general-in-chief as 
follows : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 21, 1862. 

" Since the receipt of the President's order to 
move on the enemy, I have been making every 
exertion to get this army supi)lied with clothing 
absolutely necessary for marching. 

" This, I am happy to say, is now nearly 
accomplished. I have also, during the same 
time, repeatedly urged upon you the importance 
of supplying cavalry and artillery horses to re- 
place those broken down by hard service, and 
steps have been taken to insure a prompt de- 
livery. 

" Our cavalry, even when well supplied with 
horses, is much inferior in numbers to that of 
the enemy, but in efficiency has proved itself 
superior. So forcibly has this been impressed 
upon our old regiments by repeated successes, 
that the men are fully persuaded that they are 
equal to twice their number of Ilebel cavalry. 

" Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged 
in picketing the river, I have not at present over 
about one thousand (1,000) horses for service. 
Officers have been sent in various directions to 
purchase horses, and I expect them soon. With- 
out more cavalry horses "our communications, 
from the moment we march, would be at the 
mercy of the large cavalry force of the enemy, 
and it would not be possible for us to cover our 
flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary in- 
formation of the position and movements of the 
enemy, in such a way as to insure success. My 
experience has shown the necessity of a lai'ge 
and efficient cavalry force. 

" Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg 
leave to ask whetht-r the President desires me to 
march on the enemy at once, or to wait the re- 
ception of the new horses, every possible step 
having been taken to insure their prompt 
arrival. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
^^Major-General (Jormnanding. 
" Major-General H. W. Halmx'K. 

" General-in-Ckief, Washington." 



144 



On the same day General Ilalleck replied as 
follows : — 

" Washington, October 21, 1862 — .'3 p. m. 

" Your telegnim of 12 M. has lieeii subinilted 
to the President. lie directs uie to say that he 
has no change to make in his order of the 6th 
instiint. 

"If you have not been, and are not now, in 
condition to obey it, you will be alile to siiow such 
want of aliility. The President does not expect 
impossibilities; I)Ut he is very anxious that all 
this good weather sh<Mdd not be wasted in inac- 
tivity. Telegraph when you will move, and on 
what lines you pro])ose to march. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" (Teneral-in-Chirf. 

" Major-General Geo. B. McClellan." 

From the tenor of this despatch I conceived 
that it was left for my judgment to decide 
whether or not it was po-sLble to move with safe- 
ty to tlie army at that time ; and this responsi- 
bility I exercised with the more cunlidence in 
view of the strong assurances of his trust in me, 
as commander of that army, with which the 
President had seea fit to honor me dui-ing his 
last visit. 

The cavalry requirem^ts, without which an 
advance would have been in the highest degree 
injudicious and unsafe, were still wanting. 

The country b<. fo-i'e us was an enemy's countrv', 
where the inhabitants furnished to "the enemy 
every possible assistance ; provicb'ng food for 
men and forage for aitimals, giving all informa- 
tion concernmg our movements, and rendering 
every aid in their- power to the enemy's cause. 

It was manifest that we should find it, as we 
subsequently did, a hostile district, where we 
could derive no aid from the inhabitants that 
would justify dispensing with the active co-ojier- 
ation of an ethcient rivalry force. Accordingly I 
fixed uix>n the first of November as the earliest 
date at which the forward movement could well 
be commenced. 

The general-in-chief, in a letter to the Secre- 
tary of War, on the 28th of October, says : " In 
my opinion, there has been no such want of sup- 
plies in the army under .General McClellan as to 
prevent his comi)liance with the orders to advance 
against the enemy." 

Notwithstanding this opinion, expressed by 
such high auLJiority, I am compelh d to say again 
tli.it the delay in the reception of necessary sup- 
plies uj) to that dale had left the army in a condi- 
tion totally unfit to advance against the enemy, — 
tiiat an advance under the existing circumstances, 
would, in my judgment, have been attended with 
the liighest degree of peril, with great suffering 
and sickricss among the men, and with imminent 
dang r of being cut off from (<ur supjilies by the 
su])erior cavalry force of the enemy, and with no 
reasonable prospect of gaining any advantage 
over him. 

I dismiss this subject with the remark that I 
have found it impossible to resist the force of my 



own convictions, that the commander of an army 
who, from the time of its organization, has for 
eigliteen months been in constant communication 
with its officers and men, the greater part of the 
time engaged in active service in the field, and 
who has exercised this command in many battles, 
must certainly be considertd competent to d ter- 
mine whetlier his army is in proper condition to 
advance on the enemy or not ; and he must 
necessarily possess greater facilities for forming a 
correct judgment in regard to the wants of his 
men, and the conditina of his su])plies, than tiie 
general-in-chief in liis office at Wasliington city. 
The movement from Washington into Maryland, 
which culminated in the battles of South Moun- 
tain and Antietam, was not a part of an offensive 
campaign, with the object of the invasion of the 
enemy's teiTitory and an attack upon his capital, 
but was defensive in its purpose-;, although offen- 
sive in its character, and would be technically 
called a " defensive-offensive campaign." 

It was undertaken at a time when our armv 
had experienced severe defeats, and its object 
was to preserve the national capital and Balti- 
more, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and 
to drive the enemy out of Marykmd. These 
purposes were fully and finally accomplished by 
the l)a;tle of Antietam, which brought the armv 
of the Potomac into what might be termed an 
accidental position on the upper Potonvac. 

Having gained the immediate oliject of the 
camp-aign, the first thing to be done was to in- 
sure Maryland from a return of the enemy ; the 
second, to prepare our own army, exhausted bv 
a series of severe battles, desti ute to a great ex- 
tent of supplies, and very deficient in artillery 
and cavalry liorses, for a definite offensive move- 
ment, and to determine upon the line of opera- 
tions for a further advance. 

At the time of the battle of Antietam the Po- 
tomac was very low and jjresented a comparatively 
weak line of defence unless watched by large 
masses of troops. 

The reoccujjation of Harper's Ferry, and the 
disposition of troops above that point, rendered 
the line of the Potomac secure against everything 
except cavalry raids. No time was lo-t in plac- 
ing the army in proper condition for an advance, 
and tlie circumstances which cau-ed the delay 
after the battle of Antietam have been fully 
enumerated elsewhere. 

I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its vicinity 
as a proper base of operations for a movement 
upon Richmond. I still considered the line of 
the Peninsula as the true approach, but, for 
obvious reasons, did not make any proposal to 
return to it. 

On the 6th of October, as stated above, I was 
ordered by the Presideiit, through his general- 
in-chief, to cross the Potomac and give l)attle to 
the enemy, or drive him south. Two lines 
were presented for my choice : — 

1st. Up the valley of the Shenandoah, in 
which case I was to have 12,000 to lo,000 addi- 
tional troops. 



145 



2d. To cros'5 between the enemy and Wash- 
ington, — that is, east of the Blue Ridge, — in 
which event I was to be reinforced with 30,000 
men. 

At first I determined to adopt the line of the 
Shenandoah, for these reasons : The Harjjer's 
Ferry and Wincliesler Railroad, and the various 
turnpikes converging upon Winchester, afforded 
superior facihties for supplies.. Our cavalry being 
weak, this line of communication could be more 
easily protHCted. There was no advantage in in- 
terposing at that time the Blue Ridge and the 
Shenandoah between the enemy and myself. 

At the period in question the Potomac was still 
very low, and I apprehended that, if I crossed the 
river below Harper's Ferry, the enemy would 
prom]:)tly cheek the movement by recrossing 
into ^larvlind, at the same time cover his rear 
by occupying in strong force the passes leading 
through the Blue Ridge from the southeast into 
the Shenandoah valley. 

I anticipated, as the result of the first course, 
that Lee would fight me near Winchester, if he 
could do so under favorable circumstances ; or else 
that he woidd abandon the lower Shenandoah, 
and leave the army of the Potomac free to act 
upon some other line of operations. 

If he abanrloned the Shenandoah, he would 
naturally fall back upon his railway communica- 
tions. I have since been confirmed in the btlief 
that, if I had crossed the Potomac below Harper's 
Ferry in the early part of October, General Lee 
would have recrossed into Maryland. 

As above explained, the army was not in con- 
dition to move until late in October, and in the 
mean time ch'cumstances had changed. 

The period had arrived when a sudden and 
great rise of the Potomac might be looked for at 
any moment ; the season of bad roads and diffi- 
cult movements was approaching, which would 
natimUly deter the enemy fi'om exposing himself 
very far from his base, and his movements all ap- 
peared to indicate a falling back from the river 
towards his supplies. Under these circumstances, 
I felt at liberty to disregard the possibihty of the 
enemy's recrossing the Potomac, and determined 
to select the line east of the Blue Ridge, feeling 
convinced that it would secure me the largest ac- 
cession of force, and the most cordial support of 
the President, whose views, from the beginning, 
were in favor of that line. 

The subject of the defence of the line of the 
upper Potomac, after the advance of the main 
army, had long occupied my attention. I de- 
sh-ed to place Harper's Ferry and its dependen- 
cies in a strong state of defence, and frequently 
addressed the general-in-chief upon the subject 
of the erection of field-works and permanent 
bridges there, asking for the funds necessary to 
accomplish the purpose. Although I did my 
best to explain, as clearly as I was able, that I 
did not wish to erect permanent works of ma- 
sonry, and that neither the works nor the perma- 
nent bridges had any reference to the advance of 
the army, but solely to the permanent occupa- 
19 



tion of Harper's Ferry, T could never make the 
general-in-chicf understand my wishes, but was 
refused the funds necessary to erect the field- 
works, on the ground that there was no ajipro- 
priaiion for the erection of permanent fortifica- 
tions ; and was not allowed to build the [K-nna- 
nent bridge, on the ground that the muiii army 
conld not he delayed in its movements until its 
completion. 

Of com-se I never thought of delaying the ad- 
vance of the army for that ])urp"se, and so 
stated repeatedly. On the 25th of October I 
sent to the general-in-chief the following tele- 
gram : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 25, 1802— 10.4o P. M. 

" As the moment is at hand for the advance of 
this army, a question arises for the decision of 
the general-in-chief, which, although perhaps im- 
pliedly decided hy the President in his letter of 
the Icith, should be clearly presentf-d by me, as 
I do not regard it as in my province to de- 
termine it. 

" This question is the extent to which the line 
of the Potomac should l)e guarded, after the 
array leaves, in order to cover Maryland and 
Pennsylvania from invasion by hrge or small 
parties of the enemy. 

" It will always be somewhat difficult to guard 
the immediate line of the river, owing to its 
great extent and the numerous passages which 
exist. 

" It has long appeared to me that the best way 
of covering this line would be by occupying Front 
Royal, Strasburg, Wardensville, and Aloorefield, 
or the debouches of the several valleys in which 
they are situated. 

" These points, or suitable places in their 
vicinity, should be strongly intrenched and per- 
manently held. One great advantage of this 
arrangement would be the covering the Balti- 
more and Ohio railroad, and an essential part 
of the system would be the construction of the 
link of railway fi-om Winchester to Strasburg, 
and the rebuilding of the Manassas Gap railway 
bridge over the Shenandoah. 

" The intrenchment of Manassas Junction 
would complete the system for the defence of 
the approaches to Washington and the uj-per 
Potomac. Many months ago I recommended 
this arrangement ; in f ict, gave orders for it to 
be carried into effect. I still regard it as essen- 
tial under all circumstances. 

" The views of the chief engineer of this army, 
in regard to the defences and garrison of Har- 
per's Ferry and its defences, are in your posses- 
sion. 

" The only troops under my command, outside 
of the organization of the army of the Potomac, 
are the Maryland brigade, under General Ken- 
ley ; the 54th Pennsylvania, Colonel Voss ; 12th 
Illinois cavalry, and Colonel Davis's 8tli New 
York cavalry ; total. 2,894 infantry, one battery, 
and about 900 cavalry men. 

" There are also two of my regiments of cav- 



^146 



airy (about 750 men) guarding the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad between Hancock and Cum- 
berland. 

" As I have no department, and command 
simj)!}' an active army in the field, my responsi- 
bility for the ^ufety of the line of the Potomac 
and the States north of it, must terminate the 
moment I advtuice so far beyond that line as to 
adopt another for my base of operations. The 
question for the general-in-chief to decide, and 
which I regard as beyond my province, is 
this : — 

" 1st. Shall the safety of Harper's Ferry and 
the line of the Potomac be regarded as assured 
by the advance of the army south of the Blue 
Kidge, and the line left to take care of itself? 

" 2d. If it is deemed necessary to hold the 
line, or that hereinbefore indicated in advance of 
it, how many troo]js shall be placed there, at 
■what ])oints, (and in what numbers and ot what 
composition at each,) and where shall they be 
supplied — i. e. from the army, or from other 
som'ces ? 

" Omitting the detached troops mentimed 
above, and the small garrisons of Boonsboro' 
and Frederick, the last retm-ns show the strength 
of this army for duty to be about (116,000) one 
h'lndred and sixteen thousand officers and men. 
Th^s includes the divisions of Stoneman and 
Whipple, but does not include Heintzelman, Sigel, 
and Bayard. 

" If Harper's Ferry and the river above are 
rendered fully secure, it is possible that the 
active army, it it supplies the garrison, m ty be 
reduced so much as to be inadequate to the pur- 
poses contemplated. If it is preserved intact, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and 
Ohio railroad m<\\ be unduly exposed. 

" I leave the decision of these grave questions 
to the general-in-chit^f. I know notliing of the 
number of troops at Baltimore, &c. 

" An important element in the solution of this 
problem is the fact that a gi eat portion of Bragg's 
army is probably now at liberty to unite itself 
with Lee's command. 

" I commence crossing the river at Berlin in 
the morning, and must ask a prompt decision of 
the questions proposed herein. 

"GEORGK B. McCLELLAN, 
"Major- General Commanding. 
" Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washington." 

To which I received the following reply : — 

Washington, October 26, 1862—1.35 p. m. 

"In addition to the command which you had 
when I came here, you also have the greatt r part 
of that of Major-General Pope. Moreover, 3 ou 
have been authorized to use any troops within 
your reach in General Wool's department, and 
in Western Virginia. General Banks's comnv nd 
is also untier your direction, with the single 
restriction that he is not to remove troops from 
"Washington till he has notified me of his orders. 

" Since you left Washington I have advised 



and suggested in relation to your movements, but 
I have given you no orders ; I do not give you 
any now. The Government has intrusted you 
with defeating and driving back the Rebel army 
in jour front. I shall not attempt to control you 
in the measures you may adopt for that purpose. 
You are informed of my views, but the President 
has left you ai liberty to adopt them or not, as 
you may deem best. 

" You will also exercise your own discretion in 
regard to what points on the Potomac and the 
Baltimore and Ohio railro.d are to be occupied 
or fortified. I will only add that there is no ap- 
propriation for j^ermanent intrenchments on that 
line. Moreover I think it will be time enough 
to decide upon foitifying Front Royal, Stras- 
burg, \\'ord nsville, and Moorefield, when the 
enemy is driven south of them, and they come 
into our possession, 

" I do not think that Ave need have any imme- 
diate fear of Bragg's army. You are within (20) 
twenty miles of I^ee's, while Bragg is distant 
about (400) four hundred miles. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" Mij.-Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

On the 29th I sent the following : — 

" Headquartees Army of the Potomac, 
" October 29, 1862—1.15 P. M. 

"On the 25th instant I seut you a despatch 
requesting you to decide what steps should be 
taken to guard the fine of the Potomac when 
this army leaves here. To this I received your 
rejjly that I had l)een intrusted by the Presi- 
dent with defeating and driving away the Rebel 
army ; that you had given me no orders hereto- 
fore, — did not give me any then, &c. Under 
these circumstances I have only to make such 
arrangements for guarding this extended line as 
the means at my disposal will permit, at the 
same time keeping in view the supreme necessity 
of maintaining the moving army in adequate force 
to meet the Rebel army before us. 

" The dispositions I have ordered are as fol- 
lows, viz : Ten thousand men to be left at Har- 
per's Ferry ; one brigade of infantry in front of 
Sharpsburg ; Kenley's brigade of infantry at 
AVilliamsport ; Kelly's brigade, including Colonel 
('ampbell's 54th Pennsylvania infantry, at Cum- 
berland ; and between that point and Hancock. 
I have also left four small cavalry regiments to 
patrol and watch the river and the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad from Cumberland down to 
Harper's Ferry. 

" I do not regard this force as sufficient to 
cover securely this great extent of line, but I do 
not feel justified in detaching any more troops 
from my moving columns ; I would, therefore, 
recommend that some new regimen's of infantry 
and cavalry be sent to strengthen the forces left 
by me. 

" There should be a brigade of mfantry and 
section of artillery in the %icinity of Cherry Run, 
another brigade at Hancock, an additional bri- 



147 



gnde at Williamsport, one regiment at Hagers- 
town and one at Chambershurg, with a section 
o: artillery at each place if possible. This is on 
the supposiiioii that the enemy retain a consid- 
erable civalry force west of the Blue Ridge ; if 
they go east of it, the occupuion of the points 
named in my despatch of the 2Jlh instant wdl 
obviate the necessity of keej)ing many of these 
t oops on the river. 

" There are now several hundred of our 
wounded, including General Richartlson, in the 
vicinity ot Sharpsbiu-g, that cannot possibly be 
moved at preent. 

" I rejieat, that I do not look upon the forces 
I hive been able to leave from this army as suffi- 
cient to prevent cavalry raids into Maryland and 
Pennsylvania, as cavalry is the only description 
of troops adequate to this service, and I am, as 
you are aware, deficient in this arm. 

'« U. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major- General Commanding. 
"Maj"r-General Halleck, 

" Iretieral-in-Chie/, Washington." 

To which I received on the 30th this reply : — 

"Washington, Oct. 30, 1862—11.30 a. m. 

" Your "telegram of )esterday was received late 
last evening. The ti'oops proposed for Thorough- 
fare Gap will be sent to that place whenever you 
are in position for their coijperation, as previous- 
ly staged, but n ) new regiments can be sent from 
here to the upper Potomac. The guarding of 
that line is left to your own di^creti^n with the 
troops now under vour command. 

"»H. W. Hx\LLECK, 

" General-in-Cliief. 
»' Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

I accordingly left the 12th corps at Harper's 
Ferry, detaching one brigade to the vicinity of 
Sliarpsiiurg. General Morell was ])laced ni com- 
mand of I he line from the mouth of the Antie- 
tam to Cumberland, General Slocum in command 
of Harper's Ferry and the line east of the mouth 
of the Antietam. 

The orders given to these officers were as fol- 
lows : — 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" October 29, 1862— 1 P. M. 

"The general commanding directs that you 
send one brig ide of your corps to march at once 
to the |)osition now occu|iied by General F. J. 
Porter's corps, in front of Sharpsburi,', to watch 
and guard the line of the river, the ford near the 
mouth of the Antietam Creek to the mouth of 
the Opequan Creek. 

" The officer in command will also take steps 
to afford proper protection to the sick and 
wounde ! in the hospitals in the vicinity of Sharps- 
burg and Boonsboro'. The regiment now at 
Boonsboro' will be placed under his orders. 
General Kenley, at WiUiamsport, will guard the 
river from the mouth of the Opequan alone, in- 
cluding the ford at the mouth of the Opequan. 



"The commanding general also directs that 
yon take immediate ste])s to establish the remain- 
der of your corps as follows, viz : one brigide on 
Maryland Heights, (jue brigade on Loudon 
Heights, with the remainder on Boliv.ir Heights 
and at Harper's Ferry. 

"These dispositions should be made at once, 
so that General Couch can move witli his corps. 
Please acknowledge the receipt of this. 

"K. IJ. MAUCY, 

" Okie/ of Staff. 

" General H. W. Slocum, 
" Com,maiiding Army Corps, Uarper's Ftrry.^ 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"October lil. 18G2. 

"General: I am instructed by the com- 
manding general to say to you, that he has se- 
lected you to perform tlie highly important and 
responsible duty of taking charge of and com- 
manding the troops left for the defence of the" 
line of the Potomac River, from the mouth of 
the Antietam to Cumberland, as W(>11 as any other 
troops that may hereafter lie sent for the ]irotec- 
tion of the Maryland and Pennsylvania frontier 
within the liiiiits of the lines herein specified. 
The force which has been left to guard the line 
is not deemed adequate to prevent cavalry raids, 
but it is all that the commanding general feels 
authorized to detach from the army of the Poto- 
mac at the present time, and it devolves upon 
you to make the best use of this force in your 
power. Yoti will have four cavalry regiments 
under your command, which should be so dis- 
tributed along the. river as to watch all the avail- 
able fords, and give timely notice to the infantry 
of the approach of any force of Rebels. 

" You will afford all the protection in your 
power to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. 

"You will endeavor to prevent any cavalry 
raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania. 

"Y"ou will take steps to have all the sick and 
wounded of our army, as well as of the Rebel 
army within your lines, properly taken care of 
until they can be sent to general hospitals, or 
discharged, or paroled. 

" You will make your headquarters at Hagers- 
town, and occasionally visit the ditterent parts of 
your line. 

"You will please report promptly to these 
headquarters everything of inqiortance that oc- 
curs within the limits of your conunand. 

"The three brigades now at Cumlwrland, 
WiUiamsport, and Sharpsburg. including the 
fifty-fourth Pennsylvania volunteers, near Cum- 
berland, will be under your command. They 
are commanded by Generals Kelly, Kenley, and 
Gordon. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
"S.WILLIAMS, 
" Assisfant. Adjutant- General. 

"General G. W. Mokell. 

" Commanding upper Potomac." 

On the 25th of October the pontoon bridge at 
Berlin was constructed, there beinj; already one 
across the Potomac, and another across the Shen- 
andoah, at Harper's Ferry. 

On the 2(jth two division of the ninth corps, 
and Pleasanton's brigade of cavalry, crossed at 
Berlin and occupied Lovettsville. 



148 



The first, sixth, and ninth corps, the cavalry, 
and the reserve artillery, crossed at Berlin be- 
tween the 2Gth of October and the 2d of No- 
vember. 

The second and fifth corps crossed at Harper's 
Perry between the 2'Jth of October and the 1st 
of November. Heavy rains delayed the move- 
ment considerably in the beginning, and the first, 
fifth, and sixth corps were obliged to halt at least 
one day at the crossings to complete, as far as 
possible, necessary supplies that could not be 
procured at an earlier period. 

The plan of campaign I adopted during this 
advance was to move the army, well in hand, 
parallel to the Blue llidge, taking Warrenton as 
the point of direction for tlie main army ; seizing 
each pass on the Blue IJidge by detachments, as 
we approached it. and guarding them after we 
had passed as long as they would enable the 
enemy to trouble our communications with the 
Potomac. It was expected that we would unite 
with the eleventh corps and Sickles's division 
near Thorouglifare Gap. We depended upon 
Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies until the 
Manassas Gap railwa}- was reached ; when that 
occurred the passes in our rear were to be aban- 
doned, atid the army massed ready for action or 
movement in any direction. 

It was my intention if, upon reaching Ashby's 
or any other Pass, I found that the enemy were 
in force between it and the Potomac, in the val- 
ley of the Shenandoah, to move into the valley 
and endeavor to gain their rear. 

I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did ex- 
pect that by striking in between Culpepper Court 
Ilouse and Little Washington I could either sep- 
arate their army and beat them in detail, or else 
force them to concentrate as far hack as Gor- 
donsville, and thus place the army of the Poto- 
mac in position either to adopt the Fredericks- 
burg line of advance upon Kichmond, or to be 
removed to the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, 
it were found impossible to supply il l)y the Or- 
ange and Alexandria railroad beyond Culpepper. 

On the 27tli of October the remaining divis- 
ions of the ninth corps crossed at Berlin, and 
Pleasanton's cavalry advanced to Purcellville. 
The concentration of the sixth corps, delayed 
somewhat by intelligence as to the movements 
of the enemy near Hedgesville, &c., was com- 
menced on this day, and the first corps was 
already in motion for Berlin. 

On the 28th the first corps and the general 
headquarters reached Berlin. 

On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed and 
encamped near Lovettsville. Stoneman's divis- 
ion, temporarily attached to the ninth corps, 
occupied Leesburg; AveriU's cavalry brigade 
moved towards Berhn from Hagerstown ; two 
divisions of the ninth corps moved to Wheat- 
land, and one to Waterford. The second corps 
commenced the passage of tiie Shenandoah at 
Harper's Ferry, and moved into the valley east 
of L(nidon Heights. 

On the 30th the first corps crossed at Berlin 
and encamijcd near Lovettsville, and the second 
corps completed the passage of the Shenanduali. 
The fifth c<n-ps commenced its march from 
Sharpsburg to Harper's Ferry. 

On the ;51st the second corps moved to the 
Ticinily of Hillsborough; the sixth corps reached 



Boonshoro'; the fifth corps reached Harper's 
Ferry, one division crossing the Shenandoah. 

On the 1st of November the first corps moved 
to Purcellville and Hamilton ; the second corps 
to Woodgrove ; the fifth corps to Hillsborough ; 
the sixth corps reached Berlin, one division 
crossing. Pleasanton's cavalry occupied Plulo- 
UKmt, having a sharp skirmish there and at 
Bloomfield. 

On November 2d the second corps occupied 
Snicker's Gap; the fifth corps, Sirickersville ; 
the sixth corps crossed the Potomac and en- 
camped near Wheatland ; the ninth corps ad- 
vanced to Bloomfield, Union, and Philomont. 
Pleasanton drove the enemy out of Union. 
Averill was ordered to join Pleasanton. The 
enemy offered no serious resistance to the occu- 
pation of Snicker's Gap, but advanced to gain 
possession of it with a column of some 5,000 to 
0,000 infantry, who were driven back by a few 
rounds from our rifled guns. 

On the 3d the first corps moved to Philomont, 
Union, Bloomfield, &c. ; the second corps to the 
vicinity of Upperville ; the fifth corps remained 
at Snicker's Gap ; the sixth corps moved to Pur- 
cellville ; the ninth corps moved towards Upper- 
ville. Pleasanton drove the enemy out of Up- 
perville after a severe fight. 

On the 4th the 2d corps took possession of 
Ashby's Gap; the Gth corps reached Union; tiie 
9th corps, Upperville ; tlie cavalry occupied 
Piedmont. On the 5th the 1st corps moved to 
Rectortown and White Plains ; one division of 
the 2d corps to the intersection of the ParSs and 
Piedmont with the Upperville and Barber's 
road; the Gth corps to the Aldie Pike, east of 
Uiiperville ; the 9th corps beyond the Manassas 
Pailroad, between Piedmont and Salem, with a 
brigade at Manassas Gap. The cavalry under 
Averill had a skirmish at Manassas Gap, and the 
brigade of Pleasanton gained a handsome vic- 
tory over superii^r numbers at Barber's Cross 
Iloads. Bayard's cavalry had some sharp skir- 
mishing in front of Salem. 

On the Gth the 1st corps advanced to Warren- 
ton ; the 2d corps to Kectortown ; the 5th corps 
conmienced its movement from Snicker's Gap to 
White Plains ; the 9th corps to Waterloo and 
vicinity on the Rappahannock; the 11th corps 
was at New Baltimore, Thoroughfare and Hope- 
well's gaps ; Sickles's division guarding the Or- 
ange and Alexandria Railroad from Manassas 
Junction towards Warrenton Junction; the cav- 
alry near Flint Hill ; Bayard to .cut ofl' what 
there might be in \^'arrenton, and to proceed to 
the Rapp.ihannock Station. 

November 7th : General Pleasanton was or- 
dered to move towards Little Washington and 
Sperryville, and thence towards Culpepper 
Court House. 

November 8tli : the 2d corps moved half way 
to Warrenton ; the 5th corps to New Baltimoi'e. 

November 9 : the 2d and 5th corps reached 
Warrenton ; the Gth corps. New Baltimore. 

Late on the night of tiie 7th 1 received an or- 
der relieving me from the connuand of the army 
of the Potomac, r nd directing me to turn it over 
to General Burnside, which I at once did. 

1 had already given the orders for the move- 
ments of the bth and 9th ; these orders were 
carried into eti'ect without change. 



149 



The position in which I left the army, as the 
result of the orders I had given, was as fol- 
lows : — 

The 1st, 2d, and 5th corps, reserve artillery, 
and general headquarters, at Warrenton; the 
9th corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in 
the vicinity of Waterloo ; tlie 6th corps at New 
Jjahiniore; the 11th corps at New Baltimore, 
Gainesville, and Thoroughfare Gap; Sickles's 
division of the 3d corps, on the Orange and Al- 
exandria railroad, from Manassas Junction to 
Warrenton Junction ; Pleasanton across the 
Rappaliannock at Amissville, Jefferson, &c., 
with his pickets at Hazel River, facing Long- 
street, six miles from Culpepper Court House; 
Bayard near Rappahannock Station. 

The army was thus massed near Warrenton, 
ready to act in any required direction, perfectly 
in hand, and in admirable condition and spirits. 
I doubt whether, during the whole period that 1 
had the honor to command the army of the Po- 
tomac, it was in such excellent condition to fight 
a great battle. When I gave up the connnand 
to General Burnside, the best infori;iation in our 
possession indicated that Longstreet was imme- 
diately in our front near Culpepper; Jackson, 
with one, perhaps both, of the Hills, near Chester 
and Thornton's gaps, with the mass of their 
force we.vt of the Blue Ridge. 

The reports from General Pieasanton on the 
advance indicated the possibility of separating 
the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either 
beating Longstreet sejiarately, or forcing Tiim 
to fall<back at least upon Gordonsville, to eliect 
his junction with the rest of the army. 

The following is from the report of General 
Pleasanton : — 

"At this time, and from the 7tli instant, my 
advance pickets were at Hazel River, within six 
miles of Culpepper, besides having my flank 
jiit'kets towards Ciiester and Thornton's gaps 
extended to Gaines's Cross Roads and Newby's 
CJross Roads, with numerous patrols in the di- 
rection of Woodville, Little Washington, and 
Sperryville. 

'■ The information gained from these parties, 
and also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, 
as Well as citizens, established the fact of Long- 
street, with his command, being at Culpepper, 
while Jackson, with D. H. Hill, with their re- 
spective commands, were in the Shenandoah 
Valley, on the western side of the Blue Ridge, 
covering Chester and Thornton's gaps, and ex- 
pecting us to pass through and attack them. 

'• As late as the 17th of November, a contra- 
band just fiom Strasburg came in my camp and 
reported that D. H. Hill's corps was two miles 
beyond that place, on the railroad to Mount 
Jackson. Hill was tearing up the road and de- 
stroying the bridges, under the impression that 
we intended to follow into that valley, and was 
en route for Staunton. 

"Jackson's corps was between Strasburg and 
Winchester. Ewell and A. P. Hill were with 
Jackson. Provisions were scarce, and the Reb- 
els were obliged to keep moving to obtain 
them." 

Had I remained in command, I should have 
made the attempt to divide the enemy, as before 
suggested, and, could he have been brouglit to a 
battle within reach of my supplies, I cannot 



doubt that the result would have been a brilliant 
victory for our army. 

On the loth of November General Pleasanton 
Avas attacked by Longstreet, with one division 
of infantry, and Stuart's cavalry, but repulsed 
the attack. 

Tills indicates the relative jxisition of our 
army and that of the enemy at the time 1 was 
relieved from command. 

It would be impossiijle to participate in opera- 
tions, such as those described in the foregoing 
pages, without forming fixed oi)inians upon sub- 
jects connected with the organization of our 
armies, anl the general conduct of military 
operations. 

This Report wotdd be incomplete without a 
brief allusion to some general considerations 
which have been firndy impressed upon me l)y 
the events which have occurred. 

To my mind the most glaring defect in our 
armies is the absence of system in the apjjoint- 
ment and promotion of general and other otKcers, 
and the want of means for the theoretical instruc- 
tion of the mass of officers. The expansion of 
the army was so great and so rapid at the com- 
mencement of the existing war that it was per- 
haps impossible, in the great scarcity of instruct- 
ed officers, to have adopted any other course 
than that which was pursued ; but the time has 
arrived when measures may be initiated to rem- 
edy existing defects, and provide against their 
recurrence. 

I think that the army should be regarded as a 
permanent one; that is to say, its afl'airs should 
be administered precisely as if all who belonged 
to it had made it their profession for life ; and 
those rules for promotion, &c., whicli have been 
found necessary in the best foreign armies to ex- 
cite honorable emulation, produce an esprit du 
corps and procure efficiency, should be followed 
by us. 

All oflacers and soldiers should be made to feel 
that merit, — that is to say, courage, good con- 
duct, the knowledge and performance of the du- 
ties of their grade, and fitness to exercise those 
of a superior grade, — will insure to them ad- 
vancement in their profession, and can alone 
secure it for them. 

Measures should be adopted to secure the the- 
oretical instruction of staff officers at least, who 
should, as fiir as possible, be selected from ofl5- 
cers having a military education, or who have 
seen actual service in the field. 

The number of cadets at the Military Academy 
should be at once increased to tlie greatest extent 
permitted by the capacity of tiie institution. 
The regular army should be increased and main- 
tained complete in numbers and efficiency. 

A well-organized systcnn of recruiting and of 
depots for instruction'should be adopted, in order 
to keep the ranks of the regiments full, and 
supply promptly the losses arising from battle or 
disease. This is especially necessary for the 
artillery and cavalry arms of the service, which, 
from the beginning of the war, have rendered 
great services, and which have never been fully 
appreciated by any but their comrades. _ We 
need also large bodies of well-instructed engineer 
troops. 

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns 
the direction ^should be left to professional 



150 



soldiers. A statesman may, perhaps, be more 
competent than a soldier to determine the politi- 
cal objects and direction of a campaign ; but 
those once decided upon, everything sliould be 
left to the responsible military head, without 
interference from civilians. In no other manner 
is success prol)able. The meddling of individual 
members of committees of Congress with sub- 
jects which, from lack of experience, they are of 
course incapable of comprehending, and which 
they are too apt to view througii the distorted 
medium of partisan or personal prejudice, can 
do no good, and is certain to produce incahilable 
mischief. 

I cannot omit the exi)ression of my thanks to the 
President for tiie constant evidence given me of 
his sincere personal regard, and his desire to 
sustain the military plans wliicli my judgment led 
me to urge for adoption and execution. I can- 
not attribute iiis failure to adopt some of those 
plans, and to give tliat support to others which 
was necessary to their success, to any want of 
confidence in me ; and it only remains for me 
to regret that other counsels came between the 
constitutional commander-in-chief and the gen- 
eral whom he had placed at the head of his 
armies, — counsels which resulted in the failui-e 
of great campaigns. 

If the nation possesses no generals in service 
competent to direct its military aflairs with- 
out the aid or supervision of politicians, the 
sooner it finds them and places them in position 
the better will it be for its fortunes. 

I may l)e pardoned for calling attention to the 
memorandum subuiittcd by me to the President 
on the 4th of August, 18G1 ; my letter to him of 
July 7, 18G2; and other similar comnmnications 
to him and to the Secretary of War. I have 
seen no reason to change in any material regard 
the views there expressed. 

After a calm, impartial, and patient considera- 
tion of the suliject, — a subject which demands 
the clos^ -t thought on the part of every true 
lover of his country, — I am convinced that by 
the proper employment of our resources it is 
entirelv possible to bring this war to a success- 
ful military issue. I believe that a necessary 
preliminary to the re-establishment of tiie Union 
is the entire defeat or virtual destruction of the 
organized militai-y power of tlie Confederates ; 
and that such a result should be accompanied and 
followed by conciliatory measures ; and that by 
pursuing the political course I have always ad- 
vised, it is possible to bring about a permanent 
restoration of the Union, — a reunion by which 
the rights of both sections shall be preserved, 
and l)y which botli parties shall preserve their 
self-respect, while they respect each other. 

In this Peport I have confined myself to a 
plain narrative of such facts as are necessary 
for the purposes of history. 

Where it was possible, I have preferred to 
give these facts in the langiuige of despatches, 
written at the time of their occurrence, rather 
than to atti'inpt a new relation. 

The reports of the subordinate commanders, 
hereto annexed, recite what time and space 
would fail me to mention here : those individiuil 
instances of conspicuous bravery and skill by 
which every battle was marked. To them I 
must especially refer, for without them this 



narrative would be incomplete, and justice fail 
to be done. But I cannot omit to tender to my 
corps commanders, and to other general officers 
under them, such ample recognition of their 
ccn-dial cooperation and their devoted services 
as those reports abundantly avouch. 

I have not sought to defend the army which I 
had the honor to command, nor myself, against 
the hostile criticism once so rife. 

It has seemed to me that nothing more was 
required than such a plain and truthful narrative 
to enable those whose right it is to form a cor- 
rect judgment on the important matters in- 
volved. 

This Report is, in fact, the history of the army 
of the Potomac. 

During the period occupied in the organiza- 
tion of that army, it served as a barrier against 
the advance of a lately victorious enemy, while 
the fonilications of the capital were in progress ; 
and under the discipline which it then received it 
acquired strength, education, and some of that 
experience which is necessary to success in ac- 
tive operations, and which enable it afterwards 
to sustain itself under circumstances trying 
to the most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes 
occurred along the lines, conducted wiiii great 
gallantry, which inured our troops to the real- 
ities of war. 

The array grew into shape but slowly ; and 
the delays which attended on the obtaining of 
anus, continuing late into the winter of 18G1- 
'G2, were no less .trying to the soldiers than to 
the people of the country. Even at the time of 
the organization of the Peninsular campaign, 
some of the finest regiments were without rifies ; 
nor were the utmost exertions on the part of the 
military authorities adequate to overcome the 
obstacles to active service. 

When, at length, the army was in condition to 
take the field, the Peninsular campaign was 
planned, and entered upon with enthusiasm by 
officers and men. Had this campaign been fol- 
lowed up as it was designed, I cannot doubt 
that it would have resulted in a glorious tri- 
umph to our arms, and the permanent resto- 
ration of the power of the Government in Vir- 
ginia and North Carolina, if not throughout the 
revolting States. It was, however, otherwise 
ordered, and instead of reporting a victoi-ious 
campaign, it has been my duty to relate the 
heroism of a reduced armj', sent upon an expe- 
dition into the enemy's country, there to aban- 
don one and originate another and new plan of 
campaign, which might and would have been 
successful if supported with appreciation of its 
necessities, but wnicli failed because of the re- 
peated failure of promised support, at the most 
critical, and, as it proved, the most fatal mo- 
ments. That heroism surpasses ordinary de- 
scription. Its illustration must be left for the 
pen of the historian in times of calm reflection, 
wiien the nation shall be looking back to the 
past from the midst of peaceful days. 

For me, now, it is sufficient to say that my 
comrades were victorious on every field save 
one, and there the endurance of but little more 
than a single corps' accomplished the object of 
tlie fighting, and, by securing to the army its 
transit to the James, left to the enemy a ruin- 
ous and barren victory. 



151 



The army of the Potomac was first rednceil hv 
tlic withdrawal from my conimaml of the (hvis- 
ion of General Bleiiker, Avhich was ordered to 
the Mountain department, under General Fre- 
mont. We had scarcely landed on the Penin- 
sula when it was further reduced by a despatch 
revoking a previous order giving mc connnand 
at Fortress Monroe, and under wiiich I had ex- 
pected to take ten thousand men from that i)oint 
to aid in our o;)erations. Tiicn, when under 
fire before the defences of Yorktown, we received 
the news of the withdrawal of General McDow- 
ell's corps of about 35,000 men. This com- 
pleted the overthrow of the original i^Ian of the 
caPiipaign. 

xlbout one tliird of my entire army (five divis- 
ions out of f lurteen, one of tin' nine remaining 
being but little larger than a brigade) was thus 
taken from me. Instead of a rapid advance 
which I had planned, aided by a flank movement 
up the York River, it was only left to besiege 
Yorktown. That siege was successfully con- 
ducted by tlie army, and when these strong 
works at length yielded to our approaches, the 
troops rushed forward to the sanguinary but suc- 
cessful battle of Williamsburg, and thus opened 
an almost unresisted advance to the banks of the 
Cliickahominy. Kichmond lay before them, sur- 
rounded with fortifications, and guarded by an ar- 
my larger tluin our own ; but tin- prospect did not 
shake ilie courage of the brave men who composed 
my command. Kelying still on tlie support 
wliich the vastness of our undertaking and the 
grand results depending on our success seemed 
to insure us, we pressed forward. The weather 
was stormy beyond jirecedent ; the deep soil of 
the Penin>ula was at times one vast morass ; the 
("hickahominy rose to a higher stage than had 
been known for years before. Pursuing the ad- 
vance, the crossings were seized, and the right 
wing extended to effect a junction with reinforce- 
ments now promised and earnestly desired, and 
upon the arrival of which the complete success 
of the campaign seemed clear. 

The brilliant battle of Hanover Court House 
was fougiit. which opened the way for the first 
corps, with the aid of which, had it come, we 
should then have gone into the enemy's capital. 
It never came. The bravest army could not do 
more, under such overwhelming disappointment, 
than the army of the Potomac then did. Fair 
Oaks attests their coui-age and endurance when 
they hurled back, again and again, the vastly 
superior masses of the enemy. But mortal men 
could not accomplish the miracles that seemed to 
have been expected of them. But one course 
was left — a flank march in the face of a powerful 
enemy to another .and better base — one of the 
most hazardous movements in war. The army 
of the Potomac, holding its own safety, and al- 
most the safety of our cause, in its hands, was 
equal to the occasion. The seven days are clas- 
sical in American history' ; those days in which 
the noble soldiers of the Union and Constitution 
fought an outnumbering enemy by day, and 
retreated from successive victories by night, 
through a week of battle, closing the terrible 
series of conflicts with the ever-memorable vic- 
tory of Malvern, where they drove back, beaten 
and shattered, the entire eastern army of the 
Confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a 



place of rest and a point for a new advance upon 
the capital from tlie banks of the .lames. Hich- 
mond was still within our gras]>. had the army 
of the Potomac been reinforced and jK'ruiittcd 
to advance. Hut counsels, which 1 cannot but 
think subsequent events proved unwise, pre- 
vailed in Washington, and we were ordered to 
al)andon the campaign. Never did soldiers i)et- 
ter deserve the tlianks of a nation than tlie army 
of the Potomac for the deeds of the Peninsular 
campaign, and although tjiat meed was withheld 
from them by the authoriliis, I nu\ persuaded 
they have received the applause of tiie American 
people. 

The army of the Potomac was recalled from 
within sight of Kichmond. and incorporated with 
the army of Virginia. The disap]iointments of 
the campaign on the Peninsida had not damped 
their ardor nor diminislicd their patriotism. 
They fought well, faithfully, gallantly, under 
General Pope; yet were compelled to fall back 
on Washington, defeated and almost demor- 
alized. 

_ The enemy, no longer occu]iied in guarding 
his own capital, poured his troops northward, 
entered Maryland, threatened Pennsylvania, and 
even Washington itself. Elated by his recent 
victories, and assured that our troops were dis- 
organized and dispirited, he Avas confident that 
the seat of war was now permanently transferred 
to the loyal States, and that his own exhausted 
soil was to be relieved from the liurden of sup- 
porting two hostile armies. But he did not un- 
derstand the spirit which animated the soldiers 
of the Union. I shall not, nor can I living, 
forget that when I was ordered to the command 
of the troops for the defence of the capital, the 
soldiers, with whom I had shared so nmch of 
the anxiety, and pain, and suffering of the war, 
had not lost their confidence in me as their com- 
mander. They sprang to my call with all their 
ancient vigor, discipline, and courage. I led 
them into Maryland. Fifteen days after they 
had fal'en hack defeated before Washington, they 
vanquished the enemy on the rugged height of 
South IMountain, pursued him to the hard-fought 
field of Antietam, and drove him, broken and 
disappointed, across the Potomac into Virginia. 

The army had need of rest. After the terrible 
experiences of battles and marches, with scarcely 
an interv^al of repose, which they had gone 
through from the time of leaving for the Penin- 
sula ; the return to Washington ; the defeat in 
Virginia; the victory at South Mountain, and 
again at Antietam, it was not surprising that they 
were in a large degree destitute of the absolute 
necessaries to efl'ective duty. Shoes were worn 
out ; blankets were lost ; clothing was in rags ; in 
short, the army was unfit for active service, 
and an interval for rest and equipment was 
necessary. When the slowly forwanUd supplies 
came to us I led the army across the river, 
renovated, refreshed, in good order and disci- 
pline, and followed the retreating foe to a position 
where I was confident of decisive victory, when, 
in the midst of the movement, wliile my advance 
guard was actually in ct>ntact with the enemy, I 
was removed from liie conimaml. 

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last 
campaign with this brave army was crowned 
with a victory which saved the nation from the 



152 



greatest peril it had then undergone. I have 
not accoinplished my pu-pose if, by this Report, 
the army of the Potomac is not phiced high on 
the roll of tlio historic armies of the world. Its 
deeds enmjhle the nation to wliich it belongs. 
Always ready for battle, always firm, steadfast, 
and trustwortliy, T never called on it in vain ; 
nor will tlie nation ever have cause to attribute 
its want of success, under myself, or under other 
commanders to any failure of patriotism or 
bravery in that noble body of American soldiers. 
No man can justly charge upon any portion of 
that army, from the commanding general to the 
private, any lack of devotion to the service of the 



United States Government, and to the cause of the 
Constitution and the Union. They have proved 
their feahy in much sorrow, sutl'ering, danger, 
and through the very shadow of death. Their 
comrades dead on all the fields where we fought 
have scarcely more claim to the honor of a 
nation's reverence than their survivors to the 
justice of a nation's gratitude. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient 
servant, 

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
Major- General United States Army. 
Brigadier-General L. Thomas, 

Adjutant- General United States Army. 



War Department, 
Adjutant-GcncraVs Office, Washington, December 22, 1863. 

I certify that the above is a true copy of the original Eeport on file in this office. 

E. D. TOWNSEND, 
Assistant Adjutant- General. 



READ AND DISTRIBUTE 



REPORT 



MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 



UPON THE 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY Of THE POTOMAC, 



ITS CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND, 

TROM JULY 26, 1861, TO NOVEMBER 7, 1B62. 

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.! 



Revrinted entifk 
Ke 



Chap. 
Shelf 



I 

(-* IVau to the House of 

0* I}«DEX, 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. , 



BOSTON: 

PUBLISHED AT THE OFFICE OF THE BOSTON COURIEK, 

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